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Abstract 
 
International trade has brought tremendous choice to consumers and expanded markets for 
producers. Cross-border exchange also brings import risks such as food contaminants and 
invasive species. Balancing legitimate concerns to protect health and the environment with 
avoiding protectionist use of risk-based measures is highly important to the integrity of the 
multilateral trading system. This research studies three aspects of the relation between domestic 
regulations and international trade.  
 
Firstly, this thesis provides evidence addressing an ongoing international policy debate. This 
thesis is the first to show that the 8,487 new risk-based regulations under the Sanitary 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and 4,745 regulations under Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement notified from 1996-2010 are driven in part by loss of tariff protection and country-
level environmental governance factors. Declining tariffs, however, do not make the 
implementation of “suspect” SPS (i.e. measures later subject to a trade concern) more likely. 
This suggests policymakers may be systematically choosing to work on products that have lost 
tariff protection, but not systemically putting in illegitimate, non-tariff barriers to compensate.  
 
Secondly, this thesis investigates the patterns of Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) raised against 
292 suspect SPS policies and 282 suspect TBT policies by members of the WTO from 1996-
2010. It was found that developing countries struggle to resolve concerns they raise against 
developed economies. From work on 79 plant health concerns, it was clear that countries raise 
STCs using science-based and economics-based arguments of illegitimacy.  
 
Lastly, SPS measures are implemented to reduce risks transmitted via trade, but the 
effectiveness of risk reduction depends as well on actions of supply chain actors before export. 
A case study on coffee pests and diseases from a survey of 119 growers and 89 traders in 
Uganda is presented to scrutinize the decision-making process of growers in a high pest/disease 
prevalence environment.   
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 Introduction 
 
The topic of Trade and Environment is wide research area. This PhD focuses on challenges 
that occur from import risks. The first half the work is devoted to study of regulations used to 
mitigate these risks before the border of the importing nation. The second half examines, via a 
case study in Uganda, how stakeholders respond to plant pests and diseases that have 
established behind the border. While the work is by nature interdisciplinary, this chapter 
introduces the overarching research area (section 1.1) with specific literature introduced at the 
beginning of each chapter. The aims and objectives of the thesis are in section 1.2, which is 
followed by a chapter-level overview in section 1.3 and the original contributions of the thesis 
(section 1.4). 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH AREA 
 
Around half of employment in developing countries is in the agricultural sector (Bussolo, De 
Hoyos & Medvedev, 2011), and for the least developed countries, around 75% of people are 
engaged in agriculture as their primary activity (Cheong, Jansen & Peters, 2013). While most 
food is produced for local consumption, export markets have become an increasing share of 
total agricultural output growing at 4% annually (by volume) from 1950-2010 compared to 2% 
annual growth for overall agricultural output (Cheong, Jansen & Peters, 2013).1 The growth in 
agricultural exports for developing countries though has primarily been to markets of other 
developing countries (Aksoy & Ng, 2010). Developed country markets are more difficult to 
penetrate due to quality and safety standards (Henson & Loader, 2001), which some evidence 
suggests can be overcome with technical assistance like that provided by the Standards and 
Trade Development Facility (STDF) (Henson, Masakure & Cranfield, 2011). However, 
agricultural trade policy is not an important topic just for developing countries. Several 
developed nations like Canada are major agricultural exporters; as a result, the agricultural 
sector generates significant revenue and jobs making it politically important. Other developed 
nations like South Korea and Japan depend tremendously on food and other agricultural 
                                                
1
 To be clear, while agricultural exports are becoming a more significant use of agricultural production, the 
share of agriculture as a percentage of global GDP (1/13th in 2005 vs. 1/10 in 1960) or global merchandise trade 
(9%  in 2005 vs. 22% in 1975) is actually declining (Anderson & Martin, 2005).  
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products imported into their market.2 As a result, agricultural trade policies are important for 
developed nations as well. 
 
The intersection of agriculture and trade policy is important, but fraught with complication. 
Agriculture both historically and currently is the most difficult sector of international trade to 
achieve policy consensus. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiation from 1986 to 
1995 was delayed due to the US and EU disagreeing over agricultural trade (Anderson & 
Martin, 2005). The current impasse of the 2001 Doha Round of trade agreements of the WTO 
largely results from disagreements on agricultural policy; in August 2014, the only sub-
agreement (the Bali agreement) to emerge from over a decade of mired Doha Round talks 
collapsed as well over agriculture issues (BBC News Business, 2014). The swing towards 
bilateral (and plurilateral) trade agreements and the tenuous state of the institutional legitimacy 
of the multilateral system in the 21st century is driven in part by challenges from agricultural 
trade policy.3 The main points of disagreement for the breakdown of the Bali agreement were 
about agricultural subsidies and stockpiles4, however, regulations meant to mitigate risks of 
invasive species and food contaminants have another set of policy challenges. These risk-based 
measures are particularly interesting because of the scientific and economic motivations for 
their use—and potential abuse.   
 
Import risks are defined here as potential hazards for the importing nation from taking a foreign 
product into a domestic market.5 International legal protections allow countries to protect 
against these risks. There are obvious reasons that make import requirements necessary. As 
one example of an import risk, invasive species cause immense economic damage to 
agricultural (and natural) land and the costs of control are often tremendous (Waage, Fraser, 
Mumford, et al., 2005). The widely cited study by Pimentel, Zuniga & Morrison (2005) 
                                               
2
 See Appendix A.11 for net agricultural exports by country in 2011 using data from FAOSTAT (2014). 
3
 This point is returned to at the end of the thesis (Chapter 8) in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
4
 The main holdout nation was India, refusing to back down from many of their agricultural support programs. 
Reading the modelling results of Bussolo, De Hoyos & Medvedev (2011) it is clear that South Asia would 
experience drastic increases in poverty due to the removal of agricultural distortions, while most other regions of 
the world would experience declines in poverty.  
5
 The other side of the trade equation are export risks. These are defined here as risks that arise to human, 
economic, and environmental capital for the exporter from resource use in a home market for consumption in a 
foreign nation. The literature here includes topics like the impacts of labelling (Staffin, 1996) (Loureiro & 
Lotade, 2005) and science of footprinting (e.g. water (Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2004), land (Würtenberger, 
Koellner & Binder, 2006), fertilizers (MacDonald, Bennett & Carpenter, 2012)). These are beyond the scope of 
the research and not discussed further.  
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estimated the cost of environmental damage, agricultural losses, and control of invasives at 
almost $120 billion USD per annum in the United States alone—the global figure is certainly 
higher. The growing need to study invasion events is recognized by many scientists.6 
 
In the international context of the World Trade Organization (WTO), regulations against import 
risks primarily fall under the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. WTO members have sovereignty to decide what they will 
allow and what they will not allow into their markets—subject to their commitments under 
these international agreements. It is difficult to regulate global trade in a way that minimizes 
environmental/health risk and maximizes the welfare benefits for both parties involved in the 
exchange. The best policies are never straightforward: (1) future environmental conditions are 
difficult to predict, (2) stakeholders have divergent values, and (3) interactions between species 
are complex (Schlaepfer, Sax & Olden, 2011).  
 
Given the scientific uncertainties and potential clash of stakeholder values, it is not surprising 
the difficulty policymakers face in legislating effective and non-controversial regulations on 
imported products to protect human, animal, and/or environmental health. Regulatory 
measures one country views as legitimate protection of their territory, another claims are unfair 
use of regulations to obfuscate economic motivations. Most of the economic argument centres 
on the political economy drivers to protect domestic industries (Kono, 2006), especially when 
the public supports aiding domestic agriculture (Jensen & Shin, 2014). However, illegitimate 
policies under the banner of risk mitigation can also be used with the intention to harm a rival’s 
market. At the end of July 2014, Russia was accused of using phytosanitary measures on apple 
imports from Ukraine (and threating wider EU fruit and vegetable bans) in a tit-for-tat response 
to embargos for Russia’s actions in destabilizing Ukraine (Devitt & Szary, 2014). The various 
uses (and potential abuses) make the study of risk mitigation measures on agricultural trade a 
complex, but interesting area. It is important as well. The recent analysis of the “leverage 
points” to achieve global food security by West, Gerber, Engstrom, et al. (2014) in Science 
shows the need to close yield gaps and produce crops in economically and environmentally 
optimal areas. Therefore, effective, fair, and safe agricultural trade regulations are needed to 
achieve a sustainable future for global food supplies while protecting nations from import risks.  
                                               
6
 See Simberloff, Martin, Genovesi, et al. (2012) for the most recent review of the literature. 
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1.2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
This thesis has two major aims: 
 
1. To investigate the use of risk-mitigation measures and the complications that have 
arisen from them in the WTO. 
2. To explore how people respond to pests and disease risk on their farms once 
sanitary or phytosanitary policy has failed to mitigate the harm before the border. 
 
To make progress towards the first aim there were five objectives: 
 
1. Synthesize the theoretical literature and empirical evidence for non-tariff barriers to 
trade compensating for lost tariff protection. 
2. Test claims of policy substitution for lost tariff protection with risk-based trade 
measures. 
3. Identify the conflicts that currently arise between countries on SPS and TBT 
measures as well as to distinguish the factors that give rise to dispute. 
4. Test claims of bias against developing countries in the resolution of trade concerns 
in the SPS system. 
5. Examine the motivations given by countries in the concerns they raise against others’ 
SPS policies. 
 
To develop the second aim there were seven objectives in a case study of Ugandan coffee: 
 
1. Conduct interviews with key stakeholders in the supply chain and a run a targeted 
household survey of coffee growers and traders.  
2. Assess the impact of certifications and cooperative institutional arrangements on 
coffee production and pest risk-reduction behaviours like weeding and pruning. 
3. Examine whether stakeholders at different levels of the supply chain agree on the 
risk of different pests and diseases of Robusta coffee.  
4. Determine the risk-aversion of growers and if risk-aversion has an impact on coffee 
plot decisions.  
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5. Elucidate the opinions of farmers and traders about fair prices for coffee and their 
ideal supply chain to see if that has an impact on coffee investment choices.  
6.  Use a novel market simulation game to elicit growers’ willingness to accept a 
stable priced contract for coffee. 
7. Examine other income-sources that coffee growers have and what factors influence 
some to abandon coffee production after heavy pest damage 
 
1.3. OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THESIS 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of SPS regulatory pathway for WTO members and the chapters that 
address issues in each area highlighted 
 
As shown conceptually in Figure 1, this PhD addresses topics at the country-level for SPS/TBT 
notifications and concerns in Chapters 2 through 4, and at the producer-level for SPS issues in 
a specific commodity-country case study in Chapters 5 to 7. The advantage of a case study in 
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a particular context is to highlight the consequences from inadequate SPS policy participation 
at the national level.  
 
As presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the regulatory setting of policies to mitigate import 
risks are meant to address the poor quality of some imported products, but can result in 
disagreements about the severity of measures required (e.g. ppb concentration levels to protect 
human health from mycotoxins). The risks at the border stem from the decisions of stakeholders 
within an exporting country’s supply chain. As shown in Chapters 5 to 7, a country that does 
not have rigorous SPS institutional structures is hurt both by the spread of pests and diseases 
within their production areas, as well as, the limited ability to negotiate compliance limits with 
importers. In the case study discussed (Uganda’s coffee production system), the lack of robust 
SPS policies led to low prices from quality issues and low production from yield losses as 
supply chain actors adapted to introduced pests. Producers’ and traders’ responses then shape 
how the country as a whole is perceived by their trading partners (see Figure 1). 
 
The thesis is presented in eight chapters; brief summaries of the contributions are given below:  
 
Chapter 2: Environmental Protection or Protectionism? 
Econometric methods are utilized to rigorously test questions of what determines countries’ 
use of SPS and TBT policy. The contributions of this chapter to the literature are twofold: (1) 
it is the first robust empirical test of the policy substitution argument for SPS and TBT use, and 
despite the persistence of the belief in the policy sphere, one of few empirical tests for NTM 
substitution after liberalisation. Secondly, (2) it empirically tests other important country-level 
drivers (e.g. environmental governance)—which have not previously been examined—to 
explain countries’ use of risk-based trade measures. 
 
Chapter 3: Patterns of Trade Concerns in SPS/TBT Use 
Econometric methods are used to test for tariff binding as a driver of SPS measures that are 
later questioned as illegitimate by other WTO members. Major assumptions on the 
concordance between SPS measures and Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) are made, however 
despite these limitations, this is the first empirical test of tariff binding constraints as a driver 
for issuing potentially illegitimate SPS policies. It also provides evidence against the 
suggestion in the literature that the use of SPS measures on obscure products are likely 
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illegitimate. Only one peer-reviewed work has utilized the STC data, hence another set of 
contributions are detailed summary statistics on the patterns of STC use.  
 
Chapter 4: STC Resolution and Plant Health Cases 
As the leader on analysis of GATT and WTO dispute, Bown (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005) 
shows rigorously that the development status of the country has an impact on (1) its ability to 
participate and (2) the outcome of the dispute. This chapter is the first to test this relationship 
for STC disputes in the SPS system. An additional contribution is to demonstrate a 
methodology on plant health concerns for categorizing the reason for raising the STC. 
 
Chapter 5: A Case Study of Responses to SPS Issues 
Survey data collected by the author on 119 farmers are compared to production data from two 
cooperatives (with over 4,000 growers combined) that collaborated in the research. Qualitative 
analysis of the challenges to cooperative coffee farming in Uganda are discussed. New data 
collected by the author at a workshop in Nkokonjeru of around 100 growers’ views about the 
coffee supply chain structure is presented. 
 
Chapter 6: Risk-aversion of Coffee Farmers and Traders 
Empirical contributions are made in three areas of risk-aversion of coffee growers in the case 
study regions of Uganda. (1) Coffee growers’ and traders’ risk aversion are measured using a 
classic Holt & Laury (2002) design based on Tanaka & Munro (2014). The chapter presents 
the first comparison of coffee growers to a large random sample of the Ugandan population 
from Tanaka & Munro (2014). (2) A pest survey developed by the author is used to understand 
the priority pests of Uganda Robusta coffee and the extent to which stakeholders at different 
levels of the supply chain communicate and agree on the risks of each. (3) A coffee market 
game developed by the author is piloted at the workshop in Nkokonjeru. The novel 
methodology, with future improvements, has wider potential for understanding farmers’ 
decision-making under uncertain market prices and crop investment opportunities.  
 
Chapter 7: Income Diversification and Decision-making 
Results from the survey of 119 coffee growers and 89 traders are used to examine the social 
networks of growers and who they consult when making decisions on pest treatment and 
investments on the coffee plot. A logistic model is created to predict the likelihood of 
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abandoning coffee production based on a farmer’s beliefs and characteristics of the household. 
Contributions to the empirical literature are made demonstrating the importance of growers’ 
views on fair price for their products and the number of social connections a grower consults 
for advice.  
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Work 
Conclusions are drawn at the end of each chapter, but some overarching points are briefly 
discussed. Future research, including some preliminary work that was not included in the PhD 
on risks present at the EU border, is discussed, and included in the Appendix (A.28).7  
 
1.4. EXTERNAL PRESENTATION OF WORK 
 
The work that became part of Chapter 2 began while the author was a Fulbright Scholar at the 
College of Business and Economics at The Australian National University and was advised by 
Dr. Emma Aisbett. An earlier version of just the SPS work was written in a working paper for 
the Crawford School of Public Policy.8 Earlier versions of the work with Dr. Emma Aisbett 
under the title “Environmental and Health Protections, or new Protectionism? Determinants of 
SPS Notifications by WTO Members” were accepted and presented by the author at three major 
international conferences:  
• Empirical Investigations in Trade and Investment (EITI), Keio University, Tokyo, 
Japan, 16 March, 2012.  
• International Conference on Econometrics, Operations Research and Statistics 
(ICEOS), Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus, 25th May, 
2012. 
• European Trade Study Group, KU Leuven, Brussels, Belgium, 15th September, 2012. 
 
The econometric estimation models that the author used in his PhD were substantially 
improved by Dr. Emma Aisbett in subsequent work. Our current paper together (not included 
                                               
7
 With permission from DG Sanco (see Appendix A.29), EU border notifications (over 20,000 in the past 
decade) of rejected imports were scraped using automated computer scripts coded by the author from two online 
websites maintained by the European Commission: the RASFF database for food products and RAPEX online 
websites for non-food products. 
8
 Crawford School Research Paper No. 12-13 
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in the PhD) is substantially different, with the addition of a political economy model of standard 
setting which incorporates producer loss aversion. As of this publication date, this paper has 
been submitted to a peer-reviewed international trade journal with the title “Trade liberalization 
and product standards for health and environmental protection”.  
 
The work of Chapter 3 on the patterns of trade concerns in the SPS agreement and the work on 
the causes of dispute for plant health concerns (Chapter 4) was presented at the American 
Phytopathological Society (APS) annual meeting in 2012. The reference is given below: 
• Pearson, L. (2012) “From Boom to Busted: Trade Concerns under the WTO’s SPS 
Agreement” Special Session ‘Right of the Boom: Deciding to Act, React, or Let Go 
in a Fluid Data Environment’ American Phytopathological Society (APS) annual 
meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, 8th August. 
 
Selected results from the fieldwork in Uganda (Chapter 5 to Chapter 7) were presented at a 
research booth of the Imperial Festival (May 9-10, 2014). Initial results from Chapter 7 were 
presented by the author and Mr. Ignitius Bwoogi at a lunchtime seminar in the Centre for 
Environmental Policy (CEP) on January 22nd, 2014.  
 
The author taught two lectures on trade and environment to MSc students of CEP at Imperial 
College in March of 2013 and 2014. As well, other presentations are listed below: 
• Pearson, L. (2013). “Trade Policy from a Sustainability Paradigm” Global 
Sustainability Institute (GSI) annual conference. Anglia Ruskin University, 
Cambridge, England, 14th May.  
• Pearson, L. (2012) “Achieving Sustainable Agriculture Trade in the Global Food 
System” Global Environmental Change and Human Security, 3rd international 
conference. North-South Research Center for Social Sciences (Morocco) and GIZ 
(Germany). Marrakesh, Morocco, 22-24th November.  
• Pearson, L. 2011. “Always use protection? SPS measures as green protectionism” 
poster presented at ETNA Summer School on Food Security – how can science and 
policy contribute. Lucerne, Switzerland, 10 September, 2011. 
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 Environmental Protection or Protectionism?  
 
Protecting the geographical borders and integrity of the country is one of the fundamental 
purposes of a sovereign state. No country wants to unnecessarily cause environment damage 
due to an invasive species, put its citizens at risk from a clearly dangerous product, or allow 
disease vectors freely into the country. Therefore, policy must exist in order to mitigate the 
risks that come from allowing commerce and travel across borders; this fact has long been 
recognized in the multilateral trade system through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
its predecessor the General Agreement on Trade and Treaties (GATT). Under the GATT, 
Article XX codified the exceptions to liberalisation rules when it came to reasons of 
environmental and human health protection. With the inception of the WTO in 1995, these 
exceptions have been codified into two agreements: the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement and a major update to the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.  
 
2.1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE SPS AND TBT AGREEMENTS 
 
The SPS agreement covers import regulations and standards dealing with food safety, animal 
health, and plant health. While they usually apply to agricultural products, they are not 
restricted just to these products. The agreement is meant to protect from risks that arise from 
the import of foreign products, ensuring that imported products meet the standards for domestic 
industries in areas like food safety. Countries are encouraged to follow international standards 
suggested by three international standard-setting organizations with different product focuses: 
the (1) FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission suggests international standards for food, 
the (2) International Animal Health Organization (OIE based in Paris) for animal health, and 
finally, the (3) FAO’s Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for 
plant health. These agencies existed long before the SPS agreement and were formed based on 
the need to codify standards in response to various outbreaks.9 Countries are free to differ from 
international standards to provide the level of protection they deem appropriate, but can only 
do so to protect against a scientifically justified risk. Countries are also obliged to implement 
                                                
9
 For instance, the OIE was formed in 1924 largely in response to rinderpest (cattle plague) establishing in 
Belgium while in transit from India to Brazil. See the OIE website for more of the history of the organization: 
http://www.oie.int/about-us/history/ 
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regulations in the least trade restrictive way possible and to avoid unjustified barriers to trade.10 
If countries follow international standards, they are very unlikely to be challenged. A good 
review covering the history of the SPS agreement can be found in Isaac (2004), and a thorough 
explanation of the application of the agreement is available via the SPS training module 
produced by the WTO (WTO, 2014).  
 
Complementing the SPS agreement is the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement. The 
TBT agreement was previously the Standards Code adopted at the end of the Tokyo Round of 
multilateral trade agreements in 1979. The agreement covered technical regulations, standards, 
and conformity assessment procedures. Technical regulations are any characteristic of the 
product—such as size and strength—as well as the packaging and labelling of a good.11 The 
Standards Code was further extended at the adoption of the TBT agreement in 1995 with the 
creation of the WTO. The extensions included coverage of processing and production methods, 
a wider conformity assessment provision, along with other changes. Technical standards are 
important for consumer information and ensuring that products meet the requirements for 
which the buyer intends them.  
 
Technical standards on products can form very effective barriers to trade if implemented for 
the purpose of protecting domestic producers (Beghin & Melatos, 2011; Schlueter, Wieck & 
Heckelei, 2009; Chen, Yang & Findlay, 2008; Swann, 2010). The purpose of the TBT 
Agreement is to make sure technical regulations and product standards (excluding those 
concerning health, which are covered by the SPS agreement) are not set arbitrarily. Differing 
from the SPS agreement, the TBT agreement suggests a code of practice that encourages 
industry groups to adopt sets of voluntary standards, which countries could recognize when 
assessing if a product should be permitted in the market. There are parallel institutional bodies 
for the TBT agreement like the SPS agreement, which meet to discuss transparency and issues 
that arise from implementation of the agreement. 
 
                                               
10
 The examination of SPS Specific Trade Concerns in Chapter 4 will examine in more detail the challenges that 
arise from countries disputing the legitimacy of SPS measures implemented by other WTO members. 
11
 See exact definitions on the WTO’s technical description of the TBT agreement:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm 
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2.2. DIFFICULTY OF PROTECTION 
 
Despite the recognized legitimate need for protection against risks that arise from the import 
pathway, difficulty comes in operationalizing the SPS and TBT agreements for a variety of 
reasons. There are two main strands of difficulty. The first (1) is the challenge of establishing 
scientific agreement on the risk protected against by a given measure with a high enough degree 
of certainty for consensus. To address this issue there has been an extensive research agenda 
centred on improved models of pest entry, establishment, and spread under various 
assumptions of landscape heterogeneity, human movement, and climate conditions.12 The 
second (2) major type of issue—and the focus of this research—is dealing with regulations 
created under the guise of biologically-based protection which obfuscate true economic 
motivations for protectionism. In relation to the WTO, the second issue is of prime importance 
as there is a growing recognition of the need to better understand domestic policy impacts on 
trade with the success of the institution in lowering tariff-based protectionism among members 
(WTO, 2012). 
 
On the economics side of the research work on SPS measures and other Non-Tariff Measures 
(NTM) generally, one of the most pervasive assumptions is that a major driver of the increased 
use of measures has been to substitute for the loss of tariff protection. The SPS Agreement 
Training Module available from the WTO expresses this claim quite succinctly: 
 
All governments accept the fact that trade restrictions may be necessary to ensure food safety 
and animal and plant health protection. However, governments are sometimes pressured to 
go beyond what is necessary for health protection and to use SPS measures to shield domestic 
producers from economic competition. Such pressure is likely to increase as other trade 
barriers are reduced as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. An SPS measure which is 
not actually required for health reasons can be a very effective protectionist device, and 
because of its technical complexity, a particularly deceptive and difficult barrier to challenge. 
(WTO, 2014) 
 
This belief that the decline of tariffs from trade agreements, like the Uruguay Round, lead to 
additional SPS measures is maintained commonly in the academic literature as well (discussed 
                                               
12
 See Waage & Mumford (2008) for an overview of biosecurity research related to SPS issues.  
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below). Despite the ubiquitous nature of this statement, there is a lack of rigorous empirical 
evidence to test it.  
 
SPS and TBT measures are particularly interesting because ostensibly their objectives of 
protecting human, plant and animal health are laudable and serve legitimate policy objectives. 
Concerns about protectionist abuse of SPS and TBT measures are common both in the 
academic literature (Runge, 1990; Mahé, 1997; Baldwin, McLaren & Panagariya, 2000; 
Charlier & Rainelli, 2002; Kastner & Pawsey, 2002a; Peterson & Orden, 2008; Gӧtz, Heckelei 
& Rudloff, 2010) and the broader media. Recent SPS controversies include: the market access 
implications of the EU limits on aflatoxin levels for African cereal and nut growers (Otsuki, 
Wilson & Sewadeh, 2001); the barriers to emerging economy exporters to US markets posed 
by drug residue standards (Tran, Wilson & Anders, 2012) and processing standards (Anders & 
Caswell, 2009) on seafood; the long-running contention between the US and the EU over 
scientific uncertainty both in the assessment of health risk from hormone-treated beef  (Charlier 
& Rainelli, 2002; Kastner & Pawsey, 2002b) and genetically modified foods (Hanrahan, 2010); 
and Australia's refusal from 1921 to 2012 to allow the import of apples from New Zealand due 
to the potential introduction of the contagious disease fire blight to its orchards.13  
 
2.3. OVERVIEW AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 
 
The goal of this chapter is not to measure the trade impact of SPS and TBT measures, but to 
analyse if the use of SPS/TBT measures has risen commensurate with the decline of tariffs. 
Recent analysis on the latest data through 2013 from the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), which collects data on SPS and TBT measures along with other 
NTMs noted:  
 
The presence of correlation between the use of NTMs and traditional forms of trade policy 
[i.e. tariffs]… may indicate that NTMs have been used, at least to some degree, as substitutes 
to tariffs in order to continue protecting key economic sectors in spite of tariff liberalisation 
of the last 10 years. (Nicita & Gourdon, 2013)  
 
                                               
13
 see Dispute 367 on WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm 
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This chapter builds upon very basic correlation tests like those conducted by those authors at 
UNCTAD to rigorously analyse relationships between domestic policy and tariff liberalisation 
for a subset of NTMs. Complementing previous approaches discussed in the literature review 
(section 2.4 below), the research in this chapter examines evidence of protectionist intent by 
connecting the decline in bound tariffs on a product with the issuance of new SPS and TBT 
regulations on that same product. The two basic research questions driving the analysis are: 
 
1. Does the loss of tariff protection lead to compensating use of SPS and TBT policy? 
2. What are the other determinants of SPS/TBT policy changes? 
 
Analysis is conducted in both a cross-section14 for total notifications from countries on products 
in the 15-year sample period (1996 to 2010) and several time-series15 specifications for 
country-product-year observations. Beyond the main examination of the bound tariff as a 
determinant of notifications, the role of other trade variables—exports, imports, exchange rate 
and current account deficits—are also examined in determining the probability of new/changed 
SPS or TBT regulations.  
 
In contrast to the previous literature (section 2.4), serious consideration to other potential 
drivers of SPS measures is given. Knowing that health and environmental quality are normal 
goods16, their proliferation may be related to rising incomes and demographic changes. The 
research setup of both the cross-section and the time-series models control for population and 
income levels and changes. In the cross-section, the regressions also analyse the relationship 
between SPS/TBT notifications and measures of domestic environmental and health 
governance. 
 
The various sources of all the data on SPS/TBT policy, economic factors, and demographic 
factors are described in the Data and Variables section (2.5, page 38). Some summary 
information and trends in SPS/TBT use, which motivate the modelling, are presented in section 
2.6. The theoretical predictions on how these variables are expected to influence the regression 
models are discussed in the respective model setup sections. The predictions for the cross-
                                               
14
 Cross-section methodology and predictions are in section 2.7, and the results of regressions are in section 2.8 
15
 Time-series methodology and predictions are discussed in section 2.9 and the results are found in section 2.10 
16
 Meaning that the demand for the good increases (decreases) with the rise (fall) of income 
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section are discussed in section 2.6 and the time-series expectations are discussed in section 
2.9. Section 2.11 discusses future research and concludes.  
 
2.4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Through successive rounds of trade negotiations, bound tariffs have fallen and limitations have 
been placed on traditional trade barriers among WTO members. From very early in the 
evolution of the GATT, however, there have been concerns that negotiated reductions in tariffs 
may lead to a rise in NTMs that serve as barriers to trade (Wilson, 1969).17 
 
2.4.1. NTM concerns from Tokyo to Uruguay Round 
Page (1987) reviews much of the early work on measuring NTMs following the Tokyo Round 
of GATT negotiations which concluded in 1980, as well as general trends in protection (tariff 
and non-tariff) from 1960s to 1980s (Page, 1987). Similarly, Green (1981) writes of the “new 
protectionism” of the 1980s with the use of “fair trade” (defined in his study as countervailing 
duties and anti-dumping laws), “orderly marketing”, and “voluntary restraints”. Laird & Yeats 
(1990) look at the growth of NTBs17 comparing 1966 to 1986 using NTB frequency indices. 
They found significant increases in NTB frequency ratios for the major economies of the 
developed world. Food products had the highest increase (53% greater). Overall coverage rose 
from 5% in 1966 to 51% in 1986. They conclude “while a major effort was made in multilateral 
trade negotiations to reduce tariffs, protectionism in the form of NTBs greatly expanded, and 
may have even offset or exceeded the effects of liberalized import duties” (Laird & Yeats, 
1990). This concern led to the inclusion of agreements intended to curtail non-tariff 
protectionism in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
 
Although the NTB concerns in the early years of GATT were predominately centred on quotas 
and voluntary export restraints (VERs), today technical standards and anti-dumping (AD) 
measures are of increasing importance. For example, in the 2012 WTO World Trade Report 
both Pascal Lamy, director WTO, and Patrick Low, WTO Chief Economist, highlighted the 
critical importance of better understanding the drivers and impacts of domestic environmental 
                                               
17
 NTMs are also called Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) in the literature when they are clear “barriers” to trade and 
not just policy measures that have the potential to affect trade patterns.  
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and health policies—such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures—on international 
trade (WTO, 2012). In the policy arena and grey literature, these environmental/health 
measures are often framed as “protectionism in disguise” or green protectionism (Wilson, 
2010). 
 
2.4.2. The political economy of protectionism 
The incentives for governments to raise NTMs in response to negotiated decreases in bound 
tariffs have been illustrated in numerous political economy models. Some refer to the political 
advantages of NTMs' complexity and/or financial benefits from lobbying contributions (Yu, 
2000; Kono, 2006), while others focus on specific substitution of one type of NTM for another 
(Rosendorff, 1996). Mansfield & Busch (1995) have an extensive discussion of the various 
incentive structures that have been modelled. The intuition of all these models is that trade 
agreements lower the rate of protection, but do not reduce the underlying domestic political 
economy pressure for protectionism. Bhagwati (1988) labelled this phenomenon the “Law of 
Constant Protection”. 
 
2.4.3. Empirical studies 
In contrast to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature is relatively undeveloped in 
testing the relation between liberalisation and countries' NTM use. Earlier studies looked only 
over a few years and used broad NTB coverage ratios (Laird & Yeats, 1990). The connection 
at a more detailed level on specific NTMs has been investigated almost solely for AD measures 
(Moore & Zanardi, 2011; Vandenbussche & Zanardi, 2010; Anderson & Schmitt, 2003a). 
Feinberg & Reynolds (2007) for example, find that tariff reductions increased the likelihood 
and the number of AD petitions. However, the correlation found in this and similar studies have 
generally been between levels of tariffs and changes in NTBs. The current chapter attempts to 
test the relationship between NTMs and tariffs in properly specified time-series models. 
 
A growing number of studies seek to quantify the trade impacts of SPS. Chen, Yang & Findlay 
(2008) find a trade depressing effect from food safety standards can be more significant than 
that of import tariffs. A survey of developing country exporters also found that SPS measures 
are thought to form some of the strongest barriers to trade (Henson & Loader, 2001). Other 
studies of SPS measures focus on developing techniques to find tariff equivalents (J.C. & 
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Bureau, 2001; Maskus, Wilson & Otsuki, 2000). These methods have been applied mainly in 
studies of specific countries and/or specific products to capture the trade effects of SPS 
measures, usually using product-line SPS coverage ratios in a gravity model setup. These 
studies also tend to conclude that SPS regulations have a trade depressing effect (Calvin, 
Krissoff & Foster, 2008; Liu & Yue, 2009; Otsuki, Wilson & Sewadeh, 2001; Chen, Yang & 
Findlay, 2008; Jongwanich, 2009). While these findings are important, they do not address the 
issue of protectionism per se. Though reduced trade is a protectionist effect, it does not 
necessarily imply protectionist intent. 
 
Protectionism has been variously defined throughout the literature with regards to NTBs. Broad 
definitions such as Walter (1971) define any measure which impacts the direction, 
composition, or volume of trade as a protectionist barrier. Others have taken a narrower view 
and considered the data from trade concerns: when there is a high ratio of trade concerns to 
new trade policy notifications at the product level, this could indicate protectionist intent by a 
country (Disdier & van Tongeren, 2010). Disdier, Fontagné & Mimouni (2008) look for 
protectionism in the frequency of standards on products across countries; when only a few 
countries have issued a regulation on a specific Harmonized System (HS) 18 code, the regulation 
may be potentially protectionist. In the following analysis, the relationship with the bound tariff 
will be used as evidence of a potentially protectionist bias to SPS/TBT policy changes.  
 
2.5. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
The main set of data comes from SPS and TBT notifications of WTO member states. The 
empirical analyses utilize panel data of all countries (98) that have reported SPS notifications 
(Regular and Emergency) in 69 product types (at 2-digit, chapter level HS codes) to the WTO 
over the period from 1996 to 2010. For the TBT system, the empirical analysis utilizes a panel 
data set of the 68 countries that have notified Regular TBT measures on 95 different HS-2 lines 
                                               
18
 HS refers to the Harmonized System or less commonly, the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System. All internationally traded codes are coded with standardized descriptions and codes that express 
increasing levels of disaggregation with more digits. As an example: “live animals” is the chapter description at 
the 2-digit level for HS01. At the 4-digit level, HS0102 is the section code for “live bovine animals”. At the 6-
digit level HS010210 is “Pure-bred breeding bovines”. HS classification goes to 8-10 digits depending on the 
country, but 8-digits is the standard for tariff-line level classification. See further description on the World 
Customs Organization website:  
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/instrument-and-tools/hs_convention.aspx 
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of products during the same period. The data on notifications from each country per product, 
per year were then merged with relevant economic factors, environmental metrics, and 
governance controls to form a panel.  
 
The European Union (EU) created a dilemma. The EU reports some SPS/TBT notifications as 
community-wide policy, but also individual members are able to report new SPS/TBT policy 
as well. Two versions of the databases were created. One is an EU aggregate where EU 
notifications and member states notifications are compiled into a large, aggregate EU “country” 
(the methodology used by Fontagné, Mimouni & Pasteels (2005)). The second applies EU-
wide notifications to each member state and drops the EU as an independent “country” in the 
data set. This disaggregated version will account for intra-EU trade and slight differences 
between the standards in each country. Results are reported for the EU-disaggregated version 
of the TBT/SPS data set unless otherwise specified. 
 
The data for all analysis comes from a variety of common sources in the economics literature 
as well as some less-common sources for the environmental and SPS notification components. 
The sources are explained in the following sections (2.5.1 to 2.5.3). Summary statistics for all 
of the variables are reported in Table 63 in Appendix A.1 for SPS measures and in Appendix 
A.2, Table 64 for TBT measures.  
 
2.5.1. SPS and TBT notifications 
Each WTO member is required to have both a National Notification Authority and an official 
Enquiry Point for SPS regulations. A parallel body is required for TBT notifications that can 
be the same agency, which is often the case for developing countries. The transparency sections 
of the SPS and TBT agreements require that all WTO members report new or changed 
SPS/TBT measures to the WTO when the standard is different from international standards and 
will have a significant impact on trade. To increase transparency, these notifications are 
compiled by the WTO and available through the SPS Information Management System (SPS-
IMS)19 and TBT Information Management System (TBT-IMS)20. For both the SPS and the 
TBT agreement, member countries report both “Regular” notifications that reflect new or 
                                               
19
  http://spsims.wto.org 
20
  http://tbtims.wto.org/ 
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changed permanent regulatory measures. Only for the SPS agreement, members report 
“Emergency” measures that should be temporary restrictions either due to an outbreak event 
or while gathering evidence to make a Regular notification.  
 
Although these online databases represent a significant improvement in the compilation of SPS 
and TBT data, there is still likely to be some under-reporting by countries. For instance for the 
SPS system, not all WTO members have appointed a National Notification Authority and some 
have not issued any SPS notifications in the 1996 to 2010 period. Specifically, by 2010, there 
were 153 WTO members, yet only 64% notified at least one SPS notification and only 44% 
notified at least one TBT measure from 1996 to 2010.  
 
The other major limitation of the SPS/TBT-IMS data is that most members do not report the 
specific products (i.e. by HS 4-digit or 6-digit codes) it applies to. For many SPS notifications, 
the product the measure affects is only given at the HS 2-digit level of detail by the notifying 
country. Given these data constraints, defining products at the HS 2-digit level was used in this 
analysis, as it was the most disaggregated level possible, while still utilizing the vast majority 
of observations from the database.21 The full summary table of total TBT and SPS notifications 
by HS-2 code in the entire sample from 1996 to 2010 can be found in the Appendix (A.3 on 
page 348).  
 
Given that the research question is on the drivers of reporting an SPS measure, the sample 
needs to include all country-HS-year observations where it was possible to report a changed 
regulation. As a result, an HS-2 code was included for all countries in the analysis if at least 
one country notified at least one SPS/TBT measure in the sample period. The database then 
includes observations for every combination of 98 countries and 69 HS codes over the period 
of 1996 to 2010. Notifications are then set to be zero if there are no reported SPS/TBT 
regulations for that country-HS-year observation. Both SPS and TBT notification data are then 
merged with other economic data as described below.  
 
                                               
21
 For example, in the SPS-IMS database there are around 2,000 notifications without HS categorization from 
1996 to 2010 that will not be analysed in this work. 
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2.5.2. Trade and economic variables 
Tariff data (reported for AHS/Applied, BND/Bound, and MFN/Most Favoured Nation rates) 
at the HS 2-digit level were downloaded from UN TRAINS via the World Integrated Trade 
System (WITS)22 for all countries for the years 1996 to 2010 (World Bank, 2011). Both the 
trade-weighted average tariff and the simple average tariff were acquired. The trade-weighted 
average tariff accounts for the fact that many products that are not traded have extremely high 
tariffs and therefore artificially inflate the simple average tariffs for a country. Therefore, this 
trade-weighted tariff better reflects the tariffs observed by exporters looking to enter that 
market than the simple average tariff. 
 
Tariff binding overhang (BO) was calculated by taking the difference between the bound and 
applied tariff for each country-HS-year observation. Bound tariffs are agreed by countries on 
various products to stipulate the maximum tariff the importing nation can levy on imports from 
any WTO member. The applied tariff is allowed to vary at will by the country and, as long as 
the tariff remains below the bound tariff rate, the country is complying with its international 
obligations. The tariff BO is then a measure of the flexibility a country has to raise the applied 
tariff up towards the bound rate. When the BO is large, a country has great flexibility to raise 
the applied rate to achieve trade policy objectives. When the applied rate approaches the bound 
rate and the BO is quite small, the country does not have much flexibility to raise tariffs without 
potentially violating WTO obligations. Summary trends between BO rate and SPS/TBT 
notification is presented in section 2.6.1 starting on page 46. 
 
Trade data for imports and exports were downloaded from UN COMTRADE for each country 
as a reporter and the world as the partner (UN COMTRADE, 2012). Nominal values from the 
database were converted to constant (year 2000) baseline US dollars to match World Bank 
(WB) data. This was calculated based on the suggested method from WB.23 Macro-economic 
indicators (GDP per capita, Current Account, and Exchange Rate) were taken from World Bank 
(2012) World Development Indicators (WDI). The same data for Taiwan was acquired from 
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IMF, 2012). 
Conversions to constant year 2000 US dollars to match WB data were calculated as above.23 
                                               
22
 More information about the relationship between the UN TRAINS and World Bank’s WITS databases is 
explained on the UN website: http://www.unctad.info/en/Trade-Analysis-Branch/Key-Areas/TRAINSWITS/ 
23
 WB method for conversion to constant USD found at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/faq/specific-data-series 
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2.5.3. Governance, environment and demographic variables 
The most widely used source of environmental metrics and governance data comes from a joint 
project of Yale University and Columbia University through the Environmental Performance 
Index (EPI) (Emerson, Esty, Levy, et al., 2010) and their previous work on the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) (Esty, Levy, Srebotnjak, et al., 2005).24 These indexes have been 
widely used in the environmental economics and policy literature (Whitford & Wong, 2009; 
Mukherjee & Chakraborty, 2010; Morse & Fraser, 2005; Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007). 
Each index produces an overall score for each country based on many metrics and sub-metrics. 
From the ESI, data was missing for 13 member countries who reported 686 Regular SPS 
notifications in the sample and 10 members who reported 131 TBT notifications. From the EPI, 
data was missing for three members (Taiwan, Macao, and Hong Kong) who only reported 119 
Regular SPS notifications and three members (Taiwan, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and 
Hong Kong) that reported 123 TBT notifications. 
 
The EPI score has two components: “environmental health” and “ecosystem”. The metric of 
environmental health as a whole and then relevant components of the ecosystem metric were 
used in the cross-section analysis (see Governance and Environment in section 2.7.3).25 
 
Population for each WTO member as well as the portion of the population that is above age 65 
was taken from the World Population Prospects 2010 revision provided by the UN Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Population Division (UN DESA, 2010). Governance 
indicators on Regulatory Quality are taken from World Bank (2010).26 Data were missing for 
the years 1997, 1999, and 2001 and were linearly interpolated from adjacent years to fill in the 
missing values. Annual data for level of democracy was taken from the Polity IV project 
(Marshall & Gurr, 2011). The polity2 measure is widely used in the literature to analyse the 
impact of democracy and autocracy on environmental performance.27 Data is available for most 
countries, but seven members were missing (accounting for 107 total SPS notifications). 
 
                                               
24
 The current EPI: <http://epi.yale.edu/> ; the 2005 (last year conducted) ESI: <http://www.yale.edu/esi/> 
25
 The “ecosystem” component contained sub-metrics such as climate change that were not used as there was no 
clear relation a priori expected from these metrics. The sub-components used from the ecosystem metric were 
measures of agricultural pesticide regulation and biodiversity protection. 
26
 The data release of September 2010. 
27
 A selection of recent articles includes: (Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010; Farzin & Bond, 
2006; Neumayer, 2002; Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007; Li & Reuveny, 2006; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006) 
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In the EU-aggregated version of the dataset, the above indicators were created for the block by 
taking a simple average of the data for all 27 EU members. A simple average was used for all 
metrics for the EU-aggregate dataset for simplicity and to avoid unfairly weighting certain 
outcomes. For some of the metrics like polity2, a population-weighted average may have been 
more logical. For others like environmental health, a land-area-weighted metric might be the 
most valuable. For regulatory quality, perhaps a GDP-weighted metric would be most valid. 
While all different weighting schemes could be defended, a simple average is the easiest 
method without choosing what factor to prefer for weighting. The EU-aggregate version of the 
data is primarily used for robustness checking in section 2.10.2. 
 
2.6. TRENDS IN SPS AND TBT NOTIFICATIONS 
 
The top ten product categories on which SPS and TBT measures are applied are examined 
below. Table 1 contains the number of Emergency SPS and Regular SPS notifications for the 
top ten most notified products globally. In total, there are 8,487 SPS notifications in all HS 
categories from 1996 to 2010, but the number of notifications is heavily skewed towards a few 
product types. Meat and live animals (HS02 and HS01, respectively) account for nearly one 
third of all notifications (termed “Both” in the table) and well over half of the SPS Emergency 
notifications to the SPS secretariat in the sample period. The top ten HS codes account for over 
75% of the total number of either type of SPS notification. SPS notifications are almost 
exclusively in agricultural products (as defined by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture), 
though the SPS agreement is not legally limited to these products.28 
 
                                               
28
 Agriculture Products are defined by Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO, which defines HS 
codes 1-24 excluding fish and fish products (HS03) as agriculture. In addition, certain specific 4-6 digit codes 
from other chapters are considered agricultural products as well. In this analysis, only the 2-digit agricultural 
products were considered. Further details on the Agreement on Agriculture can be found on the WTO website:  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_02_e.htm#annI 
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Table 1: Top 10 HS-2 codes with the most SPS notifications (1996 to 2010) 
HS 
Code Description 
Agri. 
Prod. Reg. Emer. Both 
2 Meat and edible meat offal Yes 712 699 1,411 
1 Live animals Yes 678 686 1,364 
4 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey Yes 520 369 889 
5 Products of animal origin, NES29 Yes 255 290 545 
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melon Yes 501 41 542 
23 Residues & waste from the food industry Yes 240 205 445 
7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers Yes 328 37 365 
12 Oil seed, oleaginous fruits; misc. grain, seed Yes 299 9 308 
6 Live tree & other plant; bulb, root; cut  flowers Yes 271 26 297 
3 Fish & crustacean, mollusc & other aquatic invert.  272 24 296 
 TOP TEN TOTAL  4,076 2,386 6,462 
 ALL TOTAL  5,928 2,559 8,487 
 
Table 2: Top 10 HS-2 codes with the most TBT notifications from 1996 to 2010 
HS 
Code Description 
Agri. 
Prod. Reg. %  Total 
85 Electrical, electronic equipment  595 12.5% 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech  appliance;  446 9.4% 
87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway  375 7.9% 
73 Articles of iron or steel.  167 3.5% 
90 Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus  151 3.2% 
27 Mineral fuels, oils & product of their distil.  134 2.8% 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. Yes 122 2.6% 
39 Plastics and articles thereof.  119 2.5% 
4 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey Yes 113 2.4% 
30 Pharmaceutical products.  107 2.3% 
 TOP TEN TOTAL  2,329 49.1% 
 ALL TOTAL  4,745 100.0% 
 
The summary of total TBT notifications by HS-2 code from 1996 to 2010 is shown in Table 2. 
Unlike SPS, the majority of notifications concern non-agricultural products. The notifications 
are also less skewed than SPS. The top ten products (HS-2 codes) account for just under half 
of the total number of notifications, but the top two categories (HS85 and HS84) still account 
for around 22% of all notifications. The top categories unsurprisingly correspond to products 
                                               
29
 NES – not elsewhere specified (i.e. animal products not included in HS 01, HS 02, etc.) 
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that are used in industries with needs for rigid technical specifications (e.g. products of 
iron/steel in the construction industry) and safety requirements (e.g. nuclear reactors in the 
power industry and electronic equipment in the healthcare sector).  
 
SPS use by country is presented in Table 3. Several developing countries are in the top ten 
users of SPS notifications (e.g. Peru accounting for 5.6% of all SPS notifications and 
Philippines accounting for 14% of all Emergency SPS notifications). Some countries use 
almost exclusively Regular SPS notifications (e.g. Japan), others nearly exclusively 
Emergency (e.g. Albania), others more balanced (e.g. European Union).30 It might be 
interesting to explore the various political economy factors across countries that account for 
the divergent patterns of use between the two notification types, however, this is not explored 
at present.  
 
Table 3: Top 10 countries with the most SPS notifications from 1996-2010 
Country Regular 
%  
All Reg. Emergency 
%  
All Emer. Both 
%  
All Both 
European Union 771 13.01% 311 12.15% 1,082 12.75% 
Japan 530 8.94% 23 0.90% 553 6.52% 
United States 446 7.52% 92 3.60% 538 6.34% 
Peru 329 5.55% 149 5.82% 478 5.63% 
Philippines 114 1.92% 362 14.15% 476 5.61% 
Brazil 396 6.68% 12 0.47% 408 4.81% 
Albania 13 0.22% 380 14.85% 393 4.63% 
New Zealand 274 4.62% 86 3.36% 360 4.24% 
China 286 4.82% 36 1.41% 322 3.79% 
Chile 261 4.40% 35 1.37% 296 3.49% 
TOP TEN TOTAL 3,420 57.69% 1,486 58.07% 4,906 57.81% 
 
The top ten countries for TBT notifications are given in Table 4 below. The top ten countries 
have submitted a larger portion of the total number of TBT notifications than the parallel result 
for SPS policy (i.e. 72% of total TBT notifications vs. 58% for total SPS notifications). 
Additionally, only four of the top ten countries using TBT notifications are developed nations; 
many developing or newly industrialized countries including two from Africa (i.e. Kenya and 
South Africa) are in the top ten TBT users. 
                                               
30
 The econometrics analysis in the cross-section (section 2.8) and time-series (section 2.10) tests the robustness 
of the results to using either regular notifications or both types of notifications as the metric for the use of SPS 
policy. 
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Table 4: Top 10 countries with the most TBT notifications from 1996-2010 
Country Regular % Total 
USA 650 13.70% 
Israel 587 12.37% 
China  505 10.64% 
Thailand 389 8.20% 
Japan 376 7.92% 
Brazil 281 5.92% 
South Africa 205 4.32% 
Kenya 176 3.71% 
European Union 129 2.72% 
El Salvador 120 2.53% 
TOP 10 TOTAL 3,418  72.03% 
 
2.6.1. SPS/TBT notifications and bound tariffs 
The trend between the increased use of SPS and TBT notifications with falling bound tariffs is 
shown in Figure 2. In panel (a), the total number of SPS notifications from every country are 
plotted in the columns by year, while the median bound tariff across all products31 for all 
countries in the data set is plotted in the line. Similarly, for TBT measures, the information is 
plotted in panel (b). At this aggregated level in Figure 2, few definitive conclusions can be 
made. The transparency reporting system for the SPS and TBT agreement only started in 1995 
and one would expect use to increase as countries became more familiar with the system. While 
there appears to be a correlation, it by no means suggests causality. This figure cannot show if 
on specific products, declines on tariffs were concurrent or related to issuing of new SPS or 
TBT measures.  
 
Figure 3 makes the relation more clear. The sum of SPS and TBT notifications for every 
country along with their mean tariff BO are calculated. This dataset is then divided up into four 
groups of countries based on the flexibility of the tariff BO. These categories were decided by 
the percentile on the applied trade-weighted binding overhang tariff. The smallest category of 
tariff BO has countries with below 25th percentile tariff BO, while the large BO category 
contains countries with above 75th percentile tariff BO. The group of countries that had the 
                                               
31
 “All products” refers to the 69 HS codes where there was at least one SPS notification from 1996 to 2010 by 
any WTO member. If there was never an SPS notification, tariff data on that HS-line is not included.  
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smallest (<25th percentile) mean tariff BO, notify many more SPS notifications than the group 
of countries with among the highest average tariff BOs. The TBT system had more outliers, 
but it also appears that countries with tighter tariff binding across all their products notify more 
TBT measures.  
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 2: Trend between median bound tariff levels and (a) annual global SPS notifications, (b) annual 
global TBT notifications 
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Note: no countries had a mean BO between median (p50) and 75th percentile (p75) 
(a) 
 
Note: no countries had a mean BO between median (p50) and 75th percentile (p75) 
(b) 
Figure 3: Notifications of (a) Regular SPS and (b) TBT measures by category of percentile median BO at 
the country level 
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In Table 5 below, the differences between the small BO category and the large BO category 
from Figure 3 are confirmed using both a two-sample T-test32 and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
(i.e. Mann-Whitney two sample test statistic) since a Shapiro-Wilk W-test suggested the data 
was non-normal for the majority of the notification types (Wilcoxon, 1945). The T-test results 
are still reported. For both SPS and TBT measures, the results show that countries in the bottom 
quartile of BO—and thus most restricted in raising applied tariffs—notify significantly more 
measures than countries in the top quartile of BO that are free to raise applied tariffs.  
 
Table 5: Tests of means difference for SPS and TBT country-level notification rates comparing smallest 
(<p25) and largest (>p75) percentile tariff binding overhang categories 
 
(mean)  
Notifications / Country  Results 
 
Significance 
 Small BO Large BO  T-test Wilcoxon  T-test Wilcoxon 
TBT Regular 124 ± 37 (n=21) 
36 ± 11 
(n=21)  
t=2.2902 
p=0.0314 
z=3.138 
p=0.0017  ** *** 
SPS Regular 344 ± 49 (n=24) 
77 ± 31 
(n=24)  
t=4.6312 
p<0.0000 
z=3.581 
p=0.0003  *** *** 
SPS Emergency 69 ± 15 (n=24) 
23 ± 7 
(n=24)  
t=2.7862 
p=0.0077 
z=3.235 
p=0.0012  *** *** 
SPS Both 413 ± 52 (n=24) 
100 ± 36 
(n=24)  
t=4.9452 
p<0.0000 
z=3.764 
p=0.0002  *** *** 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The implication of Figure 3 and Table 5 is that SPS and TBT notification increases with 
declining ability to raise tariffs due to binding constraints. However, this could be driven by 
many other country-level factors that conflate with SPS/TBT policy use. A country's GDP is 
one example since, in general, developing countries have larger BO than developed countries 
and also likely lack institutional capacity to fully utilize the SPS/TBT notification system. The 
subsequent analysis controls for these factors and other sources of heterogeneity, however, 
these simplistic figures may demonstrate the source of the persistent perception of “green 
protectionism” in the political arena for the use of these risk-based trade measures (Costinot, 
2008; Yu, 1994; Campbell & Coombes, 1999). 
                                               
32
 Levene’s test rejected the hypothesis of equal variances for the BO groups for TBT notifications, regular SPS, 
and both SPS, but equal variances could not be rejected for SPS Emergency notifications comparison.  
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2.6.2. SPS/TBT notifications and environmental governance 
From the ESI data, the component “environmental governance” was used which measures each 
countries' institutional strength in environmental regulatory capacity.33 The general trends 
between environmental governance and SPS/TBT notifications are shown below in Figure 4. 
Countries are grouped in four categories (analogous to Figure 3) based on the percentile of 
their environmental governance score. For SPS measures, low (below 25th percentile) 
environmental performance was a score of -0.175, median was 0.07, and high (above 75th 
percentile) was above 0.76.34 For TBT measures, the low threshold environmental governance 
score was -0.18 (25th percentile), median was 0.19, and the high was 0.78 (75th percentile).  
 
As might be expected for SPS policy used for legitimate purposes, the general trend emerges 
that countries with stronger environmental governance tend to issue more SPS notifications 
(see Table 6). Mean notification rates per country were tested using both a two-sample T-test35 
and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, since a Shapiro-Wilk W-test suggested the data was very non-
normal for all notification types. Given the lack of data coverage for the environmental 
governance score, several groups had a smaller sample size (around n=20). The T-test results 
are reported for completeness, but may not be reliable given the smaller sample size and non-
normality of the notification data. The rank-sum test confirms for all types of notifications that 
the typical country in the high environmental governance group is a more active user of TBT 
and SPS policy than the typical country from the low environmental governance group.  
 
                                               
33
 See section 2.5.3 for sources of environmental governance data. 
34
 See Esty, Levy, Srebotnjak, et al. (2005) for methodology of the scores calculation. 
35
 Levene’s test rejected they hypothesis of equal variances for the Environmental Governance groups for 
Regular SPS and Both SPS, but equal variances could not be rejected and were used for SPS Emergency 
notifications as well as TBT notifications comparisons.  
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 4: Notifications of (a) Regular SPS and (b) TBT measures by percentile environmental governance 
score for the country 
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Table 6: Tests of means difference for SPS and TBT country-level notification rates comparing lowest 
(<p25) and highest (>p75) percentile environmental governance score categories 
 
(mean)  
Notifications / Country  Results 
 
Significance 
 Low Env. High Env.  T-test Wilcoxon  T-test Wilcoxon 
TBT Regular  53 ± 27 (n=19)  
102 ± 37 
(n=18)  
t= -1.0666 
p=0.2935 
z= -3.151 
p=0.0016   *** 
SPS Regular  34 ± 14 (n=21)  
359 ± 51 
(n=20)   
t= -6.1976 
p<0.0000 
z= -4.046 
p=0.0001  *** *** 
SPS Emergency 34 ± 18 (n=21) 
54 ± 7 
(n=20)  
t= - 0.995 
p=0.3259 
z= -3.241 
p= 0.0012   *** 
SPS Both  68 ± 23 (n=21)   
413 ± 56  
(n=20)  
t= -5.8906 
p<0.0000 
z= -4.057 
p< 0.0000  *** *** 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
2.7. CROSS-SECTION SETUP 
 
Due to the lack of international time-series data for environmental governance and performance 
data, a cross-sectional investigation was conducted first to investigate the impact of these 
variables. SPS and TBT protections may be motivated by a combination of “protectionist” and 
“protective” desires on behalf of governments. “Protectionist” motivations would be related to 
protecting domestic producer interests in terms of raising the price of imports, or the 
government’s interest in improving the terms of trade and keeping a positive current account 
(see variables described in section 2.5.2). “Protective” motivations would be related to 
responding to consumers and the environmental lobby desiring more stringent and effective 
environmental policy (see variables described in section 2.5.3).36 Thus, explanatory variables 
in the cross-sectional analysis combine variables commonly used in the empirical literature on 
trade protectionism with those commonly used in empirical studies of environmental policy. 
The following sections briefly discuss each of the variables and their predicted relationship to 
both SPS and TBT notifications. 
                                               
36
 The best measurement of the protective motivations of SPS/TBT policy would be some measure of what each 
regulation notified is stated to prevent or protect against. The current database does not facilitate this analysis 
easily and with the number of SPS and TBT notifications in the data, country-level proxies of environmental 
stringency and governance were necessary. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, more detail on what is in the content of 
a notification and a trade concern will be analysed at a notification-level basis.  
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2.7.1. Trade-related variables 
The key variable to test whether negotiated tariff reductions are a driver for increased SPS 
notifications is the trade-weighted average bound tariff rate (see section 2.5.2 for a detailed 
explanation of the tariff variables). In line with the theoretical literature discussed in section 
2.4, the expectation is that decreases in bound tariffs will be associated with increases in 
SPS/TBT use if protectionist motivations have an influence on the use of SPS/TBT policy. As 
a result, the cross-section includes the bound tariff rate (BND), varying by both HS-2 code and 
country. Alternative measures of tariffs by the BO (difference between the bound and applied 
tariff levels) are also tested to check the robustness of the tariff result.  
 
The next most important trade-related variables are imports and exports (also varying by HS-
2 code and country). Both are included in their logarithms levels to make the variables more 
approximately lognormal. Consistent with the substantial literature on modern uses of trade 
protectionism37, it is expected that larger values of imports should be associated with greater 
numbers of SPS notifications. Quite simply the higher the import competition, the more the 
domestic producers are likely to lobby or otherwise influence government policy towards 
increasing alternative forms of protection—including SPS and TBT policy (Kono, 2006). It is 
worth noting, however, that a positive correlation between imports and SPS notifications in the 
data could also be an indicator of legitimate, protective use of SPS. Since ceteris paribus both 
the risk of a biosecurity incident and the likelihood of detection increase with higher import 
volumes, one would expect new SPS pest-risk evaluations and SPS notifications positively 
correlate with imports (Mumford, 2002; Waage & Mumford, 2008).  
 
Compared to imports, the trade protectionism literature is more ambiguous about the expected 
relationship between exports and trade protectionism. One theory suggests that export 
industries should be more competitive than their non-exporting domestic peers (Melitz, 2003) 
and thus, in less need of protection (Gawande & Krishna, 2003). However, this theory ignores 
the impact of political bargaining by domestic industries. Another line of economic theory 
work would suggest export industries would have a larger political base that they can use to 
demand protection (Grossman & Helpman, 1992). For heterogeneous industries, when more 
competitive firms improve efficiencies and increase output, declining firms may push for 
                                               
37
 (Anderson & Schmitt, 2003b; Bechtel, Bernauer & Meyer, 2012; Kee, Neagu & Nicita, 2013; Baylis, 
Nogueira & Pace, 2012) 
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protection (Rodrik, 1995). On the other hand, particularly for SPS regulations, an additional 
reason to expect a positive correlation between exports and SPS notifications is not 
protectionist. Part of setting SPS policy is to consider the potential damage to a domestic 
industry from a biosecurity incursion, thus large exports proxy having a large agricultural 
industry, which would be more valuable and demand more careful consideration when setting 
the appropriate level of protection under the SPS measure by the policy-maker. As a result of 
these myriad drivers, the expected sign on exports coefficient in the regression is ambiguous. 
 
2.7.2. GDP and population variables 
GDP and population are standard components of cross-country economic analysis. In this case, 
“protective” motivations for SPS/TBT would predict a positive correlation between GDP and 
SPS/TBT use since environmental quality and health are both normal goods. One would also 
expect a positive relationship between GDP and SPS/TBT notifications, since these measures 
require institutional support, and institutional quality is generally increasing with country GDP. 
Protectionist motivated SPS/TBT measures, however, may show a negative correlation 
between GDP and SPS/TBT use, since protectionist use of the policy is economically 
inefficient at the macro-level just as a tariff would be. 
 
The prediction for the coefficient on population size is unambiguously positive, since both 
protective and protectionist motivations for SPS suggest a positive relationship. The 
“protective” prediction is positive since there are fixed costs to funding the institutional 
capacity to build the risk-based case for the measure, preparing the measure, and notifying 
appropriately the SPS measures. The “protectionist” prediction follows from the standard terms 
of trade manipulation explanation for trade protectionism.  
 
Also included in the regressions is a more novel demographic measure, namely, the proportion 
of the population over 65. The literature on food safety standards shows that older populations 
have substantially stronger preferences for high food safety standards  (Taylor, Coveney, Ward, 
et al., 2011; Tobin, Thomson & LaBorde, 2012; Buchler, Smith & Lawrence, 2010; De Jonge, 
Van Trijp, Renes, et al., 2010). Thus, protective motivations predict that SPS/TBT use is 
increasing in the proportion of the population over 65 years old. 
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2.7.3. Governance and environment variables 
If SPS and TBT standards a being used as a legitimate means of ensuring consumer safety and 
protecting human, plant and animal health, one would expect them to be determined by a 
combination of the social pressure for such protections and the government's willingness and 
ability to respond to this pressure. This combination of drivers is captured using a number of 
variables. 
 
The base specification in the cross-section model includes the ESI environmental governance 
measure (Esty, Levy, Srebotnjak, et al., 2005). In a separate regression, governance and 
environment/health aspects are included separately. For governance, the “Regulatory Quality” 
measure from the WB World Governance Indicators (WGI) is included. For a measure of 
environmental quality, several components of the EPI are used (see data section 2.5.3 starting 
on page 42). The first is the “Environmental Health” sub-component, which aggregates scores 
for air and water quality and access, as well as, sanitation and disease burden. The second 
environmental proxy variable is the “Agricultural Pesticides” sub-component, which measures 
the stringency of safety measures on pesticide use in the country. Pesticide policies are a good 
proxy as many SPS measures are related to maximum residue levels (MRLs) of chemicals on 
agricultural products (Otsuki, Wilson & Sewadeh, 2001; Tran, Wilson & Anders, 2012). If 
domestic and foreign policy in a country are consistent, then countries with higher 
environmental health scores and more stringent pesticide regulations should have stricter SPS 
standards on imports. 
 
Finally, in all regressions the “polity2” measure of democracy from the Polity IV project is 
included. The impact of democracy on environmental policy is highly debated, but several 
papers find generally that more democratic countries tend to have higher environmental 
protection (Driesen, 2006; Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007; Midlarsky, 1998). In the political 
science literature, democracy is also predicted to increase government preferences for NTBs 
over tariffs because it allows policy makers to protect industries in ways that are less 
transparent to the public (Kono, 2006). Thus, both protective and protectionist motivations 
suggest a positive relationship between democracy and SPS/TBT use. 
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2.7.4. Model fitting for cross-section 
For the cross-section part of the analysis, the dependent variable is the total number of 
notifications (by country and HS-2 code) from 1996 through 2010. On the right hand side, 
those variables for which time-series data are available are replaced by their means over the 
15-year sample period. HS-2 code dummies are included in all regressions to control for 
product heterogeneity.  
 
After testing the performance of a number of count data models, the Zero-inflated Poisson 
(ZIP) was selected for its robustness and ability to fit the SPS data, which included a large 
proportion of zeroes. Additionally, the ZIP was the best-fit model that biased towards under-
predicting notified SPS measures as opposed to the next closest model (the Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial, ZINB) which over-predicted low counts. Following the informal method 
of Long & Freese (2001), the predicted probabilities of four count models (Poisson, ZIP, NB, 
ZINB) were compared against the observed probabilities of each count number in the data (see 
Figure 5).  
 
As expected, the Poisson count model greatly under-estimated the number of zeroes because 
of the excess zeroes on HS-2 codes that rarely have a SPS notification (see Figure 5). The HS-
2 code factor variable was used in the inflation model to predict the excess zeroes as a part of 
the ZIP model. Deviations from zero in Figure 5 that are positive reflect an underestimate of 
the model fitting as compared to the data, while negative deviations are over-estimates of the 
model as compared to the data.  
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Note: PRM is Poisson Regression Model; ZIP is Zero-inflated Poisson; NBRM is 
Negative Binomial Regression Model; and ZINB is Zero-inflated Negative Binomial.  
Figure 5: Fit of model (2) from Table 9 for SPS measures using Long & Freese (2001) 
 
Some of the zero-inflated models would not converge for TBT measures when run with 
equivalent covariates and HS-2 code dummies as the SPS models. As such, section 2.8.1 starts 
with some simplified regression models to compare TBT and SPS policies against a smaller 
set of covariates using a Negative Binomial (NB) regression to account for the over-dispersion 
in the data. More advanced models using a Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) estimator just for SPS 
measures are discussed subsequently in section 2.8.2.  
 
2.8. CROSS-SECTION RESULTS 
 
2.8.1. SPS and TBT in simplified cross-section using NB estimator 
To simplify the comparison between SPS and TBT policies in the cross-section, a limited 
number of variables that are expected to have influence on notification rates are first tested 
using a NB estimator. The total number of SPS/TBT notifications predicted by the decline in 
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the bound tariff rate, along with trade variables, and country GDP are modelled in column (1) 
of both Table 7 and Table 8. In column (2) the ESI measure of environmental governance is 
added as a further covariate. In column (3) alternative measurements of environmental 
governance, including the polity2 measure of democracy, the WB WGI measure of regulatory 
quality, and the EPI measure of environmental health at the country level are included.  
 
Table 7: Cross-sectional correlates of total (Regular + Emergency) SPS notifications by country and HS-2 
code using NB estimator 
 (1) 
SPS 
(2) 
SPS 
(3) 
SPS 
 Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.00475** -0.0471 -0.00365** -0.0379 -0.00263** -0.0230 
Log Imports 0.101** 0.0730 0.0251 0.0186 -0.0470 -0.0294 
Log Exports 0.159** 0.179 0.146** 0.164 0.0969** 0.0907 
Log GDP 0.0547 0.0278 0.0402 0.0207 0.101** 0.0447 
Enviro. governance   0.727** 0.118   
Polity     0.0935** 0.122 
Regulatory quality     0.312** 0.0520 
Enviro. health     0.0201** 0.0793 
ln(α) 1.003**  0.792**  0.663**  
Observations 6394  5592  5936  
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients and discrete change in predicted number of notifications (ΔN) for a change 
in the covariate from minus to plus 0.5 standard deviations. HS-2 code dummies 
included, but not reported. 
 
The results show consistently that decreases in the bound tariff predict increased log counts of 
notifications of SPS or TBT measures in all models tested (see Table 7 and Table 8). For SPS 
measures in Table 7, the NB models predicted a one-unit decrease in the bound tariff rate results 
in a 0.00263 to 0.00475 increase in the log count of SPS notifications. Similarly, for TBT 
measures in Table 8, the models predicted a one-unit decrease in the bound tariff rate results in 
a 0.00240 to 0.00335 increase in the log count of SPS notifications. For all TBT and SPS 
models, the value of α confirmed significant over-dispersion in the data (i.e. α ≠ 0), hence the 
correct choice of the NB estimator instead of Poisson. 
 
Additionally, for both SPS and TBT measures larger export values positively correlated with 
more notifications. While for TBT there was a positive relationship with imports as well, for 
SPS the result was not robust once environmental governance covariates were introduced in 
models (2) and (3). Similarly, richer countries (as measured by log GDP) were associated with 
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more TBT notifications per HS-2 code product, but the result was inconclusive for SPS 
notifications where the coefficient was not significant in models (1) and (2).  
 
Table 8: Cross-sectional correlates of total TBT notifications by country and HS-2 using NB estimator 
 (1) 
TBT 
(2) 
TBT 
(3) 
TBT 
 Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.00240* -0.0150 -0.00335* -0.0228 -0.00263* -0.0170 
Log Imports 0.0903** 0.0580 0.124** 0.0878 0.137** 0.0916 
Log Exports 0.0831** 0.0839 0.0781** 0.0829 0.0715** 0.0727 
Log GDP 0.114** 0.0535 0.0930** 0.0464 0.0992** 0.0468 
Enviro. governance   -0.296** -0.0478   
Polity     0.0235** 0.0335 
Regulatory quality     -0.100 -0.0188 
Enviro. health     -0.00798* -0.0294 
ln(α) 1.247**  1.198**  1.212**  
Observations 7707  6824  7146  
Note:  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients and discrete change in predicted number of notifications (ΔN) for a change 
in the covariate from minus to plus 0.5 standard deviations. HS-2 code dummies 
included, but not reported. 
 
As expected for SPS measures, countries with higher environmental governance scores 
reported more SPS notifications by HS-2 code (see models (2) and (3)). For TBT measures, 
countries with lower environmental governance scores are shown to report more TBT 
notifications. There is less of a clear relation between TBT policy and environmental policy of 
a country (as compared to SPS policy). As shown in the data, a lot of TBT notifications apply 
to vehicles, nuclear reactors, and other products with discriminating technical standards, but 
little relation to environmental quality and human health. It could be that countries with more 
heavy, polluting industry use TBT measures more frequently and as a result, there is a 
correlation with poor environmental metrics.  
 
It is difficult to interpret results in terms of the log counts. To aid understanding, the predicted 
number of notifications at the country-HS level for model (2) are plotted in Figure 6 for TBT 
and Figure 7 for SPS. The predictions are plotted over the range of the trade-weighted bound 
tariff from the 1st to 99th percentile. Separate plots are made for variations of high/low 
environmental governance scores and high/low export value at the HS-2 level. 38  
                                               
38
 “High” here is defined as 95th percentile in the data and “low” is 5th percentile in the data 
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Note: (left) p95 Enviro. Gov. confidence intervals shown in red bars due to overlap 
Figure 6: Predicted TBT notifications from model (2) in Table 8 over bound tariff for high/low 
environmental governance and high/low exports in the HS-2 code 
 
 
Figure 7: Predicted SPS notifications from model (2) in Table 7 over bound tariff for high/low 
environmental governance and high/low exports in the HS-2 code 
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The first thing to note in the figures (Figure 6 and Figure 7) is the impact that the value of the 
export industry (as measured by the log of HS-2 exports) has on the number of policy changes 
for either the SPS agreement or the TBT agreement. For SPS measures particularly, the 
countries with low export values are predicted to have very few notifications, whether the 
country has high or low environmental policy metrics and no matter how stringent or loose the 
tariff binding is. The impact of a declining bound tariff is most explicit for the high 
environmental governance country in a large export sector; there the largest possible move 
from a 100% tariff to a 0% tariff would be expected to double the number of SPS notifications 
from around 5 to around 10. Realistically however, such large movements in tariffs are very 
rare and for most trade policy scenarios, the predicted impact would be much smaller.  
 
For TBT measures, the impact was similar for larger export product categories, but to a lesser 
degree than SPS measures. The biggest difference in notification rates between 95th and 5th 
percentile exports was around 3 times as many notifications as compared to around 6 times for 
SPS (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). In addition for TBT measures, environmental governance 
scores predicted the opposite effect compared to SPS, and also a smaller magnitude difference 
between notification rates of the top (i.e. 95th percentile) environmental performers and the 
lowest (i.e. 5th percentile) environmental performers (see Figure 6).   
 
2.8.2. SPS using ZIP estimator with additional covariates 
Using a wider set of the covariates discussed in section 2.5 (page 38), Table 9 presents the main 
regression results for the cross-sectional analysis of SPS measures. The discrete change in 
predicted number of notifications (ΔN) per HS-2 code per country for a change in the covariates 
from minus to plus 0.5 standard deviations (other covariates held at means) is shown in the 
second column for each model. The main variable of interest, the bound tariff rate, has a 
statistically significant negative correlation with the number of SPS notifications made by a 
country in the 15 years of the sample. Nevertheless, the predicted economic/policy impact is 
small. While the average number of notifications per country per HS-2 code is just under three 
(2.85) in the dataset, a one standard deviation decrease in bound tariff rate is predicted to 
increase notifications by only 0.03-0.08 notifications (a 1% to 3% increase above mean 
notification rate) depending on the specification.  
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Table 9: Cross-sectional correlates of total SPS notifications by country and HS-2 code using a ZIP 
estimator 
 (1) 
SPS 
(2) 
SPS 
(3) 
SPS 
 Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.00190** -0.0618 -0.00251** -0.0808 -0.00115** -0.0333 
Log Imports 0.0475** 0.110 0.0436** 0.100 0.0229** 0.0472 
Log Exports 0.0445** 0.154 0.0478** 0.162 0.0265** 0.0813 
Log GDP per capita 0.0179 0.0205 -0.0248 -0.0280 -0.237** -0.242 
GDP per capita growth 14.89** 0.185 11.20** 0.140 10.88** 0.120 
Log Population 0.0191* 0.0243 0.0604** 0.0713 0.0803** 0.0908 
Population growth 0.140 0.00175 -19.42** -0.195 -1.164 -0.0129 
Percent aged over 65 6.757** 0.282 3.854** 0.158 5.961** 0.220 
Polity 0.0847** 0.411 0.0775** 0.334 0.0622** 0.267 
Enviro. governance   0.164** 0.0797   
Regulatory quality     0.393** 0.216 
Enviro. health     0.0119** 0.154 
Pesticide regulation     0.00477* 0.0253 
Biodiversity protect.     0.00300** 0.0535 
Observations 5936  5525  5936  
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients and discrete change in predicted number of SPS notifications (ΔN) for a 
discrete change (± sd/2) in the covariate reported. HS-2 code dummies included in main 
and inflation equation, but not reported.  
  
Imports and exports are both positively correlated with SPS use. The economic significance of 
imports is similarly small to that of the bound tariff, but that of exports is about twice as large 
(in regressions 2 and 3 of Table 9). These findings could be consistent with either protective or 
protectionist drivers of SPS use, but certainly do not suggest a dominance of traditional import-
protecting motivation. GDP per capita growth and population size both show robust positive 
correlations with SPS use. This indicates that SPS use is increasing in both countries with large 
populations and countries that are getting richer.  
 
The most robust and economically significant correlates of SPS use are the measure of 
democracy (i.e. polity2), the percentage of the population aged over 65, and the measure of 
general regulatory quality. All three of these indicators are associated with “protective” 
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motivations for SPS use.39 The protective motivation of SPS use is also lent support by strong 
positive coefficients on environmental governance, environmental health, pesticide regulation 
and biodiversity protection. It appears countries with strong measures of environmental policy 
and human health use more SPS regulations. 
 
One notable feature of the results in Table 9 is the generally small magnitude of the predicted 
effects. For non-agriculture HS-2 codes, the probability of a notification is very small in the 
dataset and several HS-2 codes were only included as one or two countries used them in one 
or two years in the sample (see many HS-2 codes with only 1 or 2 total SPS notifications in 
Appendix A.3 on page 348). Thus, Table 10 reproduces the same regressions for the restricted 
sample including only agricultural HS codes. The signs and relative importance of the 
covariates are the same as in the full sample results. However, as expected given the use of 
SPS policy primarily on agriculture products, the magnitudes of the effects are substantially 
greater in this sample. 
 
The final predictions of the number of SPS measures for HS-2 codes in agriculture are plotted 
in Figure 8 over bound tariff rates and Figure 9 over environmental governance scores for 
model (2) in Table 10. The dashed vertical lines in both plots show the 25th, 50th (median), and 
75th percentile points in the data for the variable on the x-axis. Confirming the theoretical 
results of Kono (2006), both plots strongly show that countries that are fully democratic (polity 
score of 10, which is about 10% of the dataset) notify many more SPS notifications than non-
democratic countries (the upper range of closed anocracy40). In addition, the difference in 
notification rates between a 25th and 75th percentile country for environmental governance is 
slightly higher than for a move from a 75th percentile to a 25th percentile bound tariff rate ceteris 
paribus.  
 
Given that the cross-section ignores the time-series variation, in the next section the impact of 
bound tariff rate changes are tested in a panel data setting without the environmental 
                                               
39
 Democracy is also associated with protectionist uses of SPS and other NTM policies according to the political 
economy theory discussed by Kono (2006), but generally more democratic countries are associated with more 
concern for the environment and human health (Li & Reuveny, 2006; Farzin & Bond, 2006; Fredriksson, 
Neumayer, Damania, et al., 2005). 
40
 Full descriptions of the terms associated with different polity2 scores are on the PolityIV project website:  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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governance covariates (which lacked variation in time), but with other economic controls (e.g. 
current account status and exchange rate movement).  
 
Table 10: Cross-sectional correlates of total SPS notifications by country and HS-2 code using a ZIP 
estimator on a restricted sample of just agricultural HS-2 codes 
 
(1) 
SPS 
(2) 
SPS 
(3) 
SPS 
 Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN Coeff. ΔN 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.00202** -0.406 -0.00265** -0.558 -0.00128** -0.248 
Log Imports 0.0481** 0.396 0.0443** 0.379 0.0201* 0.160 
Log Exports 0.0471** 0.585 0.0493** 0.631 0.0275** 0.331 
Log GDP per capita 0.00953 0.0465 -0.0271 -0.137 -0.260** -1.237 
GDP per capita growth 14.70** 0.762 10.82** 0.593 10.38** 0.521 
Log Population 0.0210** 0.112 0.0625** 0.322 0.0866** 0.448 
Population growth 0.765 0.0396 -19.63** -0.868 -1.042 -0.0523 
Percent aged over 65 6.824** 1.184 3.757** 0.677 5.903** 0.992 
Polity 0.0798** 1.606 0.0744** 1.403 0.0569** 1.105 
Enviro. governance   0.149** 0.316   
Regulatory quality     0.416** 1.044 
Enviro. health     0.0131** 0.815 
Pesticide regulation     0.00397 0.0959 
Biodiversity protect.     0.00315** 0.258 
Observations 2065  1906  2065  
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients and discrete change in predicted number of SPS notifications (ΔN) for a 
discrete change (± sd/2) in the covariate reported. HS-2 code dummies included in main 
and inflation equation, but not reported. 
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Figure 8: Predicted SPS notifications in agricultural HS-2 codes from model (2) in Table 10 over bound 
tariff for fully democratic and non-democratic countries 
 
 
Figure 9: Predicted SPS notifications in agricultural HS-2 codes from model (2) in Table 10 over 
environmental governance score for fully democratic and non-democratic countries 
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2.9. TIME-SERIES SETUP 
 
The cross-sectional analysis described in section 2.8 above was necessary in order to make use 
of important environmental, governance, and demographic variables for which there is 
insufficient times-series variation. There are, however, a number of advantages of a time-series 
model for covariates with sufficient data. 
 
2.9.1. Advantages of time-series compared to cross-section analysis 
Four main advantages are outlined presently. First (1) is the ability to account for country 
heterogeneity, which may be correlated with the explanatory variables of interest. The next 
advantage, (2) is the ability to reduce simultaneity bias by using lagged values as instruments 
for the imports, exports, and tariffs. Since there is a substantial empirical literature (see section 
2.4.3) seeking to measure the trade dampening impact of NTMs like SPS and TBT, the 
potential for endogeneity if current levels of these covariates are used to predict notifications 
is apparent. Additionally, (3) time series estimates can include year dummies to control for 
global shocks such as disease emergence (e.g. avian influenza) and economic conditions (e.g. 
the Global Financial Crisis) which may have unduly influenced the means of covariates in the 
cross-section. Lastly, (4) a time-series model of new notifications is more appropriate to the 
data as there is no information on the levels of SPS and TBT regulations that existed prior to 
1996. The notification data is just on new notifications to policy changes, but regulations 
protecting human, plant, and environmental health have been in existence for decades codified 
under the GATT Article XX or existing as separate legal frameworks that foreign countries 
had to comply with to enter a domestic market.  
 
2.9.2. New variables in time-series analysis 
The expected predictions for most of the right hand side variables were discussed in section 
2.6, but there are two additional variables used in the time series analysis. The first (1) is the 
real effective exchange rate compared to a trade-weighted basket of currencies. This data, like 
that for GDP per capita, was extracted from The World Bank (2012). The exchange rate index 
data is expressed such that an increase indicates currency appreciation. Positive exchange rate 
movements make it harder for domestic firms to compete in both import and export markets as 
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their prices relative to other currencies are higher. Thus, protectionist motivations predict a 
positive relationship between exchange rate increases and SPS/TBT use.  
 
The second (2) additional variable in the time-series analysis is whether the current account is 
positive or negative. Niels & Francois (2006) find a declining current account balance increases 
the likelihood of using protectionist policy. Additionally, policy makers often claim to want to 
boost exports and generally help the current account situation of a country. Thus, one might 
expect the protectionist pressure for SPS and TBT policy use to be greater when the current 
account turns negative. Although countries that seek to influence their current account balance 
may also seek to manipulate SPS policy, this endogeneity issue can be reduced by accounting 
for omitted country characteristics in various ways in the time series. Once the endogeneity 
problem is solved, it is expected that a positive current account balance would lead to less 
pressure for protectionism (and thus less protectionist use of SPS notifications). 
 
2.10. TIME-SERIES RESULTS 
 
The first results of the time series analysis are shown in Table 11. The regression of column 
(1) takes a similar approach to that used in some of the recent literature on anti-dumping 
initiations (Moore & Zanardi, 2011). Following their approach, industry (HS-2 codes) and year 
dummies, but no country dummies or fixed effects are included. Also similar to Moore & 
Zanardi (2011), notification probability is allowed to be a function of both previous levels 
(. 	_	) and changes (. 	_	) in the covariates. Lag tariff changes by 
one year are used to allow time for notifications to be filed in response. Imports and exports 
are lagged two years to reduce simultaneity bias from trade outcomes being codetermined with 
SPS/TBT policy. Due to strong auto-regression in these series, however, this strategy of using 
lags as instruments for trade flows may only be partly successful in the levels. This issue of 
auto-regression is discussed more fully below. 
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Table 11: Logit and conditional logit models of at least one SPS notification by country, year and HS-2 
 (1) 
SPS>1 
(2) 
SPS>1 
(3) 
SPS>1 
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.00820* -0.00957* -0.0170** 
 (0.00360) (0.00417) (0.00660) 
L2. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.00702** -0.00424 -0.0143* 
 (0.00128) (0.00241) (0.00597) 
L2.D. Log Imports -0.0654 -0.148 -0.258 
 (0.156) (0.196) (0.177) 
L3. Log Imports 0.194** -0.124** -0.448** 
 (0.0372) (0.0455) (0.157) 
L2.D. Log Exports 0.164** 0.0557 0.0762 
 (0.0540) (0.0664) (0.0844) 
L3. Log Exports 0.195** 0.0448* 0.0810 
 (0.0168) (0.0220) (0.103) 
D. Log Exchange Rate 0.705 1.767** 1.636* 
 (0.508) (0.673) (0.677) 
L. Log Exchange Rate -0.629* 1.146* 1.214* 
 (0.283) (0.550) (0.597) 
D. Positive Current Account 0.0923 0.170 0.194 
 (0.0996) (0.115) (0.144) 
L. Positive Current Account -0.0730 0.0746 0.0541 
 (0.0461) (0.0829) (0.121) 
Observations 22,164 19,960 7,613 
Conditioning Group None None Country-HS code 
Dummies Year, HS-2 Year, HS-2, Country Year 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Lag levels and changes 
of GDPPC and population are included as in the models of Table 10, but not reported 
here to facilitate discussion on variables of interest between SPS and TBT.  
 
Not surprisingly given the absence of country effects, the results in column (1) of Table 11 
above are broadly similar to those obtained in the previous cross-sectional analysis for SPS 
measures (see Table 9, page 63). Like before, the bound tariff is negatively correlated with SPS 
notification probability; while imports and exports are positively correlated with it. 
 
Column (2) of Table 11 represents an attempt to control for country heterogeneity through the 
inclusion of country dummies in the regression. Many of the coefficients become insignificant 
in column (2), and the coefficient on import levels changes sign to become negative and 
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significant. These changes in comparison to column (1) are due to a combination of the 
dummies absorbing much of the variation in the data and to the fact that some of the results in 
the previous column may have been driven by spurious correlation with unobservable country 
characteristics. The negative and significant result for the level of imports in this column is 
contrary to expectations discussed in section 2.7.1. This could be due to an endogeneity issue; 
countries which protect a certain sector more heavily, are likely to have relatively more SPS 
and relatively less imports in that sector. An alternative explanation is that a strong domestic 
industry may supply the majority of the domestic market and therefore import values are low; 
however, given the importance of the industry, they need strong SPS protection from legitimate 
risks presented by foreign pests/diseases. The US citrus industry fits this sort of description, 
and it might be a more widely relevant archetype. To address the endogeneity concern, a 
regression conditioning on country-HS effects is presented in in column (3). 
 
The most obvious impact of conditioning out country-HS effects is to reduce the sample size 
used for the estimation due to the large number of country-HS pairs for which there is no 
identifying variation. Secondly, the statistical significance of the bound tariff variables 
increases. Thirdly, the coefficient on exports becomes insignificant. Otherwise, the results are 
much the same as column 2, including the negative and significant correlation between import 
levels and SPS notifications. 
 
The same modelling framework is used on TBT measures as well and presented below in Table 
12 below. The relation between bound tariff declines and increasing use of TBT measures 
found in the cross-section analysis was not robust to time-series investigation. However, the 
new time-series variables were the only reliable predictors of having at least one TBT measure 
in an HS-2 code. Interestingly, the direction of correlation with the exchange rate index is 
opposite the predicted direction. Consistently across all three models, a depreciating 
currency—which should make exports more competitive, as well as, make imported products 
more expensive in the domestic market—seem to drive the likelihood of having at least one 
TBT measure. The mechanism here could be that as the economic conditions improve for the 
manufacturing sector (where most TBT measures are applied) they are more likely to need to 
specify additional safety/technical measures on imported products that are inputs to the 
industry. Rigorous proof of this hypothesis is left for future research.  
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The other robust predictor of having at least one TBT notification was a negative correlation 
with a positive current account. The result was especially consistent for a change in current 
account status (. 	 	 , see Table 12). This is consistent with 
protectionist motivation for TBT policy application, but the only covariate that indicates this 
relationship.  
 
Table 12: Logit and conditional logit models of at least one TBT notification by country, year and HS-2 
 (1) 
TBT>1 
(2) 
TBT>1 
(3) 
TBT>1 
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) 0.000455 -0.00704 0.00125 
 (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.00568) 
L2. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.00268 -0.00558 0.00510 
 (0.00213) (0.00309) (0.00556) 
L2.D. Log Imports 0.0277 0.0961 -0.198 
 (0.159) (0.226) (0.264) 
L3. Log Imports -0.0743 0.180** -0.311 
 (0.0449) (0.0588) (0.265) 
L2.D. Log Exports -0.00403 0.0225 -0.0415 
 (0.0339) (0.0409) (0.0626) 
L3. Log Exports 0.0211 0.108** 0.0132 
 (0.0204) (0.0251) (0.0895) 
D. Log Exchange Rate -3.318** -2.011* -2.182** 
 (0.677) (0.827) (0.805) 
L. Log Exchange Rate 0.762 0.656 0.682 
 (0.453) (0.908) (0.777) 
D. Positive Current Account -0.369** -0.737** -0.752** 
 (0.108) (0.189) (0.227) 
L. Positive Current Account -0.185** -0.0708 -0.0600 
 (0.0592) (0.133) (0.180) 
Observations 32,122 28,818 6,186 
Conditioning Group None None Country-HS code 
Dummies Year, HS-2 Year, HS-2, Country Year 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Lag levels and changes 
of GDPPC and population are included as in the models of Table 10, but not reported. 
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2.10.1. First differences model 
The specification in column (3) of Table 11 and Table 12 is substantially more conservative 
than those that have previously been published in the literature (see section 2.4.3). 
Nevertheless, the negative correlation between import levels and SPS use suggests there is still 
the possibility of bias being introduced by the inclusion of the levels of potentially endogenous 
variables such as imports and exports. Strong autocorrelation can render lagged levels a poor 
instrument for current levels (Arellano & Bover, 1995). This problem is largely absent for 
changes (first differences) in variables. Presenting the results from this approach on SPS 
measures, Table 13 only includes changes of covariates on the right hand side. In addition to 
further reducing endogeneity concerns, the first-difference model in Table 13 has the advantage 
of being easier to interpret than the “error-correction” style model in Table 11 that Moore & 
Zanardi (2011) use. 
 
Table 13: First differences models using logit and Poisson for SPS notifications by country, year and HS-2 
 EU 27 Members EU Aggregate 
 (1) 
SPS>1 
(2) 
SPS 
(3) 
SPS>1 
(4) 
SPS 
 Cond. Logit F.E. Poisson Cond. Logit F.E. Poisson 
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.0108* -0.00378** 0.00530 -0.00601* 
 (0.00523) (0.00204) (0.00653) (0.00299) 
L2.D. Log Imports 0.0178 0.244** -0.0364 0.355** 
 (0.153) (0.0730) (0.173) (0.134) 
L2.D. Log Exports 0.0428 0.0785** 0.0501 0.0872* 
 (0.0676) (0.0222) (0.0655) (0.0361) 
D. Log Exchange Rate 1.565* 1.203** -0.545 0.633 
 (0.608) (0.285) (0.739) (0.361) 
D. Positive Current Account 0.151 -0.0667 0.0588 -0.155 
 (0.122) (0.0574) (0.169) (0.113) 
Observations 7613 2961 3370 874 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Column (1) conditional logit model of probability of at least one 
notification, column 2 ‘fixed effect' Poisson model of number of notifications conditional 
on there being at least 1. Conditioning group or ‘fixed effect' units in both columns are the 
Country-HS. Year dummies also included but not reported. Columns 3 and 4 treat 
European countries as a single “EU” entity. Changes of GDPPC and population are 
included for all columns, but not reported. Cluster robust standard errors in brackets for 
columns (1) and (3); standard errors in brackets for cols (2) and (4).  
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Column (1) of Table 13 presents the results of a conservative first-difference conditional logit 
model of SPS notification. However, even in this regression, the two key indicators of 
protectionist motives—bound tariff and exchange rate—remain statistically significant with 
the signs predicted by protectionist theories of SPS policy use. No other coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level. For TBT measures in column (1) of Table 14 below, again the result 
for bound tariffs was not significant and the major drivers appeared to be depreciating currency 
and a current account becoming negative.  
 
Table 14: First differences models using logit and Poisson for TBT notification by country, year and HS-2 
 EU 27 Members EU Aggregate 
 (1) 
TBT>1 
(2) 
TBT 
(3) 
TBT>1 
(4) 
TBT 
 Cond. Logit F.E. Poisson Cond. Logit F.E. Poisson 
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.000758 -0.0196 -0.00411 -0.0170 
 (0.00529) (0.0127) (0.00338) (0.0128) 
L2.D. Log Imports -0.0739 0.130 -0.158 0.0653 
 (0.205) (0.246) (0.233) (0.286) 
L2.D. Log Exports -0.0495 -0.106 -0.0595 -0.120 
 (0.0428) (0.0908) (0.0483) (0.0912) 
D. Log Exchange Rate -2.055** -0.590 -2.926** -0.724 
 (0.702) (0.539) (0.791) (0.577) 
D. Positive Current Account -0.660** -0.178 -0.723 -0.217 
 (0.204) (0.217) (0.382) (0.290) 
Observations 6186 876 3295 669 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Column (1) conditional logit model of probability of at least one 
notification, column 2 ‘fixed effect' Poisson model of number of notifications conditional 
on there being at least 1. Conditioning group or ‘fixed effect' units in both columns are the 
Country-HS. Year dummies also included but not reported. Columns 3 and 4 treat 
European countries as a single “EU” entity. Changes of GDPPC and population are 
included for all columns, but not reported. Cluster robust standard errors in brackets for 
columns (1) and (3); standard errors in brackets for cols (2) and (4).  
 
Up until this point in the time-series analysis, the analysis has focused on the probability of at 
least one notification being made in a given country-HS-2-year observation. This focus was 
appropriate in order to make the analysis more comparable to the existing NTB literature, and 
since 93% of the observations in the SPS dataset are zeroes (97% in the TBT dataset). However, 
restricting the estimating sample by conditioning on country-HS as in columns (1) and (3) of 
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Table 13 and Table 14, the proportion of non-zero observations rises substantially as the 
permanently zero observations will be excluded because of a lack of identifying variation.  
 
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 13 and Table 14 makes use of the information in the count data 
about how many notifications are made in a given year. Specifically, columns (2) and (4) 
estimates a Poisson fixed-effect model of the number of notifications in a year, conditional on 
there being at least one. Together columns (1) and (2) comprise a two-part model of SPS/TBT 
notifications. Columns (3) and (4) reproduce the same regressions as the first two columns, but 
replace the 27 European Union countries with a single “EU” entity as a robustness check since 
EU members notified both as one unit and by individual nations.41 
 
For SPS measures, in column (2) of Table 13 imports and exports are now positive and 
significant, while bound tariff remains negative and significant. The significance of the trade 
variables may indicate that the increase in trade does not affect the probability of notifying an 
SPS measure on a given HS-2 code, but the more trade that occurs the higher the number of 
SPS measures can be expected, all other things equal. As well, the coefficient on the exchange 
rate remains consistently positive and significant indicating that an appreciating currency 
promotes higher numbers of SPS measures notified. However, this currency effect may be 
driven by the EU nations, as when they are treated as a single country in columns (3) and (4), 
the significance of exchange rates disappears.  
 
Either treatment of Europe had little effect on the results for TBT notifications, other than the 
effect of a negative current account causing at least one notification seemed to be driven by 
individual EU nations. The main robust driver of having at least one TBT notification on a 
given HS-2 code is a depreciating currency, but this does not have any predictive power on the 
number of notifications in an HS-2 code. As before, these results may be driven by TBT’s use 
in heavy industry where there is a strong need for technical and safety regulations. An economy 
that is becoming more competitive in the export market via a depreciating currency may be 
more likely to issue at least one TBT measure, but it says little about the extent to which the 
country will become more involved in TBT policy setting.  
 
                                               
41
 Review the treatment of EU countries in the two datasets in section 2.5.1 
75 
 
2.10.2. Robustness to alternative specifications 
The robustness checks of alternative tariff and country groupings were conducted just on SPS 
measures. TBT is not included since the tariff result was insignificant (see Table 14, page 73). 
Additionally, the TBT agreement does not have a mechanism for notifying emergency 
notifications, so there was only one measure of notifications to use for analysis. The only robust 
predictor of TBT notifications was currency depreciation, yet it had no predictive power in 
terms of the total number of TBT measures per HS-2 code. As a result, none of the models 
tested held tremendous explanatory ability on the use of TBT policy. The results from the cross-
section analysis of correlation between TBT notification and bound tariff decline (section 2.8) 
were likely driven by country-level heterogeneity, which was controlled for with the time-
series models.  
 
Throughout the time-series analysis the weighted average bound tariff was used as the tariff 
constraint measure. In Table 15, as a robustness check, regressions were run in a NB fixed 
effect model to check if the results are the same for alternative tariff measures. The NB model 
was chosen to account for the overdispersion in the data from the high zero count at the country-
HS-year observation. Fixed effects of country-HS are included to account for country-product 
level heterogeneity.  
 
Column (1) replaces the bound tariff with the tariff BO—the difference between weighted-
average applied tariff and bound tariffs. BO is an inverse measure of the extent to which the 
bound tariff is a constraint. As shown in the demonstrative plots of the data (Figure 3 on page 
49) in section 2.5.2, the expectation is that BO is negatively correlated with SPS use. Column 
(1) confirms this result.  
 
In column (2) the components of BO are separated out into bound and applied tariffs. 
Conditional on the bound tariff, a higher applied tariff indicates that the bound tariff is more of 
a constraint. The expectation is that conditional on the bound tariff, increases in the applied 
tariff will increase SPS use. The results find a positive relationship between applied tariff and 
SPS use (see Table 15). This results should, however, be treated with some caution as it is 
potentially biased upwards due to unobserved increases in the demand for protection in the 
sector which might simultaneously influence both applied tariffs and SPS use. This potential 
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simultaneity bias issue is the reason why applied tariffs were not included in the analysis of 
section 2.10.  
 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 15 confirm that the results are robust to the use of simple rather 
than trade-weighted average tariff measures. Trade-weighted tariffs have the potential for 
endogeneity issues with imports as a covariate in the model, but the model was robust to either 
tariff measure.  
 
Table 15: Alternative tariff measures show consistent drivers of SPS use. Negative binomial fixed effect 
model of SPS notification by country, year, and HS-2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.D. Tariff BO (MFN wgt.) -0.00949**    
 (0.00265)    
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.)  -0.0117*   
  (0.00491)   
L.D. MFN Tariff (wgt. av.)  0.00832*   
  (0.00367)   
L.D. BND Tariff (simp. av.)   -0.00944* -0.0103** 
   (0.00388) (0.00391) 
L.D. MFN Tariff (simp. av.)    0.00927* 
    (0.00365) 
L2.D. Log Imports 0.0255 0.0226 0.0231 0.0337 
 (0.153) (0.152) (0.153) (0.153) 
L2.D. Log Exports 0.0410 0.0418 0.0415 0.0410 
 (0.0676) (0.0678) (0.0671) (0.0668) 
D. Log Exchange Rate 1.563** 1.557* 1.566** 1.538* 
 (0.604) (0.605) (0.607) (0.604) 
D. Positive Current Account 0.146 0.148 0.150 0.147 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Observations 7613 7613 7613 7613 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Fixed effect units are Country-HS. Year dummies also included but 
not reported. Changes of GDPPC and population are included for all columns, but not 
reported. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Having confirmed that the results are robust to the choice of tariff constraint measure, now the 
choice of SPS measure is tested for robustness. In particular, it is necessary to differentiate 
between Regular SPS and Emergency SPS notifications. Because of the need for expediency 
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in some cases—such as disease outbreaks—emergency notifications can be made with less 
justification than regular notifications. One might logically expect more “protectionist” use of 
emergency measures and, thus, larger coefficients on the tariff and exchange rate drivers of 
SPS Emergency notifications.  
 
Table 16 provides some support for this claim. The coefficient on exchange rate in the NB 
regression for SPS Emergency notifications in column (1) is larger than for SPS Regular 
notifications in column (2). Additionally, the coefficient on the bound tariff term is around 3 
times larger for Emergency SPS measures as compared to SPS Regular measures. However, 
overall it is clear that these covariates predict the use of both policies.  
 
Table 16: Results are confirmed for either Regular or Emergency notifications. NB fixed effect model of 
SPS notification by country, year and HS-2 
 (1) (2) 
 Emergency Notifications Regular Notifications 
L.D. BND Tariff (simp. av.) -0.0120** -0.00446** 
 (0.00248) (0.00108) 
L2.D. Log Imports 0.0378 -0.0600 
 (0.206) (0.0986) 
L2.D. Log Exports -0.0377 0.0246 
 (0.0940) (0.0429) 
D. Log Exchange Rate 3.005** 1.514** 
 (0.945) (0.354) 
D. Positive Current Account -0.0666 0.118 
 (0.156) (0.0680) 
Observations 2982 7645 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Fixed effect units are Country-HS. Year dummies also included but 
not reported. Changes of GDPPC and population are included for all columns, but not 
reported. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Many methods were used to address potential sources of endogeneity in the above regressions. 
However, there is one potential source of spurious correlation between bound tariffs and SPS 
use that has not been addressed. It is possible that in the brief period after countries join the 
WTO they experience both falling bound tariffs and become adept at using WTO institutions 
such as SPS measures. This short-term surge in policy changes to comply with WTO rules and 
institutions could result in spurious correlation. To check whether this phenomenon could be 
driving the results, the sample is split according to whether the country joined the WTO during 
the sample period.  
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The results, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 17, suggest that new joiners are not driving the 
results. The coefficient on bound tariff is almost exactly the same in the WTO founders sample 
as in the full sample (see column (5)). In the new WTO joiners sample, the coefficient on bound 
tariffs has a larger magnitude, but is statistically insignificant due to the small sample size. 
 
Table 17: Results by country group for NB fixed effect model of SPS notifications by country, year and 
HS-2  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 WTO 
Founders 
WTO 
New 
Developing Developed Full 
Sample 
 SPS SPS SPS SPS SPS 
L.D. BND Tariff (simp. av.) -0.00575** -0.0174 0.0103 -0.00607** -0.00571** 
 (0.000998) (0.0386) (0.0163) (0.000994) (0.00102) 
L2.D. Log Imports -0.0157 -0.0122 -0.147 -0.0836 -0.0378 
 (0.0941) (0.376) (0.139) (0.130) (0.0903) 
L2.D. Log Exports 0.0150 -0.148 -0.0137 0.0337 0.0231 
 (0.0391) (0.233) (0.0637) (0.0554) (0.0391) 
D. Log Exchange Rate 1.742** -30.30** 2.339** 1.939** 1.507** 
 (0.331) (8.714) (0.887) (0.454) (0.333) 
D. Positive Current Account 0.0265 -0.370 0.119 0.0365 0.0807 
 (0.0640) (1.290) (0.118) (0.0768) (0.0633) 
Observations 7602 291 1687 6206 7893 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Fixed effect units are Country-HS. Year dummies also included but 
not reported. Changes of GDPPC and population are included for all columns, but not 
reported. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Finally, it is well established that developing countries have different patterns of use of NTMs 
(such as anti-dumping measures) as compared to advanced economies (Feinberg & Reynolds, 
2007). The results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 17 suggest that this finding holds true in the 
use of SPS as well. In particular, developing countries do not show a negative relationship 
between bound tariffs and SPS notifications, while developed countries do. 
 
While it is possible that developed countries are more prone to protectionist abuse of SPS, an 
alternative explanation is because developing countries have been exempt from most of the 
stringent bound tariff reductions agreed at the WTO. Support for this interpretation is provided 
by the fact that the coefficients on exchange rate are almost identical in the two samples.  
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2.11. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to refocus the discussion of NTBs and protectionism from 
one of protectionist effect—which has been amply demonstrated in the literature—to one of 
protectionist intent. There is an underlying belief stated on the WTO SPS website (see block 
quote in section 2.2) as well as variously in the literature (see section 2.3) that the liberalisation 
of tariff regimes has led to an increase in the use of non-tariff means of protection. This chapter 
is the first—to the author’s knowledge—that rigorous tests of this relationship for SPS and 
TBT measures in a cross-section and panel data setting.  
 
The primary finding is that the negative relationship between bound tariff levels and SPS use 
is highly robust throughout a range of increasingly conservative model specifications. The 
relationship for SPS was true for both regular measures that become part of a country’s long 
run policy as well as emergency measures, which are meant to be temporary policy changes. 
Bound tariffs are a driver for TBT notification for some countries, but in the time-series, there 
was no evidence that they are a robust predictor of TBT policy use. Dividing the sample into 
different subsets of countries revealed that the primary driver of this relationship for SPS is the 
developed, founding WTO member states. Developing countries, however, are not completely 
free of evidence of protectionist use of SPS since the coefficient on exchange rate is just as 
large in their sample as it is for the developed countries. Thus a potential explanation for the 
fact that developed WTO members seem to use SPS more in response to falling tariffs might 
be that they are the group who have committed to the most stringent tariff reductions. 
 
Protectionism is, however, far from being the only motivation for SPS measures. Indeed, the 
cross-sectional results suggest that there are other larger and more important drivers. Good 
democracy, regulatory quality, environmental governance, and aging populations all show 
positive relationships that indicate “protective” motivations for SPS use.  
 
While there is a benefit to analysis at this macro-scale, more details about regulations used 
illegitimately are probably better discerned at a finer scale on the content of the specific 
measure. The following chapter (Chapter 3) examines Specific Trade Concerns to determine 
where the disagreements on the legitimate use of SPS/TBT measures exist during the same 
period as the analysis of this chapter.  
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 Patterns of Trade Concerns in SPS/TBT Use 
 
Complementing an analysis between bound tariffs and the use of SPS and TBT measures, this 
chapter and Chapter 4 examine the disagreements that happen between WTO members in the 
course of setting and implementing SPS and TBT policy. The data used are “Specific Trade 
Concerns” which are discussed at the WTO in Geneva during SPS and TBT Committee 
meetings three times per year. STCs are reported as agenda items at the meetings and a 
notification of the concern is raised via the SPS-IMS and the TBT-IMS.42   
 
The raising of a STC is a formal mechanism by which a country can introduce a complaint 
against another country’s SPS/TBT policies regulating imports. SPS/TBT measures which 
form strong barriers to trade and are motivated by protecting domestic producers—rather than 
preventing a legitimate risk—are likely to be raised as a concern by other WTO members. 
Conversely, one would expect legitimate measures to receive fewer complaints. SPS/TBT 
measures that are (1) with scientific merit, (2) not overly restrictive to trade, and/or (3) not on 
an important commodity are unlikely to be questioned with a STC. As a result, STCs may also 
provide interesting insight into where protectionist measures, potentially motivated by loss of 
tariff protection, have been used. The analysis of this chapter will solely be on STCs and what 
motivates the raising of a concern; the outcomes when those concerns proceed to official 
disputes under the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO are not analysed (see literature 
review in section 3.3 for references on WTO disputes under the DSB).  
 
This chapter is divided into several sections. First, an introduction (section 3.1) motivates the 
study of trade concerns as a way to illuminate the challenges in SPS/TBT compliance. The 
research questions are presented (section 3.2) and followed by a review (section 3.3) of the 
empirical literature on general WTO disputes. While several authors have examined the 
determinants of WTO disputes and their outcomes (see section 3.3), only one peer-reviewed 
study (Disdier & van Tongeren, 2010) and three working papers43 use STC data in their 
empirical work, as far as the author could find. From informal discussion with one of the 
authors (Jasmin Grӧschl) at the European Trade Study Group conference in Leuven in 
                                                
42
 The same reporting system as the notification data acquired for the research in Chapter 2. The TBT data is 
available at <http://tbtims.wto.org/> and the SPS data at <http://spsims.wto.org/> 
43
 (Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm, 2013; Crivelli & Grӧschl, 2012; Fontagné, Orefice, Piermartini, et al., 2013) 
81 
 
September 2012, the author confirmed that STC data is under-utilized given the attention paid 
to SPS/TBT coverage measures in the empirical trade literature. Section 3.6 presents analysis 
on determinants of SPS STCs using data on the 292 SPS STCs raised from 1996 to 2010 paired 
with the SPS measure notifications from Chapter 2. Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
Some of the summary results from sections 3.5 were presented along with the early work of 
Chapter 4 on plant health related STCs by the author as an invited speaker at a special topic 
session of the American Phytopathological Society (APS) Annual Meeting in August 2012.44 
Some results from sections 3.5 and resolution rates of STCs in Chapter 4 were also presented 
and discussed with WTO staff members of the SPS Secretariat at an informal meeting 
organized by the author in December 2012 in Geneva.  
 
3.1. HOW STCS ARE RAISED 
 
While the SPS and TBT agreements have been in place for decades, implementation of some 
countries’ risk-based measures has not been without controversy. Like other agreements of the 
WTO, disputes were anticipated in the SPS/TBT regulatory framework given the uncertainty 
of scientific evidence used to justify risk-based regulations.45 As such, the system was designed 
to have a formal process to address these disagreements.  
 
An overview of the dispute process is shown in Figure 10 for the SPS agreement—the process 
for the TBT agreement is analogous. A thorough review of the process can be found in a chapter 
written by the long-time Secretary of the SPS Secretariat, Gretchen Stanton, in an edited 
volume on the SPS agreement (Stanton, 2012).46 Within the SPS agreement, informal 
discussions of issues often precede the raising of a STC. Once a specific concern is raised as 
an agenda item at the SPS Committee meeting, it will be discussed and outcomes recorded in 
                                               
44
 Pearson, L. “From Boom to Busted: Trade Concerns under the WTO’s SPS Agreement” Special Session 
‘Right of the Boom: Deciding to Act, React, or Let Go in a Fluid Data Environment’ American 
Phytopathological Society (APS) annual meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, 8th August, 2012. 
45
 Although TBT measures do not require the same rigorous scientifically-based risk assessment as SPS 
measures, compelling cases must still be made for implementing measures and the process for reporting disputes 
is the same.  
46
 The author also acknowledges information received informally about aspects of the STC mechanism of the 
SPS by Gretchen Stanton and other members of the SPS Secretariat when presenting work in early form from 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 of this PhD at the WTO in Geneva on Dec 20th, 2012.  
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the meeting minutes. Afterward, all of the information is recorded, coded, and made publically 
available online via the SPS-IMS (or equivalently, TBT-IMS for TBT STCs).  
 
 
Note: Red dashed box highlights the stage of interest to this chapter. This figure is 
informed by the written process discussed in Stanton (2012). 
Figure 10: Outline of escalation of disputes between WTO member countries on SPS/TBT matters  
 
Most concerns will not be resolved within the context of one meeting. STCs are often raised 
again (called “re-raised” throughout this chapter and Chapter 4) at subsequent SPS Committee 
meetings when they are unresolved in the interim period by the disputing47 members. If a 
concern is resolved between meeting periods, it will be reported as “resolved” in the subsequent 
meeting and if possible, the specific agreement reached in the resolution to the issue will be 
recorded in text form in the notification to the SPS-IMS. The rates of resolution vary quite 
significantly by country, and the drivers of resolution are examined subsequently in Chapter 4. 
 
 
                                               
47
 “Dispute” or “disputing” is used with its colloquial meaning about a disagreement occurring between two or 
more parties throughout this chapter. In the context of this work, it does not mean a formal WTO DSB dispute. 
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3.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This chapter contains analysis on the count-based data of every STC under the SPS and TBT 
agreement first raised from 1996 to 2010. Three research questions are addressed:  
 
1) Are STCs initiated against SPS measures more often on HS codes where the bound 
tariff has fallen comparatively more?  
2) Are initiated STCs re-raised more often on HS codes with tighter tariff BO?48 
3) Do STCs appear more often on HS codes that have only a few SPS measures 
notified?49  
 
The research questions are addressed by combining the data on SPS notifications from Chapter 
2 with the new data from SPS STCs. The main question tested (1) is whether bound tariffs have 
influence on the initiation of trade concerns. As discussed in Chapter 2, the liberalisation of 
tariff regimes from successive rounds of WTO multilateral agreements has not displaced the 
domestic political-economy drivers for industry protection. As a result, the expectation is that 
non-tariff means of protection will be implemented as tariffs fall (Baylis, Nogueira & Pace, 
2012; Ray, 1987; Yu, 2000; Feinberg & Reynolds, 2007; Mansfield & Busch, 1995). While 
Chapter 2 did find robust evidence for this relation in the notification of new or changed SPS 
policy, the hypothesis here is that SPS measures that are flagged for concern as potentially 
protectionist (or somehow illegitimate) via the STC mechanism would have an even stronger 
relation to declining bound tariffs. It was not possible to conduct the analysis for the TBT 
agreement due to the lack of HS-2 code information on STCs in the TBT-IMS.50 
 
In addition to this analysis, summary information detailing the use of TBT/SPS STCs by 
country and by HS-2 code51 is presented in section 3.5. The summary statistics and cross-
tabulations of the data are presented since there are few studies that have utilized this data.  
 
                                               
48
 Recall from section 2.6.1 that SPS measures appeared to be notified more often by countries with tighter tariff 
binding overhang (tariff BO is the difference between the bound tariff and the applied tariff, which reflects the 
ability of a country to raise its applied tariff to achieve trade policy goals).  
49
 An implication from Disdier, Fontagné & Mimouni (2008) discussed in the literature review (section 3.3). 
50
 Only 5 out of 282 STCs raised in the sample had HS-2 code information in the TBT-IMS entry.  
51
 Just for SPS STCs due to the data constraints on TBT STCs 
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3.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Isaac (2004) asserts that the SPS agreement is where the agri-food challenges of the 21st 
century will occur. This, he argues, is for two reason:  (1) the ambiguity of what is characterized 
as “legitimate” and  (2) the unilateral power the agreement gives members to set 
"unchallengeable" market access barriers (Isaac, 2004). He contends that SPS measures are 
overly influenced in the process of setting regulations by political economy pressures. Isaac 
(2004)—in this author’s opinion—over-states the ability of members to use SPS arbitrarily 
given (1) the need for measures to based on a risk assessment and (2) that challenges are 
possible via STCs. Nevertheless, his study motivates the importance of studying SPS 
implementation challenges. 
 
Isaac (2004) also argues that developing countries may use “special and differential 
treatment”52 to put in place SPS measures that are effective in blocking imports, but do little to 
protect health. This assertion would suggest that developing countries notify more SPS 
measures than developed members notify, or have more STCs raised against them. Given their 
smaller economic size, one might argue some, like Peru, are overrepresented in SPS 
notifications (see SPS Regular notification rates in Chapter 2); however, many developing 
countries notify few, if any, measures. To further investigate the issue, STC use by country is 
explored in section 3.5.1.  
 
3.3.1. Literature analysing SPS/TBT STC data 
There are only four papers available (all but the first are working papers) that use SPS or TBT 
STC data as their main source for analysis. (1) Disdier & van Tongeren (2010) use SPS STC 
data for just OECD countries from 1996 to 2006 as one of three variables in their cluster 
analysis of NTMs. They conclude that there are six different types of protection using NTMs. 
One of the clusters of products (mostly meat and dairy) are found to have both high trade 
coverage, high SPS notification rates, and high STC rates suggesting that SPS policy may be 
protectionist in these types of products for OECD countries (Disdier & van Tongeren, 2010). 
This finding is slightly counter to an earlier work by Disdier suggesting that protectionist 
                                               
52
 Special and differential treatment is a provision in the WTO to help developing countries who may struggle to 
fully implement regulations and follow all the rules in a timely manner. More information can be found on the 
WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm 
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policies would likely be in HS codes where few countries have issued SPS measures (Disdier, 
Fontagné & Mimouni, 2008). Following the earlier paper’s line of argument, one would expect 
“protectionist” SPS/TBT policies in HS codes with few SPS/TBT measures, but many STCs. 
The evidence for the patterns of trade concerns against SPS notification rates by HS 2-digit 
code will be considered by the author in the cross-section regressions in section 3.6.2.  
 
(2) Crivelli & Grӧschl (2012) use a Heckman selection model to estimate the impact of SPS 
STCs on trade in agricultural products occurring between pairs of countries. They find that SPS 
STCs negatively affect the probability of trade occurring between countries, but conditional on 
trade being present, the presence of STC measures increased the amount of trade. Particularly, 
they find their results are strongly influenced by conformity assessment types of STCs and that 
these measures form the strongest barriers to market entry (Crivelli & Grӧschl, 2012). They 
cite that only one other author has used data from SPS STCs, but the author was combining 
them along with other measures on a single sector of trade and thus, excluded from this 
review.53  
 
(3) At a more micro-scale than the study of Crivelli & Grӧschl (2012), Fontagné, Orefice, 
Piermartini, et al. (2013) use firm-level data from French exporters to study the intensive and 
extensive margins of trade on 4-digit HS codes covered by SPS STCs. They find robust 
evidence that the presence of a trade concern on a product line reduces the probability of a firm 
to export by 2.2% and tentatively suggest that larger firms increase prices in destination 
markets or increase market share as a result. They—like Crivelli & Grӧschl (2012)—do not 
look at what motivates a STC or how they get resolved either; the STCs are simply a key 
exogenous variable in their regression models.  
 
Lastly (4), Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm (2013) look at the number of STC generated that do 
not proceed to formal disputes with the DSB. They conclude that the STC mechanism of the 
SPS and TBT Committees are effective at preventing escalation of disputes. Their work on 
dispute resolution is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
                                               
53
 Crivelli & Grӧschl (2012) cite that Schlueter, Wieck & Heckelei (2009) study also uses SPS STC data; 
however, Schlueter, Wieck and Heckelei use all SPS regulatory notifications (i.e. including STC, Regular, 
Emergency, etc.) combined in one variable and only considering specific 4-digit HS codes in meat trade (HS02). 
As such, their paper does not address the use of STCs specifically nor distinguish them from other trade metrics.  
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3.3.2. The drivers of raising official WTO disputes on SPS issues 
The most related studies to examine drivers of SPS disagreements are in the legal literature. 
The main thrust of the literature examines various aspects of WTO DSB disputes citing the 
SPS agreement. Several authors have written about the first dispute that was settled under the 
SPS agreement: the US-EU beef hormone dispute (Kastner & Pawsey, 2002b; Charlier & 
Rainelli, 2002; Bureau, Marette & Schiavina, 1998; James, 2000). The “beef hormone case”—
as it is commonly referred to—was a landmark case for the SPS agreement. The complaint 
originated with the EU banning the use of hormones as growth promoters in cattle in 1989 
(Kastner & Pawsey, 2002b). The dispute highlighted: (1) the importance of lobbying, as US 
beef producers successfully convinced the US government to pursue the dispute against the EU 
and (2) the upholding of SPS rules, as the lack of a science-based risk assessment lead to the 
loss of the case by the EU (Kastner & Pawsey, 2002b). Other SPS WTO disputes followed. 
Smith (2000) presents case studies on Mediterranean Fruit Fly, Foot and Mouth Disease, and 
Exotic Newcastle Disease in order to discuss the drivers of dispute in these three challenges. 
Smith (2000) concludes that the key drivers of dispute are (1) a lack of transparency and (2) 
not showing equivalence to international standards.   
 
Overall, while several authors have recognized the importance of understanding the drivers of 
agricultural trade disputes, none have specifically looked at the drivers of STCs in the SPS 
agreement. Despite the widespread belief that NTMs like SPS measures may be motivated by 
protectionist factors, there has not been an empirical test to see if those factors motivated the 
SPS measures later subject to formal dispute by an STC.  
 
3.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
STC data were downloaded from the SPS-IMS for all countries and all products where the 
concern was first raised from 1996 to 2010. Globally 292 SPS STCs were raised for the first 
time during that period; many concerns are raised multiple times over many years, but tracked 
by the same STC identification number until they are reported as “resolved” or “not 
resolved”.54 Additional data was included on those trade concerns that were re-raised in 2011 
                                               
54
 There were 16 SPS STCs where the result was “partially resolved”. These were excluded from the data set as 
some are reported as being “partially resolved”, but then subsequently re-raised, while others remain throughout 
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and 2012 as well. Two extra years account for over 90% of the first re-raise events (for 
justification of this sampling methodology, see Figure 88 on page 356 in Appendix A.7). 
Countries that raised the concern are referred to as “raising members” and the countries they 
raised the STC against are referred to as “maintaining members” throughout Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. 
 
Equivalently to the SPS data, STC data for concerns raised under the TBT Agreement were 
acquired from the TBT-IMS. Globally 282 TBT STCs were raised for the first time from 1996 
to 2010. Additional data was included on those trade concerns that were re-raised in 2011 and 
2012 as well. Unfortunately, under the TBT system the products (i.e. HS codes) upon which 
the STC is based are not directly coded in the system. Of the 282 STC raised, only five were 
coded with at least a HS-2 level product category. For the vast majority of STCs the product 
categories must be deciphered from the free text description of the concern or in the text of the 
title of the STC. Due to this limitation, the analysis on the TBT agreement was much more 
limited than for the SPS agreement. The summary statistics for TBT STC use are reported in 
section 3.5, but it is not used in the analysis of determinants of STC notifications in section 3.6. 
 
STCs are usually reported three times per year from the SPS/TBT Secretariat when the 
Committee meets in Geneva. The categories of data available for each STC is given in Table 
18, however, many STCs lack information in one or more categories. For simplicity of analysis, 
concerns are coded by the author by the year in which the meeting occurred. However, the 
count variable created for the number of times a concern is raised accounts for multiple raising 
events in a single year. 
 
                                               
the sample period. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle what happened in these cases without a more in-depth 
case-by-case analysis. With partially resolved STCs included, the number of SPS STCs was 308. 
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Table 18: Information recorded in the notification of a STC to the SPS/TBT Secretariat of the WTO 
Used for analysis in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 Also available 
• Products covered (by 2-, 4-, or 6-digit 
HS codes), 
• Current status as “resolved”, “partially 
resolved”, or “not reported” 
• Date the concern is first raised 
• Dates it is subsequently raised 
• Date reported as “resolved” 
• Member(s) raising the 
complaint/concern 
• Member(s) maintaining the 
controversial SPS measure 
• Members supporting the STC55 
• Description of content56 
• Subject keywords57 
• Links to relevant documents 
• Description of 
solution/resolution 
 
Additionally, many STCs are raised as one concern, but apply to many products at the 4-digit 
or 6-digit HS level. For the majority, the first product reported in the STC will have the same 
2-digit HS code as the other products reported in the STC. As a result, the first product’s HS-
2 code will be considered the “primary” HS-2 code for the concern in this chapter. The primary 
HS-2 code is used to merge with the SPS measure notification data (from Chapter 2) for the 
analysis of STC determinants discussed in section 3.6 below. The summary statistics on STC 
use in section 3.5 will also report the “primary” HS-2 code about which the concern is raised.  
 
Given the lack of empirical analysis in the literature on SPS/TBT STCs, extra attention is given 
to summarizing the information contained within this data source. Summary information with 
insights into how WTO member countries have used the mechanism in SPS and TBT 
Committees is given in section 3.5 and accompanying summary tables in Appendices A.5, A.6, 
A.8, A.9, and A.10. These summary cross-tabulations report on the full STC data acquired as 
explained above. The preparation for analysis of determinants involved some modifications to 
the data, which is explained in the next section, 3.4.1.  
 
                                               
55
 Only used in the analysis in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 as a binary variable called “is support?” which is 1 if 
there is at least one country supporting the raising member’s concern and 0 if not. 
56
 Used in analysis of plant health STCs only (section 4.5 in Chapter 4) 
57
 Terms like “animal health”, “food safety” etc. Section 4.5 analysis is on STCs with “plant health” as a 
keyword 
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3.4.1. Testing drivers of STCs from SPS notifications 
From Chapter 2, each of the 8,487 SPS notifications58 from 98 WTO members on 69 different 
HS 2-digit (HS-2) codes from 1996 to 2010 form the basis of the potential set of regulations 
that a STC can be issued against during the same time period. The SPS STCs are then observed 
on the same set of countries, products, and years. The main difference between the dataset 
constructed in Chapter 2 and the one here combined with STC data is that observations of zero 
SPS notifications are removed. While those observations were necessary for considering the 
probability of notifying an SPS regulation, the analysis here assumes a STC is raised against 
one of the notified SPS regulations. As a result, the variable of interest is of a previously 
notified SPS measure subsequently being raised as a STC. Of the 292 total SPS STCs raised, 
only 244 have both HS-2 code and maintaining member countries identified as required for the 
analysis.  
 
The European Union presented a dilemma since members report trade concerns as a union and 
as individual nations. Unlike the SPS measures data in Chapter 2 though, the number of 
individual EU members subject to STCs were relatively few. Combined, there were only 13 
STCs raised against Poland, France, Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Except 
for France, all countries had complaints against them before ascending to the European Union 
in 2004 (2007 for Romania). In contrast, the EU as a block had 49 STCs raised against them 
on specific HS-2 codes in the period. As such, the STC data is merged with the EU aggregate59 
dataset of Chapter 2 where individual EU members will be excluded.  
 
Excluding these individual EU members as well as those that lack HS-2 or maintaining country 
information, the final dataset for analysis has 231 STCs paired with SPS notification data and 
the relevant covariates from that dataset in Chapter 2.60 The model to test then is the number 
of STCs expected, given the covariates, on a country-HS-year combination where at least one 
SPS measure was previously notified. A count data model was chosen over a logistic or probit 
model since observations of STCs on a given country-HS-year observation ranged up to eight 
                                               
58
 Both Emergency and Regular notifications are included 
59
 The method of treatment of notifications in the EU aggregate and disaggregated versions of the SPS/TBT 
notification data is explained on page 39 and the treatment for covariates on page 43 in Chapter 2.  
60
 The covariates used in the analysis are: trade data (imports and exports) by country-HS-year, trade-weighted 
average bound tariff rates by country-HS-year, exchange rate index by country-year, current account status by 
country-year, GDP per capita by country-year, population by country-year, and finally, environmental 
governance score by country. The sources and preparation of these data are discussed in section 2.5 from pages 
39 to 43.  
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STCs. Given the over-dispersion and excess zeroes, the negative binomial (NB) estimator was 
favoured over a Poisson model (Long & Freese, 2001).  
 
In the data, around 5% of the unique country-HS-year observations of at least one SPS measure 
notification are also subject to a STC in the same year.The primary difficulty to address is the 
issue of time lags between the changing of an SPS policy, issuing of an SPS measure, and the 
subsequent raising of a STC by a third party. Since the STCs do not specify directly which SPS 
measure they are raising a concern against, assumptions are made and tested in two treatments 
of the dependent STC variable. The assumption made in the analysis is that the STC refers to 
either: (1) the current year’s SPS notification of the maintaining member country on that HS-2 
code or (2) the last previously notified SPS notification from one to several years prior to the 
STC. Results presented starting on page 97 for the cross-section (section 3.6.2) and page 103 
for the time-series (section 3.6.3) analyse the data for either assumption. The summary statistics 
for the variables used in the regression models are found in Appendix A.14, page 369. Section 
3.6 begins, however, with a look at the trends in STC use by category of tariff BO. The 
methodology of this brief analysis is discussed in the next section (3.4.2).  
 
3.4.2. Raise count by tariff binding category 
Complementing the above approach, an alternative test for protectionist bias via the tariff 
motive is whether the STCs that are re-raised more often are found on HS-2 codes with tighter 
tariff binding. Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm (2013) study argues that disputes that are re-
raised many times are likely issues that are more contentious or “serious”. Therefore, the re-
raise count for a STC might be an indication of how difficult and unfair the raising member 
perceived the SPS measure to be.  
 
The analysis presented in section 3.6.1 tests if the raise count of each STC has any relation to 
the tariff BO. For the maintaining member countries, the number of STCs per country-HS 
observation were grouped according to their quartile of tariff BO for the year they were 
issued.61 Statistical tests (including two-sample T-tests and rank-sum tests) were used to test 
                                               
61
 There is certainly a time lag between the tariff binding which caused an illegitimate SPS measure to be issued 
that was then later called into dispute by a STC, but the simplifying assumption of using current year was used. 
Given that the point of comparison is between STCs issued, the error should bias groups equally.  
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for differences in notification rates between tariff binding groups. The data set used is the same 
as the one described above in 3.4.1. 
 
3.5. SUMMARY INFORMATION ON SPS/TBT TRADE CONCERNS 
 
3.5.1. Top countries for SPS STCs  
Table 19 below contains the ten countries that raised the most trade concerns from 1996 to 
2010 in the SPS Committee. The full list of raising countries is in Appendix A.8 on page 357. 
For each member, Table 19 reports the total number of STCs that were resolved by 2012 as 
well as the mean number of years it took to resolve the concern and the mean number of times 
that the concern was re-raised before resolution.  
 
Table 19: Top 10 countries raising STCs under the SPS Agreement from 1996 to 2010 
Raising 
Member 
Num. 
STC 
Raise 
Num. 
STC 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Years 
until 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Num. 
Times 
Raised 
% of 
STC 
with 
Support 
(max) 
Num. of 
Supporters 
(total) 
SPS 
Notification 
of Raising 
Member 
(mean)  
SPS Notif.’s 
of 
Maintaining 
Members 
  1. United States 59 15 3.8 2.5 51% 11 538 455 
  2. European Union 54 27 5.6 2.3 31% 4 1,082 290 
  3. Argentina 28 14 3.3 2.5 39% 4 147 337 
  4. certain members 23 5 4.4 5.4 74% 13  670 
  5. Brazil 21 4 1.8 2.8 29% 7 408 309 
  6. China 18 2 3.0 6.0 33% 3 322 618 
  7. Canada 15 8 3.9 1.9 60% 5 184 490 
  8. Thailand 7 3 2.3 8.0 43% 4 202 326 
  9. Mexico 7 0   43% 5 213 256 
10. Australia 5 0   60% 3 201 802 
ALL COUNTRIES 292 94 3.8 3.0 44% 13  444 
Note: Counts of the number of STC raised in column 2 do not include re-raising of 
concerns, they reflect unique concerns raised.  
 
The resolution rate varies greatly by country. For example for the EU, around half of all STCs 
are eventually resolved, but for China the rate is only 11% (column 3 divided by column 2 of 
Table 19). Of the STCs that the USA has raised, 51% have had at least one other WTO member 
register support for the concern (column 6), but for Brazil only 29% of raised STCs have had 
other WTO members express support for the concern. Additionally, the time it takes to resolve 
the concerns ranged from 6 years on average for concerns raised by the EU to around 2 years 
for Brazil. For Mexico and Australia, none of their STCs have officially been resolved. The 
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differences in resolution rates observed between raising countries are examined in Chapter 4 
starting on page 109.  
 
Some countries are both top raisers of trade concerns and have the most concerns raised against 
them (see Table 20). The United States and the European Union top both lists, which is likely 
driven both by their large trade in agriculture products and by their status as large economic 
markets that foreign exporters want to access. Also on both lists are Brazil, China, Mexico, and 
Australia. The presence of countries like Brazil and China indicate that emerging powers are 
both subject to pressure to make their markets non-discriminatory, while concurrently pursuing 
fair access to other countries’ markets.  
 
Table 20: Top 10 countries maintaining measures subject to SPS STCs first raised from 1996 to 2010 
Maintain 
Member 
Num. 
STC 
Against 
Num. 
STC 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Years 
until 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Num. 
Times 
Raise 
% of 
STC w/ 
Support 
(max) 
Num. 
Member 
Support 
(total) 
SPS 
Notif’s 
Maintain 
Member 
(median) 
Binding 
Overhang 
w/ STC 
(median) 
Binding 
Overhang 
w/ SPS62 
 1. European Union 57 9 5.5 3.6 60% 13  1,082  1.7 1.0 
 2. United States 31 6 3.3 3.3 32% 5  538  1.7 0.5 
 3. Japan 23 4 3.5 4.0 57% 7  553  2.2 0.4 
 4. certain members 18 5 4.4 4.0 39% 6    
 5. China 16 6 2.3 2.5 31% 3  322  -0.1 0.2 
 6. Australia 13 7 4.6 3.0 85% 7  201  1.2 3.4 
 7. Brazil 12 4 3.8 2.3 33% 5  408  21.0 21.3 
 8. Mexico 9 3 3.3 7.3 22% 2  213  19.5 26.1 
 9. Indonesia 8 2 1.5 4.0 38% 3  36  42.3 34.4 
10. Korea 8 2 1.0 3.0 38% 5  209  6.8 3.9 
ALL COUNTRIES 292 94 3.8 3.0 44% 13  3.0 1.0 
Note: Counts of the number of STC raised in column 2 do not include re-raising of 
concerns, they reflect unique concerns raised.  
  
Several countries are in the top ten for raising STCs, but much further down the list in measures 
raised against them. These countries include Argentina, Canada, and Thailand. A defining 
feature of all three of these countries is that they are all major net exporters of agricultural 
products. In 2011, Argentina was the second largest net exporter of agricultural products by 
                                               
62
 Recall tariff binding overhang is the difference between the bound and the applied tariff, indicating a 
country’s flexibility to raise the applied tariff without violating WTO commitments. See section 2.5.2 on page 
41. 
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value (for the full country list of agricultural net trade see Appendix A.11 on page 361).63 This 
provides some suggestive evidence that STCs are raised to improve market access against 
allegedly unfair policies in markets of some importance for the exporter. It also suggests that 
agricultural export value or net agricultural exports may be an important country-level driver 
of being an active raiser of STCs against other members.  
 
There are also several countries that are not significant raisers of trade concerns, but have many 
raised against them (see Table 20). From the top ten, this list includes Japan, Indonesia, and 
Korea. Looking again at the net agricultural trade from 2011, Korea and Japan are among the 
top net importers of food (see again Table 72 in Appendix A.11 for data). These Asian markets 
represent a large target market for exporters to sell their agricultural goods. As a result, they 
are possibly subject to more scrutiny by other WTO members who raise STCs against them.  
 
While the conclusions of the work of Chapter 2 were that tariffs were a driver of SPS 
notification and could potentially indicate a protectionist bias in SPS use, the tentative 
suggestion from the summary statistics in Table 20 is that tariff binding64 does not seem to be 
tighter on measures subject to trade concerns as compared to general SPS measures. The 
median tariff BO of all HS-2 codes with any SPS notification from maintaining members in 
Table 20 (last column on right) is lower than the median BO of just the HS-2 codes with STCs 
(2nd column from right). However the conclusion here is tempered by missing data: 89 out of 
292 STCs (30%) lack tariff binding data due to (1) the applied or bound tariff data being 
missing (54 observations) or (2) the STC not being assigned to a HS code in the SPS-IMS (35 
observations).  
 
3.5.2. Top countries for TBT STCs 
While the SPS agreement had 38 countries that have raised STCs from 1996 to 2010, the TBT 
agreement has had only 16 countries raise at least one STC in the period. These countries are 
listed in order of concerns raised in Table 21. Unlike the SPS agreement, some of the top raisers 
of STCs have issued relatively few TBT measures of their own. For example, Canada has only 
                                               
63
 Data from FAOSTAT (2014) for exports minus imports in 2011 by value on all products in the group of 
agricultural products as defined by FAO.  
64
 Recall tariff binding overhang (BO) is the difference between the bound and the applied tariff, indicating a 
country’s flexibility to raise the applied tariff without violating WTO commitments (review section 2.5.2). 
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issued 10 TBT notifications indicating new/changed Canadian TBT policies, but have 
questioned the validity of four other members’ regulations. However, four is not many STCs 
to issue in a 15-year period. The result that stands out when examining the TBT STC data is 
that the top five complainants drive the majority of concerns. In the TBT agreement, the 
majority of issues are raised by several members working together to question another 
members’ TBT regulations (certain members in first column of Table 21). The TBT agreement 
had 50% of total STCs raised by certain members as compared to the SPS agreement with less 
than 8% raised by certain members. The top five countries (including the certain members 
category) account for 91% of all TBT STCs raised as compared to 63% for the top 5 raisers of 
SPS STCs.  
 
Table 21: Rank of countries by number of STCs raised under the TBT Agreement from 1996 to 2010 
Raising 
Member 
Num. 
STC 
Raise 
(mean) 
Num. 
Times 
Raise w/o 
Resolve 
(total) 
TBT 
Notifications 
of Raising 
Members 
(mean) 
TBT 
Notifications 
of Maintaining 
Members 
 1. certain members 141 4.7  213 
 2. European Union 65 1.9 129 199 
 3. United States 24 2 650 185 
 4. China 20 1.9 505 404 
 5. Japan 8 1.5 376 191 
 6. Canada 4 1.3 10 174 
 7. Mexico 4 1.3 2 399 
 8. Switzerland 3 2.7 23 291 
 9. Argentina 2 1.5 2 578 
10. Australia 2 1 22 650 
11. India 2 1 3 390 
12. Indonesia 2 1.5 41 390 
13. Chile 2 2 2 83 
14. Malaysia 1 1 13 129 
15. Norway 1 2 2 10 
16. Slovenia 1 1   
ALL COUNTRIES 282 3.3  229 
 
Who did these 16 countries raise concerns against? The markets with potential issues in their 
TBT policies are more diffuse than the group that raises concerns against them. There are 40 
countries that have had at least one of their TBT policies questioned by another WTO member 
(see the full list of countries in Appendix A.10 on page 360). Recalling from section 2.5 in 
Chapter 2 that only 68 countries have issued any TBT notifications in the period, then 59% of 
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members have had at least one complaint against a TBT policy that they have changed—a 
higher percentage than the SPS agreement where 47 out of 98 members (48%) have had at least 
one STC raised against their notified SPS policies.  
 
The top ten countries with the most STC raised against them of the 40 maintaining members 
are listed in Table 22. Unlike the SPS agreement, in the TBT agreement trade concerns are 
most often raised against individual member countries. While the 4th largest “country” 
maintaining suspect SPS measures in Table 20 on page 92 was certain members, in the TBT 
system there was only one STC raised against certain members maintaining the measure.  
 
Another feature that stands out in Table 22 for TBT trade concerns is that many of the top 
markets maintaining concerns raised against them by other countries have notified relatively 
few TBT measures. For example, India has 15 STCs against them, but have only issued three 
TBT measures during the period. Similarly, Argentina has had seven complaints raised against 
them, but have only issued two TBT measures. This would indicate for the TBT system, many 
complaints are raised against WTO members’ policies that have not been notified officially to 
the TBT-IMS. Either there is (1) a lack of notification due to misunderstanding or lack of 
capacity, or (2) it could indicate countries not notifying their protectionist-motivated policies.  
 
Table 22: Top 10 countries maintaining measures subject to TBT STCs first raised from 1996 to 2010 
Maintaining 
Member 
Num. 
STC 
Against 
(mean) 
Num. Times 
Raise w/o 
Resolve 
(total) TBT 
Notifications 
of Maintain 
Member 
  1. European Union 62 4.5 129 
  2. China 34 2.9 505 
  3. United States 33 2.4 650 
  4. Korea 19 2.7 43 
  5. India 15 4.9 3 
  6. Brazil 14 3.5 281 
  7. Japan 11 2.1 376 
  8. Canada 9 3.3 10 
  9. Indonesia 9 2.7 41 
10. Argentina 7 2.7 2 
ALL COUNTRIES 282 3.3  
 
While the product-level information is not present for TBT STCs, the presence of many 
concerns in places with few notifications could indicate protectionist use by countries. This 
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issue of underreporting in the TBT system hinders research on TBT notifications; TBT STCs 
will not be explored further in this chapter.  
 
3.5.3. Top HS-codes for SPS STCs 
The full cross-tabulation of SPS STCs by country and the HS-2 codes they were raised against 
is reported in Appendix A.5 for raising members and Appendix A.6 for maintaining members. 
Since TBT STCs lacked good coverage of HS-2 codes, they are not reported. Table 23 below 
presents the summary statistics of resolution rate and type of country involved in the STCs by 
HS-2 code.  
 
Table 23: Total SPS STCs by HS-2 code with resolution and country information 
       Raising Maintaining 
HS 
Code 
Num. 
STC 
Raise 
Num. 
STC 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Years 
until 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Num. 
Times 
Raise 
% STC 
w/ 
Support 
(max) 
Num. 
Member 
Support 
Num. 
Unique 
Nations 
% 
Dev. 
Num. 
Unique 
Nations 
% 
Dev. 
2 77 25 3.0 2.9 27% 8 34 61% 17 42% 
8 36 14 3.5 3.2 44% 12 15 28% 19 74% 
NA 36 7 5.4 3.4 58% 11 14 37% 12 31% 
1 25 5 3.2 1.8 52% 4 15 63% 12 46% 
7 17 6 4.2 2.7 65% 5 13 53% 9 38% 
4 14 8 5.7 2.6 43% 5 9 62% 6 23% 
6 12 4 2.5 2.8 58% 2 8 18% 9 55% 
10 11 6 5.2 4.7 9% 5 9 55% 5 36% 
5 9 1 7.0 7.0 78% 11 4 22% 4 14% 
21 9 2 2.5 4.0 56% 13 4 0% 6 88% 
44 9 4 6.8 1.5 56% 8 4 14% 7 38% 
3 8 3 3.0 2.3 38% 6 5 25% 5 50% 
23 8 5 3.0 2.0 38% 1 7 38% 5 50% 
16 5 1 3.0 8.0 20% 2 4 40% 4 80% 
9 5 1 1.0 2.0 80% 13 1 0% 5 100% 
33 2 0  
 
50% 3 2 50% 2 0% 
17 2 0  
 
50% 2 2 0% 2 50% 
22 2 0  
 
50% 1 2 100% 2 50% 
20 1 0  
 
0% 0 1 0% 1 0% 
88 1 1 2.0 2.0 0% 0 1 100% 1 100% 
30 1 0  
 
100% 3 1 100% 1 0% 
11 1 1 4.0 2.0 0% 0 1 100% 1 0% 
18 1 0  
 
0% 0 1 0% 1 100% 
TOTAL 292 94 3.8 3.0 44% 13 38 47% 47 44% 
Note: “% Dev.” is the percentage of the total number of STCs in that HS-2 code that are 
raised or maintained by developing countries.  
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As shown in Table 23, the HS-2 product line with the most concerns raised is HS02 (Meat) 
followed by HS08 (Edible Fruits and Nuts). Meat is a particularly active sector as 34 out of 38 
total nations that have ever raised a STC have raised at least one on meat against one of 17 
other member nations. The most active and difficult category to achieve consensus might be 
HS05 (Products of Animal Origin NES65). Only one of nine concerns have been resolved; the 
concern that was resolved took seven years and seven meetings where it was re-raised before 
resolution was reached.  
 
Table 23 also suggests that some product categories vary in importance by the countries’ 
development status. HS08 (Edible Fruit and Nuts) and HS06 (Live Trees and Other Plants) 
mainly have concerns raised by developed nations (72% of HS08 STCs, 82% of HS06 STCs) 
against developing country nations (74% of HS08 STCs, 55% of HS06 STCs). Further down 
the list, HS21 (Misc. Edible Preparations) has concerns raised only by developed countries 
against mostly developing countries (88% of HS21 STCs). On the other hand, HS04 (Dairy, 
Birds’ eggs, honey), HS07 (Edible Vegetables), and HS01 (Live Animals) are all majority 
raised by developing countries against developed nations. While the reasons behind this are 
not explored in the current research, the HS code factors are controlled for in the regression 
models that follow in section 3.6 and in the analysis of STC resolution in Chapter 4 to make 
sure the results are not driven by product level heterogeneity.  
 
3.6. DETERMINANTS OF STCS FROM SPS MEASURES 
 
The determinants of SPS measures being subject to a STC are explored in this section. The 
section begins in 3.6.1 with an analysis of the data to answer two questions motivated by the 
literature and Chapter 2 results. The first (1) is whether STCs are re-raised more often when 
they concern products with tighter tariff BO. The assumption is that STCs raised once are 
simple issues like information requests, whereas, the STCs that are raised many times are likely 
serious complaints against a protectionist SPS policy that may have been put in place to 
compensate for lost tariff protection (Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm, 2013). The second (2) 
question is whether STCs are raised more often on products that have very few SPS 
notifications. The assumption is that SPS risks should vary more by product than country, so a 
                                               
65
 NES – not elsewhere specified (i.e. animal products not included in HS1, HS2, etc.) 
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country using SPS measures on a product that has few notifications globally may be motivated 
by protectionism (Disdier, Fontagné & Mimouni, 2008).  
 
The subsequent sections (3.6.2 and 3.6.3) examine the determinants of an SPS measure being 
subject to a STC. The cross-section results (section 3.6.2) test to see if at the country-level the 
total number of SPS measures used correlates to the number of them that are subject to STCs. 
The time-series (section 3.6.3) does a more thorough investigation to find a relation between 
the bound tariff and the likelihood of putting in place an SPS measure that will be subject to a 
trade concern.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the analysis is on the probability and expected number of SPS 
measures being raised as a STC. As such, for example if the STC raised in 2005 is mapped to 
an SPS measure in 1999, it is the conditions of the covariates in 1999 that are of interest as that 
was the year the suspect policy was put in place. The models say nothing about why the raising 
member chose 2005 as the year to raise the concern for example. The question of the conditions 
in the raising member’s country that lead to raising concerns is left for future research.  
 
3.6.1. STC trends on SPS notifications 
Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm (2013) use the number of times a STC is raised in the SPS/TBT 
Committee as a proxy of the “seriousness” of the concern.66 They logically assume that 
concerns that are more contentious, impact more trade for the raising country, or are more 
legitimate complaints against a protectionist policy will receive more attention from raising 
members. If a SPS measure was put into place due to protectionist drivers like a tight tariff BO 
preventing the country from raising the applied tariff to achieve trade policy goals, one would 
expect that more “serious” STCs would be raised on products with a tighter tariff BO. As shown 
in Figure 11, there is no evidence for this prediction.  
 
The median raise count for STCs in each category of tariff binding are very close (see Figure 
11), and the means are not significantly different by a two-sample T-test. Whether the tariff 
BO was tight or very loose, the number of “serious” concerns raised is relatively constant. Said 
                                               
66
 They arbitrarily define any concern raised over three times as “serious” 
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another way, the mean number of raising events for a given STC is not influenced by the tariff 
BO category of the HS-2 product line for the country it is raised against.  
 
  
Note: Categories by percentile tariff BO on the HS-2 code of the STC maintaining 
member in the year of STC notification. <p25 indicates the country-HS observations with 
the tightest binding overhang and least ability to raise the applied tariff rate. The BO 
rates were: p25=0.31%, p50=3.13%, p75=21.25%.  
Figure 11: Median number of times a STC is raised by percentile tariff BO 
 
Disdier, Fontagné & Mimouni (2008) suggest that HS codes with few SPS notifications may 
signal that the SPS measure was motivated by protectionism and not a legitimate risk. 
Comparing the percentage of SPS measures in each HS that were later raised as STCs, there is 
very little evidence that this is occurring for the sample of maintaining countries used in this 
section.67 The number of STCs and SPS notifications by HS-2 code are presented in Table 24. 
The HS-2 codes are ranked by the percentage constructed from the total number of STCs 
divided by total number of SPS measures notified on that HS code globally.  
 
                                               
67
 As explained in part of the methodology section (3.4.1), STCs from EU individual members are excluded as 
well as STCs raised against “certain members” without a defined maintaining WTO member. As a result, the 
total number of STCs in Table 24 will be lower for some HS codes than those given in the summary in section 
3.5.3 which included the full sample of countries.  
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Table 24: Top ten HS-2 by percentage of SPS measures that become STCs for period 1996 to 2010 
Rank 
HS-2 
Code 
Total  
SPS 
Notif’s 
Total 
STCs 
% of SPS 
Raised 
as STC 
1 88 3 1 33.3% 
2 21 82 9 11.0% 
3 33 19 2 10.5% 
4 17 29 2 6.9% 
5 08 542 34 6.3% 
6 44 136 7 5.1% 
7 02 1411 65 4.6% 
8 07 365 15 4.1% 
9 10 262 10 3.8% 
10 06 297 11 3.7% 
 
While there are certainly some HS-2 codes with few SPS notifications that had a high 
percentage raised as STCs (e.g. HS88 or HS17), the majority of STCs are in HS codes with 
many SPS notifications (see Table 24 above). The full table in the Appendix (A.12, page 366) 
reveals that there are many HS codes with sparse SPS notifications that were subject to no 
STCs. The lack of correlation between total number of SPS measures raised and number of 
STCs on country-HS observations is confirmed in the cross-section model that follows (section 
3.6.2).  
 
3.6.2. Cross-section results 
The results below are in a cross section set-up with the total number of STCs as the dependent 
variable and the independent variables are the means by country-HS observation (i.e. 
collapsing the data over the years observed, 1996 to 2010). The first version of the model 
presents the results assuming the STC is due to the notified SPS measure in the same year 
(columns (1) and (2) in Table 25 below). The second set of models assume that the STC pertains 
to the last previously notified SPS measure (columns (3) and (4) in Table 25 below).  
 
The results of Table 25 below show that lower bound tariffs on HS 2-digit level products from 
maintaining member countries were not correlated with more STCs being raising against them. 
This was true whether the STC was assumed to be raised against the same SPS regulation 
notified that year (columns 1 and 2) or the last previously raised SPS notification in that HS-2 
code (columns 3 and 4). The only significant predictor of SPS measures having STCs raised 
against them were the GDP of the maintaining member country.  
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Larger economy countries were predicted to have higher numbers of STCs raised against their 
SPS measures. This provides some confirmation to the suggestion from Bown (2004c) that 
wealthier (i.e. more powerful) countries will be more likely to implement policies that are 
outside the legal bounds of a trade agreement. However, a major caveat is that it is impossible 
to know from this data if the STC was a worthy complaint (i.e. the SPS measure was indeed 
protectionist). In fact, the lack of correlation with the bound tariff suggests that protectionism—
in terms of compensating for lost tariff protection—is not a driver. As STCs are raised about 
market access restrictions that the raising member deems unfair, it is not surprising that raising 
countries would petition for access to larger markets.  
 
Table 25: Cross-sectional correlates of total STCs by maintaining country and HS-2 using NB estimator 
 STC  
(Present Year SPS) 
STC  
(Last Notified SPS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) 0.00206 0.00124 0.00133 0.000299 
 
(0.00254) (0.00257) (0.00312) (0.00318) 
Log Imports 0.0738 0.107 0.0911 0.116 
 
(0.0657) (0.0672) (0.0758) (0.0782) 
Log Exports -0.0470 -0.0556 -0.0168 -0.0235 
 
(0.0401) (0.0395) (0.0477) (0.0475) 
Log GDP 0.596** 0.570** 0.608** 0.571** 
 
(0.0798) (0.0803) (0.0917) (0.0927) 
Total SPS -0.00216 -0.00249 -0.00158 -0.00219 
 
(0.00305) (0.00299) (0.00333) (0.00329) 
Enviro. Governance  -0.116  0.0141 
 
 (0.169)  (0.195) 
ln(α)68 -1.230* -1.344* -1.104* -1.178* 
Observations 868 834 868 834 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. HS-2 code dummies included. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
One check of the result with maintaining member’s GDP is to restrict the sample to just STCs 
that are suggested by Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm (2013) to be “serious” concerns. 
Eliminating STCs that are raised just once or twice should remove many of the STCs that are 
not legitimate complaints against an unfair SPS policy. The model is re-estimated on a 
                                               
68
 The value of α confirmed significant over-dispersion in the data (i.e. α ≠ 0), hence the choice of the NB 
estimator over Poisson. 
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restricted sample for the expected number of STCs, assuming the STCs in that country-HS 
observation are raised more than two times. The results from the restricted sample regression 
are in Table 26. 
 
Table 26: Cross-sectional correlates of total STCs (raised more than two times) by maintaining country 
and HS-2 using NB estimator 
 STC  
(Present Year SPS) 
STC  
(Last Notified SPS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) 0.00352 0.00231 0.00131 -0.000128 
 (0.00354) (0.00356) (0.00402) (0.00412) 
Log Imports 0.0491 0.0855 0.107 0.145 
 (0.104) (0.106) (0.112) (0.115) 
Log Exports -0.0952 -0.107 -0.0904 -0.101 
 (0.0658) (0.0650) (0.0730) (0.0726) 
Log GDP 0.778** 0.735** 0.772** 0.729** 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.142) (0.143) 
Total SPS 0.000343 -0.000790 0.000674 -0.000619 
 (0.00627) (0.00617) (0.00657) (0.00647) 
Enviro. Governance  0.0331  0.0250 
  (0.304)  (0.340) 
ln(α)69 0.162 0.0922 0.0888 0.0303 
Observations 807 773 807 773 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. HS-2 code dummies included, but not reported. Standard errors in 
brackets. 
 
The estimated from Table 26 are very similar to the results of the full sample which included 
STCs raised two or fewer times as well (Table 25). The coefficient on   is higher in 
Table 26 suggesting again that wealthier countries have more STCs raised against their SPS 
measures, which is not driven by either the product categories (HS-2 codes) they tend to trade 
in, nor the total number of SPS measures ( ) in the country-product observation. 
Future research accounting for the validity of the complaint and better identification to match 
the STC to the specific SPS measure it is against would be needed to come to a robust 
conclusion. The preliminary suggestion from the estimations is that larger economies are 
subject to more concerns raised against them, likely motivated by raising members wanting 
                                               
69
 The value of α could not confirm over-dispersion in the data (i.e. α ≠ 0). Thus, the results were checked using 
a Poisson regression, which reported the same sign and significance for all covariates (results not shown).  
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enhanced market access and not because the maintaining member is more protectionist due to 
its power, since the result on   (. . ) is not significant.  
 
There was a non-significant, negative correlation between the total SPS raised in an HS code 
and the number that are subject to STCs. The lack of a significant positive relationship indicates 
that STCs are not raised uniformly against SPS measures, since a greater number of SPS 
measures on the country-HS observation does not lead to a greater number of STCs against 
them. Nor is there statistically significant evidence of negative correlation, which would have 
led confirmation to the suggestion in the study of Disdier, Fontagné & Mimouni (2008) that 
posits that HS codes with few SPS notifications may mean that the country raising the measure 
was motivated by protectionism and not a legitimate risk—hence expected to be subject to a 
STC, However, it is possible that countries have different HS codes in which they are more 
likely than other countries to use protectionist policies. If many countries had a unique HS code 
that they used for illegitimate policies, most of the identifying variation may be absorbed by 
the HS-2 code dummies in the models in Table 25. Models that do not control for HS-level 
heterogeneity found a positive correlation: higher (lower) numbers of STCs are expected 
against HS-2 codes with globally more (fewer) SPS notifications—opposite the suggestion of 
Disdier, Fontagné & Mimouni (2008).70 All evidence suggests that STCs are not more likely 
to occur on products with relatively few SPS measures notified on them, so there is little 
support for the hypothesis that protectionist SPS measures may occur more often on less-
notified HS codes.  
 
3.6.3. Time-series results  
Next, a time-series framework based on the modelling conducted in section 2.9 for SPS 
measures in Chapter 2 is used for those SPS measures that become STCs. Again, the models 
are run with two versions (i.e. present year SPS and last notified SPS) of the dependent STC 
count variable on the country-HS-year observations due to the lack of identification as to what 
SPS measure the STC applies to in the data.  
 
                                               
70
 Results in Appendix A.13, page 358 
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Table 27: First differences models using logit and Poisson for STCs raised on SPS measures maintained 
by country, year, and HS-2 
 
STC 
(Present Year SPS) 
STC 
(Last Notified SPS) 
 
(1) 
STC>1 
(2) 
STC 
(3) 
STC>1 
(4) 
STC 
 Cond. Logit F.E. Poisson Cond. Logit F.E. Poisson 
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) 0.0292 0.0156 0.133* 0.0817 
 (0.0343) (0.0871) (0.0517) (0.0694) 
L2.D. Log Imports -1.212 -0.629 2.719** 2.071 
 (0.926) (1.913) (0.944) (1.521) 
L2.D. Log Exports 0.519 -0.353 -0.344 -0.172 
 (0.373) (1.162) (0.203) (0.427) 
D. Log Exchange Rate -4.712 -10.18* -8.571** -3.125 
 (2.640) (4.505) (3.314) (3.124) 
D. Current Account (+) -0.343 -0.602 -1.602 -1.430 
 (0.828) (1.528) (1.545) (1.154) 
Observations 269 154 219 174 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Columns (1) and (3) conditional logit model of probability of at least 
one notification. Columns (2) and (4) ‘fixed effect' Poisson model of number of 
notifications conditional on there being at least 1. Conditioning group or ‘fixed effect' units 
in both columns are the Country-HS. Year dummies also included but not reported. 
Changes of GDPPC and population are included for all columns, but not reported. 
Cluster robust standard errors in brackets for columns (1) and (3); standard errors in 
brackets for columns (2) and (4). The same model is used as that previously for Table 13 
on page 72 in section 2.10.1. 
 
Table 27 presents the results from a conditional logit model and fixed effect Poisson model. 
Conditioning on country-HS to examine observations with identifying variation over time, the 
probability of a STC being raised on the given SPS measure is shown to have no statistically 
significant relationship to declining bound tariffs. If anything, the model with the assumption 
that the STC is raised about the previous SPS notification (column (3)) finds a weakly 
significant relation that declining bound tariffs within a country-HS group decrease not 
increase the probability of that SPS measure being raised as a STC.  
 
The same model (Table 27) also finds evidence in some specifications (e.g. column (3)) that 
SPS measures issued with increasing imports and depreciating currency are also more likely to 
be raised as a STC. This result is worthy of future investigation, however, first there needs to 
be clear identification between the STC and the specific SPS measure under dispute before 
further detailed econometric analysis. More insight may be gained from looking at specific 
STCs and a country’s reason for raising the concern; this is conducted for concerns related to 
plant health in section 4.5 of Chapter 4.  
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As one check of the validity of the assumption on when the STC is raised in the past, a model 
using the next, future SPS measure as the object of the STC is used (see results in Table 28). 
Since it is impossible that a STC would be raised before an SPS measure has notified a new 
policy or change, the model results should be completely insignificant. There is little reason to 
expect any relationship between a STC and the covariates on future SPS measures, except for 
the trade variables. One would expect that the STC could cause a decrease in trade in the 
following years. Certainly, future years’ GDP, population, and the bound tariff should be 
exogenous to the STC raised in the past. 
 
Table 28: Specification check of first difference model using logit and Poisson for STCs on future SPS 
regulations by country, year, and HS-2 
 STC 
(Next notified SPS) 
 (1) 
STC>1 
(2) 
STC 
 Cond. Logit F.E. Poisson 
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) -0.0167 -0.0173 
 (0.0117) (0.0227) 
L2.D. Log Imports -1.889 -1.761 
 (1.066) (1.518) 
L2.D. Log Exports -0.360 -0.319 
 (0.255) (0.361) 
D. Log Exchange Rate 2.789 0.695 
 (2.729) (3.511) 
D. Positive Current Account 0.633 1.202 
 (1.180) (1.739) 
Observations 238 180 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Coefficients reported. Column (1) conditional logit model of probability of at least one 
notification. Column (2) ‘fixed effect' Poisson model of number of notifications conditional 
on there being at least 1. Conditioning group or ‘fixed effect' units in both columns are the 
Country-HS. Year dummies also included but not reported. Changes of GDPPC and 
population are included for all columns, but not reported. Cluster robust standard errors 
in brackets for column (1); standard errors in brackets for column (2). 
 
As expected, in Table 28 the future bound tariffs had no relation to the issuing of a STC. The 
sign is also in the opposite direction as the plausible models in Table 27. While the result is not 
statistically significant, both exports and imports seem to be lower as predicted by reverse 
causality. The assumptions made on the dependent variable in the previous regressions did not 
appear to be obviously flawed based on these results (i.e. there were not spurious correlations 
using covariates on future notified SPS measures after a STC).  
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The results from both the cross-section and the time-series indicate that the decline of the bound 
tariff does not result in compensating protectionist use of unfair SPS measures (as measured 
by measures that are later subject to a STC). In context with the results of Chapter 2 that SPS 
measures are more likely to be issued on products that have experienced bound tariff declines, 
how can this be interpreted? It is likely that SPS policy makers in countries need to prioritize 
their work on new SPS policies. This may be influenced by which products are more important 
to the domestic sector, and domestic agricultural industries may push for products that are 
under more competition from loss of tariff protection. However, the results on STCs seem to 
indicate that this bias in prioritization of work does not result in a bias towards issuing unfair 
SPS policies. While all SPS measures seem to be driven to some extent by a tighter binding 
tariff, that same tariff variable does not drive the issuing of protectionist SPS policies (as 
deemed by other members raising STCs against them).  
 
3.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Fair open markets with reliable regulatory policies on agri-food trade is an important part of 
securing food security for the 21st century and key to enabling developing countries to benefit 
from their agriculture-focused economies in the global market. SPS policies help secure 
borders from unnecessary risks, but often countries dispute over the legitimacy of some 
regulatory policies and the science used to justify them. This chapter explored a few of the 
myriad of issues that arise from SPS regulations and some of the ongoing debates about what 
motivates disputes from the academic literature by analysing STC data from the WTO.  
 
From section 3.5, the summary statistics of the data revealed that the United States and the 
European Union both are among the largest raisers of STCs as well as among the top countries 
that have SPS policies called into question. One key feature that emerged was the importance 
of the agriculture sector to the trade of the country in differentiating raising and maintaining 
members. While larger economies like the US and EU were at the top of both raising and 
maintaining STCS, the key feature that made countries raise more relative to the number they 
maintained was their net agricultural export. Major net agricultural exporters like Thailand and 
Argentina raised many more STCs than were raised against them. Alternatively, major net 
importers of agriculture products like Japan and Korea had many more STCs raised against 
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them than they raised against others. This provides some suggestive evidence that STCs are 
raised to improve market access against unfair policies in large markets. 
 
The main question analysed in this chapter was what the drivers are of an SPS measure being 
subject to a STC. There was little evidence that STCs are motivated by a declining bound tariff. 
Section 3.6.1 showed that the number of times a STC is re-raised (a reflection of its seriousness) 
is not significantly different across all quartile groups of tariff BO. Additionally, SPS measures 
that are raised on obscure HS-2 level codes are not more likely to be raised as a STC—
indicating that using that metric as a proxy of protectionist use is likely poor. The cross-section 
(3.6.2) and time-series (3.6.3) results also strongly indicated that tariff binding does not 
influence the likelihood of an SPS measure being subject to a STC. The main drivers of SPS 
measures being subject to STCs seem to come at the country-level. Countries with larger 
markets (as measured by GDP) are more likely to have their SPS measures later petitioned by 
a STC—even when controlling for HS-2 code heterogeneity and total SPS measures raised.  
 
The results of Chapter 2 found that SPS measures are more likely on products that have 
experienced declining tariffs. The present results of Chapter 3 suggest declining tariffs do not 
make the SPS measure more likely to have a STC raised against it. The combination of these 
results may indicate that SPS bodies within countries may be influenced to apply SPS measures 
on products that are more sensitive or experience more lobbying, but the measures applied are 
in full compliance with the risk-based requirements of legitimate SPS policies. Certainly, 
disputes occur and faulty protectionist policies are called into question with STCs, but there 
does not seem to be a systematic bias in their use as a compensatory mechanism to 
liberalisation.  
 
There were several limitations and assumptions in the analysis. For one, there could be a 
selection bias in the concerns that are raised as STCs. Countries often discuss issues outside 
formal mechanisms and attempt to achieve clarification or understanding on a given regulation. 
The extent of these back channel communications is unknown, but thought to happen quite 
often among country representatives at SPS Committee meetings in Geneva.71 When these back 
door communications fail—or are not used—the formal dispute process begins with the raising 
                                               
71
 Personal communication with Gretchen Stanton, Secretary, SPS Secretariat in Geneva Dec 20, 2012. 
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of a STC. There could be a selection bias in the issuing of a STC as a result, however, analysis 
of this bias is not conducted due to the difficulty of finding good instruments (i.e. exclusion 
restrictions) for the selection equation that are not in the outcome estimation. In such cases, 
correcting for the bias may produce more inaccurate estimates than the original selection bias 
(Brandt & Schneider, 2007).  
 
Another assumption in this analysis presented in the cross-section (3.6.2) and time-series 
(3.6.3) is that STCs always refer to previously notified SPS measures. This may be a weak 
assumption given the analysis just of plant health STCs in section 4.5 following in Chapter 4. 
That analysis reveals that STCs are also raised for clarification of information and are not just 
raised in order to question the scientific validity of the new/changed regulatory measure. Short 
of individually analysing the contents of all STCs with full data, the simplifying assumption 
that the majority are raised against previously issued SPS measure had to be used.  
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 STC Resolution and Plant Health Cases 
 
In addition to signalling which SPS measures are potentially protectionist, STCs may also 
highlight which aspects of the obligations included in the SPS and TBT agreements tend to 
generate the most disagreement between member nations. Analysing the issues that have arisen 
in implementation can help design better mechanisms to prevent future disputes. The SPS and 
TBT agreement have obligations both for the evidence used to justify the policy measure as 
well as obligations to undertake measures in the way that is least restrictive to trade. Disputes 
arise when countries fail to meet these obligations in the opinion of a trading partner.  
 
Whether a SPS measure meets these economic obligations (e.g. implementing least trade-
restrictive policies) and/or scientific obligations (e.g. evidence of legitimate risk assessment) 
are often called into question by STCs. These different reasons for raising trade concerns may 
result in the different rates of resolution. As highlighted in the summary tables in section 3.5 
of Chapter 3, countries have very different rates of resolution for concerns they raise. 
Resolution of trade disputes under the GATT and WTO is the subject a substantial amount of 
academic research (see literature review, section 4.2). However, the drivers of resolution of 
STCs under the SPS agreement has not been analysed to date in the literature. The research 
questions guiding the chapter and order of presentation are reviewed in the next section (4.1). 
 
4.1. RESEARCH AIMS 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the drivers of resolution of STCs under the SPS 
agreement. For SPS STCs the first research question and related sub-questions are: 
 
1) What factors predict SPS STC resolution? 
a. How do developing countries fair in dispute resolution? 
b. Are democratic countries more likely to resolve STCs before they proceed to 
official WTO dispute?72 
                                                
72
 This is an implication of the results of the studies of Busch (2000) and Busch & Reinhardt (2006), which is 
discussed further in the literature review (section 4.2) 
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The next set of work in the chapter attempts to classify STCs according to the type of complaint 
the raising member alleges against the maintaining member’s regulations. This methodology 
was piloted on a subset of STCs from the main sample that related to “plant health”.73 Future 
research could apply the methodology discussed to all STCs for a more robust investigation of 
the dynamics of the STC system. Two additional questions are analysed for plant health 
concerns: 
 
1) Does the reason for raising the STC affect the probability of resolution? 
2) Does the value of trade on the HS code under concern for both raising and 
maintaining members of the STC affect the probability of resolution?  
 
Resolution of a STC is reported in the SPS-IMS database for each STC.74 Diagrammatically 
the possible outcomes after raising a STC are shown in Figure 12. The SPS STC resolution 
rates by country (section 3.5.1, page 91) and by HS75 code (section 3.5.3, page 96) from 1996 
to 2010 were reported previously as part of the summary work in Chapter 3. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.4.1 examines the trends in one country against 
one country disputes (also called “dyadic disputes” in the literature) and multiple party disputes 
(i.e. “non-dyadic” disputes) using STCs. A few of the most significant multiple party disputes 
are discussed. Section 4.4.2 examines just dyadic STCs, where one member raises the STC 
against one other member’s SPS policies. The drivers of resolution from country-level factors 
suggested by the WTO dispute literature are examined to understand how they differ for SPS 
STCs. Section 4.5 contains work on STCs related to plant health. Section 4.5.1 shows the 
breakdown in the use of different complaint reasons for plant health STCs. Section 4.5.2 
analyses whether these reasons for raising a STC have an impact on the probability of 
complaint resolution. Finally, section 4.5.3 briefly examines the impact of bilateral trade on 
dispute resolution between two countries. Section 4.6 concludes.  
 
                                               
73
 See data section (4.3.2) for sampling methodology  
74
 For reasons unknown to the author, the resolution statuses of TBT STCs are not reported in the TBT-IMS. As 
such, the resolution rates and analysis can only be conducted on SPS STCs. 
75
 Harmonized System (HS) see previous footnote (number 18) explaining the HS system on page 38. 
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Figure 12: Flow chart for outcomes of raising a trade concern in the SPS Committee (author’s own). 
 
Early drafts of the work on notification rates and resolution rates for plant health related STCs 
(section 4.5) was presented by the author as an invited panellist to a special session at the 
American Phytopathological Society (APS) Annual Meeting in August 2012.76 Early results 
on resolution rates of all SPS STCs (section 4.4.2) were also presented and discussed with 
WTO staff members of the SPS Secretariat at an informal meeting organized by the author in 
December 2012.  
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Busch (2000) uses a rare-events logit model to study the effect of democracy on GATT dispute 
outcomes that could go to an official panel, but often end in consultations instead. Two 
democratic countries with a dispute (termed a democratic “dyad”) may prefer to empanel as 
the legal proceedings appeal to them, but this escalation also raises the costs of the conflict 
outcome, which highly democratic countries would not prefer. Busch (2000) results show that 
                                               
76
 Pearson, L. “From Boom to Busted: Trade Concerns under the WTO’s SPS Agreement” Special Session 
‘Right of the Boom: Deciding to Act, React, or Let Go in a Fluid Data Environment’ American 
Phytopathological Society (APS) annual meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, 8th August, 2012. 
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highly democratic countries are more likely to settle at the consultation phase, but not if it goes 
to a panel. Busch (2000) suggests high audience costs prevent democratic countries from 
making concessions in a panel so defendants are less likely to resolve. Audience costs are 
further examined in Busch & Reinhardt (2006) for WTO disputes, finding similarly that when 
more countries officially join the dispute in support of either side, it makes the dispute less 
likely to resolve early and more likely to proceed to a final WTO DSB ruling.  
 
Bown (2004c)—in a seminal work published in the Journal of International Economics—
investigates the drivers of illegal use of the safeguards provision77 of the GATT from 1973 to 
1994. Bown asks why there are disputes at all under GATT rules, and whether there are 
economic drivers that motivate governments to make trade policy adjustments counter to their 
international agreements. The study finds evidence of governments implementing policies to 
better their nation’s terms of trade, which may lead to a trade dispute. The results suggest that 
the ability of a trade partner to retaliate determines whether that country pursues a legal or 
illegal safeguard measure. The power dynamic between a developing and developed country—
and similarly, that between a large and small economy—in a bilateral trade relationship is 
potentially fraught with unfair policies put in place by the more powerful partner. The empirical 
results of Bown (2004c) show that the more powerful trading partner is more likely to pursue 
aggressive trade policies outside of the confines of international agreements when they know 
that their partner is unlikely (or unable) to retaliate. In related work, Bown & Hoekman (2005) 
show that developing countries are mostly excluded from the DSB official settlement process 
despite legal aid being offered to their representatives. Bown (2004b) as well confirms that 
power dynamics have a significant effect on economic resolution to WTO and GATT disputes.  
 
Contrary to Bown (2004c), others like Horn, Mavroidis & Nordstrӧm (1999) argue that the 
findings on country power are more due to the value and diversity of trade that developed 
countries engage in and their legal capacities for disputes, rather than pure power 
considerations. Similarly, Davis & Bermeo (2009) contend that developing countries face start-
up costs to legal capacity and experience with WTO dispute initiation, and once these are initial 
capacity constraints are overcome, developing countries use the system well. Contrary to these 
legal capacity arguments, for WTO DSB dispute initiation Gӧtz, Heckelei & Rudloff (2010) 
                                               
77
 A similar agreement allowing for legitimate reasons to protect the market like the contemporary mechanisms 
in the WTO available from SPS and TBT measures. 
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study finds no significance for measures of legal capacity, export diversity, or importance of 
the export sector in likelihood of initiating an official dispute in the agri-food sector. Instead, 
the only significant predictors of dispute initiation were aggregate measures of market 
protection from the maintaining member and raising member. Gӧtz, Heckelei & Rudloff (2010) 
study found raising countries that were more liberalized and maintaining countries that were 
more protectionist were more likely to be involved in disputes. There is no conclusive answer 
to the differential initiation of disputes and resolution outcomes by country development status. 
A full legal review of the WTO disputes from 1996 to 2006 can be found in Petersmann (2006) 
and with a focus on the lack of dispute mechanism use by African countries in Alavi (2007).  
 
Lastly, Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm (2013) look at the number of STC generated that do not 
proceed to formal disputes with the DSB. They argue that the body provides a way to diffuse 
trade tensions before they become intractable trade disputes. They differentiate between 
“trivial” and “serious” concerns by the number of times the STC is raised. Those that are raised 
at only one meeting are “trivial” and those that are raised at over three meetings are “serious”. 
As such, they argue that many concerns in the SPS system that are left unresolved, may just be 
“trivial” concerns that were not worth bringing up in a subsequent meeting. In their analysis, 
they only use one ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model; the model showed that the 
number of meetings a concern is discussed at (their proxy of seriousness) is influenced by the 
number of other countries supporting the concern as well as the number of countries the 
concern is raised against. The majority of their argument is a qualitative one about the 
usefulness of the system for resolving disputes without a formal dispute proceeding—though 
they concede less than half of their “serious” SPS STCs are reported as resolved (Horn, 
Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm, 2013).  
 
The following analysis presented in this chapter—that was mostly conducted in 2012 before 
Horn, Mavroides & Wijkstrӧm (2013) —improves upon their work in a number of ways. 
Firstly, more details on the time to resolution by country and the drivers of resolution are 
examined. The regression models incorporate country level factors (e.g. GDP, Environmental 
Governance metrics, etc.) into the analysis of outcomes for developing countries. Finally, 
disaggregated analysis on the actual content of the STC is conducted for plant health related 
concerns.  
 
114 
 
4.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
As before for Chapter 3, STC data were downloaded from the SPS-IMS and TBT-IMS for all 
countries and all products with concerns that were first raised from 1996 to 2010. Complete 
details of the process are found in section 3.4 (page 86) of Chapter 3. TBT STCs are used in 
this chapter only to compare to SPS STCs on the percentage of disputes that are dyadic (section 
4.4.1).78 Modifications to the data were made for the analysis of resolution rates for SPS STCs 
(see explanation in next section, 4.3.1) and for the subset of SPS STCs related to plant health 
concerns (see explanation in section 4.3.2).  
 
4.3.1. Dyadic disputes and resolution 
The majority79 of SPS STCs involve one country raising an issue against another WTO 
member’s SPS policy. It is also possible for multiple countries to raise a concern or for one 
raising country to raise a STC, but name multiple maintaining countries that have questionable 
SPS regulations. The analysis on resolution rates is primarily concerned with disputes 
occurring between just two nations—also referred to in this chapter as a “dispute dyad” or 
“dyadic dispute” to match the common terms used in the conflict studies literature (Sattler & 
Bernauer, 2010; Busch, 2000; Guzman & Simmons, 2005).  
 
Non-dyadic disputes are sometimes ambiguously recorded in the SPS-IMS database as being 
raised or concerning “certain members”. It is difficult to analyse disputes when the country it 
concerns is ambiguous (i.e. certain members). As a result, the cases of multiple countries either 
raising a concern or maintaining a measure are considered briefly (see section 4.4.1 on non-
dyadic disputes) and are then excluded from the main analysis on the resolution rates of dyadic 
disputes (section 4.4.2). Of the 292 SPS STCs raised for the first time from 1996 to 2010: 21 
were raised by certain members, 16 were maintained by certain members, and 2 had certain 
members on both sides of the dispute. After excluding these non-dyadic STCs, there were 253 
dyadic SPS STCs for analysis.80  
 
                                               
78
 TBT STCs lacked resolution status data in the entries in the TBT-IMS. 
79
 See section 4.4.1, page 125, for breakdown summary of STCs into dyadic and non-dyadic dispute types 
80
 The main differences between the data samples in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is that the resolution analysis of 
this chapter includes individual EU members and STCs that lack HS-2 information, while the determinants 
sample used in Chapter 3 includes STCs raised by “certain members”.  
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Models are estimated for the probability of resolution using a logistic regression model (results 
are discussed in section 4.4.2). The dependent variable of interest is !		" which is a binary 
variable that is 1 if the STC has been resolved at some point up until 2012 or 0 otherwise. The 
STC data are combined with a variety of covariates from country and country-product level 
sources (discussed below).  
 
From the literature review, the expectation is that a country’s GDP and development status will 
have an impact on their ability both to raise and to resolve a dispute. The implication from the 
results of Bown (2004c) study is that raising members that are much poorer than maintaining 
member countries will be less likely to achieve a resolution to the dispute. GDP data is acquired 
by country and year in constant year 2000 US dollars from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of World Bank (2010). Status as a developed nation is also from the same source.  
 
The results of Busch (2000) for GATT disputes would suggest that more democratic countries 
should be more likely to resolve STCs so as to prevent the movement of the trade concern to 
an official WTO DSB dispute. Democratic data comes from the polity2 measure of democracy 
from the Polity IV project (Marshall & Gurr, 2011). The joint-democracy score is created by 
summing the polity2 scores of both raising and maintaining members of the STC; higher 
numbers express more fully democratic countries involved in the dispute dyad. 
 
The review of the qualitative factors affecting resolution of historic food safety disputes 
covered by Kastner & Powell (2002) suggests there are three factors: (1) domestic economic 
considerations, (2) public perception of risk, and (3) government’s willingness to cooperate on 
regulatory matters with other countries. There are not clear variables to measure the last two 
qualitative factors, but there are proxies. Regulatory quality score differences and democracy 
score differences between disputing countries may proxy Kastner & Powell’s 3rd factor. 
Assuming the public can engage in setting of other environmental policies, the environmental 
governance scores of nations may proxy Kastner & Powell’s 2nd factor. These factors may help 
shed light on how STC resolution fits into the context of resolution of historic food safety 
disputes. Environmental Governance data by country is acquired from the ESI database of Esty, 
Levy, Srebotnjak, et al. (2005). Country level regulatory quality indicators come from the WGI 
of World Bank (2010). Democracy scores come from the Polity IV project (Marshall & Gurr, 
2011). All variables are from the same data sources used in Chapter 2. 
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Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis of section 4.4.2 are in Table 77 of 
Appendix A.14 on page 370. 
 
4.3.2. Examination of plant health concerns 
Analysis on the content of the STC (i.e. the text description of why it was raised) and the 
amount of trade covered between disputing parties was conducted just for STCs that had “plant 
health” as a keyword of the STC.81 Data from the SPS-IMS were compiled from all members 
that initially raised a concern from 1996 to 2010. In total, members initiated 79 new STCs in 
the period related to plant health.  
 
Deciphering the text content of the STC description for analysis is difficult to standardize. 
Partially this is due to the heterogeneity in usage of the text box and difference in severity of 
the complaint. At the lower end of text word count was 33 words for STC #105 raised for the 
first time in 2001 by Argentina against Cuba questioning restrictions on apples and pears.82 At 
the upper end with over 2,700 words, STC #277 was raised by China in 2008 against NAPPO83 
members (Canada, USA, and Mexico) for standards on cargoes from areas infested with Asian 
gypsy moth (Lymantria dispar asiatica). Many STCs were around 1,000 words with multiple 
additions to the text to summarize the positions expressed by both parties during subsequent 
re-raise events and SPS Committee meetings. Some members would cite the specific section 
of the SPS agreement that the proposed violation had occurred in, while most would explain 
the violation in words. The method used by the author to document the reasoning for the 
complaint was to mark concerns according to five categories of complaint type, which 
collectively covered the various reasons for all STCs in the sample. Table 29 shows these five 
categories and an STC excerpt in each.  
 
In cases where multiple reasons were given by the WTO member for raising the STC, each 
reason for the concern was recorded for the STC. An example was STC #316 raised by Costa 
                                               
81
 Review Table 18 on page 89 for what information is available in the SPS-IMS system for each STC 
82
 All future STCs discussed will be referred to by the STC number. Full details of each STC can be found using 
the WTO SPS search facility using the “number of the specific trade concern” in the first search box at: 
http://spsims.wto.org/web/pages/search/stc/Search.aspx 
83
 NAPPO is one of the Regional Plant Protection Organizations (RPPOs) further defined below on page 122 
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Rica against the USA in 2011 that was both a request for pest-free recognition and arguing the 
SPS measure applied by the maintaining member was disproportionately trade restrictive:  
 
Costa Rica stated that Costa Rica was free from Chrysanthemum White Rust and had 
requested the United States to reduce post-entry quarantine to two months. However, the 
United States continued to request a post-entry quarantine of six months. On 27 April 2010, 
APHIS had provided a post-entry permit restricting chrysanthemums from Costa Rica to 
2000 cuttings, this was a disproportionate measure...” [emphasis added] (STC #316). 
 
In summary, 55 of the 79 disputes (70%) were categorized as being raised for only one of the 
five reasons in Table 29. Of the other 24 measures with multiple reasons for raising, 21 (26%) 
were raised for two reasons and 3 (4%) were raised with three of the five reasons from Table 
29 mentioned. The most common grouping of two reasons given together were members both 
(1) disputing the scientific evidence or Pest Risk Assessment (PRA) used to justify the concern 
while also arguing (2) it was disproportionately trade restrictive compared to alternative ways 
of meeting the risk mitigation objective of the maintaining member.  
 
Table 29: General reasons for raising plant health SPS STCs and examples 
Reason 
Type 
Reason of 
Complaint Example from STC in sample 
Science Pest-free area 
recognition 
“… expressed concerns regarding Indonesia's Decree 37 
implemented in March 2006, which established new 
phytosanitary requirements on fruit imports that failed to 
recognize fruit fly free areas in the United States.” (STC #243) 
Science Disputed PRA or 
scientific evidence 
“…asked Japan to explain the scientific rationale behind its 
measure, and the risk assessment it was based on” (STC #56) 
Economic Regulatory time delay 
“The undue delays and changes in the procedures undertaken 
by Australia were a concern to Chile.” (STC #194) 
Economic Disproportionately trade restrictive 
“Canada urged India to use the least trade-restrictive 
measures as stipulated in the SPS Agreement.” (STC #186) 
Information More information 
requested 
“Australia was a major grain exporter and was especially 
interested in the documents which should accompany 
shipments.” (STC #174) 
 
There were six STCs raised by two members together that were named in the data. Unlike the 
previous analysis of Chapter 3 where multiple raising members were grouped with the certain 
members category, these six STCs were treated as separate observations for each identified 
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raising member country. There were still four STCs raised ambiguously against certain 
members that were left unchanged since the members were not named in the entries in the SPS-
IMS. 
 
Some STCs cover a variety of products at the highly aggregated product level of 2-digit HS 
codes (e.g. edible fruit), while others are more specific at the 6-digit HS level (e.g. fresh apples). 
Eight STCs did not specify product categories, but expressed concern about cross-cutting, 
general phytosanitary issues related to plant health. Eight STCs listed two distinct HS codes 
(products) they applied to and three STCs listed three HS codes they were concerning. Where 
the STC concerned multiple products, it was split such that each product was treated as a 
separate observation.84 This methodology was used since the amount of bilateral trade was 
investigated so it was important to have the concern applied at the most disaggregated level 
possible. After separating multiple raising countries and multiple products covered into 
separate observations, the total observations of SPS plant health STCs was 108. 
 
Trade data at the level reported for the STC (2-digit, 4-digit, or 6-digit HS codes) was 
downloaded from (UN COMTRADE, 2012). Three pieces of trade data were acquired for each 
observation: (1) the exports of the product of the raising member to the maintaining member’s 
market, (2) the total export of the product from the raising member to all countries, and (3) the 
total export85 of all countries to the maintaining member’s market for the HS code of the STC. 
Calculations made by the author using the trade data are shown diagrammatically in Figure 13.  
 
                                               
84
 Unlike Chapter 3 where the first HS-code was treated as the primary HS code to merge with SPS 
notifications.  
85
 Effectively the total export from all countries to the maintaining member’s market is the “import” into that 
market, however, the export from all countries is used to avoid the differences in value due to the way exports 
are reported in UN COMTRADE as free on board (FOB) and imports include costs of insurance and freight 
(CIF).  
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Figure 13: Conceptual diagram demonstrating export share and market share calculations from trade 
flows for dyadic STC dispute 
 
The “export share” is defined for the purposes of this chapter as the percentage of the raising 
member’s total exports for the HS code of the STC that are exported to the maintaining 
member’s market (see left side of Figure 13). The “export share” should reflect the importance 
of the maintaining member’s market for the raising member’s export industry in that sector. 
For instance, in the on-going dispute by South Africa against the EU over phytosanitary 
restrictions on citrus imports due to Black Spot (fungal disease: Guignardia citricarpa), the 
EU imported 40% of South Africa’s citrus production in 2013 (Shanghai Daily, 2014). This 
would be defined as the EU accounting for 40% of South Africa’s citrus “export share”.  
 
Analogously, the “market share” is defined as the percentage of the total imports into the 
maintaining member that the raising member accounts for of the HS code of the STC (see right 
side of Figure 13). The larger the market share, the more important the raising member should 
be for the maintaining member’s supply of that product in their domestic market.  
 
Data on the maintaining and raising members’ GDPs were acquired from World Bank (2012). 
Data on which Regional Plant Protection Organization (RPPO) the country belonged to was 
extracted from the lists on each organizations’ website available from the IPPC website.86 The 
full name of each RPPO can be found in Table 33 (page 136).  
                                               
86
 IPPC website portal with list of the RPPOs:  
https://www.ippc.int/partners/regional-plant-protection-organizations 
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A few countries belong to multiple RPPOs (e.g. Mexico is a member of both NAPPO and 
OIRSA, and the United States is a member of NAPPO and PPPO). Countries in multiple 
RPPOs were assigned to the RPPO where they would make up a larger share of the total STCs 
raised, or in the event of a tie, where the nation would be one of fewer members (i.e. have more 
representation). For example, in the case of Mexico, this meant that the nation was assigned to 
OIRSA for this analysis as Mexico contributes a larger share of raising and maintaining STCs 
in this group as opposed to NAPPO. The United States would make up the largest STC raiser 
and maintainer in any RPPO, so it was assigned to NAPPO where it would be one of two 
members. The summary statistics available in the Appendix (A.15) report the STCs by country 
both grouped by UN region and, alternatively, grouped by RPPO for complete transparency.  
 
4.4. STC TRENDS AND RESOLUTION RATES 
 
As explained in the methods section (4.3.1), 292 unique SPS STCs were raised for the first 
time from 1996 to 2010. Ones that are unresolved often will be raised again at a subsequent 
meeting. New STCs are initiated every year, but for many of the years from 1996 to 2010, 
around half of the STCs raised annually are previous STCs that are re-raised since a resolution 
could not be reached (see panel (a) for SPS and panel (b) for TBT of Figure 14 on the next 
page). Several STCs are re-raised multiple times in a given year, but for ease of presentation, 
it is only counted in the figure for the first raise per year. At the upper end of re-raises, one SPS 
STC was re-raised for the 7th year in 2004. For the TBT agreement, the number of re-raises is 
even higher. There are five STCs that were raised at meetings for at least 7 years of the 15-year 
period and one STC that was re-raised for the 11th year in 2010. While the TBT agreement does 
not report resolution status, the high number of re-raises would suggest many are unresolved.  
 
In particular, after 2005 there has been an increased load from both unresolved STCs being re-
raised at meetings and an increase in the number of new STCs initiated (blue bars at the bottom 
of stacks in panel (b) of Figure 14). The drivers of this shift in TBT STCs and their impact is 
unknown and worthy of future investigation. For the SPS agreement, the number of new STCs 
initiated is relatively consistent from year to year (blue bars at bottom of stacks in panel (a) of 
Figure 14).  
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 (a) 
 
 (b) 
 
Figure 14: Annual STCs raised, bars stacked by the number of times the STC has been raised for (a) SPS 
agreement and (b) TBT agreement 
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The SPS agreement has information on the resolution status of STCs and so it is possible to 
look at the trends in resolution rates of the concerns. As shown in Figure 15, the number of 
new STCs initiated each year is, with the exception of 2004, always greater than the number 
that are resolved. As a result, the cumulative unresolved cases is increasing over time (green 
line in Figure 15). From 1996 to 2010, WTO members reported that only 93 of the 292 STCs 
(32%) were resolved. Given the low rates of resolution, the drivers of what allows some cases 
to achieve resolution while others do not is a clear question.  
 
 
Figure 15: Initiating new SPS STCs outpaces resolving of previous SPS STCs 
 
4.4.1. Analysis of non-dyadic STCs 
The focus for the remaining two sections of 4.4 now turns to resolution of STCs. In a few cases 
in the STC data, there were concerns raised jointly by many countries against several countries 
or by one country against several nations. As shown in Table 30, however, the majority of trade 
concerns are dyadic, but this is driven by the SPS agreement. Under the TBT agreement, half 
of the total STCs are raised by multiple raising countries against one maintaining member (see 
third quadrant of right side of Table 30).  
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Table 30: Number of dyadic and non-dyadic disputes under the TBT and SPS agreements from 1996 to 
2010 raised by WTO members against other member countries 
  
SPS Maintaining 
Member 
   TBT Maintaining 
Member 
 
 One Multiple 
   
One Multiple 
SPS 
Raising 
Member  
One 253 16 
 
TBT 
Raising 
Member 
One 140 1 
Multiple 21 2 
 
Multiple 141 0 
 
The fact that the TBT agreement has so many STCs where there are multiple countries making 
the claim could explain the difference in the re-raise rates between the agreements that was 
alluded to by Figure 14 above on page 121. Busch & Reinhardt (2006) find that in early WTO 
disputes with many claimants working together it was more difficult to achieve resolution since 
each member will have differing priorities in an acceptable solution to the dispute. While the 
TBT does not report resolution status, the number of concerns that are re-raised multiple times 
could indicate this phenomenon.  
 
The re-raise rates are different for dyadic and non-dyadic disputes in both agreements. As 
shown in Figure 16 below, it appears non-dyadic disputes are re-raised more times. 
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Figure 16: Boxplots of numbers of re-raises for dyadic and non-dyadic STCs in the SPS and TBT system 
 
In order to formally test for differences in the number of re-raise events per STC, a standard T-
test or Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test could potentially be invalid for discrete and skewed count 
data like the re-raise counts of STCs (McElduff, Cortina-Borja, Chan, et al., 2010). McElduff, 
Cortina-Borja, Chan, et al. (2010) study shows that with this type of data a negative binomial 
(NB) regression with a single predictor is the more accurate model to test for differences. This 
was used for both SPS and TBT STCs separately with the only predictor being a binary variable 
if the STC was a dyadic dispute or non-dyadic dispute.  
 
The NB model was estimated with robust standard errors to reduce the bias from 
heteroscedasticity of the error terms. The predicted counts for each group are shown in Figure 
17 panel (a) for SPS STCs and panel (b) for TBT STCs. As expected, the mean number of 
times a given STC is raised is significantly higher for non-dyadic concerns compared to dyadic 
concerns in both agreements. However, for the TBT agreement, the difference is larger and the 
95% confidence intervals are narrower. Non-dyadic STCs in the TBT agreement are expected 
to be raised over twice as many times as dyadic STCs on average. 
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(a)  
 
(b) 
Figure 17: Predicted number of raises for dyadic and non-dyadic concerns from single predictor NB 
model with robust standard errors 
 
The non-dyadic disputes raised by several countries may indicate a particularly onerous 
SPS/TBT policy that a maintaining member put into effect. When a measure has been shown 
to be quite restrictive and with little scientific support, many countries may join in raising a 
concern against the country (162 STCs have occurred like this in the TBT and SPS system, as 
seen in Table 30, page 123). An example of this type of dispute is SPS STC #10 raised in 1998 
by 11 nations against the European Union for its modified SPS policy on allowable aflatoxin 
residue levels on several agricultural products. 
 
The SPS policy that STC #10 disputed was the subject of analysis on the magnitude of cancer 
risk the EU was actually mitigating from such stringent aflatoxin standards. Otsuki, Wilson & 
Sewadeh (2001) showed that while the restrictions cost African exporters some $670M USD 
annually in lost trade, the amount of cancer risk avoided by the EU population was 
approximately 1.4 mitigated deaths per billion people per year—a miniscule risk to the EU 
population. The policy was shown to be without merit and resolved by the EU modifying the 
standard.87  
 
Multiple countries disputing against multiple countries’ policies are quite rare events; only two 
have occurred from 1996 to 2010 and both in the SPS agreement. These two cases were SPS 
STC #84 first raised in 2001 and SPS STC #183 first raised in 2003. In the first case, STC #84 
was an animal health concern raised by several exporting countries (mainly from Eastern 
                                               
87
 A full review of history of EU mycotoxins policy can be found in Van Egmond, Schothorst & Jonker (2007). 
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Europe) that were considered free from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or having 
BSE-free zones. The STC was raised by them against many countries outside Europe that had 
been using emergency notifications to ban several dairy and beef products from raising 
members due to BSE concerns. 
 
The second concern STC #183 was related to plant health in the timing of implementation for 
International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) number 15 standards. ISPMs were 
developed by the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in order to promote 
standardization and harmonization among countries for common phytosanitary issues affecting 
plants. ISPM 15 was specifically developed to prevent the spread of wood boring insects (e.g. 
Bark Beetle and Bark Borer) which were becoming a common vector for invasion primarily 
via wood pallets used in international shipping (Haack & Brockerhoff, 2011). Chile and 
Uruguay had requested more time and consideration of different treatment methods in order to 
comply with ISPM 15 standards on wood products required by many WTO members at that 
point in 2003.  
 
Both of these concerns reflected broad policies (i.e. BSE restrictions or ISPM 15) which 
affected many exporters and importing countries for the wide range of products that the policies 
covered. For the most part though, disagreements between WTO members occur on a more 
narrow range of products and/or trade relationships.  
 
The number of non-dyadic disputes does vary each year. The number of STCs by the type of 
the dispute (i.e. dyadic or non-dyadic) is shown in Figure 18. In 2005, as little as 14% of the 
total number of STCs raised in the SPS and TBT Committees were non-dyadic disputes, but in 
other years the non-dyadic percentage peaks to 49% (2009). Overall, though, there is no 
monotonic trend for the percentage of non-dyadic disputes over time.  
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Figure 18: Percentage of annual new SPS and TBT STCs that are dyadic disputes from 1996 to 2010 
 
Lastly, the mean resolution rates for non-dyadic and dyadic SPS STCs are compared using a 
two-sample test of proportions. Of the 253 SPS STC dyadic disputes, roughly 33% ended in 
resolution. For the 39 non-dyadic disputes, around 26% ended in resolution. However, the 
mean resolution rates for the two types of dispute were not significantly different by a two-
sample test of proportions (# = −0.9407, * = 0.3469). This is counter to the findings for 
WTO DSB disputes of Busch & Reinhardt (2006) where third parties made dispute resolution 
less likely. As a result, there may be factors in common with dispute resolution for dyadic and 
non-dyadic concerns. However, the factors driving concern resolution are investigated below 
in section 4.4.2 just for dyadic disputes to take advantage of country and country-product level 
information in the STC. Given that non-dyadic concerns are raised significantly more times 
than dydadic concerns in the TBT and SPS agreement (refer back to Figure 17), it is likely that 
non-dyadic concerns take longer to resolve due to the multiple parties involved, but ultimately 
are not significantly less likely to end in resolution as compared to dyadic disputes.  
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4.4.2. Resolution rates for STCs 
Given the importance of resolving food safety disputes to food security and the economies of 
many countries, it is important to understand the factors that seem to drive resolution (Kastner 
& Powell, 2002). As shown above in Figure 18 of the previous section, the majority of concerns 
raised in the SPS and TBT system are dyadic disputes between two nations. In these disputes, 
others often offer official support for the concern, but do not officially join as a disputing 
party.88 It was also previously shown at the beginning of section 4.4 that there are more 
concerns raised each year than there are resolutions to past concerns (Figure 15, page 122). As 
a result, over time there is an increase in the number of outstanding and unresolved STCs. The 
question remains what makes dispute resolution more likely for some of these STCs? 
 
The first results analyse the impact of the power of the country involved in the dispute as 
measured by the GDP or development status, similar to Bown (2004c) and (Bown, 2004b) for 
WTO and GATT disputes. Table 31 below shows the results of the logistic model for the 
probability of resolution of the STC with four different models measuring the relative economic 
size of countries on either side of the STC.89 In all models, HS-2 code dummies are included 
to control for product-level heterogeneity in resolution rates that could be driven by certain 
products being easier to agree on than others are.  
 
                                               
88
 Recall from Table 18 (page 89) in the data section, one piece of data given for STC entries in the SPS-IMS is 
the number of other members that have offered “support” to the concern. The author created a binary variable to 
keep track if there were other countries supporting the concern or not.  
89
 Review the data description section 4.3.1 and the literature review (section 4.2) for variables considered and 
predictions of factors that should matter for dispute resolution. 
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Table 31: Resolution probability using logit model on SPS STCs first raised from 1996 to 2010 
 
(1) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(2) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(3) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(4) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
# Supporting -0.104 -0.112 -0.105 -0.130 
 (0.0947) (0.0964) (0.0905) (0.0924) 
Raise Count 0.242* 0.251** 0.269** 0.263** 
 (0.0972) (0.0920) (0.101) (0.0985) 
Raise ln(GDP) 0.115    
 (0.0696)    
Maintain ln(GDP) -0.367**    
 (0.0808)    
Diff. ln(GDP)  0.243**   
  (0.0560)   
Raise Developing?   -0.828*  
   (0.332)  
Maintain Developing?   0.775*  
   (0.328)  
Raise ln(GDPPC)    0.330** 
    (0.127) 
Maintain ln(GDPPC)    -0.198 
    (0.128) 
Observations 242 242 242 242 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Robust Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients reported. HS-2 dummies included, but 
not reported.  
 
The number of times a STC was raised (!	  in Table 31) was the most robust 
determinant of STC resolution. There are two ways to interpret this result. The (1) first is that 
the raise count could reflect measures that are valid concerns on serious issues for the raising 
members. This is the interpretation of the raise count used by the study of Horn, Mavroides & 
Wijkstrӧm (2013). The fact that the resolution rate is higher for “serious” concerns could mean 
that the STC mechanism is effective at resolving issues that are important for members, and 
the less serious issues are simply disregarded by members without resolution, or without 
reporting resolution. An alternative interpretation (2) is that raise count just reflects how 
persistent the raising member is about the issue. If a country keeps raising the problem at 
subsequent meetings, it is more likely to achieve resolution eventually with the maintaining 
member. Definitive conclusions cannot be made. Regardless, there were still independent 
effects on developing country members in dispute resolution.  
 
The results of Table 31 show in column (1) that the lower the GDP of the maintaining member 
country, the more likely the dispute is to be resolved. Similarly, in column (2) instead of each 
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countries’ GDP, the difference in their GDPs is used.90  Positive (negative) differences reflect 
a member raising a dispute against a relatively smaller (larger) economy. The positive and 
significant coefficient on . () indicates that concerns are more likely to be resolved 
when the raising country’s economy is larger than the maintaining member’s economy. 
Column (3) indicates that developing countries are less likely to resolve STCs they raise, but 
more likely to resolve when the STC is raised against their SPS policies. Column (4) shows 
that wealth of the nation as measured by GDP per capita (GDPPC) indicates that richer 
countries are more likely to resolve disputes they raise. All four models add evidence that the 
resolution of STCs is similarly impacted by power in the way that Bown (2004c) showed for 
trade disputes under the GATT. Developing countries are less likely to achieve resolution on 
concerns they raise and more likely to have concerns raised against them end in resolution.91  
 
The predicted probabilities from the model in column (3) of Table 31 are plotted below in 
Figure 19 to understand the outcomes for different country combinations in the disputes and 
the relation to the number of times the STC is re-raised. Figure 19 shows that it is the difference 
in country power that results in differing rates of STC resolution. As seen in panel (b) of Figure 
19 when the dispute is between two developed members or two developing members, the 
predicted resolution probabilities are approximately the same. Panel (a) reveals that especially 
for STCs that are not re-raised many times, developing countries are significantly less likely to 
resolve disputes they raise than developed members are.  
                                               
90
 Calculated raising member minus maintaining member 
91
 However, the current metric does not express how the resolved claims end (i.e. which country “wins” the 
dispute). Further research analysing and coding the claims that do report the outcome would be needed.  
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 (a) 
 
 (b) 
Figure 19: Predicted probabilities of STC resolution over Raise Count for: (a) raising and maintaining 
members with opposite development status, (b) with the same development status 
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In the next set of models, the impacts of democracy, regulatory quality, and environmental 
governance are examined.92 Like the previous models in Table 31, Table 32 shows that 
!	  and  () were robust determinants of the probability of resolving a 
STC even with the new environmental and governance covariates.  
 
Table 32: Resolution probability using logit model on SPS STCs first raised from 1996 to 2010 including 
environmental and governance covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# Supporting -0.170 -0.122 -0.139 -0.112 -0.182 -0.160 
 (0.107) (0.102) (0.0993) (0.0963) (0.112) (0.106) 
Raise Count 0.277** 0.249** 0.266** 0.250** 0.279** 0.252** 
 (0.0958) (0.0937) (0.0933) (0.0925) (0.103) (0.0909) 
Diff. ln(GDP) 0.225** 0.231** 0.245** 0.243** 0.216** 0.246** 
 (0.0671) (0.0690) (0.0684) (0.0698) (0.0594) (0.0567) 
Maintain Enviro. Governance 0.263      
 (0.327)      
Raise Enviro. Governance 0.525      
 (0.347)      
Diff. Enviro. Governance  -0.114     
  (0.239)     
Maintain Regulatory Quality   0.199    
   (0.241)    
Raise Regulatory Quality   0.153    
   (0.231)    
Diff. Regulatory Quality    -0.00304   
    (0.169)   
Maintain Democracy Score     0.0113  
     (0.0380)  
Raise Democracy Score     0.134**  
     (0.0465)  
Joint Democracy Score      0.0560 
      (0.0334) 
Observations 238 238 242 242 238 238 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Robust Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients reported. HS-2 dummies included, but 
not reported.  
 
Previous work on GATT  disputes (Busch, 2000) and early WTO disputes (Busch & Reinhardt, 
2006) suggested that more democratic countries would be more likely to resolve disputes 
before they proceed to a panel. The results from SPS STCs shows that this effect was true only 
for raising members, but the democratic score of the maintaining member was irrelevant to 
resolution likelihood (see column (5) of Table 32). More democratic raising member countries 
were more likely to resolve their dispute regardless of the government of the maintaining 
                                               
92
 The choice of covariates is discussed previously in section 4.3.1 
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member.93 There was no evidence that regulatory quality or differences in environmental 
governance had any impact on dispute resolution, despite the suggestions in the literature from 
historic food safety disputes (Kastner & Powell, 2002). It could be that the ESI Environmental 
Governance score is a poor proxy for the public’s perception of food risk—Kastner & Powell 
(2002) second factor that related to resolution of historic food safety disputes. As well, the 
differences in regulatory quality between nations may be a poor indicator of their willingness 
to cooperate on regulatory regimes with each other—Kastner & Powell (2002) third factor.94 
 
4.5. ANALYSIS OF PLANT HEALTH CONCERNS IN DETAIL 
 
The drawback to using a count-based metric for STC analysis above is the lack of detail of 
what reasons members give for raising the dispute. Additionally, the impact of trade on dispute 
resolution was not considered for the full sample of STCs. These will be considered in some 
detail for a sub-set of SPS STCs that were raised concerning plant health. A quick overview of 
which nations raise STCs about plant health, which nations maintain the most controversial 
measures, and what products seem to generate the most concerns is presented below. This is 
followed by an analysis of (1) the text given with the STC notification explaining the reason 
the concern was raised and (2) the value of trade the STC covers. 
 
Plant health related STCs are unsurprisingly raised on agricultural product codes mostly related 
to crops, fruits, nuts, and wood. Aggregating products to the highest level (HS 2-digit codes) 
to allow comparison in Figure 20, HS08 (edible fruit and nuts) was the subject of 42% of 
concerns raised. This group has as many complaints as the next three categories combined 
(HS07 – edible vegetables and tubers with 17% of concerns, HS06 – live trees and other plants 
with 13% of concerns, and HS44 – wood and other articles of wood with 11% of concerns). 
The number of concerns in each HS-code that are resolved by 2010 are plotted for each bar as 
well. Figure 20 suggests that concerns about HS10 (cereals) may be easier to resolve than STCs 
                                               
93
 A model was also run with the covariate of the difference in the polity2 democracy scores between the raising 
and the maintaining member, however, the results (not shown) were also insignificant.  
94
 David Vogel of University of California at Berkeley has written extensively on the issue of international 
regulatory coordination (Vogel, 2012; Kelemen & Vogel, 2010; Roberts & Unnevehr, 2005). Particularly 
relevant to the present issue, the EU and the USA both have high metrics of regulatory quality, but different 
domestic considerations that have evolved in the past 50 years on their willingness to engage multilaterally on 
policy coordination. Kelemen & Vogel (2010) details the drivers of this change.  
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in other products, however this figure does not account for the year the concern was raised or 
the countries involved, so no definitive conclusions can be drawn.  
 
 
Figure 20: Number of plant health SPS STCs raised from 1996 to 2010 by HS-2 code and resolution status 
 
Similarly to the entire set of STCs under the SPS agreement, many of the years in the sample 
have more concerns re-raised than new plant health STCs initiated (see Figure 21 below). There 
is a noticeable decline in new STCs raised after a peak in 2001 (with the exception of 2005). 
As a result, the cumulative unresolved plant health related STCs have actually held relatively 
constant in the mid-2000s and have declined in 2010 (see Figure 22). It appears at least for 
plant health STCs that the implementation of SPS measures has been more agreeable among 
WTO members, at least in the past five years approximately.  
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Figure 21: Annual plant health STCs raised, bar stacked by the number of times the STC has been raised 
 
 
Figure 22: Annual new and resolved plant health STCs along with cumulative unresolved concerns 
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The most active country raising plant health related concerns was the United States with 32 
STCs raised from 1996 to 2010 (30% of the global total for the period). The European Union 
was the second most active raising member with 18 concerns raised (17% of global total). 
Argentina was third with 11 STCs (10% of global total). The full list for each raising country 
by UN Region (Table 80, page 373) or RPPO (Table 81, page 374) is in Appendix A.15.  
 
The country that had the most concerns raised against it was also the top raiser of STCs: the 
USA had 17 concerns raised against them. The EU was tied with Australia with 9 STCs raised 
against them, however, the EU was surpassed by Japan with 13 concerns raised against them. 
Argentina was not subject to any plant health STCs against their SPS policies. The full details 
by maintaining country by UN region (Table 78, page 371) and by RPPO (Table 79, page 372) 
is also in Appendix A.15. A summary table of totals by RPPO is given in Table 33 below. The 
vast majority of STCs are raised between members of different UN regions. Only 6% of all 
STCs were between members in the same UN region suggesting that often disputes may be 
about policies meant to keep non-native species out of a country, however, the details of the 
concerns are discussed in the next section (4.5.1).  
 
Table 33: Plant health STCs by RPPO 
Full Name of RPPO 
STCs 
Raised 
% 
Raised 
STCs 
Maintained 
% 
Maintained 
NAPPO - North American Plant Protection Organization 36 33.3% 18 16.7% 
APPPC - Asia and Pacific Plant Protection Commission 22 20.4% 31 28.7% 
EPPO - European & Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization 20 18.5% 20 18.5% 
COSAVE - Comité de Sanidad Vegetal del Cono Sur 19 17.6% 7 6.5% 
OIRSA - Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 4 3.7% 9 8.3% 
CAN - Comunidad Andina 2 1.9%   
Independent 2 1.9% 19 17.6% 
NEPPO - Near East Plant Protection Organization 2 1.9%   
CPPC - Caribbean Plant Protection Commission 1 0.9% 4 3.7% 
TOTAL 108 100.0% 108 100.0% 
 
4.5.1. Breakdown of plant health STCs by reason for complaint 
As described in the methodology section for the plant health concerns (4.3.2), the author read 
the text of each of the 79 STCs raised from 1996 to 2010 to determine the basis of the concern 
and specific rule of the SPS agreement that the raising member claimed the maintaining 
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member violated with their SPS policy. If raising members claimed multiple reasons for raising 
the STC, it was counted in multiple categories of complaint. The summary table below (Table 
34) reflects the percentage of each of the five common reasons for raising a STC that were 
mentioned in the final analysis sample of 108 observations of STCs.95 By the nature of the 
methodology, the percentages are weighted more heavily by the STCs that are raised by 
multiple members, on multiple products, and/or with multiple reasons for complaint.  
 
Table 34: Percentage of all plant health SPS STCs that mention five reasons for complaint 
Reason Type Reason for Complaint 
Num. of 
STCs 
% of 
STCs 
Science  48 44% 
 Pest-free area recognition 12 11% 
 Disputed PRA or scientific evidence 36 33% 
Economic  93 86% 
 Regulatory time delay 42 39% 
 Disproportionately trade restrictive 51 47% 
Informational  5 5% 
 More information requested 5 5% 
Note: % of STCs adds to more than 100% as several STCs cite multiple reasons for 
raising the concern 
 
Overall it appears that STCs more often cite economic reasons like that the SPS measure has 
too long of a regulatory time delay or that it is implemented in a way that is too restrictive to 
trade. However, 44% cite scientific concerns as well. While not reported in the table, there are 
three observations where both a pest-free area was disputed along with an economic concern 
raised as well. The majority of the dual or triple reasons for concerns relate however to 
countries concurrently disputing the PRA or scientific evidence for the SPS measure along with 
arguing it is: overly trade restrictive (8 observations), a regulatory time delay (4 observations), 
or both (6 observations). There was only one observation of the raising member arguing an 
SPS measure needed clarification (i.e. more information requested) while simultaneously 
arguing it was a regulatory delay.  
 
Figure 23 below breaks down type of complaint by HS-2 code. It is clear that the type of 
concerns are not grouped on any particular product type. However, for HS10 (cereals), there 
                                               
95
 Review 4.3.2 (specifically page 120) for how the 79 STCs were broken down for multiple raising countries 
and multiple products into 108 separate observations for the analysis sample.  
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does seem to be a higher percentage of complaints involving the PRA or other scientific-based 
concerns as compared to other HS codes.96 
 
 
Note: Scientific reasons in light/dark blue; economic reasons in light/dark red; information 
requests in grey. HS-2 codes ordered from most STCs (top) to least STCs (bottom). 
Figure 23: Percentage of total STCs by complaint type for each HS-2 code 
 
Looking at the reasoning for the STC by region, the percentages of economic or scientific 
motivations for raising the dispute is more revealing. By region maintaining the measure in 
panel (b) of Figure 24, it is clear regions have different types of concerns raised against them. 
North America (mainly the United States) has concerns raised against it due to regulatory 
delays in setting policy or bringing products to market, and SPS policies going beyond a less-
trade restrictive option that would reduce the risk equivalently (in the raising countries’ 
opinions). Meanwhile, East Asian countries primarily have concerns raised against them due 
to a lack of solid scientific evidence for their policies. Southeast Asia, Europe and Latin 
America are petitioned the most by raising member countries to recognize pest-free areas; most 
of these concerns are being raised by Latin American and North American countries.  
                                               
96
 HS11 and HS12 had only a few STCs in total, see Figure 20 (page 137), so their percentage breakdown in 
Figure 23 is not too informative. 
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In panel (a) of Figure 24, it appears that East Asia and Europe primarily raise concerns against 
other members citing economic violations of the SPS agreement (i.e. that the SPS measures of 
the maintaining member are overly trade restrictive or have too many regulatory delays). North 
American, Latin American, and Australasian countries have a higher percentage of STCs raised 
citing a lack of scientific evidence to support a maintaining member’s policy or petitioning for 
the maintaining member to recognize their pest-free area. The question remains whether the 
reason for the concern has an impact on how the STCs gets resolved. This question is briefly 
explored next (section 4.5.2) using the same models of resolution used on the full sample of 
STCs in section 4.4.2. 
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 (a) 
 
 (b) 
 
Note: Scientific reasons in light/dark blue; economic reasons in light/dark red; information 
requests in grey. UN regions ordered from most STCs (top) to least STCs (bottom). 
Figure 24: Percentage of total STCs by complaint type for each UN region of (a) raising countries and (b) 
maintaining countries 
141 
 
4.5.2. Effect of type of complaint on resolution  
A logit model of probability of resolution was estimated using the significant factors of the 
models in section 4.4.2 along with the new 		 variable. The variable 		 was 
constructed as a binary variable that was 1 if the STC was solely concerning a lack of scientific 
evidence or a request on pest-free status recognition. It was 0 if the concern was solely about a 
regulatory time delay or the measure being overly trade restrictive. STCs that cited multiple 
concerns were excluded from the analysis. The results in Table 35 below show that whether 
the concern was about a scientific request or an economic-based concern, the resolution rates 
were not significantly different due to that factor. Even in the increasingly simplified models 
in columns (4) and (5) only including the factor 		; it had no predictive power for the 
probability of resolving a concern.  
 
Table 35: Resolution probability using logit model on plant health STCs considering complaint type 
  (1) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(2) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(3) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(4) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(5) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
Raise Count 0.601** 0.608** 0.597**   
 (0.263) (0.257) (0.256)   
Raise ln(GDP) 0.140     
 (0.133)     
Maintain ln(GDP) -0.115     
 (0.129)     
Science -0.261 -0.238 -0.300 0.225 0.240 
 (0.730) (0.685) (0.733) (0.592) (0.489) 
Diff. ln(GDP)  0.128    
  (0.0897)    
Maintain Developing?   -0.375   
   (0.599)   
Raise Developing?   -0.965   
   (0.666)   
Observations 66 66 66 69 72 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Columns (1) to (3), robust standard errors in brackets. Columns (4) and (5) standard 
errors in brackets. Columns (1) to (4) HS-2 code dummies included, but not reported.  
 
Given the time needed to generate scientific-based risk evidence, it is hypothesized that STCs 
based on a raising member’s belief that the maintaining member’s SPS policy lacks scientific 
grounding may take longer to resolve than a concern about regulatory time delays or trade 
restrictiveness. Taking the difference between the year of the STC initiation and the year of 
resolution, a variable for the time it takes to resolve the concern is constructed. Science-based 
concerns may also be raised more often before they are resolved. Two NB regressions are then 
constructed—following the recommended methodology of McElduff, Cortina-Borja, Chan, et 
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al. (2010) for this type of data—to test for differences in science-based vs. economics-based 
concerns in the prediction for (1) the number of years it takes to resolve a concern and  for (2) 
the predicted number of times a STC is raised. The results from the two NB models are shown 
below in Figure 25 and Figure 26.  
 
 
Figure 25: Predicted number of times a STC is raised depending on the type of complaint 
 
 
Figure 26: Predicted number of years until resolution for resolved STCs depending on complaint type 
 
Figure 25 shows that the difference is in the number of times a concern is raised is very small 
between the concern types. The 95% confidence intervals overlap significantly and considering 
the dependent variable is a count metric, both types of concerns are expected to be raised 
around 2 times on average. The number of years it takes to resolve a concern shows a larger 
difference between STCs with economics-based reasons and STCs with science-based reasons. 
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The science-based concerns take around 2 years longer to resolve on average than the 
economics-based concerns.97  
 
4.5.3. Impact of bilateral trade value on resolution rate 
Trade value may have an impact on the likelihood of dispute resolution. The expectation 
discussed in section 4.3.2 is that concerns raised by countries with higher export shares will be 
more important to resolve for them than concerns with lower export shares. A higher 
percentage export share is expected to indicate that the maintaining member is a more 
important market for the raising countries exporters as they take a higher percentage of the total 
exports of the product line from the raising country. Additionally, concerns raised on products 
with higher market shares may be more important for maintaining members to resolve, as the 
raising country represents a larger source of the product in their market. Figure 27 presents 
summary box plots of the breakdown of export share and market share by final resolution status 
of the STC.  
 
Figure 27 suggests that concerns that are resolved tend to be more important concerns for the 
maintaining member, since the raiser is a larger portion of their total share of the product to 
their market. It also suggests that resolved concerns tend to be less important to the raising 
members’ exporters as the export share looks to be smaller compared to the unresolved 
concerns. Two-sample T-tests are used to confirm the difference in mean export share and 
market share for each group as the inter-quartile range (IQR) is very high, especially for the 
market share data, reflecting great variation between STCs.  
 
                                               
97
 The 95% confidence intervals have a small overlap so the result could not be considered statistically different 
by the methodology of McElduff, Cortina-Borja, Chan, et al. (2010). A two-sample T-test with unequal 
variances and Wilcoxon rank test both confirmed significant differences in the means of the two groups (results 
not shown), but cannot be considered accurate for the reasons mentioned in McElduff, Cortina-Borja, Chan, et 
al. (2010) for count data. However, the accuracy of the T-test and rank test models should be closer to the truth 
since there are not many 0 counts in either model, which are a large source of the bias issue discussed in their 
study.  
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Figure 27: Raising member’s export share and market share by resolved status 
 
A two-sample T-test with unequal variances98 is used to compare the mean export share and 
mean market share between resolved and unresolved STCs. The results show that the mean 
export share for resolved concerns is 6.9% ± 3.3% and is 17.1% ± 3.8% for unresolved concerns 
( = 2.0432, * = 0.0448). The mean market share for unresolved STCs was 23.3% ± 4.3% 
and for resolved STCs the market share was 40.0% ± 7.8%. While the T-test results suggest 
that there are differences due to export share and market share, to confirm whether these factors 
are driving the resolution or just associated with other factors predicting resolution are tested 
in a logistic model of dispute resolution.  
 
The results of the model are presented below in Table 36. Only in the simplified models 
including only the market share and export share covariates were the coefficients significant. 
Considering the heteroscedasticity of the error, the use of standard errors as opposed to robust 
errors is likely flawed with standard errors too narrow in columns (4) and (5). The marginal 
significance of the export share even with the relaxed assumptions suggests it may not be a 
                                               
98
 Levene’s test rejected the hypothesis of equal variances for both market share and export share data 
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strong determinant of resolution probability. The market share had more predictive power. 
Both covariates had relatively consistent values for the coefficients and the same sign in each 
specification; with a larger sample size, statistical significance might have been achieved. The 
lack of significance of the !	  covariate in all the models in Table 36 could be due 
to the small sample size as well, since the correlation coefficient with either /0* ℎ	 or 
23	 ℎ	 was very low (below 0.1).  
 
Table 36: Resolution probability using logit model on plant health STCs with trade covariates 
 (1) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(2) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(3) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(4) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
(5) 
Pr(Resolve=1) 
Raise Count 0.101 0.0849 0.0402   
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.135)   
Raise ln(GDP) 0.0729     
 (0.148)     
Maintain ln(GDP) -0.197     
 (0.146)     
Export Share -0.0173 -0.0172 -0.0309 -0.0281* -0.0277* 
 (0.0250) (0.0267) (0.0317) (0.0237) (0.0213) 
Market Share 0.0126 0.0123 0.0166* 0.0153** 0.0146** 
 (0.00925) (0.00914) (0.00851) (0.00805) (0.00741) 
Diff. ln(GDP)  0.130    
  (0.122)    
Maintain Developing?   -0.637   
   (0.688)   
Raise Developing?   -0.637   
   (0.644)   
Observations 72 72 72 72 74 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Columns (1) to (3), robust standard errors in brackets for Columns (1) to (3). Columns (4) 
and (5) standard errors in brackets. Columns (1) to (4) HS-2 code dummies included, but 
not reported.  
 
Overall, there was some evidence that resolution is more likely for raising countries that raise 
concerns on products with higher market share for the maintaining member. It appears that 
maintaining members may be more likely to agree to resolution when the raising country is a 
larger source of that product in their market. The fact that resolution happens more often for 
lower export share products (by the two-sample T-test results, page 144) could indicate a few 
different influences. Either (1) the raising member is more likely to make concessions to 
achieve resolution on a product in a relatively less important market or (2) raising members 
that are large global exporters of a product (hence export share for any maintaining market is 
relatively low) are more likely to achieve resolution to their STCs. The fact that there was some 
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weak evidence of these two trade factors influencing resolution in just a small sector of SPS 
STCs suggests it is worthy for future research on the full sample of STCs.  
 
4.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Results on resolution status indicate that many concerns are raised multiple times before 
achieving resolution (if at all). For many years in the sample, there are more concerns re-raised 
than there are new concerns initiated for either the TBT or SPS agreement (section 4.4). As a 
result, the outstanding unresolved cases for the SPS agreement particularly are increasing with 
time. The majority of disputes in the SPS agreement are dyadic (one raising member vs. one 
maintaining member). For the TBT agreement, half of all concerns are multiple countries 
raising a concern against one maintaining member. Non-dyadic disputes are re-raised 
significantly more times than dyadic ones, but at least for the SPS agreement, are no less-likely 
to be resolved than dyadic concerns (4.4.1).  
 
For dyadic SPS concerns, the most robust predictor of resolution was the raise count of the 
dispute. However, even when controlling for this, the results found that developing countries 
that raise concerns are less likely to resolve them than their developed counterparts if the other 
party in the dispute is not developing as well (section 4.4.2). The analysis showed that it was 
the difference in relative economic size between disputing parties that determined the 
difference in resolution rate. Potentially this is evidence that the power dynamics discussed by 
Bown (2004c) for GATT and WTO disputes applies to the outcomes of SPS STC disputes as 
well. This result could also be explained by the fact that developing countries may lack 
scientific and technical capacity to effectively argue their claims—a similar argument to that 
of a lack of legal capacity used by Horn, Mavroidis & Nordstrӧm (1999) and Davis & Bermeo 
(2009) in explaining the bias against developing countries in GATT and WTO DSB disputes. 
The developing country complainants conceivably cannot contend with the scientists and 
lawyers defending the SPS regulation of the developed country. When a developing country 
raises a STC against another developing country, however, there is a more level playing field. 
The drive for building technical capacity among developing countries in the SPS and TBT 
system may help address these disparities and should be encouraged. 
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Kastner & Powell (2002) suggest that public risk perception and government’s willingness to 
cooperate on regulatory agendas with other countries affect the outcomes of food safety 
disputes. However, the regression results of section 4.4.2 could not find any support for this. 
The main drivers of dispute resolution were consistently the raising member being a large, 
wealthy country and the maintaining member being a smaller economy. The strength of the 
results may be limited though by the lack of strong covariates to proxy Kastner & Powell (2002) 
suggested qualitative factors that matter for dispute resolution.  
 
For plant health concerns it was found that there was little perceivable difference across HS-
codes in the type of reason given for raising the STC (section 4.5.1). However, there was some 
indication that STCs on cereals (HS10) were both easier to resolve and more often based on 
disputes over the science justifying the measure. In the models estimated for plant health STCs, 
however, the type of complaint (science or economics) did not have predictive power for the 
likelihood of resolution of the STC (section 4.5.2). The only variation appeared to be that STCs 
calling into question the science behind an SPS measure took longer on average to resolve (~4 
years vs. ~6 years between initial raising of the STC and notification of resolution). Lastly, 
there was limited evidence that concerns that are more important to the maintaining member 
(as measured by market share) were more likely to be resolved. There was little evidence that 
export share played a role in resolution likelihood (section 4.5.3). However, the analysis was 
limited by a small sample size and should be applied in the future on the entire sample of STCs.  
 
The decline in new plant health STCs in the past 5 years is a positive sign of effective 
regulation, given the ongoing emergence of new plant pests and risks due to climate change 
(MacLeod, Pautasso, Jeger, et al., 2010). Vectors such as live plant imports both historically 
and in the 21st century have been a large source of threats to food security and environmental 
health (Strange & Scott, 2005). Pimentel, Zuniga & Morrison (2005) famously estimated loses 
due to invasive species in the US at $120 billion each year, a large portion due to plant pests 
and pathogens. While policy makers likely consider the threat of dispute due to plant health 
SPS policies, the potential losses due to unmitigated risks can be much worse. Beginning with 
Chapter 5, the following chapters examine the actions of Ugandan farmers and the organization 
of an industry (coffee) that has suffered extreme losses due to foreign plant pests and diseases.  
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 A Case Study of Responses to SPS Issues 
 
While SPS regulations on imports affect trade of products at the border, many SPS issues—as 
well as controls—start well before export. The decisions of actors within a country’s supply 
chain ultimately determine whether the product can meet the final quality check at export to 
comply with the SPS measure. Even effective SPS regulations at the border can be thwarted 
by an inability to consider the incentive structure and decision-making process of the growers 
and traders in the industry. It is important to study the decision-making process of growers to 
see how they interpret and act on risks from pests. Additionally it is crucial to consider how 
growers and traders will respond to incentives from government policies conveyed to them as 
best practices to follow. There are four related reasons studying actors in an export supply chain 
is useful for understanding SPS regulations: (1) maintaining a reputation for trustworthy SPS 
certifications is vital for maintaining market access; (2) border rejections of unsafe food, as 
well as some SPS STCs, originate in practices in the supply chain behind the border; (3) 
accurately estimating the potential impacts from an outbreak of a new pest in a PRA need to 
consider actions from stakeholders in the supply chain; and lastly, (4) crop losses due to poor 
on-farm and transport practices are a significant threat to food security and rural incomes.  
 
Pests, diseases, and invasive species have differing impacts depending on actions that are taken 
within a country to control their spread. As highlighted by the analysis of plant health STCs in 
section 4.4 of the previous chapter, controlling plant diseases are often contentious topics of 
policy. For developing countries that are highly dependent on agricultural commodity exports, 
mitigating the spread of plant diseases within their borders is important for both ensuring 
adequate supply to the market, as well as demonstrating ability to maintain quality control and 
phytosanitary health within production areas. For fruit, vegetables and many other agricultural 
production systems, the decisions made on the farm, in transport, and finally at the packaging 
and final shipping stage have a large impact on whether or not pests get through the supply 
chain. As demonstrated recently with the debate between the EU and India over the poor 
phytosanitary levels of India’s fruit and vegetable exports, the inability of a country to maintain 
“clean” exports can have significant economic implications for the country’s producers 
(Menon, 2014).99  
                                                
99
 India topped the list of countries exporting fruit and vegetables to the UK with the most interceptions and 
border rejections for several years, despite issuing phytosanitary certificates that claimed to meet the agreed SPS 
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Studying the behaviours of stakeholders in a supply chain is also important to have better 
models of behind the border pest control in the process of setting SPS regulations. When 
designing SPS regulations and ensuring they mitigate against significant risks, a pest risk 
analysis will include the likely impact (socioeconomic as well as ecological) of a pest if it were 
to establish in the growing regions for the agricultural product (Kumschick & Richardson, 
2013). These models include estimates of the yield losses for the potential areas affected by the 
given pest or disease. However, the assessment of impact is difficult. As Kumschick & 
Richardson (2013) state: “how to effectively incorporate impact into the RA [Risk Assessment] 
and how to predict impact need to be studied more thoroughly”. Many studies have reported 
the importance of managers’ responses to pests in determining the impact or optimal response 
to an invasion (Elbakidze, 2008; McKee, Goodhue, Zalom, et al., 2009; Halbert & Manjunath, 
2004; Richards, Shanafelt & Fenichel, 2014; Oerke, 2006). As demonstrated quite significantly 
with the consequences of citrus greening disease (huánglóngbìng or HLB) on the orange 
industry in Florida, it is important to consider how individual actors on the ground respond to 
the incentives presented to them by a policy.100  
 
Bioeconomic models are increasingly used to elucidate the impact of various parameters of the 
crop and disease to understand the optimal decisions for a grower to take (Elbakidze, 2008; 
McKee, Goodhue, Zalom, et al., 2009). Elbakidze (2008) for example models the impact that 
policy incentives may have on decisions backyard flock owners make to control avian 
influenza. In the empirical data as well, there is clear evidence that the economic impact from 
an invasive or pest is quite dependent on changes in human activity in response to the event 
(Richards, Shanafelt & Fenichel, 2014).  
 
For these two general reasons (i.e. designing more effective policies to maintain a country’s 
reputation for pest control, and generating better economic impact estimates in the design stage 
of SPS regulations), it is key to better understand how farmers respond to diseases and what 
influences their decisions on the farm. Understanding the factors that motivate their decisions 
                                               
regulations on the goods. The United Kingdom decided to ban some fruit and vegetable imports from India. The 
UK argued that insects (like whiteflies and Thrips palmi) coming from India could establish in the United 
Kingdom, threatening British salad production as well as the UK’s pest free status for fruit flies (Menon, 2014). 
100
 In Florida, backyard citrus tree owners harboured a reservoir of disease. The lack of incentives for them to 
control their stock of trees likely expedited the spread of the disease across the state—hugely affecting the 
commercial growers (Halbert & Manjunath, 2004). 
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can help inform policies aimed to incentivize growers to produce cleaner products and control 
pests when they are observed. Failed certifications from poor quality at the port of the intended 
export market often originate back to the farm. This chapter introduces a case study that 
explores these issues for coffee pests and diseases in rural Uganda. Results from fieldwork in 
December and January 2013/14 during the coffee harvest season inform the analysis.   
 
5.1. UGANDA’S COFFEE INDUSTRY AS A CASE STUDY 
 
One of the unexplored questions arising from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 is what happens with SPS 
issues in the subset of WTO members (almost solely developing countries) who are not active 
participants in the SPS Committee in Geneva?  From the perspective of a developing country, 
the previous chapters have been illuminating in two respects. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the 
majority of SPS notifying members are developed countries influenced by falling binding 
tariffs. Chapters 3 and 4 showed which nations were involved in SPS disputes and found 
evidence that developing countries struggle to resolve trade concerns with developed country 
trading partners maintaining suspect SPS measures. However, these chapters did not address 
some consequences for a developing country, such as consequences from a lack of (1) effective 
SPS controls within a country and (2) active participation in SPS policy setting at the 
international level.  
 
Uganda is one of the dozens of least developed countries of the WTO that did not notify any 
SPS measures in the sample discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. While Uganda was an original 
member of the WTO since the GATT, they notified their first SPS measure in 2013 (a 
notification pertaining to regulations on imports of maize and maize-derived products).101 They 
only began to set up an SPS National Enquiry Portal in 2013 with funding from Abi Trust 
(Kimbowa, 2013). With a lack of institutional capacity to control the border and lack of 
transparent import policies to foreign exporters, it is likely that the SPS issues within Uganda 
(and similar countries) are less controlled than more active participants in the WTO SPS 
system.  
                                               
101
 Document number G/SPS/N/UGA/2 found in the SPS-IMS. Uganda issued a completely blank notification in 
1999, which has not been considered here.  
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The coffee supply chain in Uganda reflects many of the issues that come from poor SPS 
controls within a country and at the border. Primarily these are: (1) lower prices received from 
importers due to rejections and quality issues, and (2) lower yields from foreign pests/diseases, 
which have become established in the country’s production areas. These outcomes feed into 
and result from decisions made by farmers and traders within the supply chain. 
 
The role of SPS issues in Uganda coffee is further emphasized by the background before the 
major incursion of CWD in the mid-90s. SPS issues led to both (1) declines in supply and (2) 
declines in price for the coffee sector. After liberalization of the sector in the first years of the 
1990s, producer share of export price rose significantly from a highly variable 20% to 50% 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s to a steady 75% of export price in the 1990s post-liberalization 
(World Bank, 2006b).102 Concurrent with this development were higher prices for coffee in the 
mid-90s relative to the previous 5-10 years. This lead to a surge in production. The peak in 
exports shows clearly in Figure 111 in the Appendix (page 420). Arguably, these beneficial 
conditions led to the incentive to smuggle coffee from the DR Congo into Uganda. By many 
accounts, coffee planting material, seedlings, and sacks of coffee cherries flowed freely across 
the porous border with no SPS regulations to control for vectors of pest/disease (Hakiza, DT, 
Musoli, et al., 2009; Cheyns, Mrema & Sallée, 2006; Rutherford, 2006; Flood, 2009). Due to 
poor SPS control, Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD) became established within Uganda resulting in 
massive devastation of farmers’ plots in a short amount of time. The decline in export volumes 
as CWD became established shows markedly (again see Figure 111).   
 
CWD is infamous for the destruction it caused—and continues to cause—to the coffee industry 
of Uganda. A group of closely related fungal pathogens causes the disease, the most of 
important of which is Gibberella (Fusarium) xylarioides. The fungus invades the vascular 
tissue of Robusta coffee (C. canephora)—the type of coffee which dominates Ugandan 
production—eventually killing the tree. Between its successful entry into Uganda from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (likely in 1993) to the early 2000s, the disease killed around 
half of the Robusta coffee trees in Uganda (see more about CWD and its impact in the 
Appendix, section A.22.1, on page 388). As such, most growers are familiar with the damage 
                                               
102
 Liberalization of the coffee sector was not universally agreed to be beneficial. Many of the NGO leaders 
interviewed felt that coffee producers were better organized and controlled quality better pre-liberalization (see 
Appendix A.26). 
152 
 
that is possible from foreign plant diseases. The Ugandan government has as well instituted 
policies to improve the production conditions in the industry, which growers may be familiar 
with or even benefited from directly.  
 
The second effect of SPS issues is on price for coffee. Despite Uganda’s contemporary issues 
with producing quality Robusta coffee, it was previously known for producing some of the 
highest quality Robusta in the world due to ideal growing conditions for the tree. The country 
previously maintained a significant price premium for its Robusta (World Bank, 2006b). This 
has been lost largely due to poor SPS control. Mycotoxins103 are the primary SPS issue of 
coffee from the perspective of importers. While Uganda has had only two serious rejections of 
coffee shipments to Europe due to Ochratoxin A (a type of mycotoxin) in the first decade since 
the WTO began, the potential for many more is high (World Bank, 2006a). The few rejections 
are the result of (1) increased investments in sorting machinery by exporters and (2) coffee 
roasters mixing bad quality with good. Henson, Loader, Swinbank, et al. (2000) found in their 
case study of Ethiopia and Cameroon coffee supply chains that often roasters will blend coffee 
affected by quality issues to meet consumer and legal requirements. The World Bank (2006a) 
concluded in their report on analysing the threats to global trade integration for Uganda that 
the “Ugandan coffee industry faces a challenge related to compliance with emerging food 
safety regulation”.  If the EU were to enforce regulations on Ochratoxin limits, 7-18% of all 
green coffee imports would be rejected (World Bank, 2006a).104 Within the Ugandan system, 
mycotoxin contamination of coffee, along with other major agriculture and food products, is 
well beyond most developed country limits due to poor handling and knowledge of SPS issues 
(Kaaya & Warren, 2005).  
 
Rudaheranwa, Guloba & Nabiddo (2007) outline the constraints to Uganda’s exports, which 
have resulted in a growing trade deficit in the 2000s despite the Ugandan government’s 
“export-led growth” policies for the country. They take stock of the SPS capacities and gaps 
within the public sector export agencies, as well as, the costs of upgrades needed in the private 
sector. They find there are both supply side issues, as well as, market access constraints. Since 
                                               
103
 A group of toxic chemicals produced by a variety moulds. The mycotoxins of most concern within 
food/agricultural exports are Aflatoxins and Ochratoxins, within each of these are several different forms with 
alphanumeric designations: e.g. Ochratoxin A or Aflatoxin B1) 
104
 Already, the majority of EU rejections of food and agricultural imports every year are due to mycotoxin 
contamination (see Appendix A.28). 
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Uganda finds tariff-free and quota-free access to most major economies via preferential trade 
agreements for least-developed countries, the market access constraints are almost completely 
due to inadequate quality of production and failure to meet SPS/TBT standards (Rudaheranwa, 
Guloba & Nabiddo, 2007). For example, as of 2007, the laboratory at the Uganda National 
Bureau of Standards was the only accredited microbiological laboratory in the country capable 
of conducting tests of total plate counts of bacteria and presence of yeasts, moulds, and 
coliforms. Even the one certified laboratory still lacked capacity to analyse a subset of chemical 
residues to show compliance with SPS limits (Rudaheranwa, Guloba & Nabiddo, 2007).  
 
As the government’s coffee industry support arm, the Uganda Coffee Development Authority 
(UCDA) has a goal of “promoting production” and “controlling the quality” of coffee to 
support the position of Uganda as a high value source of coffee on the world market (UCDA, 
2014). Production and quality have both faced several barriers in Uganda, which will be 
explored in more detail throughout the following chapters. In order to achieve these production 
and quality goals, how different actors within the coffee supply chain perceive and act on 
supply risks (e.g. pests and diseases) needs to be better understood. Previous studies by World 
Bank (2006a) have found that traders and farmers are generally unaware of how SPS 
regulations affect the prices they receive for their products. This study will contribute to 
understanding what factors motivate famers’ decisions and investments in coffee production, 
given the losses they have faced from poor SPS regulations at Uganda’s border and low prices 
from poor SPS quality maintenance within the domestic supply chain.  
 
The Ugandan coffee industry is an ideal case study for exploring the decision-making and 
responses to pests from farmers in an agricultural industry. Uganda’s coffee production is a 
critical sector of the national economy compromising some 25% of all foreign exchange 
earnings, 40% of total export value, and providing income for over 500,000 smallholders 
directly and nearly 3.5 million families that are in some way reliant on the industry (UCDA, 
2014; Cheyns, Mrema & Sallée, 2006). Unlike other industries in many countries where larger 
suppliers dominate production (e.g. wheat in the USA or soybean in Brazil), the vast majority 
of Uganda’s coffee production is supplied by smallholder farmers with less than one hectare 
of land who must react to conditions, but have little influence over wider policy (Cheyns, 
Mrema & Sallée, 2006).  
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While coffee is an important export of Uganda, Uganda is quite a small player on the 
international market. Uganda has very little power to influence the price of coffee or the 
conditions of coffee that importers from the major markets demand. The international 
fluctuations of the market have an influence on the responses that the Ugandan coffee sector 
makes. When prices are up, farmers may invest more in their coffee crop and devote more time 
and effort to coffee production. When prices are down farmers may switch effort to alternative 
crops. Additionally, exporters store coffee in low price years to wait for higher price years—
hedging their exposure to an uncertain market with options on the London futures exchange 
for Robusta. As a result, while it is beyond the scope for this specific case study, some analysis 
on the global and regional trends for green coffee exports, which influence Ugandan coffee 
production, is found in Appendix A.24 (pages 405 to 429).  
 
Research discussed in Appendix A.24 examines the changes in the global export market for 
green coffee from 1961 to 2011 using UN FAO data (FAOSTAT, 2014). Analysis is conducted 
at the global level (section A.25.1), for the top country exporters (section A.25.2), and at the 
East Africa regional level (sections A.25.3 and A.25.4). The last section (A.25.5) explores the 
structure of the export industry using monthly export and import data manually extracted by 
the author from Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) monthly reports. These 
overviews and limited analysis of the coffee export market help to set the context of the survey 
results in this chapter, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.  
 
5.2. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS OF CASE STUDY 
 
This case study explores the perceived gravity of CWD and other pests. Each of the following 
three chapters will address various questions, but the two guiding research questions addressed 
in this case study are: 
 
1) How does pest/disease risk information transfer among stakeholders in the 
Robusta coffee supply chain in Uganda and do stakeholders agree on the risks? 
2) What characteristics of smallholder coffee farmers determine their response to 
CWD and other coffee pests/diseases?  
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The case study is divided among three chapters. This chapter introduces the fieldwork that was 
conducted in Uganda by the author. The organizations that participated in the study along with 
the methodology of the workshops and the interviews is presented in section 5.3 below. The 
chapter also discusses the differences among cooperative and non-cooperative coffee growers 
surveyed. Following the methodology section is the literature review (section 5.3.5) of the 
relevant studies on farmer decision-making with a focus on the different behaviours and 
outcomes expected for farmers in cooperatives. Section 5.5 examines organizational 
characteristics and production outcomes from coffee farmers’ associations in the survey in 
Uganda.  
 
Following Chapter 5, Chapter 6 discusses results measuring farmers’ risk tolerance in three 
different contexts. The first part addresses one of the main questions (question 1, above) of the 
case study about agreement among stakeholders about priority pests for Robusta coffee. 
Section 6.4.1 presents and discusses the results of the pest risk survey for different actors in the 
supply chain. The severity and frequency of five pests are summarized from the 119 surveyed 
farmers. The second measurement of risk tolerance, section 6.4.2 contains the results from the 
risk-aversion scores of 119 farmers and 89 traders surveyed in Uganda, using a classic Holt & 
Laury (2002) experimental design. Lastly, section 6.4.3 describes the results of a coffee trading 
game developed by the author to elicit a coffee grower groups’ willingness to accept stable 
prices with less market risks through a contract (methodology discussed in section 6.2.1).  
 
Chapter 7 investigates drivers of farmers’ decisions and on-farm practices. Particularly of 
interest to the second research question (above), the characteristics of farmers that are related 
to their responses pre- and post- disease incident on their plot are examined. One major 
consideration is the role that social connections play in shaping decisions. Section 7.2.1 
explores the impact that farmers’ social networks have on their decisions and the prices they 
receive for their product in the market. Section 7.2.3 assesses the determinants of decisions on 
the plot. What factors seem to predict beneficial decisions like fertilizing and pruning of the 
coffee plot are analysed based on data from the household (HH) survey. Section 7.2.4 
investigates the other crops and income generating activities that coffee growers are involved 
in and then section 7.2.5 estimates the probability that a farmer will exit coffee based on 
different attributes. Since exit is difficult to measure, the lack of planting seedlings while losing 
trees to serious pest/disease incidents is used as a proxy.  
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5.3. METHODOLOGY 
 
A survey of Ugandan coffee growers and traders in the districts of Buikwe, Kayunga, and 
Kumuli was conducted in December 2013 and January 2014 sponsored by a grant from the 
University of California at Davis (UC-Davis).105 The author along with a collaborator at UC-
Davis, Dr. Neil McRoberts, travelled to Uganda to conduct the survey along with Mr. Ignitius 
Bwoogi of the Rural Agency for Sustainable Development (RASD).106 The fieldwork consisted 
of four components:  (1) grower and trader group workshops; (2) individual HH surveys of 
growers and traders; (3) expert interviews with stakeholders, including cooperative managers, 
NGO directors, extension agents, and international exporters; and (4) a coffee trading game. 
The methodologies used for each type of data gathering are covered in separate sections below: 
section 5.3.2 for the expert interviews, section 5.3.3 for the workshops, and sections 5.3.4 and 
5.3.5 for the HH surveys. The methodology for the coffee trading game is discussed in Chapter 
6 (section 6.2.1) since the results are presented in that chapter.  
 
5.3.1. Organizations involved with the fieldwork 
Below in Table 37 is a list of the organizations that provided data and/or aided with the 
fieldwork in some way. For every organization—as well as their involvement in the capacity 
described below—the author conducted semi-structured interviews with one or more members 
of their staff on a one-on-one basis. These interviews are listed along with additional interview 
sources in Table 39 of section 5.3.2 on page 162. The decision to anonymize the names of some 
organizations (e.g. “NGO B” in Table 37 below) is also discussed there, but generally was done 
to follow best practice survey and interview design guidance to protect confidentiality given 
by Oppenheim (2000, pp.105, 266). 
 
                                               
105
 SEED Grant awarded to Dr. Neil McRoberts and Professor Thomas Gordon in the Department of Plant 
Pathology of UC-Davis; Lee Pearson in the Centre for Environmental Policy at Imperial College London; and 
Ignitius Bwoogi at the Rural Agency for Sustainable Development in Nkokonjeru, Uganda. 
106
 See section 5.3.1 for more information about the partner Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
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Table 37: List of organizations and their involvement with fieldwork in Uganda 
Name Type Research Involvement 
RASD NGO • Partner in household surveys 
• Partner in Nkokonjeru group workshop 
 
(NGO B) NGO • Partner in Kamuli group workshop 
• Provided producer data 
• Provided management documents 
 
(Exporter A) Export Firm • Provided producer data 
 
NUCAFE – Nkokonjeru Gov. Association • Provided producer data 
 
The main partner for the fieldwork in the Nkokonjeru area (including the districts of Buikwe, 
and Kayunga) was the Rural Agency for Sustainable Development (RASD). The NGO aided 
with all the HH surveys and offered their facilities to run the coffee group workshop. They 
helped find willing research assistants from students at local universities who volunteered to 
help the author conduct the HH surveys. RASD’s Executive Director, Ignitius Bwoogi, was a 
partner on the research grant.  
 
RASD is an NGO, which was founded initially as a CBO (Community Based Organization) in 
2000 by a group of concerned citizens of Nkokonjeru Town Council. The RASD Resource 
Centre is in Nkokonjeru, Buikwe District about halfway between Kampala and Jinja just miles 
from the shores of Lake Victoria. RASD registered as an NGO with the National NGO Board 
(Reg no. 5.5914/5544) in 2005. Focusing much of its resources in the Nkokonjeru community, 
RASD operates in the greater Mukono area districts (Mukono, Kayunga, Buikwe, and 
Buvuma).107 Since 2009, RASD has had on-going projects with Engineers Without Borders 
volunteers from the United Kingdom in the area of improving coffee processing technology.108  
 
NGO B is the second NGO that collaborated with the author on this research. NGO B was 
established in the early 1980s with the original focus on providing scholarships to cover school 
fees for children to attend secondary school and university. While they still allocate a large 
component of their charitable endeavours to educational support, the mission of the NGO has 
                                               
107
 More information about RASD can be found on their website: http://rasd-uganda.org 
108
 For full disclosure: the author was the UK-based project manager selecting and coordinating student 
volunteers for these summer projects at RASD for the summers of 2010, 2011, and 2012. As well, the author 
was the president of the student chapter of Engineers without Borders at Duke University that started working 
with RASD in 2006. 
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changed over time with a greater emphasis on agricultural development. The largest project 
NGO B has conducted to date was in the coffee export sector. In 2006, NGO B, in partnership 
with a major coffee export firm based in Kampala, was awarded a 5-year, >€20,000 grant from 
the EU to help establish an export market for certified coffee with smallholder producer groups 
in Uganda. As a part of the project, the NGO organized 3,500 farmers into a cooperative that 
would offer a premium for members’ UTZ-certified coffee. NGO B gave each farmer extensive 
training in Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) and requirements for maintaining UTZ 
certification. 
 
NGO B registered a further 1,200 farmers in 2012 with follow-on funding from the EU in an 
adjacent town just southeast of the main implementation site. NGO B gave the author extensive 
access to their database on production from their registered farmers as well as documentation 
on some of the challenges they faced with UTZ certification. These documents and data form 
the basis of the discussion in sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.5. However, the majority of the data is left 
for future research, as there was extensive data coverage of growers involved over 5 years, for 
12 parishes, and with 20+ villages in each parish. The data can also serve as a fruitful source 
for comparison against a cooperative with a different training regime to enhance the 
understanding of the returns to extension support and training at farmer field schools. This 
important topic is left for future research due to time constraints, but brief comparisons of the 
production data for ~3,000 farmers to other coffee farming systems is found in section 5.5.4 
starting on page 190.  
 
Exporter A from Table 37 is one of the largest exporters of Ugandan green coffee (see analysis 
of the large exporters of Ugandan coffee in Appendix A.25.5). Like other major export firms 
in Uganda, Exporter A is working to boost production of coffee—and possibly lock-in 
smallholder suppliers of quality coffee—by funding the creation of coffee farmer groups and 
training programs on how to produce quality coffee. In the Buikwe district, Exporter A was in 
the process of registering farmers at the time of the fieldwork with a goal of registering some 
3,000 farmers by the end of April 2014. Their local director, interviewee #4, agreed to release 
their preliminary data on the 838 farmers they had registered so far for any research purposes. 
This group of farmers in Buikwe was used to check that the HH survey conducted as a part of 
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this research had not suffered from a selection bias compared to this larger set of the population 
of coffee farmers in the area.109  
 
The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)110 is the government’s official 
extension agency that works with farmers on a variety of crops including coffee. The local 
NAADS office for Buikwe district was based in Nkokonjeru, not far from the resource centre 
of RASD. NAADS provides technical advice and has formal agreements with government 
programs and politicians to facilitate the delivery of coffee seedlings locally. The interviewees 
(#16 and #17)111 also said that a plant health clinic for coffee happened every Monday.112 The 
main activity the NAADS office engaged in—according to the interviewees—was the 
registration of farming associations as well as training and distribution of free seedlings. 
 
The National Union of Coffee Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises (NUCAFE)113  is a national 
association in Uganda for coffee farmers and traders. In the area covered in this study, 
NUCAFE mainly functioned as an alternative buyer of coffee that farmers could use besides 
selling it to a trader or bringing coffee directly to the coffee mill. Farmers could join NUCAFE 
for a small fee of 5,000 Ugandan Shillings (approximately £1.25 at the time of the survey) and 
buy shares in the association for 10,000 Uganda Shillings per share.114 NUCAFE did have a 
campaign to register farmers within the district as “NUCAFE certified” farmers and the 
business manager (interviewee #18) said there were trainings on coffee management as well. 
Farmers who participated in the present HH survey though disagreed: farmers reported there 
was no training and no subsequent follow-up after paying registration. Several farmers 
including specifically #45 and #67 from the HH survey claimed they felt NUCAFE just took 
their money and gave no benefit and as a result, they would never join a co-op again.  
 
                                               
109
 Table 48 on page 230 in section 6.3.1 shows the results of the tests.  
110
 More information about NAADS can be found on their website: http://www.naads.or.ug/ 
111
 See the interview list in Table 39 on page 162 
112
 However, the author could not confirm the evidence of a plant health clinic. It did not occur the Monday of 
the interview since the manager was out of town, but it also was not obvious that there was a plant health clinic 
either of the previous two weeks that the research team passed by the NAADS offices. 
113
 More information about NUCAFE can be found on their website: http://www.nucafe.org/ 
114
 Currently the shares were not paying a dividend, but there were plans to pay dividends if there are any profits 
for the farmers according to the business manager (interviewee #18). As a result, there was not currently any 
benefit to owning shares that the author could discern and the interviewee did not believe there would be a buy 
back scheme or a limit on the number of shares sold (as a result, it seemed very likely their value would only be 
diluted in time and, without a dividend, worthless).  
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Ideally, NUCAFE is meant to buy kase (the Luganda115 word for dried and milled coffee, which 
is also called FAQ or Fair Average Quality) allowing farmers to add as much value as possible 
to their product before they sell it. To facilitate this strategy, the NUCAFE office is based at 
the local processing mill. NUCAFE had registered over a thousand farmers in the Nkokonjeru 
area, but was not considered an active player by many of the largest traders interviewed in the 
HH survey (#10, #11, and #12). Several traders claimed that the local NUCAFE operation had 
not bought a single 60kg sack of coffee in the 2013 season. However, the interview conducted 
with the local Business Manager of NUCAFE, interviewee #18, disagreed with this 
perception—though the author did not ask her directly about the discrepancy. She claimed to 
be very active and gave the author access and free use of her organization’s records on 
production data for further research.  
 
The availability of data collected by the author from all three organizations as well as from the 
HH survey is summarized in Table 38. Given the variety and sample sizes in the data, several 
research projects on coffee production in Uganda could be conducted in the future. It would 
also help to parameterize models of coffee production and investment. 
 
                                               
115
 Luganda is the language of the people of Buganda, the central kingdom located in Uganda.  
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Table 38: Data availability for production data collected in the field from organizations contacted 
Category Variable EXPORTER A NUCAFE NGO B 
HH 
Survey 
Location District X X X X 
 Sub-county X X   
 Parish X X X  
 Village X  X X 
 Co-op group  X X  
HH Name X X X X 
 Age X   X 
 Sex X X X X 
 Education X   X 
 Family size X   X 
 Sources of other farm income X   X 
Plot Total acreage X  X X 
 Coffee acreage X X X X 
 Spacing of coffee trees X    
 Number of shade trees X    
 Number productive trees X  X  
 Number unproductive trees X  X  
 Number total coffee trees X X X X 
Production Yield (kg / tree) X C C C 
 Yield (kg / ha) C X C X 
 Kg sold to co-op   X  
Practices GAPs implemented X   X 
 UTZ Compliant   X  
Stats. Number of farmers 838 1,145 3,500 119 
 Years 2013 2013 2013 2013 
    2012  
    2010  
    2009  
    2007  
Note: X: data is recorded 
C: able to calculate 
 
5.3.2. Interviews 
Semi-structured, expert interviews with notes recorded were used for interviewing contacts in 
export firms in Kampala by the author (called “interviews” throughout). These interviews were 
conducted exclusively in English as the exporters and coffee industry agencies had English as 
their official language for business. A list of the contacts interviewed by the author is below in 
Table 39.  
 
162 
 
Table 39: Uganda coffee industry interview list 
ID Position 
Organization 
Name 
Organization 
Type Location 
Interview 
Date 
1 Executive Director (NGO A) NGO Nkokonjeru 18/12/13 
2 Project Manager (Exporter A) Exporter Kampala 7/01/14 
3 Quality Manager (Exporter A) Exporter Kampala 7/01/14 
4 Field Manager (Exporter A) Exporter Nkokonjeru 7/01/14 
5 Head of Programs (NGO B) NGO Kampala 8/01/14 
6 Executive Director (NGO B) NGO Kampala 8/01/14 
7 Project Officer (NGO B) NGO Kisozi 14/01/14 
8 Sustainability Manager (Exporter B) Exporter Kampala 17/01/14 
9 Coffee Agronomist (Exporter B) Exporter Kampala 17/01/14 
10 Managing Director (Exporter B) Exporter Kampala 17/01/14 
11 Research Fellow EPRC Research Kampala 10/01/14 
12 Research Fellow EPRC Research Kampala 10/01/14 
13 Employee (Inputs A) Inputs store Nkokonjeru 7/01/14 
14 President & CEO (Training A) Consulting Kampala 10/01/14 
15 Senior Scientist COREC Research Mukono 10/01/14 
16 Coordinator NAADS Extension Nkokonjeru 13/01/14 
17 Development Officer NAADS Extension Nkokonjeru 13/01/14 
18 Business Manager NUCAFE Association Nkokonjeru 13/01/14 
19 Founder (Start-up A) Business Mukono 10/01/14 
 
Export firms were contacted based on the results from analysing the largest exporters in the 
Ugandan market (Appendix A.25.5, page 425). The top ten were contacted and then two from 
the top five were formally interviewed by the author. “NGO B” was selected based on referral 
from a colleague in the Centre for Environmental Policy who had previously worked on 
agricultural development in Uganda. The employee interviewed from “Inputs A” was the 
primary employee for the only inputs supply store in town.116 The entrepreneur of “Start-up A” 
was a contact of Ignitius Bwoogi and was the former director of the only washed117 Robusta 
focused coffee business in Buikwe district before it failed. Several intuitions have heavy 
involvement in the coffee industry in Uganda and were obvious targets for interviews. The 
                                               
116
 Several traders who owned shops selling a variety of household products and trading coffee, would also sell a 
selected number of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers. Inputs A was the only inputs focused shop in the main 
town of Nkokonjeru though.  
117
 There are two basic methods of processing coffee. (1) Natural or “dry” processing means the coffee cherries 
are harvested, dried, and then milled to extract the coffee bean inside. This is the usual method of processing for 
Ugandan Robusta coffee. (2) Washed processing involves taking harvested coffee cherries, floating them in 
tanks of water and then de-pulping the berry from the bean. The sticky mucilage is left to dry on the bean and 
then extracted as well to produce a coffee bean. This method is common for Arabica coffee production.   
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Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) is the main institution for analysis of the Ugandan 
government’s policies and provides input to policymakers. The EPRC has conducted work on 
CWD and so two of their research fellows were contacted by the author for interview. 
Similarly, the National Crops Resources Research Institute (NaCCRI) and the associated 
Coffee Research Centre (COREC) under NaCCRI is the main government scientific institute 
for coffee. A Senior Scientist at COREC known by interviewee #19 was contacted and agreed 
to be interviewed. Representatives from NAADS and NUCAFE (described in the previous 
section) were also interviewed. The Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) was one 
organization that is unfortunately lacking from the interview list. Many attempts were made by 
the author to set a meeting with someone from the authority in Kampala, but a suitable time 
could not be arranged during the fieldwork. 
 
Anonymity was important for several interviewees from prominent export firms and NGOs; 
especially, the managing director of an intentionally known and top five (by annual volume 
from Uganda) exporter. Additionally, the President and CEO (interview #14) of the 
organization referred to in Table 39 as “Training A” could easily be identified if the real name 
of the organization was given as there are few organizations working on connecting supply 
chain stakeholders, holding training workshops, and producing reports on the coffee industry. 
As such, the decision was taken not to reference the names or institutions represented by these 
types of organizations as some of their honest evaluations of other stakeholders in the industry 
could be perceived as critical. The majority of the interviewees are anonymized following the 
standard methodology of interviews recommended by Oppenheim (2000, pp.265–66); a highly 
cited methodology book used widely in Political Science and other fields. The organization 
names for interview #11, #12, and #15-18 are given as they have many employees in similar 
roles so they cannot be identified based on job title alone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
The following list of topics was used to guide the semi-structured interviews: 
 
1. Integration in supply chain: 
o How does the organization you work for fit within the supply chain for 
Robusta coffee in Uganda?  
o What other organizations do you work directly with? 
2. Pests in the supply chain: 
o For the following pests, which ones are most damaging to the production 
of Robusta coffee? (Here the same images were presented from the pest 
component of the household survey).  
o How are the pests listed best controlled? 
3. Barriers in the supply chain: 
o What are the barriers to producing more coffee in Uganda?  
o What are the limitations to improving quality? 
4. Advice and connection to farmers: 
o What sort of advice does your organization give farmers?  
o What do you think growers of coffee should do differently? 
 
Questions were adapted to the context of the organization being interviewed as well as topics 
that arose during conversation. For example, the interviews with NAADS focused more on 
topics 2 and 4, while the interviews with exporters focused mostly on topic 3.  
 
5.3.3. Workshops 
Two workshops were conducted with coffee farmers and traders. The first took place in 
Nkokonjeru Town Council (Buikwe District) at the RASD’s Resource Centre with nearly 100 
farmers and traders in attendance throughout the day.118 The second workshop was a condensed 
version conducted in Kamuli town (Kamuli District) with 2 staff of NGO B and around 40 
members of the cooperative. At the Kamuli workshop, 31 farmers from the cooperative 
completed the same HH survey that was used in Buikwe and Kayunga districts (see survey 
methodology below in section 5.3.5). Example photos from each workshop in Figure 28. 
                                               
118
 The official count was taken based on the research team paid for 98 meals at lunch counted by the caterers 
providing the food. Several people arrived after lunch and others left during the day.  
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Figure 28: Setup for big group discussion at farmer workshops in Nkokonjeru (top) and Kamuli (bottom) 
 
The Nkokonjeru farmer workshop day held at RASD was divided into three parts of about two 
hours each with a break for lunch. The outline agenda for the day is found in Appendix A.16 
on page 375. The first part of the day was about understanding the market and other crop 
opportunities. The author designed a set of questions, which were loosely followed to discuss 
in small groups of around 15 people. The survey team from the HH surveys was used to help 
translate the questions and report on some of the discussion occurring during the workshop. 
For one of the activities, each group was asked to make a poster representing the answers to 
the following two prompts:  
 
1. Think about how the coffee supply chain works now. Assuming the final export 
product is priced at 5,000 Uganda Shillings (USh) per kg119, what would be the 
price at each stage of the process from the harvest to export? 
2. How do you think the coffee supply chain should work? Again, assume the 
export price is 5,000 USh per kg.  
                                               
119
 a high, but realistic price at the time 
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The results from this part of the exercise are presented and discussed on page 198 in section 
5.5.7. In addition to the supply chain questions, groups were asked to discuss damage from 
coffee pests/diseases and what actions they may take to mitigate these risks or switch effort 
towards other crops. The results from that part of the workshop is explained and discussed in 
Chapter 7. The posters created by every group were presented to the entire audience for 
discussion at the end of each part of the workshop. The research team saved the posters and 
took notes throughout the sessions to inform the discussions of the results. Some example 
photos from the workshop discussions are found in Figure 29 below. 
 
  
  
Figure 29: Example photos of workshop discussion among grower/trader groups 
 
5.3.4. Special equipment for household surveys 
Each interviewer had a Samsung Galaxy Y S5360 smart phone that captured audio, video, 
photo, and GPS location at each household interviewed. The phone was GPS-enabled such that 
the photo taken of the grower or trader would allow the researcher to locate them on the map. 
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The photos were uploaded to Panoramio120, Google Earth121, and Picasa122 (all Google 
products) which enabled maps to be made with both satellite imagery as well as the location of 
each interview. The map produced of the farmers surveyed is in section 5.3.5 on page 169.  
 
5.3.5. Surveys 
A paper-based survey with a fixed set of questions administered one-on-one at a person’s 
household (or place of work) was used for the growers and traders surveyed. Consent was 
obtained from participants who were allowed to end participation at any point of the survey 
and still receive compensation via the risk-aversion game at the end (see methods for risk-
aversion game in Chapter 6). Appendix A.17 on page 376 contains an example of the consent 
page that was given and explained to the participants before agreeing to join in the survey. 
Smallholders had to confirm that they were actively growing coffee on their plots and had at 
least ten trees to qualify for involvement in the survey.  
 
A local, bilingual survey team of four people trained by the author conducted these surveys 
almost exclusively in Luganda with English translation during recording by the member of the 
survey team.123 The surveyors (local university students and volunteers at RASD) had 
previously helped with the field research of Dr. Kate Scow at University of California at Davis 
(Kearney, Fonte, Salomon, et al., 2012). The team of experienced surveyors was trained as a 
group by the author, who then did at least three surveys with each member to ensure the surveys 
were administered as accurately and consistently as possible. Each member of the survey team 
was paid a base salary of 10,000 Uganda Shillings (USh) per day in addition to a lunch 
allowance and bonus at the end of the project. This salary was above local standards, similar 
to what the previous research teams in Nkokonjeru had paid, and suggested as fair by RASD.  
 
Farmers and traders were asked similar questions with some variances to account for their 
different place in the supply chain. Each was given a 50-question survey that was divided into 
four sections: (1) Coffee Production, (2) Network Connections, (3) Pest/Disease Survey, and 
(4) Household Controls. The study was piloted for the first two days of the survey period where 
                                               
120
 http://www.panoramio.com/ 
121
 http://www.google.co.uk/intl/en_uk/earth/ 
122
 http://picasa.google.co.uk/ 
123
 The survey team, in addition to the author, consisted of Ignitius Bwoogi, Anthony Kisitu, Paul Kisekke, and 
George Kawa.  
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the first five farmers were interviewed and the questions were updated based on the feedback 
from the respondents as well as the survey team. The results were recorded, but had blanks for 
questions that were not included or were not comparable (the differences between the test and 
the final survey were minimal and mostly about phrasing and design for easily recording 
answers). The final survey design used for farmers/growers is in Appendix A.19 (pages 378 - 
383) and Appendix A.20 for traders (pages 383 - 387).  
 
The farmer survey was conducted with 119 farmers in Buikwe and Kayunga districts, as well 
as, with 31 farmers in Kamuli district at the workshop with NGO B. The trader survey was 
conducted with 89 traders in Buikwe and Kayunga districts only. Using the tools described in 
section 5.3.4, maps of the farmers’ locations and traders’ locations were constructed. Figure 30 
displays the map of all the farmers surveyed in Buikwe, Kayunga, and Kamuli districts.124 The 
majority of farmers were surveyed in Buikwe District around Nkokonjeru Town, which is 
shown in more detail in Figure 31.  
 
                                               
124
 Traders were located in similar areas and so the map is not shown, though the data were recorded. 
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Note: each image is at the location of the grower, but at this scale just demonstrates the 
approximate locations of the survey area. 
Figure 30: Map of household survey locations among the three districts surveyed 
 
The administration of the survey was done on location at the farmer’s house or trader’s house. 
Around half of the surveys were conducted with two people present from the survey team to 
ensure accuracy of the recording at the beginning of the surveying period. However, in the final 
weeks of the survey, surveyors went out individually to increase the sample size of the study. 
The author participated in around half of the surveys to ensure quality control in their 
administration, as well as, to become more informed for conducting subsequent interviews with 
stakeholders in Kampala. Notes on perceptions and comments made by the participants were 
recorded and will be referred to throughout the study by the id number of the participant (e.g. 
farmer #45, or trader #73). Photos of a few of the surveys being conducted are shown in Figure 
32 below for illustrative purposes.  
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Figure 31: Map of surveyed Buikwe farmers around central town of Nkokonjeru where RASD is based 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Note: (a) author (left) conducting the interview of the farmer (right) with translator 
(centre); (b) coffee grower explaining the damage caused by the pest in the image given 
to her (bottom left of photo); (c) translator (centre) from survey team explains the five 
pests that are common and gets husband (right) to answer which ones they have seen 
as his wife (left) looks on; (d) after the survey, if the grower was interested, the surveyor 
would check the field and demonstrate evidence of different pests/diseases 
 
Figure 32: Examples of survey administration in the field 
 
Non-participation was minimal, but not formally recorded by every surveyor on the team. On 
the surveys that the author participated in, only two families out of more than 50 reported not 
wanting to participate after the survey was explained. Indirect methods of not participating 
could have included parents telling children to say their parents were not home or claiming to 
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not grow any coffee. While not recorded either, based on the author’s experience with the 
surveys, these potential reasons for not participating did not occur very often if at all.  
 
At the mid-point of the survey period, an additional check-in as a team was conducted to 
discuss any issues that were arising. The only issue was the explanation for the risk-aversion 
game used as compensation at the end of the interview. Further details are discussed in Chapter 
6 methodology section (6.2.3). In short, no changes were made in the administration of the 
survey at any point during data collection.  
 
5.4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The standard economic models of choice centre on the idea that a rational decision maker, 
when faced with a series of possible choices, will decide on the one that maximizes their utility 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Limitations to this standard approach and alternative theories 
of choice have been discussed in decades of economic theory on decision-making. The main 
critiques and subsequent changes to the approach of viewing decisions have been due to 
observations that real-life economic actors often have (1) time inconsistent preferences,  (2) 
make choices that depend on how the options are framed, and (3) are limited in the degree to 
which they can process information. These are discussed in more detail with influential papers 
on each theme below.  
 
A full review of the different, foundational, approaches to study economic decision-making is 
found in Edwards (1954). In short, Edwards demonstrates that most earlier work focused on 
theories of “riskless” choices for agents that are completely informed, sensitive to changes in 
prices, and rational. When moving into the topic of choices under risk or uncertainty, the role 
of rationality has come under more scrutiny; specifically, whether decision-makers truly have 
transivity of preferences and maximize expected utility (Edwards, 1954).  Farmers, in this case, 
or decision-makers generally, may be limited both by access to external information as well as 
ability to process that knowledge. (Simon, 1956) coined the term “bounded rationality” to 
convey that idea that there are constraints to the objectives, information, and tools that a 
decision-maker can consider when evaluating and taking action. Simon’s work in the 1950s 
influenced the future fields of psychology and economics by addressing how decisions on 
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allocation of resources are influenced by human cognition (Simon, 1959). Simon described the 
choice process as:  
 
A real-life decision involves some goals or values, some facts about the environment, and 
some inferences drawn from the values and facts...the whole process may be viewed, 
metaphorically, as a process of “reasoning,” where the values and facts serve as premises, 
and the decision that is finally reached is inferred from the premises. (Simon, 1959) 
 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996) in a highly influential paper extend Simon’s original concept 
of “bounded rationality” with the idea that heuristics lead to better, faster decisions than optimal 
decision-making procedures under limited information. In short, simple factors in reduced form 
models led to useful predictions of actual behaviour (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). The 
simplification of factors inspires many conceptual models of decision-making. 
 
As well as criticizing the ability of a decision-maker’s rationality in terms of perfect 
information, another shift within the theoretical literature was the assumptions of the utility 
maximization as the criteria for the choice. There are several lines of inquiry, but perhaps the 
most influential was Kahneman & Tversky (1979) paper in Econometrica for “Prospect 
Theory”. Their paper formalized the observations from psychology that people often 
overweight low probability events. They showed that decision weights can be used to explain 
this preference, as well as, incorporating the observations that people overvalue probable 
outcomes compared to certain outcomes. Their paper also showed that decisions on uncertain 
choices are reference dependent; gains and losses are only relative to that reference point set 
by the decision-maker (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).125  
 
Related critiques against the assumptions of economic models for decisions with consequences 
over time were being made against the discounted utility model (see Frederick, Loewenstein 
& O’donoghue (2002) for a thorough review). Additionally, criticisms are made for expected 
utility maximization as the decision criteria by the observation that decision-makers are often 
influenced by the weight of the consequence of the decision. Rabin (2000) notably developed 
a theory to calibrate models to account for the fact that decision-makers are risk-averse over 
decisions of “modest stakes” when most models would predict risk-neutrality. More of the 
                                               
125
 Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for his work in this area. 
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literature on the influence of risk-aversion on decision-making is returned to in section 6.1, 
where the empirical literature and evidence from simulations and games is examined before 
the presentation of the results from the case study in Uganda. Many of these updates to the 
economic theory of decision-making are incorporated into the design of conceptual frameworks 
of the decision-making process.  
 
There are several conceptual models of decision-making applied to agriculture. Errington 
(1986) categorized the decision process for farmers as happening in three stages: from (1) 
decision–making, to (2) decision-taking, and finally (3) implementing. Information comes in 
from internal and external sources in the first step of the decision-making. While the model 
was similar in nature to Simon (1959), Errington (1986) was ultimately concerned which 
decisions the farmer delegated, how that was decided, and what factors influenced that 
decision. Errington builds on much of the organizational studies research of the 1960s and 
1970s that were based on decisions taken by leaders on how to organize work (Rantamäki-
Lahtinen, 2009). The earliest influence for many studies were Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, et al. 
(1963), who was ultimately interested in identifying factors that could explain the dimensions 
of organizational structure (not reviewed in the present study). Another influential work on 
farm decision-making, Hansson & Ferguson (2011) construct a model with four structures that 
influence farmer investment behaviour in their dairy farms. They seek to understand which 
farmers further develop their dairy farms and which ones exit dairy production. The four 
structures are: decision structure, business structure, cognitive structure, and network structure. 
The emphasis on networks and factors affecting how farmers’ perceive and interpret 
information will be returned to in section 7.1 with regards to Ugandan coffee growers’ social 
connections and views on the fair price for coffee.  
 
Analogous factors to that basic process that Simon (1959) and Errington (1986) describe can 
be found in the author’s conceptual framework (Figure 33) presented below. The framework 
is influenced by the farmer decision model used in Mumford & Norton (1984) to explain 
farmers’ decisions to control pests. It is used—with some modifications discussed in section 
7.1—to guide the modelling for farmers’ decisions to abandon or invest in coffee production 
(section 7.2.5).  
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The conceptual framework follows the insights from two systematic reviews of the decision-
making literature. The first (1) is the comprehensive review of farming decision models by 
Öhlmér, Olson & Brehmer (1998). They review the literature from the 1950s to the late 1990s 
and conclude that the vast majority of conceptual frameworks take six to eight linear steps of 
decision-making. However, from empirical data the key insight is that there is a non-linear 
process of observation and searching for information paired with evaluation, decision-making, 
and post-evaluation (Öhlmér, Olson & Brehmer, 1998). This insight is carried forward in the 
continuous perception/search, evaluation, and decision loop in Figure 33. The second (2) set 
of influences comes from the systematic review of theoretical frameworks used in the strategic 
management literature from the 1970s to 1990s by Rajagopalan, Rasheed & Datta (1993). 
While several of their factors echo Simon (1959) in terms of access to external information, 
Rajagopalan, Rasheed & Datta (1993) highlight the role of decision-maker characteristics and 
environmental factors in the strategic decision process (shown in the red rounded rectangles 
attached to the characteristics of farmer category in Figure 33). 
 
 
Figure 33: Conceptual diagram of decision-making for farmers 
 
As shown in Figure 33, the basic structure of the decision-making process is in blue rectangles 
with the farmers’ evaluation of options at the centre. The farmer perceives a problem, which 
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leads to the need for evaluation. The problem perception, evaluation, and decision taking is 
conducted in a loop with subsequent perception to see if the results of the decision are achieved 
according to the farmer’s objectives. This loop follows the work of Öhlmér, Olson & Brehmer 
(1998). The evaluation to decide how to act is a complex process with many influencing factors. 
Like Rajagopalan, Rasheed & Datta (1993), the characteristics of the farmer in shaping the 
evaluation is important. In this model, the variables used to measure directly (or approximate 
indirectly) these factors are not included, but are shown in the specific application to Ugandan 
coffee growing (see section 7.1). One implication of the concept of bounded rationality is the 
limitations imposed by access to information and processing ability of a farmer. Many 
empirical results have confirmed the importance of social networks both (1) to find external 
information and (2) to provide interpretation to help make decisions (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; 
Conley & Udry, 2001; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Chloupkova, Svendsen & Svendsen, 2003; 
Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Sutherland & Burton, 2011; Conley & Udry, 2010). A brief review 
of some empirical literature on how a decision-maker’s social network influences her decision-
making and the theories of social capital are discussed in section 7.1 and briefly below.  
 
Studies of the decision-making and farmers’ perceptions are important areas of research both 
for ensuring food security and for improving economic development. These topics are often 
called farmers’ “knowledge, perceptions, and practices” or KPP in the literature (Van Mele, 
Cuc & Van Huis, 2001; Heong & Escalada, 1999). There are many studies on annual crops and 
perennial crops in a variety of contexts, but a noticeable gap on tropical crops like coffee where 
the amount of studies do not match the economic importance of the commodity (Segura, 
Barrera, Morales, et al., 2004). While the literature is too vast for complete review, a good 
review of the KPP that influence the adoption of good farming practices can be found in 
Knowler & Bradshaw (2007). Relevant studies on risk-aversion among farmers and factors that 
influence decision-making are discussed in brief below. More thorough literature reviews can 
be found on each topic in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively. The primary literature for this 
chapter is the outcomes from cooperative farming as compared to independent growers.  
 
5.4.1. Introduction to farmers’ decision-making and behaviour on the plot 
Improving understanding of how farmers make decisions is a critical area in order to improve 
implementation of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) as well as designing effective policies 
that incentivise farmers appropriately (Williamson, Little, Ali, et al., 2003). Often surveys have 
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found that farmers beliefs and practices, such as spraying of pesticides, directly contradict the 
best practices recommended by research findings of agricultural extension organizations 
(Sinzogan, Van Mele & Vayssieres, 2008; Van Mele, Cuc & Van Huis, 2001; Ntow, Gijzen, 
Kelderman, et al., 2006; Heong & Escalada, 1999; Storehouse, Gbongboui, De Groot, et al., 
1997; Escalada & Heong, 2004; Heong, Escalada, Sengsoulivong, et al., 2002). One review 
finds that risk preferences play a major role in practice adoption; an important characteristic is 
a farmers’ ability to interpret information and the farmers’ perceptions of likelihood of different 
outcomes (Just, Wolf & Zilberman, 2003). However, there does not seem to be universal 
characteristics of farmers that predict decision-making on the plot and following of best 
practices (Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007).  
 
Knowler & Bradshaw (2007) recommend that policy needs to be tailored to the local 
experience, as their review of adoption rates of practices from 31 papers found no universal 
characteristics that could predict behaviour. Part of the divergence may be due to different 
beliefs on how the ecosystem system works for their crop. Even stakeholders, only one-step 
away from each other in a supply chain, may have disparate beliefs on what affects quality and 
quantity of the final product. Sinzogan, Van Mele & Vayssieres (2008) find that mango 
growers and mango pickers on the same farms in Benin had very different beliefs on the 
importance of weaver ants (Oecophylla longinoda) to control fruit flies (Diptera: Tephritidae) 
in mango production. The pickers had learned that the ants were important to improve mango 
quality via controlling fruit fly infestations. Meanwhile, more than 75% of the growers not 
involved in picking thought the ants had no value and considered them a nuisance (Sinzogan, 
Van Mele & Vayssieres, 2008). If farmers and traders have different different beliefs about 
what affects quality, it is likely they will make sub-optimal choices for end-point quality. The 
agreement on pest risks among coffee stakeholders in Uganda are examined in Chapter 6, while 
further discussion of factors affecting decision-making on the farm is found in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4.2. The impacts of cooperative organizations 
There are several studies that analyse the differences in production and livelihood outcomes 
from farmers who choose to join cooperatives. Zheng, Wang & Song (2011) use a Heckman 
selection framework to study the factors that influence behavioural decisions (in a probit 
model) and subsequently the factors that affect farmer economic outcomes (in an OLS model) 
for cooperatives in China. They found that farmers that were more highly educated, had smaller 
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planting areas, were growing cash crops, and had a lack of labour were more likely to join 
cooperatives. Those in the cooperatives on average had higher production and incomes than a 
sample of farmers that were not in cooperatives (Zheng, Wang & Song, 2011). Similarly, 
Valkila & Nygren (2010) find that incomes are higher for cooperatives (those in Fairtrade 
schemes schemes) in Nicaragua when international prices are low. Although, Mendez, Bacon, 
Olson, et al. (2010) show for a large sample of Mexican cooperative and non-cooperative 
coffee growers, the higher incomes of cooperative farmers do not translate robustly to higher 
social-economic indicators like education and health. The extra income is often spent on other 
activities not measured in development outcomes (Mendez, Bacon, Olson, et al., 2010). The 
extra income is also quite marginal, especially for small-scale farmers producing minor 
volumes of coffee (Valkila, 2009). The extra income found in cooperatives may also be due to 
a selection bias (i.e. more able or more productive farmers may be more likely to join a 
cooperative) more so than from premiums or training received from the cooperative (Ruben & 
Fort, 2012). Additionally, many studies find that often the management of cooperatives or the 
Fairtrade buyers in a region are unable to buy all of the coffee at the premium prices (Sick, 
2008; Mendez, Bacon, Olson, et al., 2010; Wollni & Zeller, 2007; Valkila & Nygren, 2010).  
 
Valkila & Nygren (2010) overall question many of the benefits of Fairtrade, but do note that 
the social development projects did bring together particularly active members of the 
cooperative who were well aware of the community building projects that premiums were spent 
on. Their study suggests that cooperatives may be effective at building community engagement 
among coffee farmers, which could help build collective action towards solving problems as 
well as information sharing on best practices. Social capital—defined as level of trust among 
people—is expected to be higher among people in cooperatives (Chloupkova, Svendsen & 
Svendsen, 2003). Farmers in cooperatives might also be more willing to devote effort towards 
production of a premium crop. Wollni & Zeller (2007) study of cooperative farmers in Costa 
Rica finds that cooperative farmers were more likely to choose to grow specialty coffee, 
reflecting a decision to invest in their plot and put effort towards production of a premium crop. 
 
While the focus of the literature on cooperatives and Fairtrade is on price premiums and 
enhanced production, few authors have analysed the issue of the effect of farmers’ perceptions 
of a fair price on the decisions they make. Sick (2008) studied Costa Rican coffee farmers’ 
perceptions of Fairtrade. Of the many concerns, chief among them was the feeling that the 
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farmers who were aware of the final price paid per cup by consumers in the North, felt they 
were not getting a fair share of the profits. Many farmers in Sarapiqui had converted the lower 
elevation parts of the plots to dairy cattle instead of coffee, and they were trying to get income 
from coffee tourism as opposed to focusing on selling to the export market (Sick, 2008). Ruben 
& Fort (2012) find that cooperative farmers in Peru are more satisfied in terms of extension 
services and market management services than their non-cooperative counterparts. Cooperative 
group members selling Fairtrade also consulted their spouse more often for decisions, but 
statistically were no more likely to use fertilizer or follow environmental practices. They also 
found that cooperative farmers selling organic, Fairtrade coffee were more risk accepting than 
other groups (Ruben & Fort, 2012). Building on the work of these two studies, the following 
analysis looks at farmers’ views on a fair price for coffee and the differences in production and 
social connections among cooperative vs. non-cooperative organized farmers.  
 
5.5. COFFEE CERTIFICATIONS AND PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, coffee provides the main source of income for 
over 500,000 households in Uganda, with the vast majority of coffee farmers being low-input 
intensity smallholders with less than 2.5 ha of coffee and many with fewer than 50 coffee trees 
on less than 0.5 ha (UCDA, 2014; Cheyns, Mrema & Sallée, 2006). The vast majority of 
Uganda’s coffee supply comes from very small farms, but there are a few larger ones producing 
for the export market. The first set of large farms range from 20-100 hectares of coffee and 
there are possibly a maximum of a dozen of these in the country (personal conversation, 
interviewee #14). The next largest set of coffee farms are just over 100 hectares. One is owned 
by a group called KDS based in Mpigi, which has between 120-200 hectares (personal 
conversation, interviewee #14). The second is a private farm in Masaka with perhaps 120 ha 
(personal conversation, interviewee #14). There is only one very large coffee farm in Uganda 
with an enormous amount of land (several thousand hectares) devoted to coffee; the German 
coffee giant, the Neumann Kaffee Group, owns it.  
 
The Neumann Kaffee Group’s Kaweri farm has 2,500 ha of coffee devoted to producing 
washed Robusta. They own nearly a whole sub-county and control some 10,000 acres in 
addition to the washed Robusta operation, according to interviewee #15 from NaCCRI/COREC 
(personal conversation). The price premium for their washed Robusta is thought to be rather 
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good; interviewee # 14 believes they get around +600 USh premium over the London exchange 
market price (personal conversation).126 This allows them to offer a premium to farmers of 
150-200 USh per kg for quality red cherries (personal conversation, interviewee #14). This 
premium was in line with the premium that the founder of the washed Robusta start-up 
company in Mukono District was planning to offer, but could not make viable in the 2012 
season (personal conversation, interviewee #19). While only anecdotal, the narrow premiums 
that could be offered even when a company like Neumann has extreme scale highlights the 
narrow margins that are present throughout the coffee industry in Uganda. As the MD of 
Exporter B stated plainly “there is no unexplored fortune here in coffee” (personal 
conversation, interviewee #10). Price discovery is excellent in Uganda and newcomers find a 
very competitive market. The margins at every step are not well out of line with the risks and 
capital required to be in business at that stage (personal conversation, interviewee #10). 
 
The effects of narrow margins on the industry structure are explored in more detail below. The 
following sections discuss some of the characteristics of the beginning of the supply chain for 
coffee in Uganda, specifically focusing on the data collected both in surveys and interviews 
about cooperatives.127 Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 introduce the structure of a coffee cooperative 
in Uganda and give an overview of the supply chain for coffee from field to export. Sections 
5.5.3 and 5.5.4 compare the (1) social connections of cooperative vs. non-cooperative farmers 
and (2) the yield (in kgs coffee berries per coffee tree) of coffee between farmers in a 
cooperative with training, a cooperative without training, and a non-cooperative surveyed 
sample. From the literature review, the expectation is that cooperative growers should have 
better yields and thus, higher production. Section 5.5.5 discusses the challenges faced by NGO 
B, the NGO that organized the cooperative studied in this survey (see methodology section 
5.3.1 for details of the NGO). Section 5.5.6 introduces the certification schemes for coffee in 
the Ugandan market that were common among farmers’ groups. Section 5.5.7 analyses the 
results from the question on fair prices from the survey of coffee farmers in combination with 
the results on fair prices and ideal supply chain structure discussed by farmers at the workshop 
held in Nkokonjeru. The conclusions from this part of the research and some suggestions for 
future work end the chapter in section 5.6. 
                                               
126
 See page 192 for explanation of London exchange market for coffee which generates the international price 
that Robusta coffee is compared to in the Ugandan domestic market.  
127
 Cooperative, farmer group, and farmers’ association will all be used synonymously in the following sections  
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5.5.1. Ugandan coffee industry structure overview 
Farmers grow coffee and must then choose whom to sell it to and at what stage of processing. 
They can sell coffee at one of three stages of processing: (1) ripe berry right off the tree (mwanyi 
mbisi in Luganda), (2) dried coffee cherry (kiboko or mwanyi nkalu in Luganda) 128, or (3) 
process/hull the coffee to remove the husk and sell Fair-Average Quality (FAQ) coffee (kase 
in Luganda). The look and name of the coffee in Luganda and English at each stage are 
presented in Figure 34. There is a significant weight loss (around 50% of the mass) of the 
product at each of the first two stages of production (i.e. from drying mwanyi mbisi to kiboko, 
and from hulling kiboko to kase). This mitigates some of the gains in price per kg that the 
products in the latter stages of production command (see section 5.5.7).  
 
                                               
128
 Mwanyi generally refers to the coffee berry and so it can either be ripe/wet (mbisi) or dry (nkalu). Kiboko 
was another name given to dried coffee supposedly during the pre-liberalisation period of the Uganda coffee 
market when a farmer could expect to be whipped or hit (termed a kiboko) by authorities when they did not 
follow the correct procedure for drying coffee. The dried coffee thus received the metonym kiboko due to its 
association with this harsh punishment (personal conversation, interviewee #1). See interviewees’ perspectives 
on liberalisation of the coffee industry in Appendix A.26 starting on page 423. 
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Mbisi or Wet Cherry 
(a) 
 
 
Nkalu / Kiboko or Dried Cherry 
(b) 
 
 
Kase or FAQ 
(c) 
 
 
Kawa or Screen 15/18/etc. 
(d) 
 
Note: Processing transforms the product from (a) to (b) to (c) and finally (d) for export.  
(a) red, ripe cherries from tree; (b) kiboko is prepared by drying coffee outside for several 
weeks on tarps or the ground; (c) kase is prepared by hulling coffee at a milling machine 
to remove the husk from the kiboko, however black beans, chaff, and many sized beans 
remain in the batch; (d) kawa is made from kase screened at an export facility to a 
consistent size and free from defects, like insect damage or black beans from harvesting 
unripe coffee. Kawa can also refer to roasted coffee. (All photos by author). 
 
Figure 34: Images of coffee at each major stage of natural/dried processing along with the associated 
names for the coffee at the given stage 
 
Growers also must decide who to sell to. Either to the cooperative they are a member of, to a 
trader for whatever quality coffee they produce, or perhaps directly to a processor who will do 
the hulling of the coffee (assuming it is dry/natural processed). There are many types of traders 
at different points in the supply chain. Some will focus just on dried beans (kiboko) to sell to a 
processor, and others specialize on taking a finished product (i.e. kase) from a processor to an 
exporter. The nature of the product a trader buys and sells is largely dependent on the trader’s 
183 
 
operating capital.129 Cooperatives can choose to sell to a trader or do their own processing in-
house before going to an exporter. A simplified diagram of the basic structure of the coffee 
supply chain in Uganda from production to export is given below in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35: Conceptual model of simplified coffee industry structure in Uganda 
 
The average farmer is selling around 200 kg of coffee in a year (median from HH survey), 
while the average trader is buying around 7 tonnes of kiboko or 6 tonnes of mwanyi mbisi 
(medians from HH survey). The trader is typically travelling as far as 5km (median) from his 
or her house to reach the approximately 70 farmers (median) from which the typical trader buys 
coffee. While the largest traders employ 20 other traders to purchase on their behalf, the typical 
trader has only 1 other employee (median) that the trader pays to purchase coffee on their behalf 
or works with them to source coffee in some way. The typical delivery to a major exporter (like 
Exporter A) is around 6 tonnes at a time—however, they accept anything as small as one bag 
(60 kg) of FAQ coffee (personal conversation, interviewee #3).  
 
All coffee leaving Uganda has to go through a UCDA certified exporter (personal conversation, 
interviewee #10). The exporter screens the coffee firstly to remove defects and impurities like 
stones which are often mixed in with coffee (either accidentally or to add weight to the load). 
The next level of screening is to sort the coffee by the size of the bean. The beans are screened 
                                               
129
 Analysis of the traders in the survey is found in section 6.3.2 in Chapter 6 
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by a large machine, which has progressively smaller holes that smaller beans can slip through 
to the next screen-size level.  
 
There are four common screen sizes for coffee in the Ugandan market and four sizes that are 
traded on the international Robusta commodity exchange market based in London (LIFFE). 
Table 40 has the measurements for the different screen sizes; a larger screen size (e.g. Screen 
#18) is a larger bean and commands a higher price than smaller screen sizes (e.g. Screen #12). 
Uganda also exports what are called “undergrades” (i.e. beans smaller than the smallest screen 
size) to importers in China and Sudan who cater to a low-price segment of the market (personal 
conversation, interviewee #3). The existence of demand for a very low-quality bean influences 
the incentives for growers and traders to produce quality coffee.130 
 
Table 40: Screen sizes used for quality measurements of Robusta Coffee 
Screen 
Size (inch) of 
round 
apertures for 
the sieve 
Traded 
on 
LIFFE 
Common 
Ugandan 
Export 
<12   X 
12 12/64 X X 
13 13/64 X  
14 14/64 X  
15 15/64 X X 
18 18/64  X 
 
5.5.2. Example structure of a coffee cooperative in Uganda 
The proposed benefits of joining an association are often cited to be the training and price 
premium received. The individual farmer may grow quality coffee that is not appreciated by 
the roaming bicycle trader who pays an average price to every grower. However, an association 
will know that all members are complying with a certain practice and so the trader involved 
with the associated group would be expected to pay a higher price (personal conversation, 
interviewee #6). Cost savings can also be realized by spreading the costs of drying coffee 
among many farmers (e.g. bulk purchasing of tarps and labour sharing). Interviewee #14 
                                               
130
 Discussion on the low quality coffee issue in the context of changes after liberalization of the coffee market 
can be found in Appendix A.26.1, page 425. 
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mentioned cooperatives skip many of the small intermediaries between the farmers and the big 
merchant traders. The premium from organizing like this is somewhere in the range of 50-100 
USh per kg of mwanyi mbisi (personal conversation, interviewee #14).  Figure 36 shows the 
basic structure of the cooperative that was organized by NGO B. 
 
 
Figure 36: Diagram of basic structure of the cooperative organized by NGO B in Kamuli District 
 
In each village, there would be a Producer Organization (PO) that would have around 20 
growers as members. Each PO had a lead farmer who was the most experienced and trained by 
the NGO. The lead farmer would communicate best practices and ensure that everyone in the 
organization was following certification standards. The lead farmer also served as a 
communication point between the Depot Centre (DC) and the members of the PO.  
 
At the DC level, there would be quality control with officially appointed quality inspectors and 
chemical experts that could be consulted by the PO for advice on how to improve their 
operations. POs would organize to bring their kiboko to the DC where a moisture sample and 
spot checks131 for bean quality were conducted before the delivery would be accepted. 
Messages would be relayed about quality from the experts often through the lead farmer; 
however, other members of the PO also brought their coffee independently to the DC and could 
                                               
131
 It is difficult, if not impossible, to tell the quality of dried coffee by simply looking at it. The method that 
NGO B encouraged was to select a sample of dried cherries and then cut them open with scissors to inspect the 
quality of the bean inside as well as to look for mould or insect damage.  
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consult the experts. The DCs would deliver to the farmers association’s central hub at the sub-
county level, where there was a machine to process the dried coffee to kase.  
 
NUCAFE had a similar structure with POs, however, there was not a Depot Centre level of 
organization. Based on the conversation with the Business Manager (interviewee #18) as well 
as the structure of their internal production dataset, the NUCAFE office at the processing mill 
in Nkokonjeru served as the main point of contact for each PO. There was a lead farmer for 
each PO similar to the structure of NGO B.  
 
Exporter B also sponsored schemes to develop coffee farmer associations. The structure they 
used for the cooperatives was analogous to that of NGO B, but they focused on washed Robusta 
production. The POs had around 25-30 growers each and members were allowed to sell to 
anyone, however, Exporter B sponsored these schemes in the hope that they choose to sell to 
Exporter B. Farmers sold wet cherry and the PO would have a trader in a truck drive around 
every day during the harvest season to collect ripe cherries from farmers. Each of the 110 POs 
had a washing (pulping) station to wet process Robusta into a washed Robusta bean. The daily 
price would be issued by the MD (interviewee #10) which would be used by the trader 
employed to collect from farmers to bring to the pulping station for the PO; farmers would be 
paid cash on delivery of their ripe berries. Farmers needed to sort their coffee ahead of time as 
unripe or overripe berries would not be purchased. 
 
The Buikwe District field office for Exporter A was conducting a farmer registration with the 
hopes of setting up a farmers’ association equivalent to that of Exporter B. Exporter A had 
finished establishing several farmers’ associations in Masaka and was looking to expand into 
Central/East Uganda using the same structure. Based on the interview with their field manager 
(interviewee #4), Exporter A plan to register around 3,000 farmers into a washed Robusta 
producing cooperative. Analogously to Exporter B, Exporter A planned for weekly truck 
collections in the village and for the members of their cooperative to deliver to central wet-
processing facilities at the PO level.  
 
Surprisingly, despite the differences between NGOs and Exporters, the structure they used for 
a farming cooperative were strikingly similar. The main difference with NGO B was the direct 
links to extension experts who would offer growing, pest, and treatment advice to growers. 
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However, the Regional Sustainability Manager for Exporter B (interviewee #8) did travel 
several times per year out to their various farmers’ associations to check-in and provide training 
programs if needed.132 
 
The structure of a cooperative like that of NGO B, with more direct points of contact between 
farmers, traders, and extension agents, could potentially allow for better communication of pest 
and disease threats. It also could allow for better information transfer of best practices from the 
experts to the members of the association. These expected outcomes of being in a cooperative 
were confirmed in the survey (see following section). 
 
5.5.3. Comparison of social connections and practices between farming systems 
As shown in Figure 37, Kamuli farmers in an association were much more likely on average to 
fertilize their plots as compared to the Buikwe and Kayunga District farmers in the HH survey. 
Given a two-sample test of proportions: 87% ± 6.0% of Kamuli cooperative farmers fertilized, 
while only 53% ± 4.6% of independent farmers in Buikwe and Kayunga fertilized their coffee 
plots (# = −3.4575, * = 0.0005). The cooperative farmers also appeared to implement 
spraying of pesticides and fungicides more often than the other group of farmers in the surveys. 
Given a two-sample test of proportions: 37% ± 8.8% of cooperative farmers fertilized, while 
only 10% ± 2.8% of independent farmers fertilized their coffee plots (# = −3.601, * =
0.0003). Meanwhile, while Figure 37 seems to indicate a difference in implementation of Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAPs), the results were not significantly different. Kamuli farmers in 
NGO B’s cooperative implemented GAP practices such as pruning and eliminating dead 
branches from their trees just as often on average as farmers from Buikwe and Kayunga (results 
from two-sample test of proportions: # = 1.1185, * = 0.2634).  
 
                                               
132
 The coffee agronomist (interviewee #9) worked closely with the Regional Sustainability Manger 
(interviewee #8) and was in fact working on materials for a new training program that would be taking place the 
following month after the author conducted the interview.  
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Figure 37: Proportion of cooperative farmers in Kamuli who responded that they followed each practice 
compared to baseline farmers in Buikwe and Kayunga  
 
Kamuli farmers in the cooperative were more connected to other social connections than the 
independent farmers surveyed in Kayunga and Buikwe. The average Kamuli farmer in the 
cooperative had 3.5 ± 0.39 out of 7 social connections that they consulted on a regular basis 
for decisions on their coffee plot. Buikwe and Kayunga farmers who were not organized into 
a cooperative of any sort, responded that they consulted fewer social connections. The average 
Buikwe and Kayunga farmer in the survey reported consulting 2.78 ± 0.20 out of 7 social 
connections.133 The means were different at the 10% level by a two-sample T-test with equal 
variances ( = −1.8095, * = 0.0724).134 While not only reporting contacting more people on 
average to make decisions, Kamuli cooperative farmers contacted certain types of social 
connections at different rates than the farmers in Buikwe and Kayunga (see Figure 38).  
 
                                               
133
 The full results of the survey on social connections for the Buikwe and Kayunga farmers are found in section 
7.2.1 starting on page 272.  
134
 Levene’s test could not reject the hypothesis of equal variances 
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Note: Response percentage to each question was not 100% in the survey in Kamuli. 
Non-responses were left blank and excluded for analysis for that social category. For 
example, this explains how the proportion of “yes” for the spouse category can be higher 
than the proportion of consulting “any” social connection since some respondents may 
have said “no” to several categories, but left the spouse question blank.  
Figure 38: Proportion of farmers consulting social connections in Kamuli compared to Buikwe/Kayunga 
 
For the cooperative group, there is a large jump in the number of farmers that claimed to consult 
an extension worker (see Figure 38). This is likely attributed to the placement of experts at the 
DC level that farmers could consult for advice on pests, inputs, and coffee growing methods. 
In many ways, though, the most surprising change is that Kamuli farmers were more likely to 
consult others not connected to the social infrastructure put in place by the cooperative as well. 
It appears that the availability of people to consult for advice on crop management encouraged 
farmers to consult their own social network more often as well. Farmers in Kamuli reported 
consulting their spouses, friends, neighbours, and input suppliers more often. While the boost 
in the social connectivity to extension workers, leaders, and traders could be attributed to the 
infrastructure put in place by the NGO, the other connections likely cannot.  
 
These differences between the proportions that responded “yes” to consulting different social 
connections were tested for significance using a two-sample proportion test. The results are 
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reported with significance signs in Table 41. The only social categories with non-significant 
differences were the proportion that consulted at least one social connection when making 
decisions on the plot (i.e. the “Any” category in Table 41 and Figure 38) and the proportion 
that consulted a neighbour. The proportion that consulted a leader in the community was also 
only marginally significant ( * = 0.056).   
 
Table 41: Differences between proportions of Kamuli vs. Buikwe/Kayunga growers’ social connections 
CATEGORY b se0 z p-value  
Spouse -.3801681 .1052209 -3.613049 .0003026 *** 
Friend -.3277311 .1168749 -2.804118 .0050454 *** 
Neighbour -.0392157 .1175699 -.3335522 .7387175  
Leader -.2122762 .1109582 -1.913119 .0557328 * 
Extension -.5690756 .1081959 -5.259679 1.44e-07 *** 
Trader -.2689076 .1123485 -2.393512 .0166879 ** 
Input Supp. -.3025210 .1098790 -2.753219 .0059012 *** 
Any -.0544863 .0699688 -.7787227 .4361431  
N 150     
Note: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.10 
b is the differences in proportions between Kamuli as compared to Buikwe/Kayunga as 
the baseline; se0 is the standard error under the null hypothesis H0 of equivalent 
proportions between the groups. 
 
5.5.4. Comparison of production between farming systems 
The HH survey only allows comparison between the Kamuli cooperative farmers who 
participated in the workshop and the Buikwe/Kayunga farmers for many pest, socio-economic, 
and social questions. However, production and yield data for farmers in other organizations 
can be exploited for comparison (review the organizations in section 5.3.1 on page 156). Three 
groups of farmers can be compared: 
 
1. NGO B had some 3,000 farmers that both were interested in joining a cooperative as 
well as receiving extensive training and ongoing extension service.  
2. NUCAFE had registered 1,145 farmers in Buikwe and Mukono Districts. As 
mentioned previously, NUCAFE had a group of farmers that were interested in being 
in a cooperative and had joined, but they had not received any formal training and 
interventions based on interviews.  
3. The HH survey had 119 farmers who participated in Buikwe and Kayunga Districts, 
but were not members of any official cooperatives.  
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The results are shown in Figure 39 comparing yields for the three farming systems. The three 
groups are compared just in terms of yield of coffee cherries (kg) per tree on their plot. This is 
the most appropriate measure of yield to use. Yield (kg/ha/year) is difficult to interpret in a 
mixed farming plot where one hectare of land could be either 100% devoted to coffee or 10% 
devoted to coffee.  
 
The variance of the yields within each group are quite high, likely due to the difficulty of both 
accurately estimating the number of trees on a plot, as well as, keeping good records of sales 
of coffee cherries throughout the year. Based on the research team’s experience in the HH 
survey, farmers have difficulty knowing how many productive and unproductive trees they 
have because pests often decrease their number of live trees each season. Additionally, some 
of the poorest farmers do not keep records of how many kg of coffee they sell each season, and 
as a result, make a rough estimate during the survey.  
 
 
Note: NGO B data taken from 3,004 farmers with data for 2012/13 coffee year; NUCAFE 
data is taken from 1,143 with data from 2012; HH Survey was from 119 farmers 
interviewed at the end of 2013. Outliers above 6 kg/tree/year are kept in the analysis of 
group means below, but were removed from the plot area for ease of display. 
Figure 39: Comparison of coffee yields (kg/tree/year) for 2012/13 across three different farming systems 
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Despite the limitations of the data, it appears that the farmers in the HH survey had the lowest 
yield. However, NGO B and NUCAFE had significantly different yields as well. The average 
cooperative farmer in NGO B produced 1.96 ± 0.013 kg/tree/year, while the average farmer in 
NUCAFE produced 1.23 ± 0.025 kg/tree/year.135 A difference of 0.73 kg/tree might seem quite 
small, but that is nearly a 60% increase over NUCAFE’s mean yield per tree. For the average 
farmer with around 400 trees, this results annually in an extra 292 kg of mwanyi mbisi, which—
assuming it were sold at the lowest level of processing at a modest 600 USh/kg—would 
generate around 175,000 USh/year extra income. Although the data suggests the yields were 
higher, there were many challenges that came with running the cooperative.  
 
5.5.5. Challenges to cooperative organization 
Given the benefits to communication, encouraging best practices like fertilizing, and possibly 
improving yields per tree, what were the downsides to associations like the one in Kamuli?  
 
The biggest problem that the farmers’ association with NGO B faced was a cash-flow issue 
stemmed by market price fluctuations (personal conversation, interviewee #5). The association 
would need to give cash out to the DCs such that each could buy coffee from POs when farmers 
produced it. The main harvest came for all DCs during the months of November and December. 
As a result, all of the money would need to go out to each DC at the same time creating a lack 
of working capital. The association at the top of the supply chain could not always sell the 
coffee fast enough to exporters to recover the cash they had loaned out to the DCs for 
purchasing coffee. Sometimes the price on the market was quite low and so the association 
wanted to store the FAQ for later sale. Because of the time taken while storing/bulking coffee, 
the cooperative would often run out of cash within the first two weeks of the main harvest 
season (personal conversation, interviewee #5). This forced them to turn away members with 
coffee. The farmers would then sell to traders outside the system and perhaps feel that their 
extra effort for committing to UTZ certification was not worth the energy (personal 
conversation, interviewee #5).  
 
                                               
135
 Mean difference determined by two-sample T-test with unequal variances (6 = 78. 79, : = ;. ;;;;) after 
confirmation from Shapiro-Wilk W-test for normal data and Levene’s test rejected the hypothesis of equal 
variances. 
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The Regional Sustainability Manger of Exporter B (interviewee #8) mentioned these cash-flow 
constraints as well based on the interviewee’s experience in examining other cooperatives. 
Many farmers associations do not have enough capital to buy all the coffee from the member 
growers in the good years, as a result the growers lose trust in the association. Additionally, 
farmers are impatient when it comes to changing practices. If the association does a training 
and the following year there is a large pest incident, farmers lose faith quickly in the new 
practices, even when they are told it could take years for the new practices to show results 
(personal conversation, interviewee #8).  
 
According to the Executive Director of NGO B (interviewee #6), internal inspections every 
year for UTZ certification cost around 10 M USh (approximately £2,500 at the time of the 
survey) and the NGO lacked the money to maintain the certification inspections, especially 
given the failure rate for several growers. The official external inspection for the final 
certification had a similar price. As a result, when the EU grant ended in 2012, the farmers’ 
association sold without certification, as the conventional coffee price was relatively high 
compared to recent years anyway. The year at the time of the survey, 2013, had been a 
challenge. The year had lower prices and in general, there was not much of a premium at all 
for UTZ so they did not find it worth investing in the certifications. They also faced the issue 
that farmers were often going to middlemen, as the cooperative could not afford to buy all the 
coffee the farmers were delivering (personal conversation, interviewee #6). The director was 
interested in moving towards Fairtrade as the director had heard the premiums would be higher, 
but NGO B felt that they had already committed to UTZ. The training they gave was also based 
on UTZ practices, so to some extent NGO B felt locked-in to the scheme (personal 
conversation, interviewee #6). Interestingly, the lock-in was felt even when not currently 
meeting the standard and maintaining certification.  
 
Another challenge that was developing in the market in Uganda was that exporters and NGOs 
were competing for grants to register farmers into associations. The initial exporter partner for 
NGO B was Exporter B. However, NGO B’s Executive Director did express some concern that 
Exporter B was recently applying for funds to register farmers in the Kamuli District into a 
new farmers’ association. The director was unclear how the partnership would work and felt 
that Exporter B was overstepping their purpose and could not do as good of a job with farmer 
training as NGO B did with their group (personal conversation, interviewee #6). As a result, 
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the cooperative had switched exporters. Similarly, in Buikwe district, NUCAFE had registered 
some 1,200 farmers into an association, but Exporter A’s field office was likely re-registering 
many of them into the new association. The Business Manager of NUCAFE (interviewee #18) 
was unaware of the activities of Exporter A. 
 
An interesting problem that Exporter B ran into at first when organizing a farmers’ association 
was the pricing for kase. They used to pay farmers for the final product’s weight at the kase 
prices such that farmers had added all the value to the final product (personal conversation, 
interviewee #8). The farmers however accused Exporter B of cheating on the weight of the 
coffee since the exporter was not paying for the husks (although they were paying a higher 
price). As a result, many farmers started selling to a nearby processing mill which purchased 
the kiboko at the dried coffee price and then did the processing themselves before selling on to 
an exporter. The Exporter B team had to change their strategy as the factory started losing 
volumes as farmers sold to the other mill in the area. It was unclear whether this was completely 
irrational behaviour, or if some farmers knew that they were harvesting poor quality cherries 
and that the kiboko price with the added weight of the husk was better for them, than getting a 
high price for their lot which would contain many lighter, black beans. Without a controlled 
measurement, the driver of this behaviour could not be determined. However, this anecdote did 
point to a potentially interesting research area in the beliefs of traders on what drives their 
profits and their strategy to maximize value from coffee trading.  
 
5.5.6. Certifications and adding value to coffee 
Many of the farmers associations mentioned above were involved with external certification 
schemes. Among the organizations encountered in the fieldwork, the most prevalent schemes 
were 4C and UTZ. Others interviewed often mentioned Fairtrade though none of the 
stakeholders had been active in the scheme. The majority of the stakeholders discussed the 
issues with certification schemes generally and specifically focused discussion on UTZ as it 
was the most prevalent of the schemes.136  
 
                                               
136
 Certification schemes are explored in more detail by many authors (e.g. Rueda & Lambin (2012) and Taylor 
(2005)). Relevant examples for Uganda can be found in Bolwig & You (2007).  
195 
 
Exporter B had farmer associations in several certification schemes. For Arabica they had one 
group in the Mt. Elgon region doing UTZ, 4C, and Rainforest Alliance certification (personal 
conversation, interviewee #8). The exporter had started doing UTZ certified only recently in 
2011. The interviewee (#8) felt that UTZ was the simplest to maintain compliance. Rainforest 
Alliance had not sold yet for the exporter and they believe the audits would be too expensive 
to justify for smallholders, given the small premium offered. The premium they were able to 
get in the market for UTZ certified was around 50 USh/kg. This was an extremely small 
premium, and likely, this is why NGO B often said that UTZ had no premium.137 The research 
fellows based at the EPRC of Makerere University in Kampala also confirmed that there was 
little premium available for making a high quality, certified Robusta coffee (personal 
conversations, interviewees #11 and #12). One Research Fellow suggested that there are 
benefits to moving up the supply chain in terms of processing from conventional farming, but 
there is little benefit to going for higher quality coffee through certification schemes (personal 
conversation, interviewee #11). Exporter B did manage a small premium though and passed at 
least some of it on to the farmers in their associations.  
 
Exporter B had an innovative system for giving out the premium to the farmers’ associations 
they worked with. Instead of paying the farmers a premium at the time of selling, when they 
are most cash-rich, the exporter would keep records of the bonus the farmer had earned (based 
on production targets). These records would then be used to administer a bonus in the non-
harvest season when the grower would be most cash poor and needing cash to invest back into 
their plot or for other household expenses. The bonus was paid in cash or inputs depending on 
what the grower said they would like to receive (personal conversation, interview #8).  
 
The Sustainability Manager of Exporter B (interviewee #8) said that premiums have been 
squeezed on certifications and only getting worse. Roasters are pulling out of their 
commitments to giving a premium (personal conversation, interviewee #8). UTZ has gained 
traction in the international market, and as a result there are many origins with UTZ 
certification. UTZ buyers say their price that they are willing to pay and there is little room to 
negotiate for a higher price (personal conversation, interviewee #10). Rainforest Alliance 
                                               
137
 It is also likely the exporter absorbed some of the premium as well so what NGO B’s association got was an 
even smaller cut, and what the top level of the farmers’ association passed on to each grower was likely diluted 
even further.  
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allows their label to be used with as little as 30% certified coffee in the blend, as a result the 
premium for producing Rainforest Certified coffee has been more robust since the end price of 
a bag sold by the roaster is not driven as much by the premium paid for the certified label. The 
reason 4C does not offer a premium or allow a label on a bag is because they want to be the 
standard of the industry. The 4C brand did not view the practices138 they require as above what 
“should” be standard within the industry (personal conversation, interviewee #8). Exporter B 
has found that 4C is gaining a lot of traction in the market and enough roasters are demanding 
it that most exporters carry at least some (personal conversation, interviewee #10).  
 
The lack of a strong premium for certified Robusta relates directly to the lack of strong demand 
for quality Robusta in developed markets. Pricing at the export market is determined by the 
Robusta price on the London-based LIFFE exchange (London International Financial Futures 
and Options Exchange); however, it is actually the spread difference between Robusta on the 
LIFFE and Arabica on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in New York that drives demand 
(personal conversation, interviewee #10). Due to the nature of the ability of Robusta to serve 
as a poorer, but “blendable” substitute for Arabica hurts the viability of a strong, consistent 
market for washed Robusta or certified Robusta. When the price spread between Robusta and 
Arabica is very narrow, washed Robusta cannot compete. As stated simply by the Managing 
Director of Exporter B: “why would a roaster buy a washed Ugandan Robusta when they can 
get a Guatemalan Arabica for a similar price?” The substitution effect between Arabica and 
Robusta was confirmed by the Program Manager for Exporter A (interviewee #2) as well. 
Around 2010, when Arabica prices rose sharply, blenders that interviewee #2 knew switched 
from a blend of about 80% Arabica (20% Robusta) to a blend of 60% Arabica (40% Robusta). 
As the gap narrowed, the blends tended to return to the baseline levels (personal conversation, 
interviewee #2).  
 
Despite Exporter B’s success in selling UTZ certified coffee, the Regional Sustainability 
Manager (interviewee #8) was critical of many of the requirements. The issue with UTZ 
certification is that some of the requirements do not fit well in the context of the Ugandan farm. 
As an example, the chemical storehouse is required to have a tin roof, which is often more 
advanced than the main household of the coffee grower (personal conversation, interviewee 
                                               
138
 The main requirement of 4C is avoiding 10 unacceptable practices in production of coffee. 
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#8). The failure checklist of the data given to the author from NGO B’s cooperative confirmed 
this as a major constraint for farmers to maintain certification. Exporter B did mention though 
that UTZ is currently revising its standards to be more context appropriate. To address the 
concerns about context appropriate standards, Uganda is developing a code of conduct as well 
which could form a type of national certification (personal conversation, interviewee #10). 
However, the issue with this will be trust and most importers will not recognize a national 
certification (personal conversation, interviewee #10).  
 
Given the limitations of certification schemes in terms of price premium and difficulty to adapt 
to the local context, the Sustainability Manager (interviewee #8) echoed what the MD 
(interviewee #10) conveyed as well: certification schemes are never going to improve the lives 
at scale for the millions of coffee growers in Uganda. The demand is not large enough for it. 
Exporter B used to convince farmers to join certification schemes in their associations based 
on premiums, but the strategy now has shifted to talking about volume increases. Improving 
productivity seems to appeal to farmers, but it is difficult to convince them that the practices 
will work (personal conversations, interviewees #8 and #9). 
 
Outside of certification, another method of adding value often mentioned in the popular press 
(e.g. Thiemann (2012)) or with NGOs is that of roasting coffee in country before export. 
Roasting accounts for much of the value addition of the final coffee purchased by consumers 
(Cheyns, Mrema & Sallée, 2006). While the World Bank and other organizations promote 
farmers “adding value” to agricultural products before they are exported, there are many 
challenges associated with doing this for coffee. The difficulties in maintaining quality of 
roasted coffee during transport as well as the higher tariffs most developed countries maintain 
on roasted (but not green) coffee, make the economics of selling roasted coffee more difficult 
(personal conversation, interviewee #10). As well, developing the market relationships may be 
difficult due to a lack of trust in the quality of the product coming from a new roaster in a 
developing country context (personal conversation, interviewee #10). As such, many of the 
major players in the industry in Uganda do not see roasted coffee as a solution that will help 
the any significant number of coffee growers in the region (personal conversation, interviewee 
#14). 
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The overall message from many interviews was that certification systems had limited benefit 
for Robusta coffee farmers despite how well they might work for Arabica coffee systems. 
Uganda has many smallholder farmers with little land, making the costs of certification per plot 
quite high. They have limited capital to afford the improvements to maintain the safety levels 
required for some schemes (e.g. tin roof for chemical storage under the UTZ certification). 
Additionally, many farmers self-reported in the HH survey that they liked working 
independently. Roasting in country as another way to move farmers further up the value chain 
seemed like an unrealistic goal to two industry experts with over 30 years of experience each 
(interviewees #10 and #14). The majority of solutions to improve livelihoods for the average 
farmer will need to focus on stable prices, increasing yields, and encouraging GAPs like 
pruning, which help maintain production and resilience to pests (personal conversation, 
interviewee #10). Relatedly, the next two sections will examine the results from the farmers’ 
workshop and household surveys with respect to the supply chain and pricing.  
 
5.5.7. Fair prices and ideal supply chains 
The farmers that the research team worked with had well-formed opinions on how the supply 
chain could be better and what they believe a fair price is for coffee. The motivation for asking 
about prices was to help understand the issue of a lack of investment in coffee. Farmers that 
are receiving substantially below what they consider a fair price likely will not be motivated to 
invest time and resources into coffee production. At the extreme, the consistent under-pricing 
of coffee may cause farmers to exit coffee for alternative crops. For example, Sick (2008) 
reported growers in Costa Rica reported switching to dairy cattle on part of their plots after 
becoming disappointed with the lack of premium for Fairtrade coffee. 
 
The magnitude of the difference between a farmer’s view on a fair price and the price she has 
been offered is useful for two reasons. (1) It can be used to determine the level of 
subsidy/premium that would be required for a cooperative that wanted to meet the expectations 
of its growers.139 Additionally, (2) given the constraints of the system in terms of a final export 
price (determined by the international market) and the weight loses that are inevitable from 
drying and hulling, one can determine the maximum price a farmer and trader could ever hope 
                                               
139
 The largest premium found during the survey for UTZ certified coffee was only 50-100 USh, and perhaps 
this is far too low to change behaviour; the grower may still find the price well below her threshold value of a 
“fair” price that is required for action. 
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to attain even in a frictionless system with zero transport costs. If the price that the farmer or 
trader considers fair is above this point, this could suggest that she may be more likely to exit 
coffee production when other opportunities are available. While it was not possible to test this 
hypothesis in the period of this project, some preliminary results are presented below on the 
views of farmers on pricing and their ideal supply chain. It is shown that farmers’ views on 
what a fair price should be for their products have an influence on their investment behaviour 
as measured by planting seedlings in the past five years.  
  
There are constraints on prices determined by weight losses that are inevitable as coffee is 
processed to a more refined product. On the day of the interview, interviewee #8 from Exporter 
B had just finished conducting tests on coffee berry weight losses. Their tests showed that 
drying 10 kg of red, ripe coffee cherry produces 5.6 kg of kiboko, but drying 10 kg of green, 
unripe cherry yields only 4.2 kg of kiboko (personal conversation, interviewee #8). This 
confirmed what the traders reported in the HH survey that they lose about 50% of the weight 
of the coffee when drying. Similarly, interviewee #14 reported that the weight loss from mbisi 
to export is perhaps 80%: half is lost from drying to kiboko, another 50% reduction when 
hulling to kase, and then a bit more (5%) lost to broken beans and losses throughout processing. 
The trader is then penalized twice by buying unripe coffee cherries: the weight is less after 
drying and the bean is usually smaller resulting in a lower grade of coffee and thus lower price.  
 
At a basic level just using the loses and not accounting for transaction and transport costs, Table 
42 below tabulates the highest, ideal prices from a set of possible export prices. The factors are 
based on the weight loses discussed above. These ideal prices can be used as a gauge to 
compare against the outcomes for both the fair price question from the HH survey, as well as, 
the prices the groups at the workshop reported in their ideal supply chains.  
 
Table 42: Ideal prices (USh/kg) for coffee, based on export price and weight loses from processing 
 Export Kase Kiboko Mbisi 
Factor 1 0.95 0.5 0.25 
Price A               5,000             4,750                 2,500              1,250  
Price B             10,000             9,500                 5,000              2,500  
Price C             15,000           14,250                 7,500              3,750  
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As a part of the HH survey for traders and growers, they were asked the prices they got for the 
products they bought and sold, as well as, the price that they believed to be a “fair” or 
“adequate” price (see survey forms in Appendices A.19 and A.20). While some farmers 
reported unrealistic price expectations (see the outliers plotted as dots in Figure 40), many 
reported prices that, while high, were within the 75th percentile range of reported 2012 prices. 
The 75th percentile answers for “fair” prices were also below the ideal prices for kiboko and 
mbisi for a realistic export price of 5,000 USh (Table 42). 
 
 
Note: Data from farmers HH survey question 12 (see Appendix A.19). Farmers’ who sold 
both mbisi and kiboko were asked for prices of both products so there will be a bit more 
weight given to their answers in the figure. 
Figure 40: Box plots of farmers’ opinions on fair price for their product vs. the prices they reported 
receiving in 2012 and 2013 
 
Farmers believe that the fair price for their product is much higher than they have received in 
2013 or even 2012, a good year for Robusta coffee prices. As shown in Figure 40 above, on 
average farmers’ thought the fair price for mwanyi mbisi (fresh coffee cherries) was around 
twice the price they got for it in 2013. Similarly for kiboko (dried coffee cherries), the actual 
price they reported being offered in 2013 was around half on average the price that they thought 
was fair. The median fair prices by process were: 1,000 USh/kg for mwanyi mbisi; 2,000 for 
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kiboko; and 2,500 for kiboko dried on a tarp.140 The fair price expectation difference between 
kiboko dried on the ground and kiboko dried on a tarp was not significantly different (by a two-
sample T-test); only some farmers felt a higher price expectation from the expended effort on 
drying properly.  
 
 
Note: prices for mwanyi mbisi (fresh coffee cherries) and kiboko (dried cherries) are 
taken from questions to traders about what they pay growers and believe a fair price to 
be (question 13 in HH survey in Appendix A.20 on page 383). Prices for kase are taken 
from question 8 in the trader HH survey for those that sell kase.  
Figure 41: Traders’ reported fair price and actual prices for different coffee products 
 
Traders viewed the prices they received for kase to be on average below what was considered 
a fair price to them in both 2012 and 2013 (see Figure 41 above). They reported being underpaid 
by an average of 548 USh/kg in 2012 and 892 USh/kg in 2013. They view their prices to 
farmers for either mwanyi mbisi or kiboko as mostly “fair”. In 2012, the prices for kiboko and 
mbisi offered by traders were on average fair in their opinion (differences not significantly 
different from 0 by a T-test). However, in 2013, the price they offered to farmers was on 
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 Since many farmers and traders respond with the same price, the median often falls on the same value as the 
25th or 75th percentile values as well which is why they are not drawn distinctly in these boxplots (e.g. Figure 
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average around 220 USh less per kg than what they considered to be a fair price for mbisi.141 
The average difference between the fair price and the 2013 reported price for kiboko was 345 
USh per kg.142  
 
One would expect that those farmers who are less content with the price, might be less willing 
to invest in coffee and more likely to exit coffee growing to pursue other crops. While this is 
not rigorously tested here, a two-sample T-test with equal variance confirms this result for 
investment in coffee (using a binary proxy variable of whether or not the farmer has planted 
seedlings in the last 5 years). Farmers that have not invested in coffee on average thought a 
“fair” price for their product (mbisi or kiboko) was 1.95 ± 0.11 times higher than the 2013 price, 
while those that have planted thought a fair price was only 1.72 ± 0.06 times higher than the 
2013 price ( = 1.9872, * = 0.0489). Although both groups of farmers thought the 2013 price 
was too low compared to their perception of fair, those that have stopped planting seedlings to 
replace their old and dead trees believe that the price should be significantly higher. This belief 
likely leads them to choose not to invest as much in their coffee plot.  
 
Just to confirm the impact of the farmer’s opinion on a fair price on their actual behaviour, a 
logistic model is estimated to predict the probability (*) of investing in coffee (i.e. planting 
seedlings). The simple model estimated is given in equation (1). In the model, 
% *  		 is the portion of the farmer’s total plot devoted to coffee (ranging from 0 to 
1);  *	  is the multiple of the 2013 reported price the fair price was for the 
farmer (continuous from 0.75 to 5 times as much in the data); and 		 * #	 is the 
hectares of coffee the farmer has devoted to coffee (continuous from 0.1 to 14 in the data).  
 
 log *1 − * =  @ + B ∗ 		" + D ∗  + E ∗ *	_		  (1) 
 
Controlling for the size of the farmers plot, the model is clear that magnitude of the difference 
between the farmers’ view of a fair price and the reported price received in 2013 for kiboko or 
mbisi had an impact on their likelihood of investing in seedlings. The results in terms of the 
                                               
141
 One-sample t-test confirmed that the mean for the difference between fair price and reported 2013 price for 
mbisi was significantly different from 0 (t = 6.2315, p = 0.0000) 
142
 One-sample t-test confirmed that the mean for the difference between fair price and reported 2013 price for 
kiboko was significantly different from 0 (t = 4.1618, p = 0.0001) 
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odds-ratio (i.e. exponentiated log-odds coefficients) in Table 43 below show that for a 1 ha 
increase in the amount of land devoted to coffee, there is a 54% increase in the odds of investing 
in coffee. However, the coefficient is more difficult to interpret for  *	  since 
the odds-ratio is less than one, other than to say farmers that have higher fair price expectations 
are less likely to invest in planting seedlings. The results for the percentage of plot devoted to 
coffee were surprisingly insignificant; 		 * #	 likely explained a lot of the variation.  
 
Table 43: Results of logistic model estimation for probability of planting seedlings 
 (1) 
coffee plot size 1.536** 
 (0.293) 
fair price factor 0.574** 
 (0.162) 
% plot in coffee 0.993 
 (0.874) 
Observations 136 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets; there are 136 observations 
because of the 119 farmers, 17 of them sell both kiboko and mwanyi mbisi. As a result, 
those that sell both are included twice since they reported the prices they sold these 
products at and their fair price for each. 
 
It is much easier to interpret the results of the logistic model using a plot of the predicted 
probabilities from the model. The impact of increasing expectations on the fair price for coffee 
is plotted in Figure 42, holding the hectares devoted to coffee at two different constants.  
 
It is clear that farmers with less land devoted to coffee are more likely to stop investing in new 
seedlings, especially if they think the price they receive for their coffee is much less than what 
they consider to be fair. For farmers with more land devoted to coffee, the higher their view of 
the fair price is as compared to what they were paid in 2013, the more likely they were to stop 
investing in coffee as well. Other factors that may help predict investment or exit from coffee 
growing are studied further in Chapter 7.  
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Note: 0.25 ha of coffee is the 10th percentile size of plot, while 3 ha is the 90th percentile 
size of plot for farmers surveyed. 
Figure 42: Predicted probability of planting seedlings against the fair price expectations of the farmer for 
two different plot sizes 
 
Considering the importance of the fair price factor in keeping coffee growers investing in future 
production, closing the gap between what the farmer views as a fair price and that of the current 
market prices is an area worth exploring further. There are three ways that a farmer could 
potentially earn closer to the fair price for coffee: (1) increase the final export price by serving 
a higher value market, (2) improve quality such that the price offered might be higher for the 
product, and (3) eliminate intermediaries such that profits flow back towards the beginning of 
the supply chain. As discussed in the previous section (5.5.6), many experts did not believe 
there was much opportunity in (1). Additionally with the inability to tell quality by visual 
inspection of kiboko, (2) has limited potential to affect the price offered in the conventional 
supply chain. The last option (3) may have potential to bring the prices in the market closer to 
what farmers and traders view as fair for the coffee product they sell. Farmers in the workshop 
in Nkokonjeru also suggested the ideal supply chain would have less intermediaries.   
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Coffee farmers and traders at the workshop in Nkokonjeru were asked to draw the current 
supply chain and what they thought an ideal supply chain looks like. They were told that they 
should assume that the export price for coffee is 5,000 Ush/kg (a reasonable value at the time) 
and then to write what each stakeholder at each part of the supply chain receives for their 
product. The results of the diagrams for five groups are shown in Figure 43 on the next page.  
 
The ideal supply chains suggested by some groups such as #5 were more realistic than those 
proposed by other groups such as #3 and #4, which did not have a clear description of what 
processing would happen at each stage. Without any prompting by the research team, all the 
farmer groups agreed that the way to get more value back to the farmer was to eliminate 
intermediaries and shorten the supply chain. Perhaps they were well informed from previous 
experience at NGO or UCDA workshops that forming associations and eliminating the levels 
of intermediary traders is the way for the farmer to make more money.  
  
Group #1 and #4 suggested that the current supply chain had a major issue of farmers selling 
their product in small amounts with several intermediaries before it reached a major trader and 
was dried to kiboko. This was certainly true of a few of the farmers in the HH survey, who 
reported selling mwanyi mbisi by buckets or bowls (improvised from discarded materials and 
holding perhaps 3-10kg depending on the size). The reason the farmers in the HH survey 
mentioned doing this was out of a need for quick cash and either not having time for drying the 
coffee or being too old to handle the labour. The farmers selling in small quantities like this 
though were relatively rare, so groups #1 and #4 are likely reporting the worst-case scenario 
for old farmers with small plots.  
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(a.1) 
 
 
(b.1) 
 
 
(a.2) 
 
 
(b.2) 
 
 
(a.3) 
 
 
(b.3) 
 
 
(a.4) 
 
 
(b.4) 
 
 
(a.5) 
 
(b.5) 
Note: Diagrams made from original posters drawn by groups independently during the 
workshop. Photos taken from the original drawings before translation by a member of the 
research team are given in Appendix A.22 on page 388 
Figure 43: Groups (1-5) responses to what the “current” (a, on left) and “ideal” (b, on right) supply chain 
should look like 
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The proposed ideal supply chain of group #1 is very similar to the supply chain made by the 
cooperative with NGO B. Farmers dry their coffee and only sell kiboko to a processor who sells 
kase to another party who bulks it before export. The difference for NGO B is that they both 
processed coffee to kase and bulked it for export. Intermediaries are not always 
disadvantageous. NGO B’s cash flow issues largely occurred from the time spent bulking kase. 
These could possibly have been ameliorated if they sold to a 3rd party that did the bulking 
before taking to an exporter. The cooperative would have lost some of the profit, but would 
have greatly increased the speed at which they turned coffee into liquid assets. 
 
Groups #2 and #3 propose very similar solutions to the current supply chain. They both suggest 
that the only issue is eliminating some of the buyers that are in-between the farmers and the 
exporters. In group #2’s ideal supply chain, it is unclear what the buyer in-between would be 
doing (similarly for the ideal chain for group #4). A price of 3,000 USh for kiboko would likely 
be impossible to achieve given the weight loss from that stage to final export (assuming the 
final export price is only 5,000 Ush/kg). However, if the farmer is selling kase, the price is a 
bit low and the buyer in-between is taking a large profit for bulking the coffee. Group #3’s 
ideal supply chain is perhaps the most interesting as it has aggressive, but realistic prices and 
processing levels for each stage. A price of 2,000 USh/kg of kiboko is close to the fair price 
quoted by many farmers for kiboko (see beginning of this section). Moreover, the price for kase 
considers the 50% weight loss from processing and an extra 500 USh/kg to cover additional 
costs and profit, while still maintaining a final margin of 500 USh/kg for the exporter.  
 
From this activity, a few conclusions can be drawn with several suggestions for future research 
directions. (1) Farmers are well informed about the shape of the current supply chain and that 
there are several buyers in-between which are currently doing processing of coffee and that 
this takes a certain amount of capital to accomplish. (2) Some farmers have high expectations 
for what the farmer should receive for his/her product in an ideal supply chain, but 3 out of 5 
groups have feasible supply chains that involve the farmers selling kiboko to a larger group or 
trader that would process to kase. (3) All the groups knew that eliminating the sale of mwanyi 
mbisi would allow them to extract more value from the supply chain. (4) Farmers are well 
informed about the supposed benefits of farmers associations. Since they are informed, it 
suggests that it is not a lack of information that is preventing them from forming groups and 
attempting to process coffee to further stages.  
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Future research should follow up with farmers in a similar workshop format to address the 
reasons why they do not form associations given the systems in place at each district via 
NAADS to register and their knowledge of the benefits of associations to process coffee in 
bulk. Additionally, given the constraints of the system in terms of the costs and weight losses 
at each stage, a model can be developed for the financial management of a cooperative. The 
model would help design a cooperative that meets the views of farmers’ visions of fairness and 
incorporates their ideas of what the supply chain could look like. The model could take historic 
prices of coffee and calculate the premium that could be maintained for farmers while 
remaining sustainably profitable over a 20-year period for example. Given coffee prices are so 
volatile, in the high price years, profits could be saved to cover the subsidy in the low price 
years. Looking at the constraints of the system in terms of managing processing loses and the 
volatility of the final export price for coffee could inform the design of a cooperative that helps 
to meet the needs of the farmers.  
 
5.6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This chapter introduced the fieldwork in Uganda to study the perceptions of pest risk and 
factors that impact decision-making among coffee growers. Sections 5.5.1 introduced the 
stages of processing that harvested coffee is typically sold at in Uganda and the industry 
structure. Section 5.5.2 examined the typical structure of a cooperative with the example from 
NGO B and informed by interviewees from Exporter B and NUCAFE who have worked with 
their own cooperatives.  
 
The analysis in section 5.5.3 found that farmers in cooperatives consulted more social 
connections when making decisions on the farm. Cooperative farmers are also more likely to 
engage with each type of stakeholder as compared to independent farmers. Only 31% of 
independent farmers reported consulting extension services for advice, but 88% of cooperative 
farmers reported consulting extension services when making decisions on their coffee plots. 
Given the role of training and placement of agricultural experts by NGO B at coffee collection 
points in the parish, the boost in consulting extension services is expected. However, 
cooperative farmers were more likely to consult social connections outside the cooperative 
institutions as well. A full 96% of cooperative farmers reported consulting their spouses and 
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86% their friends, as compared to 58% and 53% respectively for independent growers. 
Comparable to the findings of Chloupkova, Svendsen & Svendsen (2003) for developed 
countries, social capital seems to be higher among cooperative groups in developing countries 
as well. The cooperative farmers also were more likely to fertilize and use pesticides on 
occasion (section 5.5.3). This could be driven by the training received by NGO B or reflect that 
cooperative groups are more likely to invest in premium production methods (Wollni & Zeller, 
2007).  
 
Section 5.5.4 found that cooperative groups from NUCAFE and NGO B reported having higher 
yields in terms of kg coffee per tree compared to coffee farmers in the HH survey. Although it 
is unclear if the higher yields are due to training received, the nature of being in a cooperative, 
or a selection bias among farmers who choose to join cooperatives (Ruben & Fort, 2012). NGO 
B had the highest yield of the three groups producing some 0.73 kg/tree/year more than 
NUCAFE (the next highest group). However, NGO B’s high yields were not uniform across 
the parishes that they operated in, and were not improving universally year-on-year. Further 
research with NGO B is needed to understand what drives the differences between years and 
parishes for production outcomes.  
 
While the data from NGO B, NUCAFE, and the HH survey was used to compare yields from 
different farming systems, future work could analyse other differences. Given that the 838 
Buikwe farmers from Exporter A had not received any special intervention to date, they could 
also serve as a good field control for analysis comparing the impact of training in NGO B’s 
intervention in Kamuli. Both registered farmers in Buikwe as well as the ones in Kamuli likely 
represent similar types of farmers who self-select into registering to join a group of farmers. 
The Buikwe group would just be several years behind the Kamuli farmers and thus could serve 
as a good control to measure against. This analysis could be useful to compare the costs of 
intervention against the benefits to farmers’ production.  
 
Section 5.5.5 discusses the two primary challenges faced by the cooperative of NGO B. The 
first of which was a cash-flow issue. The crop was harvested at the same time across the region 
and their capital was not sufficient to buy all of their members’ coffee before selling it on to an 
exporter. The second challenge they faced was the high costs of inspections to maintain UTZ 
certification. These challenges are not uncommon for coffee cooperatives. Valkila & Nygren 
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(2010) found that Nicaraguan cooperatives studied were selling 40-70% of their coffee through 
conventional market channels instead of Fairtrade. Certification costs keep out some of the 
most vulnerable coffee farmers and form a significant barrier to production in other coffee 
growing areas as well (Valkila, 2009; Sick, 2008). Some of these challenges faced by NGO 
B’s cooperative could be potentially diminished for cooperatives organized by major exporters. 
Exporters such as Exporter B have access to many different sales channels, are less capital 
constrained, and can afford certification costs since part of the benefit to them is for corporate 
social responsibility targets and public relations (section 5.5.6).  
 
Section 5.5.7 finds that farmers have established prices that they consider a fair offering for the 
product they produce. These prices are much higher than the prices they received in 2013 for 
mbisi and kiboko coffee. The difference between their fair price and the offered price is a robust 
predictor of coffee investment behaviour. A farmer with 0.25 ha of coffee who thinks the price 
is fair is about 60% likely to plant seedlings, but a farmer who thinks the price should be 100% 
higher (factor of 2) is only around 40% likely to plant. Farmers with more land devoted to 
coffee were more likely to invest in planting seedlings as well, but were also influenced by 
their view on the fair price for coffee. Farmers who are dissatisfied with coffee pricing are more 
likely to switch to alternative activities (Sick, 2008). However, the likelihood that a farmer 
switches from coffee to another crop is also likely dependent on their risk taking behaviour. 
Measurements of risk-aversion are examined next in Chapter 6.  
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 Risk-aversion of Coffee Farmers and Traders 
 
Agricultural production is inherently full of uncertainty. Smallholder farmers in rural Uganda 
need to deal with many risks in their lives. However, focusing just on the sale of one 
agricultural commodity, intuitively there are two major categories of risks: (1) variability in 
output and (2) fluctuation in output prices. Unlike their developed country counterparts, poor 
farmers lack access to formal insurance and credit markets to mitigate against production risks. 
While they do have informal mechanisms to cope with income shocks, relying on family and 
friends is limited in scale (Dercon, 2002; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003) and lack of insurance often 
results in selling of income generating tools and equipment (Udry, 1995). Risk-aversion and 
lack of income smoothing also inhibit investing in opportunities with future benefits like new 
technology and education for children (Dercon, 2008). The importance of agriculture to the 
economy in developing countries makes the study of risk preferences among farmers an 
important area with policy relevance.  
 
Three areas of risk preferences are examined in this chapter. First (1) in section 6.4.1 the 
agreement of priorities among stakeholders in the Robusta supply chain for five major pests 
and disease are examined. Data comes from the HH survey for growers/traders and from 
interviews with other supply chain actors.143 If parties at different levels of the supply chain 
have different views on which pests are most important, they may act with counter priorities to 
each other—spending more resource preventing a disease or pest that may not really be a 
significant issue in the opinion of the farmers. The choices of the pests included in the survey 
are discussed in section 6.2.1.  
 
Next, (2) results are presented and discussed from measurements of risk-aversion for coffee 
farmers and traders using a Holt & Laury (2002) design (hereafter abbreviated: HL) adapted 
from the work of Tanaka & Munro (2014) in Uganda. The methodology and design of the risk-
aversion game used at the end of the HH survey is discussed in section 6.2.3. There are 
thousands of experimental studies with an experimental methodology based on HL; some 
important and relevant studies are reviewed in section 6.1. The risk-aversion results for traders 
and growers are compared in section 6.4.2. 
                                                
143
 See Table 39 on page 162 for the interview list 
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Lastly, (3) the results of a coffee market game that allowed farmers to choose to take a stable, 
risk-free price for their coffee instead of a variable market price are examined. The 
methodological design of the game is explained in section 6.2.1. The game was developed by 
the author and piloted at the workshop held at RASD in Nkokonjeru. The game simulates 
market swings that occur from year-to-year within the coffee market of which the farmers are 
accustomed to responding. The usefulness of the pilot and future development to improve the 
simulation are discussed in the conclusion.  
 
This chapter as well as Chapter 7 report the results for many of the questions asked in the HH 
survey of farmers and traders. As a result, the summary statistics of characteristics of the 
participants are presented in section 6.3.1 for farmers and section 6.3.2 for traders. Section 6.5 
concludes and discusses the limitations of the risk measurements presented along with future 
lines of inquiry.  
 
6.1. THE ROLE OF RISK IN SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE 
 
The majority of smallholders in the developing world grow a variety of crops on their plots and 
often produce in mixed crop-livestock systems (Herrero, Thornton, Notenbaert, et al., 2010). 
They must choose into which agricultural products to invest both effort and money. Ideally, 
the farmer would choose crops that have high and consistent output prices, high and consistent 
yields, and invest in a portfolio of crops/livestock with uncorrelated market prices and 
uncorrelated loss characteristics (e.g. drought/flood tolerance, different pests, different harvest 
times, etc.). Optimizing based on these goals would likely reduce risk of large income loses 
and keep a more consistent level of revenue for the farmer. Farming however faces many risks 
and constraints beyond a pure financial investment, which are discussed below. 
 
Soil as well as climate characteristics will determine which crops are viable and which grow 
best in combination with each other. The plot of a smallholder is likely fixed, thus not allowing 
her to benefit from spatial diversification, which is often the best method of stabilizing farm 
income (Anderson, 1971; Trebeck, 1971). Additionally, some crops will take more time/effort 
than others take and require more or less experience to achieve results. Despite the challenges 
of modelling farm choices under uncertainty, there have been numerous examples in the 
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literature of mathematical programming models. These models often calculate a measure of 
risk-aversion based on actual economic behaviour against a theoretical model of utility 
maximization. The deviance of the measured utility function is expected to tell the researcher 
something about the economic agent’s risk preferences, assuming the model is a good fit for 
the real agent (Arrow, 1971; Austin, Willock, Deary, et al., 1998; Avelino, Zelaya, Merlo, et 
al., 2006; Bar-Sliira, Just & Zilberman, 1997; Elamin & Rogers, 1992; Hill, 2010, 2006). 
 
Given the diversity of risks and possible responses, some researchers like Anderson (2003) of 
the World Bank have suggested more qualitative frameworks for matching risk mitigation 
measures to types of risks as a more effective, practical strategy compared to mathematical 
models of optimal farming behaviour. The framework by Anderson (2003) allows for 
alternative strategies in response to risk including prevention and coping, as well as, mitigating 
risks in the informal sector instead of the usual government policy and market-based 
mechanisms (Anderson, 2003). The majority of the literature takes a more formal quantitative 
approach based on economic models developed first by Knight (1921). This was later improved 
in subsequent decades with the use of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) concept of 
“expected utility”.144 Their expected utility theory then formed the foundations on which Pratt 
(1964) and Arrow (1971) developed two common measures of risk-aversion that influenced 
decades of empirical research.145 
 
Original measures of risk aversion found in Pratt and Arrow’s work in the 1960s and 1970s 
stand out as guiding future theoretical and empirical literature about the effect of wealth on risk 
aversion (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971). Arrow (1971) showed that with higher wealth there should 
be decreasing absolute risk-aversion (i.e. a smaller portion of total assets in risky investments), 
but higher relative risk aversion (i.e. the wealthier one becomes, the more likely she will take 
risk with at least some portion of her wealth). Subsequent empirical work often looks for 
evidence of one or both of these effects. 
 
                                               
144
 Though expected utility dates back to thought experiments of Bernouli in the mid-1700s, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern are credited with deriving it into a rational decision model (Schoemaker, 1982)  
145
 A thorough review of the development of risk-aversion is found in Just, Khantachavana & Just (2010). A 
related field of research on the subject of risk-aversion centres on “Prospect Theory” first developed by 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory helped to explain empirical results showing people make 
decisions based on potential gains and losses, overweighting low probability events in both cases. The literature 
on Prospect Theory is not covered in this chapter.     
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Bar-Sliira, Just & Zilberman (1997) use econometric estimation and re-work the model of 
Arrow (1971) to account for changes in wealth and the elasticity of absolute risk aversion 
among Israeli farmers. Mainly, their results confirm the hypothesis of Arrow (1971): wealthier 
Israeli famers are more likely to adopt risk-seeking behaviours such as adopting new 
technology in their farming practices. Similarly, but in a developing world context, Elamin & 
Rogers (1992) model the traditional, mostly subsistence farm plot in Sudan incorporating a 
measure of risk-aversion in farming activity choices for three sizes of model farms. The 
imputed risk-aversion coefficients from the data collected were quite high, demonstrating the 
importance of incorporating risk-aversion measures. In their study, the sacrificed potential farm 
income from less risky cropping choices was nearly 10% as compared to optimal choices in 
the model (Elamin & Rogers, 1992).  
 
Eswaran & Kotwal (1990) show risk aversion—driven not necessarily by risk preferences, but 
by lack of access to credit—leads to under investment in risky production, as the poor are 
unable to pool risks over time. Similarly, findings of Rosenzweig & Binswanger (1992) provide 
evidence from India that more risk-averse farmers sacrifice potential income in order to secure 
a more stable, lower income as compared to wealthier farmers. As such, risk-aversion may 
prevent farmers from investing in high-return, higher-risk activities in favour of lower-risk, 
low-return poverty traps (Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009). Knight, Weir & Woldehanna (2003) 
show that risk-aversion decreases with further education and that both have an impact on 
technology adoption in Ethiopia (risk-aversion decreases probability of adoption, education 
increases adoption probability). There is great interest in the social situation and external 
factors beyond pure risk preferences that seem to drive risk-aversion. Feinerman & 
Finkelshtain (1996) found on a survey of 180 farmers in Israel that socio-economic 
characteristics such as family size, measures of wealth, and type of crop planted were correlated 
with level of risk-aversion and influenced production decisions.  
 
An alternative to the use of econometric techniques to study risk aversion based on real 
decisions made in the past, there is the experimental method where a game or survey is used to 
elicit the risk preferences of respondents. The most famous and important of such games is 
found in the seminal paper of Holt & Laury (2002). Their framework is further discussed in 
reference to the risk-aversion game used in the HH survey in section 6.2.3. The literature based 
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on the HL design is vast; over 2,500 subsequent papers have cited the experiment.146 A few 
papers stand out and are discussed in brief below.  
 
Tanaka & Munro (2014) use a HL game to elicit the risk preferences of 1,289 people among a 
randomly drawn sample of the Ugandan population in 94 villages, covering six out of the seven 
climate zones of the country. They find that agro-climatic conditions seem to influence the time 
and risk preferences of farmers as there are significant differences in preferences between 
regions of the country. However, they did not find significant impacts of individual or 
household characteristics on risk-aversion except the effect of gender (women were more risk-
averse than men) (Tanaka & Munro, 2014).147  
 
Herberich & List (2012) discuss the issue of background risks which influence real decisions 
in ways that are not accounted for in the economic theory established by Pratt (1964) and Arrow 
(1971) or subsequent HL experiments. They are among the first to incorporate background 
risks into a HL experiment with farmers and students. Background risks are incorporated by 
giving ranges of (1) pay-out sizes and (2) a lack of information about the probabilities of 
different pay-outs occurring in a set of four designs. They expected to find that farmers were 
more risk-seeking in the experiments than students as farmers are more accustomed to making 
decisions with high-levels of background risks. Despite this, their results found that farmers 
were slightly more risk-averse, but the study suffered from low sample sizes (n<20) and the 
results were not significantly different (Herberich & List, 2012).  
 
In a developing world context, Yesuf & Bluffstone (2009) find strong evidence of risk-aversion 
among rain-fed agriculture and livestock producers in 262 farm households in the highlands of 
Ethiopia, especially when the game involved a chance of loss. They also confirm, like many 
studies, that wealthier farmers were more risk-accepting than poorer counterparts (Yesuf & 
Bluffstone, 2009). Possibly, because of a high degree of risk aversion, survey results as well 
find that farmers in developing countries tend to overestimate both the severity and the 
likelihood of the worst-case scenario pest events (Heong & Escalada, 1999).148  
                                               
146
 According to metrics from Google Scholar <http://scholar.google.co.uk/> 
147
 Individual characteristics included age, education, and head of household status. Household characteristics 
included land size, asset value, and percentage of household members under age 15 (called the dependency ratio 
in the study). Several of these variables were collected in the present survey (see methodology in section 5.3.5). 
148
 This result is explored in the context of the present survey on risks and pests in section 6.4.1 on page 235. 
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In Uganda, Hill (2009) finds evidence that risk preferences do have an impact on investment 
decisions for poor coffee-producing households in Uganda. She uses a survey of 300 
households with questions on hypothetical risks, which give her a measure of the farmers’ risk-
aversion. She then divides out poor and rich farmers using a socioeconomic survey and using 
regression analysis, finds that wealthier farmers devote more land to coffee and get a higher 
share of their income from coffee (Hill, 2009). Vargas argues that this affect is significant 
because poor farmers are less likely to allocate time and effort into coffee production, which, 
though riskier, has a higher average return than other crops like matooke149 that they devote 
farming effort too. This factor is one of many that contribute to poverty traps (Hill, 2009). 
These results also confirm the theoretical predictions of decreasing absolute risk aversion and 
increasing relative risk aversion of Arrow (1971). Bauer & Chytilová (2010) also find strong 
evidence that a better understanding of risk-aversion and discounting can help guide policy 
makers’ understanding of Ugandan farmers’ investment decisions. Also in Uganda, Humphrey 
& Verschoor (2004) find that households in Eastern Uganda affected by shocks and long-term 
poverty are more risk-averse than their less afflicted counterparts.  
 
In general, the evidence base in the literature is quite mixed on whether risk aversion is a useful 
tool for understanding behaviour, leading to strong critiques even from authors that previously 
had published widely in the field (Just, Khantachavana & Just, 2010). However, as Just, 
Khantachavana & Just (2010) document, the majority of the compelling and justified critiques 
centre on the difficulty of accurately estimating a form of the utility function using econometric 
techniques.150 A more modest goal of “simply characterizing risk preferences into broad 
categories of behaviour” can still prove to provide useful insights (Just, Khantachavana & Just, 
2010). Following this suggestion, the risk-aversion experiment used in the present survey was 
inspired by the simple methodology used by Tanaka & Munro (2014). 
 
                                               
149
 A type of plantain that is a staple food in Uganda 
150
 For a thorough review of the history of the literature on the interaction between risk preferences and 
agricultural management, see Just, Khantachavana, & Just (2010). 
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6.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The main explanation of the design of the surveys and format of the workshop in Nkokonjeru 
have been explained previously in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3, pages 164 to 172). The methods 
for the pest risk component of the survey (section 6.2.1), the coffee trading game at the 
workshop (section 6.2.2), and the risk-aversion game at the end of the survey (section 6.2.3) 
are all discussed below.  
 
At the mid-point of the survey period, an additional check-in as a survey team was conducted 
to discuss any issues that were arising from the fieldwork. The most significant issue was the 
explanation for the risk-aversion game. Many farmers were responding with irrational answers 
and so the team discussed how each team member was explaining the game to see if they could 
come up with tips for each other to help boost understanding. There was no significant change 
in the administration of the survey, only alternative ways to answer questions that interviewees 
had were discussed. Despite this, the percentage of illogical responses remained quite high 
compared to the literature (see results of risk-aversion game in section 6.4.2). 
 
6.2.1. Pest risk survey 
The pest risk part of the survey was based on the methodology of Van Mele, Cuc & Van Huis 
(2001) who worked with mango growers in Vietnam. To record pest perceptions among 
Vietnamese mango growers, Van Mele, Cuc & Van Huis (2001) first asked farmers what their 
most important pest problems were. Getting this list, for each pest they subsequently asked 
farmers to report the incidence, severity, and estimated yield loss on a ranked scale of low, 
moderate, and high (Van Mele, Cuc & Van Huis, 2001). Similarly, in this survey growers were 
asked to identify five common pests/diseases of Robusta coffee. Subsequently, for the 
pests/diseases they claimed to know, they reported the incidence and severity of each 
pest/disease on their plot.151 While some growers struggled to give an answer to a typical 
season since pest severity can vary significantly annually, the majority could settle on an 
“average” season answer quite readily. The response detail was considered granular enough 
                                               
151
 The questions used for the pest risk part of the survey are found for farmers in Appendix A.19 questions 23 
to 33 and in Appendix A.20 questions 26 to 34 for traders. 
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for these purposes of comparing different groups since it was beyond the scope of this analysis 
to identify seasonal variations or impact of factors like weather on disease/pest incidence.  
 
While coffee diseases and pests are found throughout East Africa, there is country level 
variation. For instance in Ethiopia, the three major fungal pathogens of coffee are Coffee Leaf 
Rust (CLR), Coffee Berry Disease (CBD), and Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD) (Hindorf & 
Omondi, 2011). However, in Uganda since the primary coffee crop is Robusta, the top pests 
are different. The top pests explored in the present survey correspond to the highest risk pests 
as decided in a small group152 format by an East African Regional Workshop held by the Coffee 
Research Network (CORNET) in 2004 as discussed in the technical manual by Rutherford & 
Phiri (2006). Of the five pests and diseases in the present survey, Coffee Berry Borer (CBB), 
Red Blister Disease (RBD), and CWD ranked equally as the worst pests/diseases for Uganda 
by the 2004 panel with a score of 3 out of 3 (Rutherford & Phiri, 2006). Root Mealybugs 
(RMBs) also made the list of priorities with a slightly lower score (2/3). As such, these four 
pests were included with the addition of a fifth pest, Coffee (Black) Twig Borer (CTB/BTB), 
which has only recently been found in Uganda (Egonyu, Kucel, Kangire, et al., 2009). The 
present survey complements the rankings discussed by Rutherford & Phiri (2006) in several 
ways. Firstly, (1) their study did not distinguish between the priorities of different stakeholders 
in the workshop. (2) The metric they used did not distinguish between severity and frequency. 
(3) The score out of three provided poor resolution to distinguish between pests. Additionally, 
(4) since the workshop was conducted in 2004, there was a clear need to update the knowledge 
base for the current list of priority pests for Uganda Robusta coffee production including BTB.  
 
In Table 44 below, a brief description is given of each of the five pests and diseases used in the 
survey. Each pest/disease also has a small section with further descriptions in the Appendix 
(sections A.22.1 through A.22.6 starting on page 388). The main pests/diseases of concern are 
BTB and CWD, so these sections have more thorough explanations of their biology and impact 
on Robusta production in Uganda. The section on BTB (page 390) also includes a discussion 
of different stakeholders’ opinions on how best to control the pest. 
                                               
152
 The group consisted of coffee farmers, processors, marketers, regulatory bodies, development agency 
representatives, and civil society from eight East African countries including Uganda.  
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Table 44: Five common diseases and pests of Robusta Coffee in Uganda 
Pest/Disease Brief Description 
Note: images included for examiners’ copies, but 
removed for the online, publically available version 
on Imperial College Spiral due to copyright 
regulations. 
(a) Coffee Wilt Disease153 
Fusarium xylarioides (see page 388) 
A soil fungal pathogen causing extensive 
damage to yields as the entire tree dies 
once infected. It is the most famous and 
devastating historically of Uganda’s 
Robusta production. 
Note: images included for examiners’ copies, but 
removed for the online, publically available version 
on Imperial College Spiral due to copyright 
regulations. 
(b) Black Twig Borer154 
Xyleborus ferrugineus (see page 390) 
A beetle that burrows into the smaller 
branches of the coffee tree. Once inside it 
helps establish a fungus on which it feeds, 
but also which kills the branch, and 
potentially, the entire tree. 
Note: images included for examiners’ copies, but 
removed for the online, publically available version 
on Imperial College Spiral due to copyright 
regulations. 
(c) Coffee Berry Borer155 
Hypothenemus hampei (see page 395) 
A beetle that burrows into the coffee berry 
causing it to fail to ripen and ruining the 
quality of the bean inside. 
Note: images included for examiners’ copies, but 
removed for the online, publically available version 
on Imperial College Spiral due to copyright 
regulations. 
(d) Red Blister Disease156 
Cercospora coffeicola (see page 396) 
A fungal pathogen which causes damage 
to the leaves, weakening the tree as well 
as damaging berries, which reduces the 
quality and yields of the resulting coffee. 
Note: images included for examiners’ copies, but 
removed for the online, publically available version 
on Imperial College Spiral due to copyright 
regulations. 
(e) Root Mealybug155 
Planococcus fungicola (see page 398) 
A sucking pest that causes nutrient loss 
and stress to the coffee tree by affecting 
the uptake of nutrients through the roots. 
This can result in yield loss and in extreme 
cases, the death of the tree. 
 
                                               
153
 Image credits: Rutherford & Phiri (2006) and Rutherford (2006) 
154
 Image credits: http://www.forestryimages.org/browse/subthumb.cfm?sub=426 
155
 Image credits: Rutherford & Phiri (2006) 
156
 Image credits: https://www.plantvillage.com/en/topics/coffee/ 
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6.2.2. Coffee market game 
A simulation exercise was developed by the author to use with groups of farmers and traders 
to elicit their responses to price fluctuations in the coffee market, and to find their response to 
the opportunity to take a contract with a stable price. The objective was to examine to what 
extent farmers would accept and stay with a contracted stable price when opportunities existed 
to cheat the contract and make more money in “good” price years.  
 
The game was designed such that the expected earnings if a team stayed with any one trader 
were approximately the same (see Table 45). As shown in the last row of Table 45, only those 
that stayed with Trader B for every round would receive 95% compared to staying with Trader 
A or Trader C, which were equivalent over the simulated 10-season period. The factors in 
columns 3 and 4 are what Trader A’s prices were multiplied by to get Trader B and Trader C 
prices. The factors reflected the type of year (last column) the simulated season reflected. The 
“market price” that was announced to the teams was the simple mean of what Trader B and 
Trader C would later offer to the farmers as they walked around buying coffee.  
 
Table 45: Design and payments for coffee market trading game 
  
 Factors  Prices (USh / Kg)   
Season 
TRADER 
A  
TRADER 
B 
TRADER 
C  B C 
“MARKET” 
(Mean B & C)  
Type 
of Year 
1 1,800  1.1 1.3  1,980 2,340 2,160  Good 
2 1,800  0.8 0.7  1,440 1,260 1,350  Bad 
3 1,800  0.8 0.7  1,440 1,260 1,350  Bad 
4 1,800  1.3 1.4  2,340 2,520 2,430  Great 
5 1,800  1.1 1.3  1,980 2,340 2,160  Good 
6 1,800  1.1 1.3  1,980 2,340 2,160  Good 
7 1,800  0.8 0.7  1,440 1,260 1,350  Bad 
8 1,800  0.7 0.7  1,260 1,260 1,260  Bad 
9 1,800  0.7 0.6  1,260 1,080 1,170  Horrible 
10 1,800  1.1 1.3  1,980 2,340 2,160  Good 
MEAN: 1,800  0.95 1  1,710 1,800 1,755   
 
To simplify the process of production, each team was told that they produced 100 kg of dried 
coffee (kiboko) each year. The team would be able to store any coffee from a given year until 
the next year, but storage beyond one season was not allowed. Some traders do store their dried 
coffee while waiting for better prices, so this was a reasonable allowance in the game. This 
decision on constant production limited the power of the simulation to highlight investment 
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decisions and pest treatment choices farmers make. However, the simplification seemed 
necessary at the time in order to facilitate game play. It also made the game more focused on 
farmers’ responses to the opportunity for price stability in an uncertain market.  
 
The contract of Trader A guaranteed a constant price and purchase of at least half of the team’s 
annual production of coffee (i.e. 50 kg). The official contract gave each team the option to sell 
half their coffee (i.e. 50 kg) on the open market (to Trader B or C) without violating the 
contract, but Trader A would try to convince the team to sell Trader A the entire lot (i.e. 100 
kg) ostensibly to meet the company’s volume targets. Trader A used tactics like speaking of 
establishing good will and relationships between the company and the team when they sell the 
entire lot. If a team were to violate their contract during any season, it was explained that Trader 
A would refuse to deal with them for the remaining seasons of the game.  
 
At the end of season 5 (i.e. the mid-point of the game), teams were asked if they would like to 
re-sign the contract for the next 5 seasons. Teams that had not previously been on contract 
would also be able to sign-up for a contract for the remaining 5 seasons. The price and 
conditions offered by Trader A remained the same as they did at the first offer in the beginning 
of season 1. No teams were allowed to join Trader A at any season between the sign up points 
and the teams were notified of the sign-up points before the game began.  
 
The setup of the game was as follows (see Figure 44). Farmers and traders were split into six 
teams.157 One person from the research team was deemed the “market maker” with a laptop 
that was used to record sales from each team as well as to announce the yearly coffee market 
information. The “mobile team” consisted of three traders from the research team. Each trader 
was given a translator/assistant who would move with them to help assist with questions from 
the participant teams.  
 
                                               
157
 Since they would need to be able to discuss amongst their team, the survey team let participants self-select 
into approximately equal groups to allow for any cultural norms or previous friendships to be respected and to 
increase the chance that the team worked well together. 
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Figure 44: Diagram of game setup of coffee trading game 
 
The game began with the start of season 1. At the beginning of each season, the market maker 
would announce the type of year that was expected (e.g. good, bad, horrible etc.) and the market 
price for coffee (last two columns of Table 45). The traders would move between the market 
maker and each team in order to “buy” coffee from each team for the simulated season. Traders 
were allowed to try to persuade the participant teams to sell—just as a trader in the real supply 
chain may pressure farmers to accept the trader’s price. At the end of the season, traders would 
stop moving around and would record all sales from each team with the market maker. The 
next season would begin by the market maker announcing the next season number, the type of 
year, and the market price.  
 
Teams were incentivized to perform to their potential with an award of a cash prize of 7,000 
USh (approximately £1.75) for each member of the winning team.158 The score for each team 
was simply the money they made over the course of the game (i.e. the sum of each team’s 
revenue from selling their 100kg for each season). The prize and points system was announced 
with the rules before the game play began.  
 
Figure 45 shows some images from the game play at the workshop in Nkokonjeru conducted 
with RASD. The game was played as the last activity of the workshop as the high-energy nature 
                                               
158
 In this community, this cash prize would be more than a day’s wages for a typical person. 
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of the game kept interest among the participants. The main issue that the researchers 
encountered was the author underestimated the amount of time teams would spend discussing 
strategy and then negotiating with the traders. The game was cut short in the interest of time at 
the end of the farmer workshop. As such, teams did not play rounds 7, 8, and 9. However, the 
results were still useful and the research team felt they learned much of what could be discerned 
from the game by that point of play. The results are discussed in section 6.4.3, page 262. 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
 
(d) 
Note: (a) trader interacts with team in top left, (b) trader sits down to negotiate with team, 
(c) market maker (centre with laptop) announces prices while two traders look on, (d) 
trader reports sales to market maker 
Figure 45: Images from coffee trading game at workshop in Nkokonjeru 
 
6.2.3. Multiple price list design 
There are four common methods of measuring risk aversion in the field, all of which have been 
applied to some extent in a developing country context: Ordered Lottery Selection, Multiple 
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Price List (MPL), Titration Procedure, and simple investment games.159 The point of each 
method is to elicit the deviance of the respondents’ utility function from that which would be 
expected by Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Respondents who 
are risk-averse will have a certainty equivalent value (CEV) below the expected monetary value 
(EMV) of an option and conversely, those that are risk-seeking will have a CEV above the 
EMV. As an example, if the choice is between having a fixed amount of money or a 50% 
chance at £10: someone who is risk neutral would demand exactly £5 to take the fixed amount 
option (CEV=EMV=£5), someone who is risk-averse would demand less than £5 (CEV<EMV) 
to forgo the 50% chance at £10, and someone who is risk-seeking would only accept more than 
£5 (CEV>EMV) to take that fixed amount over the 50% chance at £10.  
 
The Multiple Price List (MPL) design is promising because it allows for a more accurate 
measure of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) than Ordered Lottery Selection, is more 
robust than Titration, might be less perceived as gambling as compared to simple investment 
games, and has been successfully piloted in field trials in Uganda (Tanaka & Munro, 2014). 
The original design of the MPL is discussed in detail in Andersen, Harrison, Lau, et al. (2006), 
but was made famous in a seminal paper of Holt & Laury (2002). All of these subsequent 
experiments are similar in nature to the original HL design with modifications to allow for 
time-variance, loss-aversion, and other modified characteristics of the utility function that may 
be relevant for the given research question.  
 
For simplicity and in order to make the survey results more comparable to the literature, a 
version of the design of Tanaka & Munro (2014) was used and is based on the original MPL 
design of HL. The main differences between the design used and that of HL are that the 
probabilities remained the same between rounds and different payments were used; in contrast, 
Holt & Laury (2002) varied probabilities with a constant payment.  
 
                                               
159
 Methods informed by conversation with Dr. Ben D’Exelle of University of East Anglia (UEA) at a Methods 
in the Field Course conducted by UEA London, 18 May, 2013.  
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# 
Bag A  Bag B 
 
4 red  
marbles 
 
 3 red 
marbles 
 
1 white 
marble 
 
Pick a marble 
from 
A or B? 
1 4,000  4,000 2,000 
 
2 4,000  4,500 2,000 
 
3 4,000  5,000 2,000 
 
4 4,000  5,500 2,000 
 
5 4,000  6,000 2,000 
 
6 4,000  7,000 2,000 
 
7 4,000  7,000 3,000 
 
8 4,000  7,000 4,000 
 
Note: Pay-outs are in Ugandan Shillings (conversion rate at the time of survey: 4,000 
USh ≅ £1 British Pound Sterling). 
Figure 46: MPL design used for farmer HH survey, based on Tanaka & Munro (2014)  
 
As shown in Figure 46, respondents chose between option A or option B in eight different 
rounds. This design was used in the survey administered to all of the coffee growers. A 
shortened version was used for the coffee traders, who the local survey team thought would 
not have the patience after taking a long survey to participate in the version that was used on 
the growers. The modified MPL design for the traders is shown in Figure 47. The main 
difference is that three rows (# 2, #4, and #6) were eliminated to create a shortened game. 
 
In both of the MPL designs (i.e. Figure 46 and Figure 47), option A is the safe option with a 
4/4 (100% probability) of yielding 4,000 USh. Option B is the chance option with ¾ (75% 
probability) of the left hand value and ¼ (25% probability) of the right hand value. The 
respondent starts at the top and chooses each round between option A or option B. Respondents 
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were told ahead of time they needed to make selections for each row, but then would randomly 
play one row for “real” where a payment would be made. They were told they would not have 
the option to change their answer. This followed the methodology of the original HL 
experiments. Option A should always be chosen in row #1. Option B is the only rational choice 
in row #8. The switch point, where the respondent “switches” from only answering A to only 
answering B, allows the researcher to calculate the respondent’s risk aversion.  
 
# 
Bag A  Bag B 
 
4 red  
marbles 
 
 3 red 
marbles 
 
1 white 
marble 
 
Pick a marble 
from 
A or B? 
1 4,000  4,000 2,000 
 
2 4,000  5,000 2,000 
 
3 4,000  6,000 2,000 
 
4 4,000  7,000 3,000 
 
5 4,000  7,000 4,000 
 
Note: Pay-outs are in Ugandan Shillings (conversion rate at the time of survey: 4,000 
USh ≅ £1 British Pound Sterling). 
Figure 47: MPL design used for trader HH survey, based on Tanaka & Munro (2014).  
 
In measuring the degree of a respondent’s risk-aversion or risk-seeking, a common choice in 
the literature is the CRRA measure (Herberich & List, 2012; Tanaka & Munro, 2014; 
Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz, 2013). This is the value of  in the utility function160 H(0) =
 IJKLBMN  for 0 > 0 for which the probability-weighted sum of utility outcomes is maximized 
(i.e. max (S *T ∗ H(0T)); where 0T is the pay-out to the individual () with probability *T  . 
For  = 0, the respondent is risk neutral. For  < 0, the respondent is some degree of risk-
                                               
160
 Holt & Laury (2002) use a utility function of  V(W) =  WXMY, but for high levels of risk aversion (i.e. Y > X) it 
is necessary to divide by (X − Y) to get increasing utility.  
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seeking. Finally, for  > 0, the respondent is risk-averse. Based on the researchers’ 
experimental design, they can elicit different ranges of the CRRA for which the respondent’s 
choice in the experiment was optimal—assuming expected utility theory is true. It is easiest to 
demonstrate the methodology and results given in column 2 of Table 46 below with an example 
calculation. 
 
Assume a farmer is playing the risk-aversion game given in Figure 46. She answers A for all 
choices until row 6, where she switches to B for that row through the rest of the game (rows 6, 
7, 8 see Figure 46). For row 5, she chose the safe option of a guaranteed (i.e. 100% probability 
of) 4,000 USh, which by revealed preference she must have preferred that to the 75% chance 
of 6,000 USh (see equation (2)). However, for row 6 she preferred the probabilistic option of 
75% chance of 7,000 USh and 25% probability of 2,000 USh to the safe choice (see equation 
(3)). Her risk preference can then be calculated as the interval between the solutions for  given 
the two equations (2) and (3) shown below: 
 
 4000BMN
1 −  > 0.75 ∗
6000BMN
1 −  + 0.25 ∗
2000BMN
1 −   
(2) 
  
 4000BMN
1 −  ≤ 0.75 ∗
7000BMN
1 −  + 0.25 ∗
2000BMN
1 −   
(3) 
 
Solving (2) yields  > 2 and solving (3) yields  ≤ 2.391. As such, the interval for the actual 
risk aversion parameter is given by 2.00 <  ≤  2.39 (as shown in Table 46 for switching to B 
at row 6).  
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Table 46: Risk aversion classification based on lottery choices for design in Figure 46 above 
Row of first B 
(switching 
point) 
Range of relative risk aversion 
for H(0) =  IJKLBMN  
Expected value 
difference at 
switch point  
(/[] − /[]) 
Risk preference 
classification* 
ALL B - 500 Irrational 
2        −∞ <  ≤  −0.82 125 Very risk-seeking 
3 −0.82 <  ≤  0.92 -250 Risk-seeking to risk neutral 
4    0.92 <  ≤  1.62 -625 Slightly risk-averse 
5    1.62 <  ≤  2.00 -1,000 Moderately risk-averse 
6    2.00 <  ≤  2.39 -1,750 Intermediate risk-averse 
7    2.39 <  ≤  3.79 -2,000 Highly risk-averse 
8 3.79 <  ≤  ∞ -2,250 Very risk-averse 
ALL A - - Irrational 
MULTIPLE - - Irrational 
* Terminology based on Tanaka & Munro (2014) 
 
It is also trivial to calculate the expected value difference between choice A and choice B at 
her switching point of row 6 (see equations (4) and (5) below). In equation (4), *^ is the 
probability of the payout 0^ occurring, and analogously for the two possible payouts for option 
B. The expected value of choosing the safe option of 4,000 USh is 1,750 USh less than what 
would be expected by taking the probabilistic option in B for row 6 (as shown in equation (5) 
and Table 46 as well). 
 
 /() − /() = *^ ∗ 0^ − (*_B ∗ 0_B + *_D ∗ 0_D) ,
ℎ		: *_B + *_D = 1  
(4) 
  
 
 /() − /() = [1.00 ∗ (4,000)] − [0.75 ∗ 7,000 + 0.25 ∗ 2,000] =  −1,750 (5) 
 
To enhance understanding of the experimental design, Tanaka & Munro (2014) had each row 
of the game (like Figure 46) presented at a different table in the experiment room. Thus, when 
a participant came in, she would physically sit at a different location to make each choice. She 
was also making each choice in isolation without knowledge of the next option, although, the 
order of the choices was preserved. Tanaka & Munro (2014) argue this allows the participant—
who might be illiterate, elderly, and with no formal education—to focus on the decision and 
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not get confused by the structure of the game. Given the low levels of education in 
impoverished, rural areas, even a simple game like this requires a great degree of attention and 
thought to understand fully. Likely, this simplified and focused setup allowed them to get 
relatively low irrational response rates in their experiments (Tanaka & Munro, 2014). 
 
The game was conducted at the end of every household survey for growers (following the 
design in Figure 46) and for traders (following the design in Figure 47). The game was 
administered as shown in Figure 48. Each participant was given the option to participate in the 
game for a cash prize. All survey participants elected to participate in the game, so there was 
no selection bias due to participation in the risk-aversion game results.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Note: (a) surveyor from team (left) prepares to record responses while another from 
survey team (right) demonstrates the choice A and B from different sides of two-part bag; 
(b) grower (left) contemplates whether to go with bag A or bag B 
Figure 48: Administration of the risk-aversion game in the field 
 
To the extent that was feasible, the author attempted to control for biases in the explanations 
from different surveyors administering the survey. The instructions were standardized and 
written on the back of every sheet to remind the surveyors of the methodology (see the text of 
the instruction sheet in Appendix A.18 on page 377). Additionally, training of the survey team 
at the beginning as well as the mid-point check-in covered how to administer the game. 
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Additionally, for a point of comparison and to confirm the viability of the risk-aversion 
protocol, the results from a survey of 138 adult visitors to the Imperial Festival is shown as 
well. The Imperial College Festival is an annual, two-day event where research is put on display 
to the public. The setup of the author’s research station is shown in Figure 49 below.  
 
 
Figure 49: Setup of research station on coffee pests and diseases at Imperial Festival (May 2014) 
 
The format followed the survey for growers, but was modified to be in British Pounds (see 
Appendix A.21 on page 387). The game was explained following the same guidelines that were 
used in the field. While explanations in the field could take over ten minutes, festival 
participants claimed to understand the game after a brief explanation of a few minutes. 
Responses from participants over age 18 were recorded. Certainly, this sample is by no means 
representative. The researcher did not record any characteristics beyond the risk-aversion score. 
Given the large sample size (138) though, it is useful to confirm the methodology and provide 
a snapshot comparison. Results are presented in section 6.4.2.  
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6.3. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SURVEYED FARMERS AND TRADERS 
 
The summary statistics for characteristics of the farmers and traders surveyed in Uganda are 
presented below. For the full description of the survey methodology, refer back to Chapter 5 in 
section 5.3.5 staring on page 167.  
 
6.3.1. Household characteristics of growers 
The farmers in the survey were quite diverse in their activities on their plots, family size, age, 
and experience in farming. Summary statistics for collected data about the 119 farmers in 
Buikwe and Kayunga districts are shown below in Table 47.  
 
Table 47: Summary statistics for coffee growers surveyed in Buikwe and Kayunga 
 MEAN161 SD MIN MAX OBS. 
Age 50.94 17.58 18 90 118 
Num. Children 5.97 5.03 0 42 119 
Household Size 6.96 3.89 1 22 119 
Income (USh) 2132964 2292693 96000 1.20e+07 110 
Num. Meals/Day 2.82 .43 1 4 119 
Any Education? .90 .30 0 1 119 
Married? .66 .48 0 1 119 
Own Mobile Phone? .70 .46 0 1 119 
Own Vehicle? .18 .38 0 1 119 
Have Electricity? .12 .32 0 1 119 
Own Plot? .91 .29 0 1 119 
Own Clock? .71 .46 0 1 119 
 
In line with trends across the agriculture sector in Uganda, producers with coffee on their plot 
are on average above 50 years old—and as old as 90 for one farmer surveyed. Growers had 
several children (average of six children) and often had older relatives or other family members 
living at home with them as well (average household size was seven people). Several coffee 
growers and others in the village had numerous children. One grower surveyed had 42 children 
and there was a wealthy store owner in the village who was famous in Nkokonjeru Town for 
having at least 75 children (personal conversation, interviewee #1).  
 
                                               
161
 For binary variables like “Married?” the mean indicates the percentage of the sample for which the question 
was true; as an example, 66% of growers surveyed were married and 91% owned their plot that they farmed. 
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Poverty was pervasive for those in rural areas growing coffee and other crops. A mean income 
of just over 2-million Ugandan Shillings (USh) reported in Table 47 is around £475 or just over 
£1.3 per day. Many growers were far below this average, with the poorest grower living just a 
subsistence existence and reporting surviving on a meagre 96,000 USh (£23) per year.162 Many 
of the other collected metrics were an attempt to get a better proxy for income given the 
difficulty in accurately reporting income when the vast majority of growers keep few—if any—
records. These alternative metrics confirm the general level of poverty. Only 12% of growers 
had access to electricity at their home and only 18% owned a motorcycle or automobile (refer 
back to summary statistics in Table 47). With the wide penetration of mobile phones throughout 
Eastern Africa163, 70% of farmers had access to a cell phone from at least one member in the 
family. Given the fertility of the soil and diversification into food crops, though, more farmers 
reported eating more than three meals a day than the number eating only one meal per day. 
While acute hunger or malnutrition may be issues during the dry season, starvation or clinical 
malnourishment were not present (personal conversation, interviewee #1).  
 
Compared to a larger sample from Exporter A’s registration of 838 coffee farmers in the 
Buikwe district, the author’s sample was 8 years older on average and owned slightly more 
land (though it was not significant at the 5% level). Otherwise, they were not significantly 
different in terms of whether they had education, were married, and how many hectares they 
devoted to coffee. While a robust check against the general population was not feasible, this at 
least confirmed that the 119 farmers that were surveyed were not severely different from a 
much larger population of 838 coffee growers in the district.164 A two-sample T-test was used 
with unequal variances for comparing age and total land, and with equal variances for coffee 
                                               
162
 All values are self-reported and surveyors did their best to question and confirm extreme values, however, as 
with any survey, this one is susceptible to underreporting by interviewees. They may have perceived that 
underreporting something like income would lead to a larger reward for participating or generate charity from 
the survey team member conducting the interview. However, given the fertility of the soil and growing 
conditions throughout the year, it is possible for a subsistence farmer to survive without access to much cash 
except to purchase sugar, oil, and salt from the shops in town. Also many farmers use matooke (the plantain 
staple of the Ugandan diet) to barter for other products and so poor farmers may underreport income since many 
transactions for household items do not occur in cash.  
163
 See Aker & Mbiti (2010) 
164
 It could be that comparing to Exporter A is not a fair metric of a population sample. Younger or more 
cooperative farmers may self-select into registering with an exporter that is looking to organize farmers and 
provide training and support. However, it was the best that could be done in the field at the time.  
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land.165 A two-sample test of proportions was used for the binary variables “married” and “any 
education”. The results are reported below in Table 48.   
 
Table 48: Comparisons of means between Exporter A’s 838 newly registered coffee growers in Buikwe 
and the HH survey sample of 119 growers 
Variable Exporter A Grower HH Survey p-value  
Age (years) 42.8 ± 0.5  50.9 ± 1.6 <0.0000 *** 
Total Land (ha) 3.4 ± 0.2 4.5 ± 0.6 0.0587 * 
Coffee Land (ha) 1.4 ± 0.7 1.3 ± 0.2 0.577_  
Married (Y/N) 0.69 ± 0.02 0.66 ± 0.04 0.501_  
Education (Y/N) 0.84 ± 0.01 0.89 ± 0.03 0.110_  
 
Note: significance indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Likely due to the prevalence of universal primary education, the vast majority of farmers (90% 
in Table 47) had at least a primary school education. Of those that had at least some education, 
over 50% had just primary school education (see Figure 50). The next largest category was 
secondary education, followed by those that had no formal education, and closely following 
those that had at least some higher education beyond secondary school. Higher education also 
included teaching programs and vocational schools that were beyond secondary school, in 
addition to four-year university courses. 
 
                                               
165
 Levene’s test rejected the hypothesis of equal variances for age and total land, but not for coffee land size; 
results not reported. 
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Figure 50: Reported education levels of growers in HH survey 
 
6.3.2. Household characteristics of traders 
Traders were a more heterogeneous group than growers due to their differentiated role in the 
marketplace. Richer traders owned motorcycles or trucks and focused on buying from smaller 
traders and selling to an exporter. Traders with less wealth and working capital worked from 
their bicycle buying directly from farmers. This differential role in the market was recognized 
by growers and other stakeholders interviewed. Traders were often referred to as “bicycle 
traders” or “motorcycle traders” to differentiate the type of trader the person was. In addition, 
many shop owners would also function as coffee traders. Epitomized images of each type of 
trader are shown below in Figure 51.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Note: Trader types in order of increasing wealth and specialization in the coffee industry 
(a) trader on bicycles are the most common and poorest; (b) traders on motorbikes have 
more income than those on bicycles, but often are involved in other jobs as well which 
require the motorcycle like working as a “boda-boda” or motorcycle taxi; (c) wealthier 
traders may work from their retail shop where they will sell a variety of products as well 
as buying and selling coffee; (d) the man pictured here was thought by interviewee #1 to 
be the 3rd richest man in Nkokonjeru. His main activity was coffee trading, working 
closely with the milling factory owner. All photos by author. 
Figure 51: Coffee trader types from household survey in Buikwe and Kayunga 
 
Interviewee #14 from the coffee industry training and research organization explained that big 
merchants like traders with pickup trucks (see panel (d) of Figure 51) are near the end of the 
supply chain, interfacing directly with exporters (personal conversation). They provide much 
of the liquidity and make the market for smaller traders. Bigger merchants often give out capital 
for smaller traders to go into villages to make purchases from farmers on their behalf, on either 
foot, bicycle, or motorcycle (personal conversation, interviewee #14). As a result, one question 
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traders were asked in the HH survey in addition to their working capital was how many other 
traders they had working for them.  
 
All traders were asked why the got involved in coffee trading. While the results of this question 
(number 23 in Appendix A.20) are not fully explored, it is interesting to note the patterns that 
emerged as to why each trader got into coffee and who they consulted about the decision. Many 
traders mentioned that they started trading coffee to earn additional income and that coffee was 
a product that they understood. Two traders specifically (trader #78 and trader #15) mentioned 
their personal stories of moving from a small plot farmer, to a farmer who processed their 
coffee to kase, to eventually a trader who bought kiboko and sold kase. One trader started with 
working capital of only 100,000 USh (approximately £24) and built up a trading business from 
there. 
 
Table 49 below has the summary statistics for the 89 traders surveyed in Buikwe and Kayunga 
as part of the household survey. The vast majority of traders (>90%) had a mobile phone, their 
own land, some level of education, and a clock.  
 
Table 49: Summary statistics for coffee traders surveyed in Buikwe and Kayunga 
 MEAN SD MIN MAX OBS. 
Age 37.55 9.42 20 70 87 
Num. Children 5.31 3.59 0 17 88 
Household Size 6.67 4.15 1 30 89 
Income (USh) 6059318 1.33e+07 360000 1.00e+08 88 
Num. Meals/Day 3.03 .38 1 4 89 
Any Education? .97 .18 0 1 89 
Married? .83 .38 0 1 89 
Own Mobile Phone? .93 .25 0 1 88 
Own Vehicle? .53 .50 0 1 81 
Have Electricity? .24 .43 0 1 89 
Own Plot? .91 .29 0 1 88 
Own Clock? .96 .21 0 1 89 
 
Traders’ socio-economic status is most useful to examine in reference to the community of 
growers. In Table 50 below, the results of mean comparison tests between growers and traders 
in the HH survey are reported. Two-sample T-tests of unequal variances were used to 
compare 	, 	, and 	  	 variables after the results of a Levine Test 
rejected the hypothesis of equal variances. Two-sample T-tests of equal variances were used 
237 
 
for variables: 	  ℎ"	 and ℎ	ℎ" #	. Two-sample test of proportions 
were used for the binary variables. Results are reported in Table 50.  
 
Table 50: Comparisons of means between growers (n=119) and traders (n=89) in HH Survey 
Variable Grower HH Survey Trader HH Survey p-value  
Age 51 ± 1.6 38 ± 1.0 <0.0000 *** 
Num. Children 6 ± 0.5 5 ± 0.4 0.2899  
Household Size 7 ± 0.4 7 ± 0.4 0.6170  
Income (M USh) 2.1 ± 0.2 6.1 ± 1.4 0.0074 *** 
Num. Meals/Day 2.8 ± 0.04 3.0 ± 0.04 0.0002 *** 
Any Education? 0.90 ± 0.028 0.97 ± 0.020 0.0640 * 
Married? 0.66 ± 0.044 0.83 ± 0.040 0.0046 *** 
Own Mobile Phone? 0.70 ± 0.042 0.93 ± 0.027 <0.0000 *** 
Own Vehicle? 0.18 ± 0.035 0.53 ± 0.055 <0.0000 *** 
Have Electricity? 0.12 ± 0.030 0.24 ± 0.045 0.0240 ** 
Own Plot? 0.91 ± 0.027 0.91 ± 0.031 0.9700  
Own Clock? 0.71 ± 0.042 0.96 ± 0.022 <0.0000 *** 
Note: significance indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As shown in Table 50, traders were on average wealthier than farmers were. The average 
farmer earned just over 2M USh per year, but the average trader earned some 6M USh annually, 
with the richest trader earning an order of magnitude (10x) more than the wealthiest farmer 
(compare max values in Table 47 and Table 49). Traders also more often owned a mobile phone 
and a vehicle. The vehicle ownership levels were not surprising considering many traders use 
a motorcycle or truck to conduct their business, likely they are more in need of a mobile phone 
as well to get current market prices. While electricity penetration in traders’ households was 
still low at only 24% of those surveyed, it was still significantly greater than the 12% on average 
that had electricity among the growers. Traders were also more often married than among the 
growers surveyed, however, they were also much younger on average than the growers were. 
The age result confirms the statement from NGO B’s Head of Programs that it is easier to 
engage youth in coffee business side of the supply chain rather than agricultural production 
(personal conversation, interviewee #5).  
 
Compared to farmers, traders were not only more likely to be educated, but also to have gone 
to secondary instead of just primary school. As shown in Figure 52 below, nearly half (49%) 
of the traders surveyed had gone to secondary school or higher. Traders and growers are indeed 
in distinct socio-economic classes, but may or may not have different views on risks in the 
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supply chain. As such, the comparison between traders and farmers for the three contexts of 
risk measurement are presented throughout the next section (6.4).  
 
 
Figure 52: Reported education levels of traders in HH survey 
 
6.4. RESULTS 
 
6.4.1. Prevalence and severity of pests/disease 
There are five main pests and diseases of Robusta coffee as discussed in section 6.2.1. The 
research team was interested in the extent to which stakeholders at different points in the supply 
chain agree about the pest/disease priorities and severity. Particularly of interest were the 
foreign pest (Black Twig Borer) and foreign disease (Coffee Wilt Disease) which have 
impacted Uganda’s coffee production.  
 
Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD) is one of the most widespread and important diseases in the history 
of the Ugandan coffee production system. There were minor outbreaks of the disease before 
1997 with reports in isolated fields, but these early incidences did not have a major effect on 
3 3
40
42
0
10
20
30
40
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f T
ra
de
rs
Higher None Secondary Primary
239 
 
coffee production in the country. Beyond a few farms, there was little impact or knowledge 
about this disease among coffee farmers in the country (Flood, 2009). This all changed in the 
late 1990s. The war that took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in a porous 
border between the countries which allowed for the flow of people, goods, and coffee. It was 
not just green coffee ready for export that came through, but ripe and unripe berries as well 
which served as effective vectors for fungal spores. It is all but certain that CWD came into 
western Uganda from the DRC during this period (Hakiza, DT, Musoli, et al., 2009; Cheyns, 
Mrema & Sallée, 2006; Rutherford, 2006; Flood, 2009). More about the history of the fungus 
and its impact on production is found in the appendix (A.22.1, starting on page 388).  
 
An emerging pest hitting the southern regions of Uganda in the past few years is the Black 
Twig Borer (BTB). The BTB causes extensive yield loss (over 50% of “normal” year yield in 
some cases) (Egonyu, Kucel, Kangire, et al., 2009). Just as an example, one farmer interviewed 
in 2013 in a Ugandan national newspaper article had lost his entire 10-acre field to the borer 
(Aliga, 2013). The Ugandan Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) estimates that in the 
southern Ugandan districts of Rakai, Lwengo, Kalungu, Bukomansimbi, and Masaka the 
prevalence of BTB is almost certainly 100% (Aliga, 2013). More about the views of 
stakeholders interviewed and history of the pest is found in the appendix (A.22.2, starting on 
page 390).   
 
Table 51 contains the results of asking the interviewees to identify the pests/diseases and 
ranking them from (1) worst to (5) least concern. Several people interviewed simply stated that 
only a few diseases or pests were priorities and the rest were minor problems not worth 
mentioning (e.g. interviewee #2, #8, #18). Unfortunately, the sample size of those interviewees 
who took the pest ranking survey was very small. Nevertheless, there are a few suggestive 
conclusions it makes. (1) All stakeholders agreed that BTB (pest B in the survey) was a top 
priority pest for Robusta coffee production in Uganda. For all the reasons described in section 
A.22.2, the beetle causes extensive damage and is difficult to prevent or treat. (2) The 
stakeholders agreed that Mealybugs (pest E) were quite unimportant to the production of 
Robusta currently. (3) There was disagreement about the importance of CBB (pest C) and RBD 
(disease D). While the person (interviewee #13) selling inputs to farmers thought CBB was 
quite an important pest, exporters (interviewees #4, #2, and #8) ranked it a very low priority. 
It was interesting that the NAADS employee ranked CWD (disease A) so low. Likely, the 
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interviewee was influenced by the fact that NAADS had given out so many wilt resistant 
seedlings that should address the problem.  
 
The mean value of the ranking for each pest is given at the bottom of Table 51. These priorities 
are then compared to the rankings from the survey of farmers conducted after the workshop in 
Kamuli District. Traders as well from Buikwe and Kayunga ranked the pests/diseases in the 
order of priority as they saw it on the supply chain. Finally, both measures can be compared to 
the more detailed severity and frequency measures that farmers in Buikwe and Kayunga 
reported on the HH surveys. In general, the stakeholders besides traders and farmers viewed 
BTB (B) as the worst pest, followed by CWD (A) and then RBD (D), CBB (C), and finally, 
RMBs (E) as the pest of least concern.  
 
Table 51: Results of pest/disease ranking during interviews with supply chain stakeholders 
Group Interview # A B C D E 
Exporter 4 1 2 5 4 3 
 2 2 1 x x x 
 8 2 1 x x x 
NGO 5 2 1 x x x 
 1 2 1 4 3 5 
Extension 16 3 1 x 2 x 
Cooperative 18 1 2 x x x 
Inputs 13 x 1 2 3 4 
 MEAN: 1.8 1.3 3.7 3.0 4.0 
Note: 1 worst in red, to 5 least concern in green 
 
Traders in the HH survey were quite familiar with the pests common on the plots of coffee 
growers. One reason for this is that many traders were previously coffee growers and 97% still 
reported growing at least some coffee on their own land. As a result, it was expected that traders 
would be well informed on the diseases and pests of Robusta coffee—though their priorities 
might differ from farmers due to their place in the supply chain. These expectations were 
largely confirmed.  
 
As shown in Figure 53 below, traders were very familiar with the pests and diseases common 
in Uganda for Robusta coffee. It was only Mealybugs that had a low recognition rate (58%), 
but the rate was also the lowest for growers as the pest is not that common on Robusta coffee 
in this region (see in Figure 54 for growers on page 243). CWD (A) and BTB (B) were 
recognized by all 89 traders in the survey, with RBD (D) recognized by all but one trader.  
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Figure 53: Proportion of traders in HH survey that confirmed they had previously seen the pest/disease  
 
Two methods were used to generate an average pest ranking for the traders. The most common 
ranking for each pest summarizes for each category of severity 1 to 5, which pest/disease had 
the most votes from traders. The second method takes the sum of the votes by traders multiplied 
by the ranking from 1 to 5 for each pest/disease. The latter method will weight a pests’ rank by 
the category of severity it was originally ranked in. For example, assume pest Z was considered 
the worst (rank 1) by 5 farmers and the least concern (rank 5) by 5 farmers. Also, assume pest 
X was considered the worst (rank 1) by 4 farmers and medium concern (rank 3) by 6 farmers. 
By most common rank pest Z would be considered worse than pest X since it had 5 votes versus 
pest X’s 4 votes in the rank 1 category. However, by average ranking pest X would be 
considered worse than pest Z since pest X’s average score would be B∗b c E∗dB@ = 2.2 while pest 
Z’s average score would be B∗e c e∗eB@ = 3.0 , weighed down by the five farmers who did not 
think it was a serious problem.  
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Measured by either method, traders viewed the CWD (A) as the worst disease issue for Robusta 
coffee as shown in Table 52. This was followed closely by BTB (B) which the majority agreed 
was the 2nd most significant pest, however, 34% had put it as the worst pest of the five.  
 
There was a significant drop in the priority for the next two pests/diseases. RBD (D) was cited 
by many traders to be a concern for the impact that it had on the weight and quality of the 
coffee they took to process at the mill into kase. Similarly, the next priority pest was CBB (C), 
which also affects the final bean since it becomes damaged from the insect. For around 10% of 
traders, they viewed either C or D as the top pest likely due to the impact that disease and pest 
have on their profits. C and D tend to affect traders more than growers as it is difficult to tell 
CBB or RBD damage from kiboko, especially if it is in a large sack sold by a farmer to a trader. 
As a result, the trader would only notice the impact by the shrivelled and insect-damaged beans 
that result from processing the husk off the kiboko at a mill when turning it into kase.  
 
Table 52: Tabulation of traders’ responses for pest/disease priority rankings 
 1 2 3 4 5 
MEAN RANK BY 
PEST/DISEASE 
A 48 30 7 3 0 1.60 
B 30 36 10 9 3 2.08 
C 5 4 20 33 19 3.70 
D 3 15 38 30 1 3.13 
E 2 3 12 9 34 4.17 
MOST COMMON 
PEST/DISEASE BY RANK A B D C E  
 
In agreement with the other stakeholders in the supply chain, the traders largely agreed that 
RMB (E) was a very low priority pest (42% said they had never seen one nor heard of the pest). 
They also agreed that RBD (D) causes more damage than CBB (C) as well. Unlike the other 
stakeholders in the supply chain, traders viewed CWD (A) as a priority over BTB (B).   
 
The growers in the HH survey were also aware of many of the pests and diseases of Robusta 
coffee and could easily recognize the pest/disease from the survey images and descriptions 
presented by the research team (see results in Figure 54 below). Like the traders, 100% of the 
farmers recognized CWD (A). However, for all other pests, the recognition rates by growers 
were lower than that of traders (see below in Figure 54 for growers and above Figure 53 for 
traders).  
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Figure 54: Proportion of growers in HH survey that confirmed they had previously seen the pest/disease 
 
The growers’ recognition rate of BTB (B) was only 7% lower (0.93 ± 0.023) than traders’ 
100% recognition rate, but significantly so by a two-sample test of proportions. Only 71% (0.71 
± 0.041) of growers recognized CBB (C) compared to 94% (0.94 ± 0.025) of traders. As well, 
RBD (D) was recognized by only 82% (0.82 ± 0.036) of growers, but nearly 100% (0.99 ± 
0.011) of traders in the HH survey. While both groups had low recognition rates of RMB (E), 
growers (0.43 ± 0.045) had significantly lower recognition rates than traders (0.58 ± 0.053).166  
 
There are several plausible explanations for why the growers were less knowledgeable about 
pests/diseases of Ugandan Robusta Coffee. (1) Traders cover a much larger area than farmers, 
travelling 5.8 km (mean) on average to buy coffee from 102 coffee growers (mean). Given the 
number of plots they visit, people they potentially talk to, and variations they would observe in 
farmer output from year-to-year, it is logical that they would be more aware of the pests/disease 
affecting the supply chain. In addition to being exposed to others farms, the vast majority (97%) 
grow coffee on their own plots as well, and thus, have exposure to the various problems faced 
                                               
166
 All results confirmed as significant (p<0.05) by two-sample test of proportions. 
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by growers. (2) An alternative explanation is that traders are more susceptible to positive 
response bias and would want to appear knowledgeable about coffee in a survey. This would 
lead them to confirming they have seen something in their work, when they in fact have not. 
(3) Some farmers may have not understood the question completely and may have had 
knowledge of the pest, but claimed to not recognize it since it was not a large issue for their 
plot. Of the possible explanations, (1) is quite convincing given the reach of traders and 
therefore their exposure to various coffee growing conditions.  
 
The growers were asked detailed questions on frequency and severity of the five pests, instead 
of a simple priority ranking like the other groups (recall methodology in section 6.2.1).167 
Growers in Buikwe and Kayunga rated the frequency with which the five pests/diseases attack 
their plot in the same order that the traders’ ranked the priority of each pest/disease. CWD (A) 
was most frequent, followed by BTB (B), RBD (D), CBB (C), and finally, (E) RMB. 
Interestingly, while CWD had the highest frequency of occurrence on average, BTB was said 
by farmers to be present at all times on their plot (the highest frequency), while CWD by far 
had the largest annual frequency (2nd highest frequency).168 The frequency of a pest is important 
to consider in relation to the severity when it occurs. The growers’ views on the severity of 
each pest are shown in Figure 56.  
 
                                               
167
 In retrospect, the traders could have answered these detailed questions as well, but during the survey design, 
the author was unaware of how knowledgeable traders would be about coffee production. 
168
 Based on informal conversation during the interview most farmers were clear that there was a distinction 
between a pest that came at least once a year (“annual” in the survey) and one that seemed to be present 
throughout the year (“always” in the survey) on their plot, but whether all farmers could distinguish between the 
two categories could not be confirmed for all the surveys. 
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Note: The category “never” includes those that responded that they were not familiar with 
the pest/disease in Question 27 of the farmer survey (Appendix A.19) 
Figure 55: Growers ranking of the frequency rating of each of the five Robusta pests/diseases 
 
The severity scores given by farmers’ to the five pests revealed interesting differences 
compared to the consensus of the other stakeholders and traders. Unsurprisingly, CWD (A) and 
BTB (B) were rated very severe by over 25% of the farmers’ surveyed and overall had the 
highest severity scores. However, the third highest rated pest by severity was actually the RMB 
(E) with 34% of farmers who experienced them rating them as “very high” severity—higher 
than that of CWD or BTB for that severity category. Contradicting these farmers, a nearly equal 
32% said that the Mealybugs do no damage (“none”) when they are present on the plot. 
Consistent with the other groups, Buikwe and Kayunga growers found that the damage from 
RBD (D) was more severe than that of CBB (C). Given the number of farmers that rated many 
pests as very severe and very frequent it is likely that the risk is overstated. Since no samples 
were taken or fields studied scientifically to confirm the results, it is impossible to know, but 
other studies have confirmed that farmers often cite worst-case scenario pest events (Heong & 
Escalada, 1999).  
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Note: excludes farmers who rated the frequency as “never” or reported that they were 
not familiar with the pest in Question 27 of the farmer survey (Appendix A.19) 
Figure 56: Growers rating of the severity of each of the five Robusta pests/diseases 
 
The discrepancy between farmers’ responses on RMB is difficult to interpret. Given that they 
are hard to detect until a farmer digs up a tree to expose the roots, it is likely that those that 
rated it as “very high” have only ever seen them on the trees that have shown strong symptoms 
of damage for lack of nutrients caused by the Mealybugs. Alternatively, those that have lost 
trees to BTB for instance and have dug up the tree to burn it may have noticed a few RMB that 
seemed relatively harmless in comparison. The real answer may be somewhere in between with 
the bugs causing moderate damage depending on the conditions of the soil. Further research in 
the area with actual sampling of farmers’ plots could better determine the severity and 
frequency with which RMB cause issues for the typical coffee plot in Uganda.  
 
The Kamuli District farmers that were organized into a cooperative by NGO B were surveyed 
for their views on pest/disease priorities as well. The workshop format with the Kamuli farmers 
did not facilitate explanations of frequency and severity. As a result, they were given the same 
severity ranking survey (simple ranking from 1 to 5 of the pests/diseases) as the Buikwe traders 
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and other supply chain stakeholders that were interviewed one-on-one. The results of their 
responses on the priorities of different pests are given below in Table 53.  
 
In agreement with the stakeholders (Table 51), the cooperative farmers in Kamuli thought the 
BTB (B) was the worst. This was followed by CWD (A) as the next highest priority pest. In 3rd 
and 4th, CBB (C) and RBD (D) were nearly tied. By the ranking within each category, RBD 
had the most farmers saying it was the 3rd priority pest, but by the mean of all the rankings it 
received by farmers CBB had a higher average ranking. In agreement with the interviewed 
stakeholders as well as the Buikwe traders, the farmers in Kamuli were not concerned about 
RMB (E).  
 
Table 53: Tabulation of NGO B cooperative Kamuli District farmers’ in responses for pest/disease 
priority rankings 
 1 2 3 4 5 
MEAN RANK BY 
PEST/DISEASE 
A 7 17 1 1 0 1.85 
B 18 4 5 2 0 1.69 
C 4 5 7 10 2 3.04 
D 0 2 15 10 1 3.36 
E 0 1 1 5 20 4.63 
MOST COMMON 
PEST/DISEASE BY RANK B A D C/D E  
 
Overall across all groups, it appeared that there were three distinct groups of pests/diseases in 
Robusta coffee production. The top two priority pests/diseases were clearly CWD (A) and BTB 
(B). While stakeholders in the supply chain (i.e. input sellers, extension, and exporters) and the 
Kamuli cooperative farmers were more worried about BTB, Buikwe farmers and traders both 
still felt that CWD was slightly more damaging to production.  
 
The next group of pests/diseases were RBD (D) and CBB (C). Except for the Kamuli growers 
that ranked them approximately equally, the other groups agreed that RBD (D) was more of a 
threat than CBB (C). It should be noted that many of the stakeholders outside of production 
(i.e. not traders or growers) responded that the top two pests/diseases were the only ones to 
worry about and that the rest (C, D, E) were all very minor and not worth mentioning. There 
was widespread agreement that RMB (E) are not present very often on farmers’ plots and are 
a very minor concern of the five diseases/pests presented. The only difference was that many 
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Buikwe farmers felt that although the RMBs do not come very often, they do cause a lot of 
damage when they are present on the plot. This response was likely driven by farmers only 
noticing the RMB after the tree had died from lack of nutrient transport in the roots.  
 
In general, communication between stakeholders on disease/pests risks appeared to be 
effective. Even stakeholders quite far removed from production, like exporters, were well 
informed about the top pests/diseases of Robusta coffee. Traders as well were more informed 
than growers about the different types of Robusta diseases/pests that can affect the productivity 
of the coffee tree. Both of these findings are likely driven by how connected the stakeholders 
are to production due to the tight communication links to farmers. Traders talk with many 
farmers in the course of doing business since they need to travel such a wide area and buy from 
many farmers in order to achieve the scale to operate as a seller of kase. For exporters, the 
recent phenomenon of the companies getting directly involved in organizing farmers’ 
associations and hiring agronomists (like interviewee #9 from Exporter B) have caused many 
of the employees to become very aware of the pests/disease issues that farmers face. While 
there does seem to be a fair amount of prioritization of the information transfer, everyone in 
the supply chain is aware and agreed on the major threats at the expense of not having a full 
understanding of the minor pests that farmers and traders are often dealing with as well. A 
significant finding was confirmation that the foreign pest and disease from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo were the worst of the pests/diseases of Robusta coffee in Uganda.  
 
6.4.2. Risk aversion among coffee growers 
The farmers and traders surveyed in Buikwe and Kayunga districts169 were compensated after 
completing the survey with a risk-aversion game based on a multiple price list design, as 
explained in the methodology section 6.2.3. The aggregate results for the population of growers 
sampled are shown in Figure 57.  
 
                                               
169
 The only survey respondents that were not compensated using the risk preferences game were the farmers 
involved with NGO B in the Cooperative in Kamuli District. NGO B thought it was better to compensate survey 
respondents with a lunch at the group workshop to avoid giving cash directly; the research team respected their 
wishes with how to engage with their association.  
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Figure 57: Risk-aversion responses of surveyed coffee growers in Uganda 
 
Surprisingly, given a lot of the literature and NGO work on farmers in the developing world, 
the survey found that many farmers were quite risk-seeking—it was the largest group with 35% 
of those surveyed who answered rationally. Overall, though, farmers were risk-averse on 
average (see discussion below). There is a spike at the “intermediate risk-averse” level, which 
corresponds to switching to B—the probabilistic, risky choice—at row six (recall Table 46 in 
section 6.2.3 on page 228). Row six is also the first time within the sequence where the expected 
prize for the high-paying marble jumps 1,000 USh from 6,000 to 7,000 USh instead of the 
usual 500 USh increase per row. Likely, the psychological effect of this new larger price had 
an influence in pushing more people to switch to the risky prize option at this point as compared 
to just before or just after.  
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Figure 58: Comparison of responses of all Ugandans in Tanaka & Munro (2014) with only coffee growers 
in the present survey 
 
The results for coffee growers showed more risk-seeking than the general population sample 
of Tanaka & Munro (2014) (see Figure 58). This result confirms the conjectures that Tanaka 
& Munro (2014) put forth to explain the differences in risk preferences across climate regions. 
In the districts where over 40% of the population was involved in coffee growing, they noted 
that the risk preferences were among the most risk-seeking and most significantly different 
compared to the base region (south-west highlands) in their interval regression model (Tanaka 
& Munro, 2014). Surely, other factors they discuss contribute to these differences, but coffee 
as a high-risk, high-reward crop likely makes the “background risk” (Herberich & List, 2012) 
that farmers are accustomed to much higher (i.e. risk tolerance is gained through exposure to 
“risky” situations over time). Additionally, since coffee is high-risk, high-reward farmers likely 
self-select to some extent into growing coffee, as it will appeal to more risk-taking individuals 
compared to those that are more risk-averse and prefer to invest in low-risk (low-value) 
opportunities.  
 
Compared to the adult respondents at the Imperial Festival, the coffee growers of Ugandan 
were much more risk-seeking. The results for the London adults are plotted in Figure 59. The 
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mean response for the farmer group’s switch point was 3.97 ± 0.22 (switching at the upper end 
of the “Risk-seeking to neutral” category), while for the adult respondents in London the mean 
response was 4.5 ± 0.14 (corresponding to switching between the “Slightly” and “Moderately” 
risk-averse categories). By a two-sample T-test with unequal variances170, these means were 
significantly different ( = −2.089, * = 0.0384). Given that the intervals between the 
different choices are not quite equal in terms of the range of the CRRA (see column 2 of Table 
46 on page 228), the result is confirmed with the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (i.e. 
Mann-Whitney two sample test statistic).171 The results confirm there is a significant difference 
between the underlying distributions for risk preferences between the growers and the festival 
visitors (# = −2.718 , * = 0.0066).  
 
Remarkably though, the rate of irrational responses was not significantly different. The 
Ugandan farmers responded rationally 72% of the total responses, while the Imperial Festival 
attendees responded rationally 78% of the total. By a two-sample test of proportions, the rate 
of irrational response was not significantly different from each other (* = 0.266).172  
 
                                               
170
 Levene’s test rejected the hypothesis of equal variances for mean (p = 0.00015), median (p = 0.0019), and 
10% trimmed mean (p = 0.00032). Shapiro-Wilk W-test provided some evidence that the data is approximately 
normal (z = 1.468, p = 0.071).  
171
 A Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used since the dependent variable is ordinal, but the rank-sum test does not 
assume a normally distributed interval variable like the t-test (Wilcoxon, 1945).  
172
 Rational responses—switching to B at rows 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7—were coded as “1” while irrational responses 
including all A, all B, or multiple switching were coded as “0” before the two-sample test of proportions was 
done to compare the two groups (Uganda growers v. London adults) of respondents.  
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Figure 59: Risk-aversion responses of adults at May 2014 Imperial College London festival event  
 
Lastly, the traders interviewed in Uganda took a shorter survey where rows 2, 4, and 6 were 
not present (see methodology in section 6.2.3 on page 223). The results from this abridged risk 
preference survey are reported below in Figure 60. Unfortunately, the wide bands of their risk 
preferences limit conclusions that can be drawn.173  
 
                                               
173
 For instance, the first category for the traders includes risk preferences ranging from very risk-averse through 
to risk neutral since the decision point at row 2 was removed from the choice set. The consequences of the larger 
bands especially in the risk-seeking range were not fully considered when the change was decided in the field to 
adapt to requests from the local research team. In retrospect, larger compensation amounts should have been 
used instead of shortening the game to encourage the impatient traders to participate in a longer survey.   
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Figure 60: Risk-aversion responses of surveyed coffee traders in Uganda 
 
It does appear that the traders were more risk-averse on average than growers were. Around 
40% of traders were some degree of risk-seeking, but 51% of growers measured as some degree 
of risk-seeking (combining first two intervals for growers in Figure 57). Additionally, in the 
highest category of risk-aversion where growers and farmers had the same interval in the game, 
just over 8% of farmers, but a full 18% of traders switched at this most risk-averse point. The 
mean switch-point response for traders on the same response scale as the growers174 was 5.00 
± 0.24 (“Moderately risk-averse” category), while for farmers it was 3.97 ± 0.22 as before. By 
a two-sample T-test with equal variances175, the means were significantly different ( =
−3.21, * = 0.0016). The result for traders vs growers is confirmed with the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Wilcoxon, 1945). The results confirmed there is a strongly significant 
difference between the underlying distributions for risk preferences between the growers and 
the traders (# = −3.505 , * = 0.0005).  
                                               
174
 Meaning that traders could choose from switching at row 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8, while farmers had the full choice 
set from 1 to 8.  
175
 Levene’s test could not reject the hypothesis of equal variances for mean (p = 0.68), median (p = 0.81), and 
10% trimmed mean (p = 0.72). Shapiro-Wilk W-test provided some evidence that the data is approximately 
normal (z = 1.468, p = 0.071). 
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Figure 61 recreates the classic graphs of Holt & Laury (2002) with the responses from the 
Imperial Festival as well as the survey in Uganda. The predicted values for a risk-neutral 
position are also plotted as the dashed orange line in Figure 61. By the row number of the risk-
neutral switching point (row 3), just over half of the farmers had switched to B and around 40% 
of the traders had switched to the risky option as well, while nearly ¾ of the London group 
were still in the safe, “A” position. All groups’ means were each significantly different from 
the risk-neutral switching point using a one-sample T-test. These results indicate that on 
average, each group was some degree of risk-averse (* < 0.0001 for all three comparisons).   
 
 
Note: Irrational responses (all A, all B, multiple switching) were excluded from this graph. 
As such, the response rate for A is 100% in row 1 and 0% in row 8 by definition. 
Figure 61: Proportion of safe choices in each row/decision for three populations surveyed 
 
Holt & Laury (2002) had irrational response rates among the students they surveyed of around 
10% depending on the conditions of the game (i.e. the pay-off levels and whether it was played 
for real money or just hypothetically). Tanaka & Munro (2014) had an illogical or irrational 
response rate was of 7.1%. In the present survey, the irrational response rate was much higher. 
A sizable 28% of coffee growers responded irrationally, 25% of coffee traders, and 22% of 
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adults in London responded irrationally as well. The high irrational response rate in London 
could be due to the speed at which the survey was conducted.176 The irrational response rate 
for the farmers was likely driven by educational levels lower on average than those reported 
for a general Ugandan population sample in Tanaka & Munro (2014) as well as a faster and 
less simplified survey design since the choices were administered on one sheet of paper.  
 
Holt & Laury (2002) find that men are slightly less risk averse than women, making 0.5 fewer 
safe choices on average for the risk-aversion design in their paper. The main review article on 
the topic of gender and risk from Eckel & Grossman (2008) also generally finds women are 
more risk-averse than men are. For traders in the present survey, the opposite is found (see 
Figure 62). For traders in the survey, the average switch point was 2.50 ± 0.17 for women and 
3.25 ± 0.16 for men on the original scale of the game with five rows of decisions ( =
−3.14, * = 0.0032).177 A Wilcoxon rank-sum test as well confirmed significant differences 
between male and female risk responses (# = −2.076, * = 0.0379). Female traders were more 
likely to respond with less risk-aversion than male traders were. Interestingly, none of the 
female traders fell into the very risk-averse category, while 23% of men responded in this way 
(see Figure 62). The sample size for women was quite small though with only 20 female traders 
(69 were male). 
 
 
                                               
176
 Respondents were attending a large science festival and only stopping at the booth for 5-10 minutes in order 
to review the research, try a sample of coffee, and participate in the risk survey. 
177
 Two-sample t-test with unequal variances was used. Shapiro-Wilk W-test indicated some evidence of 
normality (p = 0.0998) and Levin’s hypothesis test of equal variances was rejected strongly (p < 0.03).  
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Figure 62: Risk preference responses by gender for traders in survey 
 
Similarly to the traders, female coffee growers appeared to be more risk-seeking than the male 
coffee growers were (see Figure 63). For comparison with the traders, growers’ responses were 
grouped into the same intervals that the traders were able to choose from in their survey 
design.178 Over half of the female coffee growers (53%), fell into the risk-seeking to neutral 
category (compared to 36% for men). However, the differences were only weakly significant. 
The average female switched at row 2.75 ± 0.12, while the average male switched at row 3.11 
± 0.18 ( = −1.72, * = 0.0879).179 A Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggested the differences 
between male and female growers’ risk responses were not significant (# = −1.62, * =
0.105). 
 
                                               
178
 To make the intervals equivalent, growers responses in brackets correspond to traders responses using the 
following: traders’ 1 (1 for growers), 2 (2 and 3), 3 (4 and 5), 4 (6 and 7), and finally 5 (8).  
179
 Two-sample t-test with equal variances was used. Levin’s hypothesis test of equal variances could not be 
rejected (p > 0.22).  
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Figure 63: Risk preference responses by gender for growers in survey 
 
Many studies find evidence of wealth affecting the risk aversion of a respondent (e.g. Yesuf & 
Bluffstone (2009); Rosenzweig & Binswanger (1992); Eswaran & Kotwal (1990)). However, 
some have reported positive correlations and others negative. Unlike these studies, there was 
no evidence for such an effect among the coffee growers in the survey. While Figure 64 does 
suggest that poorer farmers are more risk-averse than their richer counterparts are, the results 
are not robust to tests of statistical significance. The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations 
rank test could not reject the hypothesis that the income groups were from an equivalent 
population (g(2) = 0.164, * = 0.9212).180 Additionally, a two-sample T-test with equal 
variance of the poorest 25% compared to the wealthiest 25% failed to find a significant 
difference in the mean response, any difference was likely due to chance ( * = 0.9125).  
 
                                               
180
 This test was used instead of a one-way ANOVA as normality is not assumed and the risk-aversion measure 
has unequal intervals, but is ordinal.  
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Figure 64: Effect of income percentile (wealth) on risk preferences of coffee growers 
 
Running an ordered logistic regression of the risk-aversion response of growers on the three 
income categories failed to produce significant results (results not shown). Additionally, 
running the same model on the continuous income data instead of the percentile groupings also 
failed to produce significant results on predicting the risk preference response (results not 
shown). Similarly, when the risk-response was retained in the original scale in the grower 
survey from switching at row 2 to 8 (instead of 2 to 5 on the trader survey scale), both measures 
of income failed to provide any ability to predict the risk response.  
 
The results were conclusive that there was no evidence that wealth had an impact on coffee 
growers’ risk preferences. Perhaps this could be due to the similar socio-economic conditions 
of growers compared to other members of society and so there was not enough variation in 
income to lead to wealth having a significant impact on risk-aversion compared to background 
risks. Additional research incorporating the time-preference surveys and further variations in 
pay-outs in different choice environments (similar to alternative games conducted in Tanaka 
& Munro (2014)) could help to better understand the impact of wealth on coffee farmers’ 
responses. It is possible that the wealthier have lower discount rates or less risk-aversion to 
games with loses, but it was not possible to test that with the present survey.  
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For the traders, there was some evidence (see Figure 65) that the self-reported wealthier of the 
traders were more risk-accepting (as expected from previous literature). However, a two-
sample T-test with equal variances comparing the wealthiest traders (above 75th percentile 
income) and the poorest traders (below 25th percentile income) found that the mean responses 
were not significant different at the 10% level ( = 1.548, * = 0.122). A two-sample 
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test did provide some limited evidence of difference at 
the 10% level, but not at the 5% level (# = 1.754, * = 0.0795). The lack of significance was 
likely driven by small sample sizes as the lowest income category had only 14 rational 
respondents and the highest income category had only 21.  
 
 
Figure 65: Effect of income percentile (wealth) on risk preferences of coffee traders 
 
An ordered logistic regression of the risk-aversion measure on the percentile income category 
for traders did produce a marginally significant result for the coefficient on the percentile 
income category variable at the 10% level. The model passed the proportional odds assumption 
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(i.e. parallel regressions assumption).181  Again, with more samples of traders, the results would 
likely be more robust. However, a simple margins plot of the predicted probabilities for 
responding in the first category of the trader survey (“risk-seeking to neutral”) is plotted in 
Figure 66. Richer traders are more likely to respond in the risk-seeking category than their 
poorer counterparts are. The 95% confidence intervals on this result are quite wide likely due 
to the low sample size for each category of income. 
 
  
Figure 66: Predicted proportions from an ordered logistic regression for responding in the most risk-
seeking category (e.g. switching in row 2) of the trader survey by percentile income category 
 
Another metric to estimate the risk-aversion of a respondent is to calculate the number of risky 
choices (called NRC) that they make. Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz (2013) use this measure 
in their experiment as it allows the researcher to calculate a metric of risk-aversion without 
making assumptions about the utility function of the participant. This removes the difficulty of 
                                               
181
 The Brant Test of parallel regression assumption returned χD(2) = 5.32, p = 0.07, the lack of significance at 
the 5% level indicates the assumption has not been violated. An additional test using a likelihood ratio test and 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the coefficients between models could not be rejected at the 5% 
level (p = 0.065). These similar tests both confirm that the assumptions of the model are not violated. 
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understanding an individual who switches multiple times between option A and option B, 
which is inconsistent with a structural risk aversion parameter like CRRA.  
 
The data is present to calculate the NRC for both traders and growers, however, since the 
number of rows in the experimental design differed, it would be difficult to compare the results. 
As such, the NRC was used as a robustness check for the measurement of risk-aversion in the 
regression results on the impact of risk preferences on behaviour (see Chapter 7), but is not 
shown here. Given that the irrational results likely come from people that do not understand 
the game at all and potentially choose randomly, the usefulness of the NRC as a measure of 
risk-aversion is questionable. It would likely bias the results of a predictive regression towards 
zero given the measurement error of the instrument, which may help explain the main lack of 
significant results for many behavioural predictions that Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz 
(2013) tested with the NRC.  
 
To conclude this section, this study finds that coffee growers are more risk-seeking than the 
average Ugandan population given the same risk preferences choices by Tanaka & Munro 
(2014). Around 35% of coffee growers switched at row 2 in the risk preferences game 
corresponding to a “very risk-seeking” preference. Overall though, the average grower was 
neutral to slightly risk-averse (switching just before row 4, the “slightly risk-averse” category). 
The traders were significantly more risk-averse than farmers, switching over 1 row later on 
average. These results are tempered by the fact that traders were presented with an abridged 
version of the survey, but the results appear robust to this methodological detail. Compared to 
the London adults who participated in the game at the Imperial Festival, farmers are certainly 
more risk-seeking. Given the nature of coffee being a high-risk, high-reward crop, it is not 
surprising to find that the growers were less risk-averse than all other groups. It is important to 
emphasize though that on average, the traders, growers, and London festival participants 
measured as some degree of risk-averse, so the point is about degree of risk-aversion.  
 
Comparing men and women, in both trader and grower groups the survey found evidence that 
women were less-risk averse than men. Only for the traders though were the results statistically 
significant. Despite the literature on the impact of wealth on risk-aversion, there was only 
limited evidence that traders with higher incomes were more risk-seeking than their poorer 
counterparts. There was no evidence that wealth had an impact on coffee growers’ risk 
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preferences, however, this could be due to the sub-population being a very similar socio-
economic class.  
 
6.4.3. Coffee market simulation with stable price contract 
One of the advantages of a cooperative or certification scheme is a price premium offered to 
growers (see section 5.5.6). For instance, Fairtrade offers a price floor that guarantees farmers 
a minimal income (Sick, 2008). The coffee trading game attempted to assess to what extent 
growers would prefer a stable price and more certain income from a contract, instead of a 
volatile market price that varied above and below the stable offer (see methodology of game in 
section 6.2.2 on page 220).  
 
The majority of teams (except Team 5) joined with and kept selling to Trader A, who offered 
the contract, throughout all years of the game for at least some of their coffee. Each team 
quickly realized that traders would have different prices and so they would wait until they had 
heard each offer before making a decision. Even when all teams signed the contract with Trader 
A, they still wanted to hear the prices from the other traders. On some teams, members were 
keeping track of the potential money they would have earned by switching out of the contract. 
Compared to the risk-aversion game in the survey, this game was understood better despite it 
being more complex. It was also very effective at generating lots of dialogue among 
participants.  
 
The methodology was modified slightly during the 6th round of the game since the research 
team was unable to get much diversification of strategy from the farmers. For the first five 
rounds, Teams 1, 2, 5, and 6 were all selling the entire lot of their coffee to Trader A. Team 3 
only sold a portion of coffee to a higher priced trader in one year. Only Team 4 was maximizing 
the benefit of a stable-priced contract for half of their annual coffee and then selling the other 
half to the highest-priced trader (the optimum strategy given the uncertainty of the type of year 
and price that would be offered). For the second half of the game, the research team decided to 
test what the farmers’ response would be to Trader A failing to uphold the contract, but making 
promises that the event was a one-off occurrence. This allowed the team to see more 
diversification of responses for the second half of the game.  
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After Trader A violated the contract by only offering to buy half of what was promised (i.e. 25 
kg), teams under contract had disparate responses. Teams 2, 3, and 6 sold Trader A the 25 kg 
of coffee that Trader A would take and then agreed to store their coffee for Trader A until the 
following year when they sold Trader A 175 kg (75kg from the previous year as well as 100 
kg of the current season). Teams 1 and 4, sold Trader A 25kg, but refused to hold onto the 
remaining 75 kg instead selling that to the external trader with the higher price on the market 
at the time (see Table 54 at the end of the section). Both teams then sold to Trader A in year 7, 
which was a “bad” year when Trader A had the highest price anyway.182  
 
However, trust had been broken to some extent. In the final year, when the price on the market 
was higher than the stabilized price, both teams (1 and 4) chose to sell half of their lot of coffee 
to the external trader with the highest price (something neither team had done in any of the 
previous years). Economically, given the last year is a one-shot game, they both should have 
sold the entire lot to the external trader and violated the contract as well since Trader A had 
already broken it previously. Both teams, though, chose not to violate their contract and sold 
50 kg to Trader A.  
 
Team 4 pursued the most optimal strategy for the game of all the teams. They signed the 
contract with Trader A, but would sell the maximum (excluding the first round) to the external 
market when prices were higher than the offer from Trader A. As a result, as shown in Figure 
67 their revenues were the highest up until the last year. The winning team (Team 5) was 
actually the one that defected completely at year 6. Team 5 sold their entire 100kg to the highest 
offer (Trader C) when Trader A reported not being able to buy as much coffee as contracted. 
Team 5 then stored all 100kg of coffee during year 7 (a “bad” year) and subsequently sold all 
of the two-year “production” (200kg) during the ultimate year. While this strategy could have 
been disastrous had the last round been a “bad” year, they managed to win with this gambit.183  
 
                                               
182
 Refer to Table 45 on page 217 to review the design of the game and payouts each year 
183
 See revenues during the game in Table 55 at the end of the section 
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Figure 67: Cumulative revenue of Teams 1 to 6 from coffee trading game 
 
Overall, the trading game demonstrated that farmers have an interest in price stability and 
prefer to take some of the risk out of a coffee market. Whether these results extend to how 
farmers might behave in a real market with an option to join a cooperative with a price contract 
is debatable. However, games have been used recently in various contexts with positive results 
for changing the behaviour of stakeholders and enhancing understanding of systems (Etienne, 
Du Toit & Pollard, 2011; Souchère, Millair, Echeverria, et al., 2010; Le Bars & Le Grusse, 
2008). 
 
Farmers expressed interest in a stable price and the willingness to uphold a contract even when 
the market price for their product is higher. When the contract was violated by Trader A in year 
6, five out of six teams sold the limited amount that the trader was able to buy. In addition, 
three of the six teams followed through with the favour Trader A requested to hold onto year 6 
coffee to sell all to Trader A in year 7. No teams broke the contract prior to Trader A’s violation, 
and only one team broke the contract after Trader A had violated it.  
 
The high rates of adherence to the contract and lack of cheating suggests there is potential for 
a cooperative to structure payments to farmers upon a guaranteed price for their coffee. The 
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advantages for the farmer are to remove some of the price risk from coffee production; for the 
cooperative, there is a potential upside from market swings. A large enough cooperative could 
hedge their exposure using futures and options on the LIFFE in London—something 
impossible for an individual farmer. A market-based approach like this may be able to achieve 
the same ends that NGOs cite of the benefits to farmers that came from stable prices before 
liberalisation.184 It also might achieve the same goals of income and consumption smoothing 
as micro-savings programs, which are encouraged by development organizations. Mitigating 
some of the risk of the high-risk, high-return nature of coffee production, may also encourage 
poorer farmers to participate. Several studies find that poorer farmers typically lose potential 
income due to focusing on low-risk, low-return agricultural production (Dercon, 2002; Elamin 
& Rogers, 1992; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1990; Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 1992; Yesuf & 
Bluffstone, 2009). However, whether such a business model could be financially viable needs 
further study. Additionally, a major threat to the business model is farmers’ selling coffee 
outside the cooperative in good years and buying third-party coffee to sell as their own to the 
cooperative in bad years. Mechanisms to ensure compliance need investigation, as these issues 
may be very difficult to overcome. 
 
There are several limitations to the game beyond the usual caveats about stated behaviour 
differing from actual decisions (Nyarko & Schotter, 2002; Hill, 2009). (1) The teams of farmers 
could have believed that the game had a “right” answer and the researchers were looking for 
them to agree to a contract. The incentive for winning the cash prize should have mitigated this 
behaviour. (2) Farmers could have been influenced by the personality of Trader A. Trader A 
may have been more influential than Trader B or C. Again, the cash prize incentive should 
have made teams more objective, but in the future, it would be useful to play the game multiple 
times with survey team members changing roles. (3) Farmers likely learned during the rounds 
and may perform differently had the game been played a second time. Teams may have choose 
to sign a contract out of uncertainty about the mechanisms of the game. While the re-signing 
of the contract in the 5th year tried to limit this bias, playing multiple times would have been 
beneficial. (4) The game did not simulate production risk (i.e. teams had a guaranteed 100kg 
to sell each year), which limited the realism of the simulation. Future research is discussed in 
the next section, building on these ideas.
                                               
184
 See further discussion on the changes after liberalisation in Appendix A.26 starting on page 422 
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Table 54: Volumes sold by team (1-5) and by trader (A, B, and C) 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6  
YEAR A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1 100    100   100   80  20 100   100   
2 100    100   70 30  100   100   100   
3 100    100   100   100   100   100   
4 100    100   100   50  50 100   100   
5 100    100   100   50  50 100   100   
6 25  75 25   25   25  75    100 25   
7 100    175   175   100       175   
8/9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
10 50   50 100     100     50   50 0   200 100     
TOTALS 675  125 800   770 30  555  245 500  300 800   
 
Table 55: Revenue in 1,000s Ugandan Shillings by team (1-5)  and by trader (A, B, and C) 
  1   2   3   4   5   6  
YEAR A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1 180   180   180   144  47 180   180   
2 180   180   126 43  180   180   180   
3 180   180   180   180   180   180   
4 180   180   180   90  126 180   180   
5 180   180   180   90  117 180   180   
6 45  176 45   45   45  176   234 45   
7 180   315   315   180      315   
8/9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
10 90  117 180   180   90  117 -  468 180   
TOTALS 1,215  293 1,440   1,386 43  999  583 900  702 1,440   
SUM 1,508   1,440   1,429   1,582   1,602   1,440   
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6.5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This chapter contributes empirical results in three different contexts of risk beliefs and 
preferences for stakeholders in the Ugandan Robusta coffee supply chain. The first (1) is a 
comparison on stakeholder views at different levels of the supply chain on priority pests and 
diseases of Robusta coffee. The research found that the top two priority pests were widely 
agreed to be BTB and CWD throughout the stakeholder hierarchy. These two afflictions had 
entered the country from poor SPS regulations at the border with DR Congo. There was 
information prioritization further from production in the supply chain; many interviewees at 
export firms and NGO contacts only reported the top two pests/diseases as issues for farmers. 
Traders and growers had slightly different priorities as well. Traders ranked RBD and CBB 
much higher than Buikwe farmers who reported the severity of RMB as a higher concern. 
Likely this is due to differing priorities: farmers worry about the tree dying from RMB, while 
traders are concerned about the quality and weight loss from CBB and RBD that impacts their 
profits on kase. This difference also reflects that traders typically pay an average price to a 
farmer for the coffee without thorough inspection of the sack of coffee being sold. 
Consequently, the farmer is not incentivized to care about reducing RBD or CBB so long as 
the infestation is below some detection threshold when the trader has a cursory glance in the 
coffee sack at the point of sale.  
 
Due to their position as intermediaries visiting many different plots, traders were the most 
informed on all five pests and diseases of the Uganda Robusta production system. Every 
participant in the survey (both trader and grower) claimed to have experience with CWD. For 
the other four pests and diseases, though, traders claimed to be familiar with all pests and 
diseases at significantly higher rates than the growers surveyed. Compared to growers, traders 
of agricultural commodities are understudied. Their knowledge of the market as well as 
production puts them in a unique position. Traders deserve a more dedicated research agenda 
especially in their role in mixing coffee from different farms, contributing to an average quality 
source of coffee (see further discussion on quality challenges in section 7.3 in Chapter 7).  
 
The results from the risk-aversion game (2) revealed that traders were more risk-averse than 
the growers in Buikwe and Kayunga Districts were. Growers measured on average as “slightly 
risk-averse” while traders were “moderately risk-averse”. Compared to Tanaka & Munro 
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(2014) coffee growers appeared to be more risk-seeking. This is likely explained by self-
selection into the high-risk nature of coffee production (Hill, 2009; Tanaka & Munro, 2014).  
 
Not all researchers have found positive results using risk preferences from HL experiments, 
and some question the usefulness of the methodology. Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz (2013) 
conclude based on their results and literature review that “lottery choices are a poor candidate 
for predicting real-world farming behaviour”. They found that the results from a classic HL 
design experiment were poor at predicting farm behaviour in terms of taking insurance, 
diversifying crop mix, and having off-farm income, which they argued should be strongly 
influenced by risk-aversion (Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz, 2013). This counters the 
findings of Barsky, Juster, Kimball, et al. (1997), whose study of health and retirement 
decisions, as well as the study by Knight, Weir & Woldehanna (2003) in the agricultural sector, 
which showed that stated risk preferences do correlate with risk taking behaviour. Similarly, 
the general results of the highly cited work of Nyarko & Schotter (2002) show that stated beliefs 
can be used to predict actual behaviour. The effect of the risk-aversion score on the decisions 
growers made on their plots will be analysed in Chapter 7. 
 
Finally, the results of the coffee market simulation (3) found that farmers preferred to reduce 
price risk exposure through a stable secure price contact. They also adhered to the contract 
even in years with higher market prices. The methodology of the coffee trading game 
demonstrated the potential use of games to elicit information on how farmers and traders 
perceive the benefits of stable prices and react to market conditions. The game is rudimentary 
though and in need of several methodological improvements before being used more widely.  
 
Three improvements should be piloted in future studies with the simulation. (1) The game could 
be more useful with an investment component that incorporated protection against risks from 
pests and diseases as well as planting of new seedlings. The teams should have the ability to 
allocate some percentage of their revenue (perhaps as a portion of the crop) into an 
“investment” in good practices on the farm. This could be one of the three main practices 
measured in the HH survey (i.e. weeding/pruning, fertilizing, and spraying). Perhaps each of 
these could have uncertain benefits as well which would cause the teams to discuss which one 
is worth investment. Additionally, farmers should have the ability to expand their coffee 
production capacity by buying seedlings. (2) The bad years could have been more variable 
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between teams and given a context beyond pricing. It would have been interesting to see the 
farmers’ responses to high prices, but low volumes due to a pest incident and see if their 
investment behaviour would change after such an incident in a bad year. Lastly, (3) it would 
be worthwhile to incorporate the decision to process coffee to kase by milling on their own as 
a team or perhaps in negotiation with another team to get a high enough volume to be economic 
to transport to the mill. This would have added an extra layer of complexity to the game, but 
possibly could elicit the reasons that farmers are reluctant to work together to bulk their coffee 
and self-process from kiboko to kase, which has a higher value per kg.  
 
Ultimately, the game was reduced in complexity for simplicity. As a pilot survey, the author 
was unsure how well the game would be understood by farmers and traders. Given the 
simplified, but realistic nature of the game, understanding was very high and the game could 
be made more complicated in a future study to incorporate some additional components 
suggested above.   
270 
 
 Income Diversification and Decision-making 
 
Understanding the drivers of agricultural decisions has been a topic of much research since the 
1970s (see literature review, section 7.1). In recent decades—largely since the 1990s—the role 
of social connections and the people farmers consult when making decisions has received more 
attention among both researchers and development professionals.185 As shown in Table 56, 
producing coffee involves many decisions at various steps during the season.  
 
Table 56: Coffee lifecycle with decision points as elucidated by discussions at group workshop at RASD 
Coffee Production Stage Example Decisions 
Investment 
 
• How many seedlings to plant? 
• How much of total plot to devote to coffee? 
• Intercrop coffee with other crops? 
Growth 
 
• What type of fertilizer to use, if any? 
• Use pre-emptive pesticide treatments? 
Treatment 
 
• Use pesticide treatments on present pests/disease? 
• Prune infected branches? 
• Remove dead or diseased trees? 
Harvest 
 
• Selectively harvest ripe berries or strip the tree? 
• Sell “wet” cherry straight off tree? 
Processing 
 
• Dry coffee cherries on the ground or tarp? 
• Keep chickens and other contaminates out of coffee 
drying area? 
• Store dried cherries or sell immediately? 
Sale 
 
• Sell dried cherry or take to processing mill to 
remove husk? 
• Sell to mobile trader or take to town store? 
 
Coffee production begins with investment at the beginning of the cycle. Next treatment 
decisions are made before harvest. Lastly, the timing of the harvest, the level of coffee bean 
                                                
185
 See the review by Woolcock & Narayan (2000) and a recent summary of network analysis used to study 
export performance in the developing world by experts at the World Bank (Raj & Arvis, 2014).  
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processing, and whom to sell to must be decided by the grower (see Table 56). At various 
points during this process, farmers have the opportunity to consult other farmers, input 
suppliers, extension agents, and/or national agencies like the UCDA. They also likely will be 
influenced by their personal tolerance for risk and alternative income sources available to them. 
Each of these decisions points—and the networks of contacts farmers consult for each 
decision—should influence the design of policy in order to effectively implement a control 
strategy for a given pest or disease.  
 
Once a farmer is confronted with an outbreak of a pest on her farm, what does she do about it? 
The research aim of this chapter was to see what determines investment in new seedlings and 
in activities meant to prevent production losses. It is likely that factors such as plot size, portion 
of plot devoted to coffee, the importance of coffee as an income source, ability to switch to 
alternative crops, and other characteristics of the farming household will influence decisions 
on the coffee plot. Of relevance for SPS policy, one important factor for generating more 
accurate damage estimates from foreign pests/diseases is how a farmer changes effort devoted 
to the crop after an incident. It is important to understand who carries on producing after a 
significant loss from disease and who exits the market in favour of other cash-generating 
activities.  
 
Based on the findings in the literature (section 7.1) on the importance of social networks, 
section 7.2.1 presents analysis of the number of social connections farmers report consulting 
for coffee management advice. The impact of these social networks on choice of processing 
level of coffee sold (e.g. kiboko or mwanyi mbisi) is examined for different social groups. 
Section 7.2.3 assesses what factors predict weeding, fertilizing, pruning, and pesticide use on 
the coffee plot. Additionally, given the low rates of following best practices for these 
behaviours, the self-reported barriers to adoption are examined. The first part of section 7.2.4 
summarizes the other crops, livestock, and income-generating activities reported by coffee 
farmers. Subsequently in the section, the drivers of being involved in other income-generating 
activities are examined, including the risk-aversion survey results that were discussed in 
Chapter 6 (section 6.4.2). The expectation is that both wealthier and more risk-averse farmers 
should have higher income stream diversity. Section 7.2.5 estimates the probability that a 
farmer will abandon/exit coffee production based on household and personal characteristics. 
The farmer’s view on the fair price for their product is included as an explanatory variable in 
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the models as well, building on the work in section 5.5.7 of Chapter 5. It is very difficult to 
measure exit from an industry in a survey because often the identification method of eligibility 
to participate in the survey (e.g. growing coffee in this case) automatically excludes those that 
have quit production of the crop. While it was not possible in this survey to measure exit from 
the coffee industry, the lack of planting seedlings in the past five years while reporting heavy 
disease incidence was used as a proxy for no longer investing in coffee production (i.e. exit of 
industry and abandonment of coffee production). A qualitative anecdote of one farmer who 
abandon coffee production is given in Appendix A.24 to enrich these quantitative results. 
 
Achieving a better understanding of the characteristics that drive behaviour of farmers will help 
generate more accurate models of economic loses and market impacts after a pest/disease 
incident. Illuminating the incentive structure and decision-making of coffee farmers could also 
improve policy design for interventions meant to prevent catastrophic changes in coffee supply 
when disease prevalence spikes. As discussed in the Appendix (section A.25.4 on page 421), 
there is large annual variability in Ugandan coffee exports. Much of this is attributed to yield 
loss from disease; however, likely a sizable part is due to some farmers choosing to enter or 
abandon coffee production and changes to the effort they devote to coffee. The findings of this 
chapter demonstrate the importance of considering farmers’ opinions and social connections 
when estimating their likelihood of abandonment of production after a disease or pest shock.  
 
7.1. DECISION-MAKING ON THE FARM, ASSETS, AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
The framework presented below in Figure 68  draws upon the work of several theoretical 
decision-making models applied to farmers (Rajagopalan, Rasheed & Datta, 1993; Mumford 
& Norton, 1984; Simon, 1959; Errington, 1986; Rantamäki-Lahtinen, 2009). Recall the 
discussion in section 5.4.  
 
In the grey ovals of Figure 68 are the variables measured in the HH survey of farmers that are 
used to proxy the factors of the conceptual framework for decision-making. Figure 68 
highlights the decision to stay in or abandon coffee production, which is analysed in more detail 
in section 7.2.5. In addition, the following sections of 7.2 explore what drivers from the 
framework affect various decisions on the plot, from implementing GAPS to growing other 
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crops. This work is more exploratory in nature to see which factors seem to have the strongest 
predictive power on the various decisions coffee farmers need to make.  
 
 
Figure 68: Conceptual framework of coffee farmer decision-making with measurement variables 
included from HH survey (grey ovals) 
 
While there are many characteristics of farmers that will be explored to determine how they 
affect decisions, on the “Information” category of Figure 68 the only variable used is a farmer’s 
response to the number of social connections they consult in decision-making about coffee. 
The importance of social networks as information sources and factors heavily influencing 
decisions has been shown in the empirical literature. Social networks play a role in problem 
detection and options awareness. In farming, Lunneryd & Öhlmér (2006) find empirical 
evidence that dairy farmers that were more connected to other peers were more sensitive to 
issue detection on their farm and knew more about how to respond to them. Interestingly, the 
variables they used to express information access were not significant as compared to the one 
used for “cooperation with fellow farmers”; it appeared that peer connections were a more 
useful source for problem detection (Lunneryd & Öhlmér, 2006). Hansson (2007) found that 
farmers who participated in “peer study circles” and who made decisions in discussion with a 
partner were more efficient dairy producers. Rantamäki-Lahtinen (2009) shows that more 
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dense informational networks formed from social connections of a farmer were correlated with 
higher resources on the farm and higher profitability. Similarly in a wide-ranging study of 
farmland abandonment in the EU, the lack of access to advice and support from a network of 
growers led to higher likelihood of farming abandonment (Terres, Nisini & Anguiano, 2013). 
Shared decision-making and the importance of who the decision-maker consults has been 
shown in other fields as well (e.g. medical decision-making (Hanson, 2008)). Given the 
empirical evidence in the literature, it was expected that Ugandan coffee growers who 
consulted their peers more often would be more aware of how to respond to pests and the price 
to sell their coffee, as well as, be less likely to abandon coffee production. 
 
Theoretically, a discussion of decision-making in the context of relationships that link the 
farmer to a wider group is grounded in the work on social capital by Coleman (1989), Putnam 
(1995), and Bourdieu (1986). All of these authors have different conceptions of social capital 
as explained in detail by Sutherland & Burton (2011). Two of the authors, Putnam (1995) and 
Coleman (1989), build their social capital frameworks on institutional relationships and formal 
obligations. These institutions form the basis by which people can build a sense of community. 
Especially for Putnam (1995), social capital is built and reflected by memberships in parent-
teacher associations, labour unions, religious institutions, and other forms of civic engagement. 
These are arguably not as applicable to a rural farming context in a developing country. In the 
Ugandan context, bartering and building of relationships based on clan as well as family groups 
are very common especially in the village setting. Instead of trust based on institutions and 
formal obligations, these exchanges of favours or goods often rely on trust that is made through 
both a history of past exchange with the individual and a history built from the actions of the 
person’s close-ties (e.g. family or clan members). Sutherland & Burton (2011) explains that in 
a rural context, farmers exchange resources usually in the form of machinery and labour. These 
exchanges rely on the previous development of social capital which promote feelings of trust 
and obligations (e.g. like the obligation to help a family member that is in need).  
 
In the context of Bourdieu (1986), it is the ability of an individual to use their credential from 
a member group to exchange types of capital—trading social capital for economic capital for 
instance through a loan or borrowing of equipment. The amount of capital (economic, social, 
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and cultural186) an individual can leverage is dependent, to an extent, on their social network 
of connections. This would suggest that farmers that have more social ties might have better 
access to accurate pricing information, can leverage others’ knowledge of pests (and borrow 
spraying equipment if necessary), and could rely on their network for economic capital to invest 
in improving agricultural production. Section 7.2.1 tests some of these potential outcomes from 
social capital with the results from the HH survey of growers.   
 
Previous research has shown that where farmers go for information before they make decisions 
matters. Williamson, Little, Ali, et al. (2003) surveyed rice farmers in Kenya and India to 
understand the information that guides pesticide usage. They find that untrained farmers spray 
based on recommendations of the pesticide dealer, while those that had insecticide training 
made more decisions based on their own assessment. Additionally, trained groups had very 
different beliefs about the potential damage and risks presented by different pests (Williamson, 
Little, Ali, et al., 2003). Similarly, in a survey of farmers in Ghana, Ntow, Gijzen, Kelderman, 
et al. (2006) find those with less training tend to over use and inappropriately use hazardous 
pesticides. In a key piece of work on social learning in the American Economic Review, Conley 
& Udry (2010) finds evidence that pineapple farmers in Ghana learn about the performance of 
inputs through their relationships and update their own behaviour in the subsequent season.  
 
In the absence of an expert opinion, farmers also may rely on peers to inform their choices. 
Heong & Escalada (1999) find that rice farmers in the Philippines when making spraying 
decisions were most influenced by chemical company agents, but also by extension agents, 
spouses, neighbours, and village leaders (in that order of importance). To the author’s 
knowledge, there is a lack of empirical work on the effect of social connections on value 
addition to a crop before it is sold. It is hypothesized that farmers that are more connected to 
others in the village will be more aware of how to take advantage of the market opportunity in 
further processing coffee (i.e. will add the most value by going from selling mwanyi mbisi to 
kiboko to kase).  
 
                                               
186
 Cultural capital is defined by Bourdieu (1986) as existing in three states: embodied, objectified, and 
institutionalized. The idea is generally the capital that an individual attains from cultural goods like books, 
marks of distinction such as educational achievement, and “long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body” that 
come from one’s social status, work, and upbringing. While cultural capital is important, the focus of 
subsequent sections is on the relationship between economic and social capital.  
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7.2. ANALYSES OF UGANDA ROBUSTA GROWERS’ DECISION-MAKING 
 
Analyses presented in the following sections are based on data collected from the HH survey.187 
Part of the discussion in sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5 is informed by the workshop in Nkokonjeru.188 
In addition to the questions already examined in Chapter 6 about fairness and supply chains, 
groups at the workshop were also asked to discuss the following questions: 
 
1. What other crops can you grow with coffee? 
2. What crops could you grow instead of coffee? 
3. What crops have you considered growing for income, but have not yet tried?  
4. With the plot you currently have, what are the limitations to coffee production? 
 
The groups’ answers to questions (1) and (3) were particularly useful to highlight growers’ 
willingness to try new crops. The answers also highlighted the recent experience growers have 
with abandoning crops that they believe are no longer worth producing. These results are 
further examined in section 7.2.5.  
 
7.2.1. Social networks of farmers in Buikwe and Kayunga 
One implication following the literature review in section 7.1 is that farmers who are more 
connected with stronger social ties should have access to more economic capital. Farmers with 
more economic capital should also be able to invest more effectively in their farms and produce 
greater output—or at least weather shocks more effectively—than farmers without a strong 
social capital base to lean on.   
 
The theoretical underpinnings of social capital would predict that individuals rely more on 
close tie networks where social capital has been built and common cultural capital is 
established more strongly than weaker tie networks (Bourdieu, 1986). In Buikwe and Kayunga 
districts, the survey found in practice this was true for coffee growers. Farmers were asked who 
they consult for advice when making coffee farming decisions (see question 14 of grower 
                                               
187
 Review survey methodology in Chapter 5, section 5.3.5, starting on page 167. 
188
 Review workshop methodology in Chapter 5, section 5.3.3, starting on page 164. 
277 
 
survey in Appendix A.19). Based on suggestions from RASD as well as previous literature189 
the seven types of social connections asked about were: spouse, friend, neighbour, community 
leader, extension officer, buyer/trader, and input supplier (see Figure 69).  
 
 
Figure 69: Proportion of growers who ask the given social connection for advice when making on-farm 
decisions for coffee 
 
As shown above in Figure 69, the vast majority (85%) of farmers consulted at least one of their 
social connections when making decisions on their plot (see “Any” category). The further that 
tie was away from the family unit, the less the person seemed to be consulted on average. While 
farmers are most likely to make decisions with their spouse, they are far less likely to engage 
with an input supplier or trader. The friend, spouse, or neighbour might have the best interests 
of the individual in mind when providing advice, but that is less clear for the input supplier 
who has an incentive to sell product or the trader who wants to give a lower price.  
 
                                               
189
  Social connections were examined in several field-based studies (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Sutherland & 
Burton, 2011; Dercon, 2002). 
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The low rank of the extension agent in the survey reflected the qualitative results from in-
person interviews with experts in the area. NAADS—while the official extension arm of the 
government and often a provider of seedlings when sponsored by a political campaign (see 
section 7.2.5)—does not engage with farmers very often or very deeply as best as the researcher 
could determine. The Managing Director of Exporter B (interviewee #10) with decades of 
experience in the Ugandan coffee supply chain said simply that NAADS “do nothing to train 
farmers” and have “very little impact” (personal conversation). Similarly, while traders may 
engage with farmers more frequently to buy coffee, they were not consulted frequently for 
decision-making. Most farmers reported that they would sell to anyone who came down the 
road on a bicycle or motorcycle buying coffee. Growers often believed that traders were 
making much more money than they were and so the level of trust seemed to be quite low for 
most farmers interviewed.190 Alternatively, for the input suppliers the low percentage grower 
consultation is most likely due to the low levels of inputs use by smallholders in the survey 
(see Figure 73 in section 7.2.3 below).  
 
Gender did play some role in farmers’ use of social ties (see Figure 70). Males appear to consult 
various social ties more on average than female growers do. The responses for the use of each 
of the seven social ties were checked for statistical significance between genders. The results 
on the tests of independence including a Fisher’s Exact test191 are reported below in Table 57.  
 
                                               
190
 The majority of traders were wealthier than the typical growers as discussed in the summary statistics for 
traders in Chapter 6 section 6.3.2. 
191
 Fisher’s Exact test is used for small samples, which inevitably may have low frequencies of counts in one or 
more cells of a 2x2 contingency table. All of the social variables had counts of at least 5 in each cell of the 
contingency table with gender, but Fischer’s Exact test results are reported for completeness and robustness to 
the question of violating the large sample assumption of the χ2 test.  
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Table 57: Tests of independence between male and female responses on use of social connections for 
coffee decision-making 
Social 
Connection 
MeanŦ  * − 	 
M F 
 Proportion 
test χ2  test 
Fisher’s 
Exact test 
      Spouse+ 0.86 0.74  0.1798 0.180 0.262 
   Neighbour 0.53 0.38  0.0984* 0.098* 0.128 
   Neighbour+ 0.61 0.40  0.0692* 0.069* 0.111 
      Leader 0.47 0.28  0.0429** 0.043** 0.050** 
      Leader+ 0.47 0.33  0.2115  0.211 0.250 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Shown in the table are only social connections with * < 0.10 from χ2 test of 
independence between male and female groups for the given social connection 
in the full survey sample (74 females, 45 males). 
Ŧ Mean indicates the proportion of each group saying “yes” 
+ Married only sub-sample (42 females, 35 males) 
 
 
Figure 70: Social connections that growers ask advice from for decision-making varies by gender 
 
As shown in Table 57, in the full survey sample, male coffee growers were more likely to 
respond that they discussed coffee plot decisions with leaders in the community. There was 
marginal significance (* < 0.10) suggesting that males were more likely to consult their 
neighbours, which was a bit stronger for the married sample of coffee farmers, but still not 
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significant at * < 0.05.192 There was also strong evidence in the full survey sample that male 
coffee growers are more likely to consult a leader in the community for advice on producing 
coffee (* < 0.05). However, this effect was driven by single women that do not go to a leader 
for advice; as such for married coffee growers, there was no significant difference by gender 
about who consults a community leader (final row Table 57). Despite the explanations from 
expert interviews (interviewee #1) that women may feel ownership over the coffee plot and 
therefore would not consult their husbands, married men and women consult their spouses at 
statistically the same rate (see row 1 of Table 57).  
 
The results above concerning gender suggest that the main differences in consultation with 
social connections are that single, female coffee farmers are quite different from the rest of the 
coffee growers. Just over 1/3 of all single female growers reported that they do not go to any 
social connections for advice (see Figure 71). This is significantly higher than reported for 
males or married females where only 8% of all those surveyed reported consulting no one for 
advice. The mean number of social connections for single females was 2 on average, while for 
the other group the mean number of social connections was 3.193, 194  
 
                                               
192
 Interestingly, married individuals are marginally more likely to consult their neighbours than single 
individuals (χ2 test, p=0.056), but overall, married and non-married individuals had statistically the same 
patterns of use of social connections for coffee production advice (results not shown). 
193
 These means were significantly different given a two-sample T-test with unequal variances (: = ;. ;Xh) 
194
 The mean for single females would have been lower without the spike of women reporting having 5 social 
connections which they go to for advice. There was no obvious distinction from the data collected to suggest 
why these six women reported having so many avenues of advice as compared to the other single women 
interviewed. 
281 
 
 
Figure 71: Number of social connections for coffee advice by gender/marital status 
 
If the number of consulted social connections shows the ability of an individual to leverage 
social capital, one would expect those with fewer social connections to be more constrained in 
their ability to improve coffee production. The inability to rely on a social network for advice, 
labour, credit or machinery, may both make the individual more susceptible to risks and less 
able to respond to them.  
 
As shown in section 5.5.7 (Chapter 5), farmers who dry their coffee before selling it earn a 
higher price from the coffee than those who sell the wet cherry. Additionally, drying the coffee 
on the ground—as opposed to on a tarp, raised platform, or concrete slab as UCDA 
recommends as best practice—results in a lower price on average. Unfortunately for the single 
women group of the survey, they did both of the detrimental practices more often than men or 
married women (see Figure 72). 195  
                                               
195
 One single woman did not respond to this question on drying method and two responded that they did a 
mixture of both tarp and ground. The three respondents are not included for this analysis on drying method. 
There was one male who did not respond to the question on drying method choice and was excluded. In total 23 
farmers reported selling both dry coffee and sometimes selling wet coffee when in need of cash. Given that 
many farmers who report selling just dry coffee might as well sell wet if desperate, those that sold both were 
counted for the portion that they sold as dry. Thus “wet cherry” reflects the farmers that always sell wet cherry 
and reported never selling any dried coffee during the year.  
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Figure 72: Processing method before sale differs for single females in the survey 
 
Nearly half (48%) of the single females surveyed sold only wet cherry—that is coffee that is 
sold directly off the tree without any drying or processing. While for males and married women, 
only roughly 1/3 (34%) sold wet cherry (see Figure 72). Of those 66% of men and married 
women who sold dry coffee (kiboko), around 70% (or 45% of the group total) chose to dry the 
coffee on a tarp or platform complying with what is considered best practice and yielding the 
highest price for coffee. While less than 1/3 of those men and married women that sold dry 
coffee made the decision to dry on the ground (21% of group total), which results in poorer 
quality coffee. For the single women who did dry their coffee before selling it (52% of group 
total), nearly half dried their coffee on the ground (representing 24% of the total group of single 
women—see Figure 72).  
 
The choice on how to process coffee before selling it to a trader can be modelled as a set of 
two choices (sell wet, or sell coffee dried on the ground) against the base choice (the best 
practice in this case: coffee dried on a tarp or platform). The results of Table 58 show that the 
decision to sell coffee immediately when wet is more likely for those with no social 
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connections, regardless of gender (which was not significant). Based on interviews, the 
decision to sell mwanyi mbisi is often done out of need for an immediate supply of cash for 
household expenses (see next section, 7.2.2). Thus, it is not surprising that those without a 
social network to rely on would be more likely to sell wet coffee. Beyond the need for cash, 
without consulting a larger network of people the grower might be less aware of the financial 
implications of the decision or potentially, the ease at which dry coffee can be processed and 
sold. The results in the second column show that as soon as a grower is talking to at least one 
other social connection, the extent of their network (the extent of social connections, measured 
in the “social” term in the table) is irrelevant to the decision between selling wet coffee and the 
best practice of coffee dried on a tarp.  
 
Table 58: Multinomial logit model of gender and social connection impact on coffee processing choice 
prior to sale.  
 (1) (2) 
Wet cherry   
gender -0.133 -0.158 
 (0.445) (0.437) 
is social -1.740**  
 (0.822)  
social  -0.145 
  (0.0978) 
Dry (ground)   
gender -1.186** -1.173** 
 (0.592) (0.596) 
is social -1.777**  
 (0.869)  
social  -0.227* 
  (0.132) 
Dry (tarp/other) (base)  
Observations 114 114 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
	"	 - Male is recorded as 1 and base 0 is female 
  - Binary variable if the grower reported consulting at least one person 
 - Count variable of the number of social connections grower reported 
 
Given the choice between drying on a tarp or on the ground, gender and number of social 
connections appeared to be strong drivers (review Table 58). Females were much more likely 
to dry on the ground instead of a tarp. Talking to at least one social connection decreased the 
probability that a grower would sell wet coffee (mwanyi mbisi). The more connections a grower 
conferred with seemed to drive the grower to dry on a tarp or platform (see social coefficient 
in column (2)). The anecdotal reasons for selling mwanyi mbisi are explored in the next section.  
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7.2.2. Reasons for selling wet coffee 
Interviews with NGO A’s Executive Director (interviewee #1) highlighted the challenges 
farmers face with managing a cash crop in a cash-scarce setting. Often farmers need to pick 
their crop early and sell for whatever price they can get because of a bill that comes up, or an 
immediate need for food. While the majority of the farmers surveyed seem to eat three meals 
per day and did not report hunger, food security has a strong connection to the ability of a 
farmer to make the appropriate decisions to maximize wealth generation. If someone is more 
food secure and has other crops or livestock to depend upon, they can wait until coffee is ripe 
to harvest (personal conversation, interviewee #1).  
 
Others interviewed argued that the behaviour to strip the coffee tree and sell wet coffee was 
not out of desperation, but was perhaps an optimal decision to prevent theft. Exporter B’s 
Regional Sustainability Manager (interviewee #8) said that many farmers worry about losing 
their coffee both to in-house theft from older children or neighbours stealing cherries. In the 
survey as well, several farmers reported coffee being stolen either by children or by others at 
night.196 The degree to which losses to children compare to pests/diseases was not addressed, 
but previous studies in Pakistan orchards confirm that theft can amount to a serious loss for 
growers (Hai, Stonehouse, Poswal, et al., 2003).  
 
Coffee drying can take two weeks. As such, selling coffee cherries right off the trees, one also 
does not have to worry about thieves stealing the drying coffee and will get immediate cash. 
One surveyed farmer explained that when the children needed school fees she simply told them 
to go pick some coffee and earn their fees. One can pick and sell on the same day. Those who 
sold both wet and dry suggested they did so to balance immediate needs for cash along with 
longer-term investments when they would dry and store coffee.  
 
The Project Manager for Exporter A (interviewee #2) discussed that some farmers sell the ripe 
cherries because in actuality they have already sold the coffee as an option once the tree had 
produced flowers. Some traders will pay farmers in advance to “book” the coffee still on the 
tree as flowers. Either the trader will then come collect off the tree, or the farmer will harvest 
when it is ripe and give the coffee to the trader to repay the debt (personal conversation, 
                                               
196
 Growers often reported theft as an additional “pest” to the pests/diseases discussed in the HH survey. 
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interviewee #2). The trader takes on a high degree of production risk and as a result, the farmer 
often gets a much lower price for the coffee. The only advantage for the farmer is immediate 
cash and lower risk of loses due to pests and disease.  
 
7.2.3. On farm practices for coffee plot 
While there are a myriad of decisions that could be explored in the survey, the three practices 
analysed were (1) the choice to fertilize or not, (2) the choice to do any type of spraying197, and 
(3) whether the farmer implemented Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) that NAADS and 
NGOs often recommend. While fertilization with manure is a GAP, what is meant by GAPs in 
this context is implementing any of the following:  
1. Pruning of the coffee tree to remove dead branches 
2. Weeding (often called “slashing” locally) 
3. Removing dead trees from the plot 
4. Removing and burning branches infested with BTB 
5. Uprooting and burning dead trees infected by CWD or infested by BTB198  
 
It was expected that farmers with more wealth or larger plots of coffee would be more likely 
to engage in behaviours that are thought to improve coffee production (i.e. fertilizing, spraying, 
and implementing GAPs). However, there was little variation in practices by coffee plot size 
until the 75th percentile (2 ha) and larger plots of farms (see Figure 73). Growers that had less 
than two hectares followed the three practices on the farm at approximately the same rates.  
 
Overall, around 70% of farmers in Buikwe and Kayunga pruned their gardens, removed dead 
trees, or did one of many things to treat pests and diseases in accordance with GAPs. Around 
50% of the farmers fertilized. However, for the growers that had the largest coffee plots of all 
those surveyed, they chose to follow all three practices at higher rates. Despite the appearance 
of difference between top and bottom quartiles, a two-sample test of proportions found no 
significant difference in adoption rates for any of the practices (results not shown).  
 
 
                                               
197
 Spraying was the term used locally and included insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides. 
198
 While practice (1) and (4) as well as (3) and (5) only differ by burning the branches, they were coded 
separately for future work investigating the impact of burning on preventing spread of BTB. 
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Note: Graphs by percentile coffee plot size, <=0.5 ha is below 25th percentile, and >2 ha 
is above 75th percentile (n=119). 
Figure 73: Proportion of growers following practices on the plot by coffee plot size 
 
  
Figure 74: Growers’ reported importance of coffee to their total income by coffee plot size 
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While not statistically significant, an explanation of this result could be that a plot of >2 ha of 
coffee starts representing the primary crop for a grower. The grower engages more in practices 
that will have an impact on yields, but have a financial and labour cost for the primary crop. 
There also could be a fixed cost of “effort” to coffee management, which prevents many 
growers with smaller plots from investing in coffee maintenance. Figure 74 demonstrates that 
for 2/3 of farmers with more than 2 ha of coffee, they self-report that coffee represents more 
than half of their income source.199 
 
Unlike plot size, income had significant effects on adoption of practices. Richer growers were 
more likely to fertilize and spray for pests, but they were less likely to implement GAPs on 
their plot (see Figure 75). In the survey, 81% ± 6.8% of growers in the poorest quartile 
implemented GAPs, but only 43% ± 9.0% in the highest income quartile did by a two-sample 
test of proportions (# = 3.0886, * = 0.0020). For fertilizing, 34% ± 8.4% of growers in the 
lowest income quartile did, but only 65% ± 8.6% in the poorest quartile did (# = −2.3924, * =
0.0167). Lastly, while 6% ± 4.3% of the poorest quartile reported spraying and 16%  ± 6.6% 
of the richest quartile reported spraying, the results were not statistically different (# =
−1.2474, * = 0.2123). 
 
The explanation for the difference in following GAPs and using fertilizer is likely that richer 
farmers chose not to engage as often in labour-intensive practices like pruning, but do engage 
in practices that require a higher expense or owning high-cost assets like cattle (e.g. cattle 
manure was the most common natural fertilizer utilized by coffee growers).  
 
                                               
199
 No farmer with more than 2 ha claimed that coffee was his/her sole income source. Likely, it takes a certain 
amount of wealth to have at least 2 ha of coffee and most farmers with that amount of wealth will also diversify 
their income sources. Diversification of income streams into other crops and activities is examined subsequently 
in section 7.2.4 
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Note: Graphs by percentile incomes, <=0.6 M USh is the 25th percentile income and >3M 
USh is the 75th percentile income of the growers surveyed who answered the income 
question (n=110).  
Figure 75: Proportion of growers following practices on the plot by income range 
 
One might expect that more risk-averse farmers would be more likely to implement GAPs, 
fertilize, and/or spray to prevent losses on their coffee plot. However, like the findings of 
Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz (2013), the measured risk-aversion of growers in terms of 
NRC did not predict behaviour.200 Farmers who did not fertilize made on average 4.66 ± 0.24 
risky choices vs. those that did fertilize made 5.11 ± 0.29 risky choices in the game, but they 
could not be distinguished from each other by a two-sample T-test with equal variances (* =
0.2474). The NRC measure had even less distinguishing power for GAPs and spraying 
decisions (results not shown).  
 
The remaining question is whether fertilizing, spraying, and/or implementing GAPs resulted in 
higher prices received for coffee products or resulted in increased yield per coffee tree. As 
shown in Figure 76 below, looking at the mean prices received by growers who follow different 
practices, there does seem to be a positive impact on price received for kiboko in the 2013 
                                               
200
 Review in section 6.2.3 of Chapter 6 the risk-aversion game that farmers took at the end of the HH survey.  
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season, especially from fertilizing the plot and implementing at least one GAP. Spraying did 
not seem to result in higher prices (a proxy for a higher quality product) for the farmer, but this 
may be due to the pest/disease incidence being significantly higher on a plot where spraying 
became necessary.  
 
 
Figure 76: Impact of plot decisions on price received for dry coffee cherries 
 
Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with robust standard errors to control 
for the heteroscedasticity of the residuals that was present, the impact of these three farm 
decisions on the price received for kiboko and for mwanyi mbisi is confirmed in Table 59. 
Spraying had a negative impact on the price of kiboko, but this is likely due to the reasons 
mentioned above about the heavy pest incidence requiring spraying to have any product left. It 
was clear that fertilizer increased the price that farmers received at the gate for their dry (by 
121 USh/kg) or fresh (by 132 USh/kg) coffee cherries. Following at least one GAP, the most 
common being pruning dead branches—a good mitigation measure against BTB (see section 
A.22.2 on page 390)—seemed to benefit sellers of kiboko, but did not have a significant impact 
on the price for mbisi sellers.  
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Table 59: OLS results on the effect of three farm decisions on price received for coffee 
 (1) (2) 
 Kiboko Price Mbisi Price 
GAPs (Y/N) 141.9** -51.08 
 (62.87) (60.00) 
Fertilize (Y/N) 120.9* 132.2*** 
 (65.29) (42.64) 
Spray (Y/N) -228.8** -46.51 
 (99.76) (41.72) 
Observations 71 65 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Robust standard errors in brackets 
 
While there were impacts on price, there was less of a clear impact on the self-reported yield 
after following different practices. As shown in Table 60 below, only the impact of following 
at least one GAP produced significantly higher yields, but only for sellers of kiboko.201  
 
Table 60: OLS results on the effect of three farm decisions on yield per tree for coffee 
 (1) (2) 
 Kiboko Seller Yield Mbisi Seller Yield 
GAPs (Y/N) 1.009** 0.168 
 (0.401) (0.301) 
Fertilize (Y/N) 0.342 0.515 
 (0.471) (0.378) 
Spray (Y/N) -0.645* -0.140 
 (0.331) (0.445) 
Observations 44 40 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Robust standard errors in brackets 
 
It is surprising that fertilizing did not have a significant impact on yield. A major caveat is that 
the data on yield per tree is highly suspect. Many farmers are jointly estimating the number of 
trees they have on their plot as well as the number of kilograms of coffee they sold in the year. 
Dividing one rough estimate by the other is likely to produce a large measurement error, which 
may bias the results towards zero (i.e. “regression attenuation”). This error may be particularly 
significant for sellers of mbisi who are more often socially isolated and less educated (see 
section 7.2.1). These reasons may explain the lack of significance and much smaller coefficient 
on the GAPs term for mbisi seller yield in column (2) model of Table 60.  
 
                                               
201
 The sellers of mbisi and kiboko were analysed separately such that no assumptions on the wet weight of the 
kiboko were made. 
291 
 
In addition to the quantitative metrics, there are qualitative results to suggest factors that 
encourage a farmer to implement GAPs and fertilize. The Head of Programs at NGO B 
(interviewee #5) said that they teach pruning as well as weeding, however, farmers complain 
about pruning being too difficult. She believes that the growers do not like to prune as they 
think that the “bushier” the coffee tree gets, the more yield it might produce, and more branches 
means some may produce in the event that others are attacked by BTB (personal conversation, 
interviewee #5). NGO B also encourages farmers to remove dead trees from their plots and to 
use cow manure for fertilizer. It appears some of their encouragement and training is effective 
(recall Figure 37 on page 188 that cooperative Kamuli growers fertilized at higher rates than 
Buikwe and Kayunga non-cooperative growers). Training programs may change behaviours of 
farmers on these practices.  
 
The Managing Director of Exporter B (interviewee #10) believed farmers do not manage their 
plots according to best practices due to both a lack of knowledge and, importantly, a lack of 
belief that these practices improve outcomes. The MD also pointed out two drivers that cascade 
into everything else: volatile prices and weather. These affect pest severity for the year as well 
as the farmers’ responses to them. When prices are low, growers do nothing and the season is 
quite bad then for Ugandan exporters. As a result, farmers end up abandoning fertilizing, 
pruning, and other best practices on their plots (personal conversation, interviewee #10). In the 
MD’s opinion, GAPs need to be incentivized or farmers will never learn from trainings that 
encourage them to adopt the practices (personal conversation, interviewee #10). Farmers may 
also invest time in a primary activity other than coffee. One grower (#21) in the HH survey 
stated she primarily cares about her pigs and “doesn’t concern herself with coffee or what 
causes the drying” (personal conversation).  
 
Part of the reason for inaction on pruning and spraying also has to do with a collective action 
problem. Pests like BTB infest neighbouring plots and trees. If a farmer acts, but her neighbours 
do not, the farmer’s plot will only be reinfested in a short period. NAADS encourages farmers 
to form a task force to treat BTB by pruning and burning (personal conversation, interviewee 
#16). Implicitly their strategy recognizes the futility of a farmer doing this practice on his/her 
own. The most common reasons farmers gave in the HH survey for the barriers to following 
best practices are displayed in Figure 77. The biggest drivers were a lack of money and 
knowledge on how to treat pests, but many farmers also felt that the pests spread too fast to 
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allow for effective action. Often farmers assumed the best treatment was spraying and that was 
why they claimed to lack money. 
 
 
Figure 77: Growers’ top reasons for not implementing GAPs and treating pests/diseases 
 
The NAADS contacts (interviewees #16 and #17) said that spraying is not cost effective or 
very efficient at controlling BTB (personal conversation, interviewee #16). However, the 
pesticide NAADS recommended was “Roket” (the senior scientist at NaCCRI/COREC, 
interviewee #15, recommended “E-max”; the inputs store employee, interviewee #13, 
recommended cypermethrinin).202 Some example pesticides on the market from the inputs store 
are shown in Figure 78. It is readily apparent with all this conflicting advice and disagreement 
on pesticides why farmers reported that they do not have the knowledge to treat the pests 
(Figure 77). This issue is worthy of future research both to determine the scientific 
effectiveness and economic efficiency of various pesticide/fungicide combinations 
recommended by various stakeholders in the coffee supply chain.  
 
                                               
202
 Recommended treatments for BTB are further discussed in Appendix A.22.2 starting on page 380. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Note: (a) Overview of pesticide/insecticide/fungicide sprays sold in inputs shop;  
       (b) Most common herbicide was a branded Glyphosate 50% W/W soluble liquid;  
       (c) Recommended insecticide for controlling BTB by interviewee #16;  
       (d) Another insecticide, a branded version of dimethoate 40% W/V 
Figure 78: Examples of “sprays” sold in the inputs store of interviewee #13 
 
Overall, there was a discrepancy between the practices that do have an impact on price and 
yield and the ones that farmers’ would like to implement if they were able. Farmers reported 
many barriers that prevent them from buying and using various sprays, but the factors that 
seemed to increase price and/or yield were following GAPs and using fertilizer. It appears that 
a lack of belief in the effectiveness of these measures may be driving inaction, and training by 
NGO B seemed to increase fertilizer adoption rates in Kamuli. However, training did not 
increase GAP adoption in Kamuli and spraying rates were much higher. The issue with GAPs 
are likely that farmers believe they should be adopted to treat BTB, but based on experience, 
know that the BTB will re-infest regardless of what they do just on their own plot.  
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7.2.4. Other crops grown in addition to coffee 
To call a smallholder a coffee grower is a bit of a misnomer. Smallholders are extremely 
diversified into a variety of crops and animal agriculture ventures; many have non-farm income 
as well. Figure 79 highlights the top 10 other crops/livestock production activities that coffee 
growers also engaged in. Matooke (a plantain and staple food of the Ugandan diet) is the most 
common crop that is grown on plots along with coffee. This result is good news. The NAADS 
office in Nkokonjeru recommends planting matooke along with yams to supplement coffee 
incomes with useful food crops that are also easy to sell at the market (personal conversation, 
interviewee #17). The Sustainability Manager at Exporter B (interviewee #8) also reported that 
matooke intercropped with coffee was thought to be the best welfare-improving cropping 
regime for the region (personal conversation).  
 
The NAADS Coordinator mentioned that farmers often were interested in maize, but NAADS 
recommends that maize needs at least 1 ha of the plot to break even (personal conversation, 
interviewee #16). From the HH survey, however, farmers were often growing maize even when 
they had less land than recommended. Maize was commonly grown in the area around 
Nkokonjeru. Maize is the main ingredient for posho a porridge commonly provided for 
schoolchildren. Nkokonjeru has developed a reputation for its boarding schools with many 
students sent to the region from Kampala. As a result, many farmers were speculating in maize 
since there is consistent demand.  
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Note: Answers from question 1 from growers’ survey see Appendix A.19 
Figure 79: Other crops/livestock that coffee growers also produced on their plots 
 
To distinguish food grown solely for home consumption, the survey also asked about other 
income-generating activities that farmers had. Farmers reported a variety of other sources of 
income, including many of the crops that they mentioned producing in addition to coffee. Four 
farmers mentioned getting money from adult children who were employed, five sold 
waaragi203, ten sold milk in the market, and others sold crafts, firewood, real estate, or worked 
in a salon in town. There were many unique income-generating activities that the smallholders 
reported that were not fully analysed from the data collected. The average coffee grower was 
engaged in at least three income-generating activities in addition to coffee, with the most 
prolific smallholder engaged in 8 other activities.  
 
Given the heterogeneity in income streams, what motivates the degree of diversification? 
Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz (2013) elicited from farmers the portions of their land that 
they divided into different crops as well as the number of different livestock they produced. 
They used this information to construct a few different measures of crop diversification, 
                                               
203
 Uganda’s national liquor made from matooke distilled like gin.  
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including portion of land in max crop (a form of concentration ratio used by Gollop & Monahan 
(1991)). Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz (2013) primarily were interested in risk-aversion, but 
found both NRC and CRRA had no predictive power to estimate income diversification. 
However, a simple binary variable (based on classifying someone as risk-averse or risk-
seeking) did have explanatory power, but in the opposite of the predicted direction. They found 
more risk-averse farmers were more likely to make seemingly less risk-averse choices on farm 
management. As an example, the risk-seeking farmers were more likely to diversify their plot 
into different crops (Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz, 2013). While the present survey did not 
collect enough data from the farmers about the acreage of their fields in different crops, it was 
possible to analyse the predictive power of NRC on the number of other income-generating 
activities that farmers had.  
 
A Poisson model was fit to predict the number of other income-generating activities that 
farmers had in addition to coffee. The factors that were thought to predict this were the farmer’s 
income, hectares of coffee, hectares of total plot size, and the risk-aversion of the farmer as 
measured by the NRC. A goodness-of-fit chi-squared test confirmed that the Poisson model 
was appropriate for the data. In order to correct for minor violations of the assumptions of the 
model, robust standard errors were used to obtain parameter estimates following the suggestion 
of Cameron & Trivedi (2009, p.70).  
 
The results of the parameter estimates in terms of incident ratios are reported in Table 61. As 
expected, farmers with higher income are more likely to be associated with larger number of 
alternative income-generative activities as well. This is not to suggest causality. Likely farmers 
are wealthy because they have become involved in a variety of income generating activities, 
not because wealth alone led them to try new activities—though that is certainly possible as 
well. Entry constraints such as lack of skills or capital may prevent the poorest from finding 
alternative cropping and non-farm income streams (Dercon, 2002). Higher income farmers may 
find it easier to diversify than the lower income farmers. In addition, the model results show 
that farmers with smaller coffee plots were more likely to have diversified into other income-
generating activities.  
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Table 61: Poisson results for predicting count of number of other income-generating activities 
 (1) (2) 
 Num. Other Income Activities Num. Other Income Activities 
NRC 0.968* 0.972* 
 (0.0169) (0.0161) 
log(income) 1.174*** 1.152*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0449) 
Coffee plot (ha) 0.933**  
 (0.0259)  
Percent of Plot in Coffee (%)  0.615** 
  (0.144) 
Total Plot (ha) 1.004 0.988** 
 (0.00601) (0.00480) 
Observations 110 110 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust standard errors in brackets 
 
In the model in column (1), moving from the 10th percentile income to the 90th percentile 
income would be associated with an increase in 2 additional income-generating activities on 
average in the data. A similar percentile increase in the size of the coffee plot would only lead 
to a decrease in 1 income-generating activity on average. Given the difficulty of interpreting 
coefficients across the spectrum of the data, the predicted counts are plotted in Figure 80 and 
Figure 81. The model in column (2) shows that the predictor with the largest impact on number 
of other income-generating activities was the percentage of land devoted to coffee. Farmers 
with a smaller portion of coffee, as well as, a smaller total plot were much more likely to be 
diversified into other income-generating activities.  
 
In model (1) and (2), NRC did have weakly predictive power (* = 0.063 in model (1)). The 
more risk-averse (i.e. lower the NRC) the farmer was the more the farmer had diversified into 
different crops or other income-generating activities. The effect was stronger for higher income 
farmers. The most-risk averse farmer (NRC=1) with high income (90th percentile) and a small 
plot of coffee (0.25 ha) would be predicted to have around 5 other income-generating activities. 
The equivalent farmer who is the most risk-seeking (NRC=8) would only be expected to have 
about 1 less income-generating activity. The effect of NRC was thus quite small. This is the 
expected direction of effect that was predicted in the paper of Hellerstein, Higgins & Horowitz 
(2013), however, the opposite of their empirical results. 
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Note: p10 income was 0.36M USh/year; p90 income was 5M USh/year; 0.25ha of coffee 
is the 10th percentile amount of coffee land and 3 ha is the 90th percentile; total plot size 
held at mean 4.5 ha.  
Figure 80: Predicted number of other income-generating activities by NRC from model (1) 
 
 
Figure 81: Predicted number of other income-generating activities by NRC from model (2) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p10 income p90 income
0.25 ha coffee 3 ha coffee
Pr
e
di
ct
e
d 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f o
th
er
 
in
co
m
e-
ge
n
e
ra
tin
g 
a
ct
iv
iti
e
s
NRC
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
p10 income p90 income
NRC=1 NRC=8
Pr
e
di
ct
ed
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f o
th
e
r 
in
co
m
e-
ge
n
e
ra
tin
g 
ac
tiv
iti
e
s
Proportion of Plot in Coffee
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
299 
 
Figure 80 and Figure 81 both show the impact of NRC, while statistically significant, is very 
marginal in terms of differentiating the choices farmers make on income stream diversification. 
Analysing a farmer’s income as well as their plot size of coffee were much better indicators of 
how many other income-generating activities they likely have. As expected, the percentage of 
the total plot that the farmer devotes to coffee has a large impact on how many other activities 
they can devote time and land to production.  
 
While Hill (2009) found evidence that wealthier farmers in Uganda generated a higher portion 
of their income from coffee, the present survey found statistically no difference in wealthier 
farmers (1) reported importance of coffee or (2) percent of total plot devoted to coffee (see 
Figure 82). From the self-reported data in the HH survey as well, the average coffee grower in 
the upper quartile of income devoted only 31% ± 4.3% of their plot to coffee; the average 
coffee grower in the lowest quartile of income devoted 41% ± 3.9% of their plot to coffee ( =
1.6869, * = 0.0967). For the communities surveyed in Buikwe and Kayunga districts, it 
appeared that the wealthiest farmers devoted less of their total plot to coffee as compared to 
the poorest farmers, but the results were not significant at the * < 0.05 level. Additionally, the 
highest income farmers were no different from others in terms of the self-reported importance 
of coffee to their income (results not shown).  
 
Both poor and rich coffee farmers are involved in other income-generating activities. The richer 
farmers with less land devoted to coffee have upwards of 5-7 other activities, but even the 
poorer farmers with a high dedication of land to coffee will usually be involved in 2-3 other 
income-generating activities (e.g. usually matooke and one or two others like chicken, maize, 
or sweet potatoes). Given that all coffee growers have other activities that allow them to 
generate at least some money and food that offsets cash expenses, what keeps them growing 
coffee and what could potentially cause them to stop growing coffee? Who would likely 
abandon coffee production if disease and pests become quite frequent and severe? The next 
section will explore these questions for growers in Buikwe and Kayunga districts.  
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Figure 82: Self-reported income has little influence on proportion of the plot devoted to coffee production 
 
7.2.5. Exit and abandonment of coffee production 
It is difficult to measure what drives a farmer to abandon coffee production (i.e. exit from 
coffee). In the survey, growers needed at least 10 trees to participate and so no one had 
completely switched out of coffee production. In this setting in Uganda, however, the lack of 
planting seedlings can be used as a rough proxy for abandoning coffee production. By not 
planting seedlings the farmer has stopped investing in the plot and, given the typical losses 
from pests and disease, would eventually lose the remaining trees as well. Many farmers do 
not remove the trees until they have cash to replant another crop and so a farmer may stop 
putting effort into coffee while saving or deciding what to grow instead.  
 
One hypothesis was that farmers were not investing in planting seedling because they could 
not afford to or because they could not access them in their village. If this were the case then, 
not planting seedlings may not represent coffee abandonment, but a lack of funds. This 
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hypothesis seemed unlikely since (1) the price of seedlings is low204 and (2) thousands of free 
seedlings are given away in the district around five times per year.205  
 
The reason this lack of investment is a good proxy in Uganda is due to the high disease/pest 
incidence on the coffee crop. All coffee growers in the survey reported heavy pest damage. In 
addition, while Hill (2009) reported an assumption of 900 tree/ha in her models of Ugandan 
coffee growers, the average number of trees per ha in the survey of Buikwe and Kayunga 
growers was 300. When asked what limited their production, 88% of growers identified 
pests/disease as the main limitation.206 The majority were selling less coffee in 2013 than in 
2012, and much less than what they thought as a typical year in the past (see Figure 83).  
 
                                               
204
 The price of seedlings was still considered affordable at around 300-500 USh (£0.07 - £0.12) per seedling 
according to both surveyed grower #52 and interviewee #14. 
205
 The local NAADS chapter offered on average five trainings per year between NAADS centrally sponsored 
programs, UCDA sponsored events, and local politicians or MP candidates running for office. Within the past 
year, interviewee #17 reported that 17,250 seedlings were distributed when the president’s office supported a 
program; 17,000 when an MP was running for election; and a further 20,000 when a local councillor was 
running for office. Given the low rates of seedling planting within the last five years reported by growers in the 
survey, it was unclear where the seedlings were going—if they were indeed given out in such massive 
quantities—without any real large-scale farmers in the area. Interviewee #1, NGO A’s director in the area, could 
confirm that seedlings were distributed from the NAADS office, but was unsure how many and how often they 
were distributed. 
206
 Answers to question 10a “What limits your production?” see Appendix A.19. 
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Note: Graphs by percentile income category; 25th percentile income was 0.6M USh/year, 
75th percentile income was 3M USh/year.  
Figure 83: Reported annual production of coffee in 2013, 2012, and a typical year in the past 
 
As shown in Figure 83, the drop in volumes sold also occur regardless of income level; likely 
pests and diseases are inhibiting production across the entire industry. Is this drop in production 
leading farmers to exit coffee? The Senior Scientist interviewed at NaCCRI/COREC 
(interviewee #15) thought that overall, coffee farmers are not leaving coffee across the country, 
but many were abandoning production in areas with alternative options for cash. In the Bisoga 
area of Uganda, Indian-owned firms are promoting sugar cane and so farmers are more tempted 
to grow that as their cash crop. In Masaka District, where coffee is the top crop for most 
farmers, there are few alternative options for cash there (personal conversation, interviewee 
#15). The Senior Scientist thought that in Buikwe and Kayunga there are many other options 
for food crops, but not large industries promoting out-grower schemes like in Bisoga. 
Interviewee #15 did confirm though that the lack of planting seedlings is likely a good indicator 
that a farmer will either chose or be forced to stop producing coffee as pests/disease eventually 
eliminate many of the trees (personal conversation, interviewee #15).  
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It was expected that those devoting more land to coffee would also have a harder time exiting 
the coffee industry for other crops. Comparing those that have planted seedlings in the last 5 
years, those that are actively replacing coffee trees have an average of 1.6 ± 0.23 ha of land in 
coffee, while those that have not planted seedlings in the past 5 years have only 0.9 ± 0.15 ha 
of land devoted to coffee ( = −2.9704, * = 0.0036).207 Partially the land size difference will 
be explained by income. Higher income farmers—not constrained by the cost of seedlings or 
transport to access them—were also more likely to plant within the past five years. Those that 
had not planted earned an average of 1.6 ± 0.36 M USh/year, while those that had planted in 
the past 5 years earned 2.5 ± 0.27 M USh/year ( = −1.9977, * = 0.0483).  
 
Given the multifaceted reasons for deciding to invest in coffee seedling planting, the most 
appropriate tool to use is a logistic regression. Following a similar setup to equation (1) on 
page 202 for the decision to invest in coffee, a model is constructed for the decision to exit 
coffee (stop planting seedlings). As before, % *  		 is the percentage of the farmer’s 
total plot devoted to coffee and  *	  is the multiple of the 2013 reported price 
the fair price was for the farmer (e.g. a factor of 1.5 means the farmer though the fair price for 
coffee was 50% higher than he reported receiving in 2013). The new variables included in the 
regression are the following:  
• The variable , which is the number of social connections growers, reported 
consulting with for decision-making on the plot (see section 7.2.1).  
• The variable . ℎ	 	, which was the number of alternative sources of 
income the farmer reported in section 7.2.4.  
• The variable 	 "			 , which is the farmers reported kg output in 
2013 divided by the typical year in the past (numbers from 0 to 1 would represent 
less volume in 2013 than a typical past year).  
• The variable ! is the number of risky choices the farmers made in the risk-
aversion game (see section 6.4.2).  
• The ordinal variable *	 ranged from 1 to 4, where 1 was coffee farmers 
that said coffee was “not important” to total income up to 4 where coffee was “sole 
income source”.  
                                               
207
 Results from a two-sample T-test with equal variances. Coffee plot size was made lognormal for comparison, 
confirmed by a Shapiro-Wilk test for normal data. Levene’s test confirmed equal variances for the two groups of 
those that have planted seedlings and those that have not.  
304 
 
• The variable *	 was interacted with farmers’ reported (	) in the 
models in columns 2-5 in Table 62. It was expected farmers with higher incomes will 
be less likely to exit coffee in general. In particular, the more important coffee is to 
their total income, the larger this effect from income will be.  
• Finally, variables for  * #	 and 		 * #	 were included.  
 
The summary statistics for all the variables used are given in Table 83, Appendix A.27, page 
435. The results of the logistic regressions are displayed in Table 62 below. 
 
Table 62: Results of logistic models for predictors of coffee exit behaviour 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 exit exit exit exit exit 
fair price factor 2.170** 2.107** 2.342** 2.400** 2.400** 
 (0.724) (0.688) (0.804) (0.869) (0.865) 
% plot in coffee 0.446 0.747 0.789 0.703 0.703 
 (0.460) (0.844) (0.898) (0.883) (0.881) 
Num. other incomes 0.884 0.877 0.839 0.825 0.825 
 (0.137) (0.140) (0.143) (0.142) (0.144) 
social 0.806** 0.829 0.793* 0.808* 0.808* 
 (0.0861) (0.0945) (0.0968) (0.101) (0.101) 
log(income) 0.562**     
 (0.149)     
importance=1 # log(income)  0.567** 0.579* 0.630 0.630 
  (0.161) (0.164) (0.183) (0.183) 
importance=2 # log(income)  0.560** 0.580** 0.636 0.636 
  (0.155) (0.159) (0.181) (0.180) 
importance=3 # log(income)  0.534** 0.559** 0.623 0.623 
  (0.159) (0.164) (0.190) (0.190) 
importance=4 # log(income)  0.539** 0.553** 0.617 0.617 
  (0.164) (0.167) (0.191) (0.192) 
volume decrease factor   1.156 1.135 1.135 
   (0.323) (0.318) (0.318) 
coffee plot size    0.820 0.820 
    (0.346) (0.354) 
total plot size    0.979 0.979 
    (0.0654) (0.0649) 
NRC     1.000 
     (0.113) 
Observations 105 105 102 102 102 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust standard errors in brackets. 
(1) Growers selling both kiboko and mbisi are counted just for their kiboko activities, 
which was the primary volume for most of the 23 mixed coffee sellers.  
(2) All five model runs passed a link test for model specification error as well as 
collinearity test checking for severe multicollinearity among all dependent variables. 
 
There were a few surprising results from the models in Table 62. Consistently, the percentage 
of the total plot dedicated to coffee did not have a significant impact on the likelihood of exiting 
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coffee. Perhaps this could be explained by a lag effect, which could not be captured in this 
cross-section of Ugandan farming. Farmers may take longer than five years to change the 
allocations of their land and invest in planting other crops or may leave the land fallow when 
the coffee trees die, instead of uprooting to plant something else. As such, while the farmer has 
decided to not plant seedlings for 5 years, they may not have made any drastic changes to their 
allocation of their plot to coffee. As such, the land becomes less dense with coffee trees, but 
the size of the coffee acreage does not change. Given that Hill (2009) assumes 900 coffee trees 
per ha in her models for Ugandan coffee and the present survey’s average was 300, this 
explanation of behaviour is plausible, but impossible to confirm with only one year of data.  
 
Other unexpected results were the lack of significance on 	 "			  and the 
number of other incomes. It was expected that farmers that have produced much less in 2013 
than in a typical past year would be less likely to have planted seedlings to keep investing in 
coffee. However, this assumption may not fully capture the extent to which pests and diseases 
have caused damages across the coffee growing sector regardless of whether a farmer is 
replanting or not. In addition, it takes a seedling around 3-4 years to mature enough to produce 
a good quantity of sellable coffee beans. As such, only those that planted seedlings 5 years ago 
could be expected to produce more volume in 2013. So the measurement of the volume 
decrease factor is not refined enough to capture differences between farmers, since all 
experienced high losses. The count variable of the number of other income generating activities 
(. ℎ	 	) similarly is only a count metric. A more detailed survey design with 
the percentage of income coming from each activity may have been able to capture the effect 
of farmers switching out of coffee. In addition, as shown in section 7.2.4 the choice of effort 
into additional income-generating activities is closely related to total income, which—while 
passing the collinearity test in the model checking for cols 1 to 5—still may capture much of 
the variation making that variable insignificant.  
 
The most robust determinants of exit from coffee investment were the number of social 
connection the farmers utilize when making decisions on the coffee plot () and the 
degree to which they view the current price for their coffee product as unfair 
( *	 ). Those farmers who consult more (less) people in the supply chain when 
making decisions are less (more) likely to exit the coffee industry. As before in the previous 
model for investment behaviour, farmers that believed the fair price for their coffee product 
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much higher than the 2013 offered price were more likely to not plant seedlings in the past 5 
years (i.e. abandon coffee production). Using the results from the model run of column 4 of 
Table 62, the predicted coffee exit probability for different values of  *	  and 
 are plotted with other variables held at their means in the dataset in Figure 84 below.  
 
 
Note: p10 fair price factor was 1.25 meaning that the fair price stated by the farmer was 
1.25 times the price the farmer reported receiving in 2013; p90 fair price factor was 2.5.  
Figure 84: Predicted probabilities of exit based on number of social connections and opinion of the fair 
price for coffee 
 
From Figure 84, the model shows that farmers that talk to all seven types of stakeholders asked 
about in the survey are around half as likely to exit coffee on average as compared to those 
who consult no one in their decision-making on the coffee plot. Similarly, those that view the 
price as more unfair are more likely to exit coffee than those that are less upset about the current 
price for their coffee products.  
 
While the direction of these results are not surprising, they highlight the value of measuring 
these opinions and social connections as part of a survey given their power to predict an 
important outcome like not investing in coffee seedling planting. The usual economic 
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indicators like the portion of land devoted to production or the stated importance of the crop to 
total income were poor at predicting which farmers were likely to abandon production.   
 
7.2.6. Activities to switch to instead of coffee production 
Famers were asked what they thought they would switch to producing if they did abandon 
coffee (Question 26 of HH survey, Appendix A.19).The results for the top five choices in crops 
and in non-crop activities are shown below in Figure 85. Many of the crops are the same as 
those currently produced in addition to coffee (compare with Figure 79 on page 295). However, 
in the workshop in Nkokonjeru, farmers had more ideas of alternative crops. Craft making was 
the only activity that farmers widely thought of switching into for cash-generation that they 
were not currently producing. This may have negative implications for poverty alleviation, as 
participation in non-farm work is one useful method to protect families from income shocks 
associated with crop losses (Kochar, 1999).  
 
 
Note: Answers to question 26 in farmer HH survey (see Appendix A.19) 
Figure 85: Five most common crop and non-crop alternatives to coffee that farmers reported 
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At the workshop, groups were asked to discuss what crops they would consider growing if they 
stopped growing coffee. While many groups reported crops that many were growing already, 
there were some unique answers. The discussion amongst the whole group—while not fully 
quantified in the analysis to date—was suggestive. There were two interesting anecdotes. 
Firstly, growers discussed a crop (vanilla) that nearly everyone previously grew when prices 
were high and then quickly abandoned when prices went back down (see panel (a) of Figure 
86). In the early 2000s, there was a large cyclone in Madagascar that devastated the world’s 
supply of vanilla (Abraham, 2004). Ugandan farmers rapidly switched into growing vanilla 
and made substantial money from it. When the prices crashed, the vast majority switched back 
to other crops. One of the farmers in the HH survey (#14) mentioned she grew coffee, but then 
switched to vanilla until that crashed and then she moved back to growing coffee.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Note: Images from video capture of workshop. Red circles indicate hands that were 
raised to respond to questions from group facilitator.  
(a) Top panel – growers who grew vanilla when prices were high.  
      Bottom panel – growers who exited vanilla when prices crashed.  
(b) Top panel – growers who currently grow cardamom.  
      Bottom panel – growers who would consider growing it in the next five years.  
Figure 86: Growers’ responses to workshop questions on alternative crops to switch to from coffee 
 
The second anecdote that emerged from the workshop about switching behaviour was farmers’ 
responses to one group’s suggestion of growing cardamom. While, only one of the farmers was 
growing cardamom currently, many stated that they would consider growing it in the next five 
years (see panel (b) of Figure 86). Both the eagerness to try new crops, the results from the 
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risk-aversion game (section 6.4.2), and the previous experience with vanilla, all seem to 
indicate that the average grower in these districts is willing to switch out of coffee, if the 
growing conditions and prices deteriorate. A brief example of one grower who did switch out 
of coffee is discussed in Appendix A.24 (starting page 405).  
 
7.3. CONCLUSIONS ON COFFEE PLOT DECISIONS  
 
The analysis in Chapter 7 has been partially explorative in nature and builds off the previous 
studies in Chapter 5 on the performance of cooperatives and Chapter 6 on the risk-aversion of 
coffee growers and traders. Using a decision-making framework discussed in section 5.4, this 
chapter assessed characteristics of the survey participant and his/her household that may 
explain choices made on the coffee plot. 
 
Section 7.2.1 found that single, female coffee farmers have smaller social networks that they 
reach out to for advice compared to other growers. The results confirmed the findings of 
Rantamäki-Lahtinen (2009) that solitary farmers struggle for profitability. Coffee growers in 
the HH survey without any social connections were found—using a multinomial logit model—
to be more likely to both dry coffee on the ground or sell wet coffee as opposed to best practices. 
Coffee growers with fewer social connections and women were also more likely to dry coffee 
on the ground. Selling wet coffee has a few advantages for immediate cash and avoiding the 
risk of theft, and this may explain why more socially isolated farmers and single women are 
more likely to sell wet coffee even when it results in lower prices (section 7.2.2). The isolation 
may also prevent this group from detecting the problem that their decisions are having on farm 
profitability (Lunneryd & Öhlmér, 2006).   
 
Section 7.2.3 found adoption rates of relatively capital-intensive practices like fertilizing were 
nearly twice as high (65% v. 34%) for the highest income farmers compared to the lowest 
income farmers, and relatively higher labour-intensive practices like implementing GAPs were 
nearly half the rate (43% v. 81%). The risk-aversion score was not significantly different 
among groups of farmers that implemented and those that did not implement any of the three 
practices discussed. Results showed the fertilizing increased the price received by farmers for 
kiboko, but the impact on yield was not statistically significant, likely due to the challenge of 
farmers recalling plot size and volumes sold accurately. Farmers claim to lack both knowledge 
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and money to effectively control pests, but it appears they believe the best solution is a pesticide 
that they cannot afford, as opposed to implementing best practices. Coffee growers were not 
different in that respect than other studied farmers in the literature (Stonehouse, 1995; 
Storehouse, Gbongboui, De Groot, et al., 1997; Williamson, Little, Ali, et al., 2003; 
Williamson, Ball & Pretty, 2008). 
 
The average coffee grower produced three other products in addition to coffee (section 7.2.4). 
More risk-averse farmers were more likely to diversify their incomes, but the effect was 
marginal. Unlike the results of Hill (2009) finding wealthier farmers specialized in coffee, in 
the survey higher-income farmers had a lower percentage of their land devoted to coffee and 
had more diversified incomes. Richer farmers may have specialized more in coffee during 
Hill’s survey in 2008/9 before BTB was a significant issue and coffee prices were higher.  
 
The main qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that farmers are adept at switching into 
and out of agricultural production depending on production conditions and price (section 7.2.5). 
They likely actively update their evaluations of coffee each season and make a decision to meet 
their livelihood objectives (recall Figure 68). Findings contribute to the literature by 
demonstrating the factors that are shown to significantly predict a coffee farmer staying in 
coffee production.  Understanding these factors helps to inform Ugandan government policies 
on replanting coffee seedlings and who to target for extension service for alternative crops. In 
a resource poor setting, coffee extension agents should target their efforts towards farmers 
likely to stay in coffee production. Additionally, the importance of the number of social 
connections shows that there can be benefits to organizing in cooperatives despite the 
challenges that were discussed in section 5.5.5.  
 
7.4. FINAL CONCLUSIONS OF CASE STUDY CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 examined the risk perceptions and decisions made by 
stakeholders in the Ugandan Robusta coffee supply chain in response to foreign coffee pests 
and diseases that have established in the country. Conclusions on the various pieces of analysis 
from the surveys, interviews, and workshops are found at the end of each chapter. A few points 
are highlighted below, with some tentative suggestions, and future avenues of research.  
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The President and CEO of an industry research organization (interviewee #14) explained that 
“everything has a market” and so traders can still turn a profit on poor quality coffee. This 
statement was confirmed by the Quality Control Manager at Exporter A (interviewee #3) who 
explained that even the reject pieces of husk, coffee, nails, rope, etc. that are rejected by their 
mechanical sorting machine are sacked up and bought by a Chinese firm (personal 
conversation, interviewee #3). The interviewee thought they used it for fuel, but was not 
completely sure why they bought it.  
 
Why would the export firm take such poor quality coffee? The industry expert (interviewee 
#14) mentioned that is partially driven by the fact that there is a lot of invested capital in 
machinery at the exporters and often these machines are running at 40-50% capacity. 
Considering exporters can process upwards of 23 tonnes of Robusta per hour, there is a huge 
volume of slack when not running at capacity (personal conversation, interviewee #2). 
Exporters then just want more volume and hope to get some average quality beans along with 
the additional volume of poor quality they receive. This was confirmed indirectly by the 
Managing Director of Exporter B (interviewee #10) who said that the industry is all about 
volume and their goal when working with farmers is yield improvement. The firm’s 
participation in various sustainability certification schemes was largely to give them an 
opportunity to train farmers and hopefully boost yields. Anecdotally, the MD (interviewee #10) 
stated directly while the author was in the office to the Regional Sustainability Manager 
(interviewee #8) who was reporting some poor results after the latest audits that “failing 
certifications were irrelevant, just use the money to get more coffee coming out of the farms” 
(personal conversation, interviewee #10). In many ways, they were using sustainability 
schemes as a method of training farmers. That was the priority more so than creating a high 
value, certified product for which there were limited uncertain markets. In the best years, 
certified coffee represented some 5% of their total sales of coffee (personal conversation, 
interviewee #8). The focus on productivity was a real point: in Uganda productivity hovered 
around 10 bags / ha on average while in Vietnam Robusta producers were able to get some 40 
bags / ha (personal conversation, interviewee #10).  
 
The focus on volume also led to accepting more beans that were smaller than a quality roaster 
would want to buy. The industry expert (interviewee #14) said that “undergrades” (below 
screen 12, see Table 82 on page 408 below) still get a good price for producing instant coffee. 
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Before 1991 liberalisation, undergrades were no more than 2-3% of coffee produced in a given 
year, but now it is much higher—he estimates maybe 10% or more is an undergrade and not 
exportable (personal conversation, interviewee #14). Partially this is driven by an old tree stock 
as well which tend to produce more screen 12s and undergrades than trees in their prime 
(personal conversation, interviewee #3). In addition, traders often dry coffee with little effort 
and care because they know that (1) there will be a market even for the undergrades or broken 
pieces and (2) because it is difficult for the next trader or buyer to tell the quality of dried 
kiboko coffee. As a result, some traders drying operations look like that of Trader #5 shown in 
Figure 87. Such drying methods have obviously negative impacts on coffee that can only be 
mixed with acceptable coffee to have a chance of meeting export standards.  
 
Note: Trader (left) drying mbisi coffee that is mostly unripe, contaminated by chicken 
faeces (right, bottom) and with obvious signs of mildew/mould damage (right, top) from 
poor drying techniques likely leading to higher mycotoxins levels than SPS regulations 
would allow in importing countries. Photos by author. 
Figure 87: Example of poor quality coffee drying from Trader #5 in the HH survey 
 
The Project Officer of NGO B (interviewee #7) perhaps summarized the situation best: “[it is] 
a lot of work to do agriculture and coffee needs to be worth it.” There is a need to get farmers 
to work together to treat BTB with a financial penalty for non-compliance and an incentive to 
follow best practices. They need to be convinced it will work as well because currently many 
growers do not believe pruning and implementing GAPs is effective since their neighbours are 
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not doing it (see section 7.2.3). Farmers organized into a cooperative, like NGO B’s 
cooperative in Kamuli, did implement some best practices (e.g. fertilizing) at higher rates, 
suggesting that training may be effective at changing farmers’ behaviour. There were some 
significant downsides to an NGO’s running the cooperative, particularly a lack of sufficient 
operating capital to buy all of the members’ coffee (see section 5.5.5). 
 
Exporters are perhaps best positioned to organize farmers into effective associations and pass 
on quality information via traders about what the market is willing to pay. NGO B struggled 
when the grant money was gone, and the farmers could not afford to maintain certification (see 
section 5.5.5). Additionally, fundamentally, the NGO functioned as an institutional 
intermediary between the exporter and the growers; it was unclear how this structure could be 
supported on such small premiums for UTZ certified coffee (e.g. Exporter B could offer only 
50 USh/kg to their associations). Though the farmers associations of Exporter B were not 
visited, the staff seemed to have a vast understanding of the market and connections to NGOs 
to help with their work of running farmer field schools. The effectiveness of different 
organizational structures for cooperatives is worthy of further investigation.  
 
Many farmers sold wet coffee for immediate cash and to prevent theft (see sections 7.2.2). 
Exporter B and Start-up A (interviewee #19) independently setup washed Robusta producing 
cooperatives to offer farmers the ability to sell mwanyi mbisi while earning a premium price. 
The main difficulty was the logistics of getting ripe coffee processed in a timely manner (see 
discussion in Appendix A.26.1). A potential solution to resolve the issue of farmers selling wet 
coffee as well as the difficulty of transportation to a central processing hub is to develop a 
mobile processing unit. Exporter B Sustainability Manager (interviewee #8) recommended a 
mobile buying unit complete with a processor, quality manager, buying manager, and some 
security could function quite well in the coffee trade. The mobile unit could travel around 
during the harvest season. This would solve the additional issue of traders mixing coffee and 
limiting the traceability of quality coffee to a given farm. With the mobile unit, quality 
premiums could be given at purchase and good producers identified in order to establish deeper 
and more consistent business relationships. Although, there is limited scale to a washed 
Robusta operation due to a lack of demand, it could work well for a small community that has 
identified a premium buyer.  
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From the farmer workshop on ideal supply chains (section 5.5.7). It was clear that farmers are 
well informed about the state of the current supply chain and believe an ideal supply chain 
reduces the number of intermediaries. Additionally, groups agreed that only selling kiboko is 
the best option for growers. Farmers as well have strong views on what a “fair” price for their 
coffee should be. This price expectation was actually one of the strongest predictors of coffee 
farmers’ investment and abandonment behaviour for coffee (see sections 5.5.7 and 7.2.5). 
These results showed that it is important to consider whether farmers will stay in a given 
agricultural market when a disease incident occurs. Like other small businesses, growers use 
some form of cost-benefit to decide whether their effort is best used on their current cropping 
pattern. The impact from an SPS incident can have long-lasting market effects. While CWD 
killed around half of the Robusta trees in Uganda during its peak decade of impact, the long-
term effects on growers’ decision-making is arguably more important. The emergence of BTB 
and the low-levels of implementing best practices on coffee plots could reflect farmers 
divesting effort away from a crop they feel is no longer reliable. Part of the driver towards 
abandonment of coffee though is also price. Farmers with higher expectations on a fair price 
than the market price were more likely to stop planting seedlings (section 7.2.5).   
 
The survey found that coffee growers are more risk-seeking than the average Ugandan 
population given the same risk preferences choices by Tanaka & Munro (2014). The traders 
were significantly more risk-averse than farmers, switching over one row later on average (see 
section 6.4.2). Income had no impact on risk-aversion for farmers, and weakly significant 
impact for wealthier traders who reported higher risk-seeking. Like the literature on 
experimental games’ ability to predict behaviour, this study found mixed effects. The number 
of risky choices (NRC) the farmers made were a good predictor of the number of other crops 
farmers’ chose to invest in (see section 7.2.4); the risk-averse farmers were more likely to 
diversify. However, NRC had no predictive power over any of the three behaviours on the plot 
(fertilizing, following GAPs, or spraying) or the decision to exit coffee production (see sections 
7.2.3 and 7.2.5 respectively).  
 
Social connections seemed to have strong relations to behaviour and outcomes from selling 
coffee. Farmers who reported consulting more social ties when making decisions on their 
coffee farms were more likely to plant seedlings (see section 7.2.5). Additionally, farmers who 
consulted no one were most likely to sell wet coffee, missing value addition from processing 
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(see section 7.2.1). Those farmers that did decide to sell dried kiboko were more likely to make 
the UCDA mandated decision to dry on a tarp when they reported consulting more of their 
social ties. These results have relation to gender as well. Single females are a distinct group 
that was found to be most often isolated from consulting supply chain actors and other social 
ties (see section 7.2.1). They were also most likely to sell wet coffee and for the ones that did 
sell kiboko, often dried it on the ground. All decisions that result in a lower price for coffee.  
 
All stakeholders agreed unanimously that BTB and CWD are the top priority pests (see section 
6.4.1). While stakeholders in the supply chain besides growers and traders were more worried 
about BTB, Buikwe farmers and traders both still felt that CWD was slightly more damaging 
to production. It is clear that this beach in SPS restrictions at the border created lasting damage 
to the coffee industry in Uganda, which may only be matched by a subsequent introduction of 
BTB in recent years. Beyond these top two pests/diseases, the next group of pests/diseases 
were RBD and CBB. Except for the Kamuli growers that ranked them approximately equally, 
the other groups agreed that RBD was more of a threat to the coffee supply chain than CBB. 
Overall, it seems information on pests and diseases do flow between actors in the supply chain. 
For the exporters, this is facilitated by some of their employees’ direct involvement in 
organizing farmers’ associations. There is prioritization of pest/disease concerns the further the 
actors are away from production, but not enough data was collected to make firm conclusions.  
 
Several data collected were not fully analysed. The distance between growers and town features 
such as the coffee-milling factory in Nkokonjeru could be measured since GPS coordinates 
were collected. It is likely that farmers in more remote villages were offered lower prices for 
their coffee and faced higher barriers to milling on their own due to transport costs. 
Unfortunately, the road conditions outside the home were not recorded in the survey, and too 
low resolution on Google Earth to distinguish between wet and dry season conditions or quality 
of the road. A subsequent study of the impact of location and transport costs should be 
conducted in this area with a new survey taking into account several factors. (1) The conditions 
of the road from the village to the town centre, (2) the different transport options available to 
the farmer208, and (3) qualitative questions about what they see as barriers to getting a higher 
price for their coffee. Such a study could help to elucidate the drivers of the very different 
                                               
208
 The current survey did not distinguish between motorcycle and vehicle ownership. It also did not ask about 
bicycle ownership.  
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prices offered farmers in the present survey. Since the GPS locations of the farmers and traders 
were recorded, it would be relatively easy to conduct a follow-up survey asking further 
questions about their practices and collecting new data about the conditions affecting transport.  
 
To augment the work on social connections, each of the farmers at the workshop was asked for 
up to 10 people that they went to for advice and up to 10 people that came to them for advice. 
Since many of the farmers who participated in the workshop were also interviewed in the HH 
survey, it is possible to match their social connections to the data collected in the HH survey. 
A social network map—similar to the work of Conley & Udry (2010) for pineapple farmers in 
Ghana—could then be created to get a better understanding of the connectedness of the farmers 
and if the more connected farmers in the social network are indeed performing better in coffee 
production.  
 
One point that was very poorly understood was the impact (and actual numbers) of free 
seedlings distributed by NAADS. A follow up survey when a distribution occurs would be 
needed. It would be interesting to test whether farmers (1) improve practices after receiving 
training and getting seedlings and (2) if it causes them to devote more of their plot to coffee 
production.   
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 Conclusion and Future Work 
 
Agricultural exports are an increasingly important part of agricultural production and a key 
economic development area for hundreds of millions of farmers in emerging economies 
(Cheong, Jansen & Peters, 2013). Quality standards and safety regulations are critical for 
mitigating the risks that come from imports of agricultural products, but these measures can be 
used arbitrarily to protect domestic producers. The overarching aims of this thesis were to (1) 
analyse the use of import risk-mitigation measures employed by nations under the SPS 
agreement and to (2) investigate the risk perceptions and actions of stakeholders in a case study 
where SPS policy failed to keep out damaging plant pests and diseases.  
 
SPS regulations serve a necessary function to protect a country’s producers and ability to export 
products at prices commensurate with quality production. The lack of mitigating against import 
risks from neighbouring countries were highlighted in the case study of Ugandan coffee. 
Uganda’s paucity of SPS institutional capacity and control at the border allowed in foreign 
pests, which forever changed the structure of the coffee industry. It is important to design SPS 
regulations that consider the potential impacts that pests will have on the decision-making of 
producers. Despite the potential difficulties that developing countries face in legal challenges 
to their SPS notifications shown in Chapter 3, active participation in the system to mitigate 
import risks is important. On the export side for Uganda, while not explored in the present 
research, working with importers of Ugandan coffee to develop a control point framework to 
address SPS issues where they occur in the supply chain could help to alleviate importers 
concerns about quality and mitigate the price impact from perceptions of product risk.   
 
All five objectives given in the introduction (section 1.2) were achieved in the pursuit of the 
first aim. (1) Both the theoretical and empirical literature on the evidence of policy substitution 
of NTM measures for lost tariff protection is reviewed in section 2.4. (2) Econometric tests of 
this substitution for SPS and TBT measures is thoroughly analysed, given the constraints of 
the data reporting systems, with results reported in sections 2.8 and 2.10. (3) Disagreements 
that have arisen in the implementation of the SPS and TBT agreement are summarized in 
section 3.5. Statistical models analysing the determinants of these Specific Trade Concerns are 
utilized and the results are reported in section 3.6. (4) Whether developing countries struggle 
to resolve claims they raise is scrutinized in section 4.4. Lastly (5), on a subset of SPS STCs 
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regarding plant health, section 4.5 examines the specific reasons countries give when they raise 
a concern against another member’s policies.  
 
In pursuit of the second aim, all seven objectives—outlined in section 1.2—were met. (1) 
Stakeholders (19 in total) were interviewed from all different levels of the Robusta coffee 
supply chain in Uganda and a household survey of 119 farmers and 89 traders was completed 
(see section 5.3). (2) The differences in production outcomes and behaviours for farmers 
organized in cooperatives and independently were analysed in sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4 with 
more qualitative discussion in sections 5.5.5 and 5.5.6. (3) The coherence of pest priority views 
among different stakeholders in the supply chain was examined in section 6.4.1. (4) Risk-
aversion of coffee growers was measured in section 6.4.2 and the impact of risk preferences on 
the behavioural decision to abandon investment in coffee production was analysed in section 
7.2.5. (5) Coffee growers’ views on fair prices for coffee was examined both in the household 
survey and in a workshop (results in section 5.5.7); the impact of that view on coffee 
abandonment behavioural choices was analysed in section 7.2.5. (6) In a workshop, a novel 
game developed by the author was piloted and the opinions of farmers on their interest in stable 
price contracts were examined in section 6.4.3. Finally, (7) the results of various factors 
including measures of social networks (section 7.2.1) from the household survey were used to 
analyse the determinants of exiting the production of coffee in section 7.2.5. 
 
Every year disease and pest outbreaks, of varying intensity, occur throughout the world from 
both unpredictable occurrences and known underlying risks. Once established, they can have 
devastating consequences for an agricultural industry—affecting both short-term output and 
long-term decisions of growers of that crop. In the case of Uganda, CWD caused extensive 
damage that may be exceeded only by the contemporary outbreak of BTB. Both issues likely 
originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo and became established in Uganda due to poor 
SPS measures at the border. The importance of effective SPS and TBT policies are clear, but 
are difficult to implement without some disagreement among WTO members. While 
conclusions are included at the end of each chapter, some key results are highlighted below.   
 
Chapter 2: Environmental Protection or Protectionism? 
Results showed robustly that with a decline in bound tariff the probability and number of SPS 
measures issued in subsequent years increases. Liberalisation was a driver for some countries 
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to issue TBT measures, but the results were not robust to more refined modelling specifications. 
Additionally, it was found that countries that have higher environmental governance metrics, 
more complete democracies, better regulatory quality, and older populations were also more 
likely to issue SPS measures.  
 
Chapter 3: Patterns of Trade Concerns in SPS/TBT Use 
The decline of bound tariffs does not predict the issuing of an SPS measure that will later 
become subject to a STC. These results suggest that the relation between tariffs and SPS 
measures use is perhaps driven by a regulatory workload selection bias, but that the measures 
that are implemented are deemed fair for the most part by other WTO members.  
 
Chapter 4: STC Resolution and Plant Health Cases 
As expected from the literature on WTO and GATT disputes, there was some evidence that 
developing countries were less likely to resolve concerns they raise against developed country 
trade partners. The reasons behind the increasing number of SPS STCs that are left unresolved 
each year is worthy of future research, to determine issues and practices that could improve 
consensus and cooperation among members. Complaints that were scientific in nature for plant 
health STCs took longer to resolve, but the resolution rate was not different from that of 
economics-based STCs.   
 
Chapter 5: A Case Study of Responses to SPS Issues 
Cooperatives appear to achieve higher yields than independent farmers do, but this result 
deserves further scrutiny to test if more able farmers self-select into cooperatives or what the 
drivers within the cooperative are that lead to better production results, and whether the results 
are sustainable.209 Cooperative farmers were also more likely to consult other stakeholders for 
advice. Robusta coffee certification schemes are not able to generate the premium from 
importers that would be required to adequately boost farm gate prices to the level farmers 
reported as their “fair” price.  
 
                                               
209
 A recent review by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation of 500 farmer field school projects 
suggested that field schools often achieve production results that are not possible to maintain beyond the project 
timeline or at scale for a wider community (Waddington & White, 2014). It is likely many of the learnings from 
this study apply generally to the benefits of cooperatives as well, many of which—including NGO B in Kamuli 
District—use the farmer field school method for training.  
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Chapter 6: Risk-aversion of Coffee Farmers and Traders 
Coffee growers are more risk-seeking than traders and more risk-seeking than the general 
population of Uganda; this is likely explained by self-selection or habituation to coffee 
production which is a high-risk, high-reward crop (Hill, 2009). A pest survey confirmed 
stakeholders have similar views on the top two priority pests, but stakeholders further down 
the supply chain prioritize information and disregard the importance of other pests/diseases. 
Preliminary evidence from a coffee market simulation suggests that growers are interested and 
willing to accept lower income in good years with a fixed-price contract in order to smooth out 
the bad price years for coffee.  
 
Chapter 7: Income Diversification and Decision-making 
Growers do not specialize in coffee and are adept at re-evaluating whether they should remain 
producing the crop or abandon investment in it. More risk-averse farmers are expected to have 
marginally more income sources. The most robust factors for determining abandoning of coffee 
production were (1) the magnitude of the difference between the current price and the adequate 
price a grower reported for coffee, and (2) the number of social connections consulted for 
advice about coffee growing decisions.  
 
8.1. FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF RESEARCH 
 
There are two potential projects extending the current work. The first is to analyse the impact 
of trade facilitating SPS measures. There is a tremendous amount of econometric estimation of 
the trade impact (or tariff equivalent) of SPS measures (see section 2.4 for review). However, 
to the author’s knowledge, there has not been analysis of measures that are marked as “trade 
facilitating” by the country notifying them in the SPS-IMS. There were 274 such measures 
from 1996 to 2010, which were excluded from the analysis of Chapter 2. Perhaps the mixed 
findings in the literature on the trade impact from SPS measures are due to the lack of good 
indication of the expected effect of the measure. An estimation of the trade enhancing effect of 
SPS measures meant to facilitate trade would help put a more nuanced view on their trade 
impact. On a related note, the EU maintains a list of country-commodity combinations that 
have been identified for “reduced inspections” due to consistent acceptable quality coming 
from the country (i.e. a lack of interceptions at the border due to sanitary or phytosanitary 
violations). An analysis of the trade impact after the qualifying year could help better estimate 
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the magnitude of the barrier resulting from inspections at the border, an aspect of the trade 
effect from SPS/TBT measures.  
 
The second extension into a new research project would be a deep analysis of products rejected 
at the EU border due to failing to comply with SPS or TBT regulations. One goal would be to 
identify SPS/TBT measures that are implemented and notified that were effective at reducing 
subsequent border rejections. This would indicate that the new/changed SPS/TBT measures 
were effective at reducing the risk at the border. Alternatively, a second aim would be to 
observe if a product with increased border rejections is more likely to be subject to 
new/changed SPS measures in the following years by the importing country. The author 
obtained permission (see Appendix A.29) to use EU border rejection data, but was not able to 
obtain a product concordance to effectively merge the data from the food/agriculture rejection 
database210 with trade and SPS notification data (see Appendix A.30). The non-food rejections 
data211 are posted weekly in HTML tables on individual websites; the author created a 
methodology for scraping the data using publically available tools to get the data prepared for 
research. The research idea is more fully explained with some summary figures in Appendix 
A.28, the details for the process of acquiring the data are also demonstrated on the author’s 
YouTube channel.212 
 
8.2. FUTURE OF SPS, TBT, AND MULTILATERAL CONVERGENCE 
 
The original mandate and economic justification for the WTO assumed that producers in 
importing countries would be the only stakeholders pushing for protectionism. Generally, the 
theoretical economic models show that consumers always benefit (i.e. prices go down, 
consumer surplus goes up, welfare increases) when trade becomes more free (assuming 
invasive species, food contaminates, etc. are effectively excluded). However, Hobbs & Kerr 
(2006) show that if consumers’ value “credence attributes” of goods213—that an imported 
product may lack—then it can create an economic rationale for consumer-based protectionist 
desires. Labelling can address many of these issues, but the current rules of the TBT agreement 
                                               
210
 The EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) 
211
 The EU Rapid Alert System for non-Food Dangerous Products (RAPEX) 
212
 Data scraping: <http://youtu.be/eXsRH2Sn7No> ; Preparing the data: <http://youtu.be/iZJR9RanlIs> 
213
 For example characteristics like knowing the good is not genetically modified or produced using child 
labour.  
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(and SPS agreement) prevent countries from acting on consumer-led pressure unless there is a 
valid risk-based justification for imposing a policy (Hobbs & Kerr, 2006). Economic 
integration further forces countries to work on harmonization of standards, which pitches 
different societal understandings of risk against each other. Unlike a tariff on which every 
nation can agree on a definition, the ideas of “safe food” or appropriate “precautionary” 
measures are more difficult to get universal consensus. Food and agriculture also have cultural 
values that make the topic even more difficult compared to discussing appropriate protections 
for products like steel or furniture. Multilateral consensus is more challenging as a result.  
 
The trend towards plurilateral agreements has been happening for some time, augmented by 
the stalled multilateral Doha Round talks. The newest plurilateral agreement currently under 
negotiation is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); a free trade agreement among Asia-Pacific 
nations.214 The TPP has potential to set the tone of future TBT and SPS policies around the 
world. The hope according to Darci Vetter, Deputy Under Secretary for the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to harmonize on a framework for evaluating risks as 
opposed to the actual measures taken (Vetter, 2014).215 The TTP allows a set of countries to 
achieve facilitated SPS standards across the major markets of TPP members in a way that 
developing countries would likely not accept in a multilateral agreement of the WTO (Vetter, 
2014). However, most parties believe that the results of the TPP will set the standard for any 
new agreement in the WTO involving SPS and TBT measures (Lamy, 2014; Vetter, 2014). 
 
US industry groups in particular have lobbied for a stronger SPS agreement within the TPP. In 
particular, they push for “enforceable SPS commitments” with strict dispute settlement 
mechanisms. As well, they argue for the development of a Rapid Response Mechanism to 
resolve SPS disputes on a “specific shipment of perishable goods” (Inside U.S. Trade, 2013). 
Another change US industry groups are pushing for is standardization of laboratory protocols 
to confirm contamination, along with a mechanism for an exporter to challenge any test result, 
requiring an immediate confirmation test by the importer. The overall goal is to raise the 
standard for what qualifies as “scientific-evidence” and set rigid guidelines that all parties agree 
                                               
214
 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, USA and 
Vietnam 
215
 The author was an attendee at the Forum on the Future of Agriculture (FFA) in Brussels on 1, April, 2014. 
The citations reflect that each session was video recorded, so all comments made by speakers can be viewed 
online. 
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on as a “fair” assessment of risk. The drive from the US to enforce rigid definitions on scientific 
evidence follows the results of the types of STCs they have been raising in plant health (see 
Chapter 4). Such a change leaves less room for countries to argue for their SPS policies and 
some nations, Australia in particular, have said they do not support changing the SPS 
agreement from the WTO standard (Inside U.S. Trade, 2012). A thorough review of US 
interests and the status of SPS issues in the TPP can be found in Johnson (2014), but in short 
the future of the multilateral trading system as well as the future of the SPS/TBT agreement 
are uncertain. Understanding the current dynamics of the SPS/TBT system is thus even more 
important to address the shortcomings for the new policy undertakings.   
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A.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SPS NOTIFICATIONS 
 
Table 63: Summary statistics of all variables used in regressions for SPS measures in Chapter 2 
VARIABLE UNITS MEAN SD MIN MAX N DATA SOURCE 
Both SPS Notifications 0.190 1.050 0 65 101,430 SPS - IMS 
Emergency SPS Notifications 0.037 0.495 0 43 101,430 SPS - IMS 
Regular SPS Notifications 0.153 0.849 0 65 101,430 SPS - IMS 
Both SPS > 1 (dummy) 0.073 0.260 0 1 101,430 Authors' own / SPS-IMS 
Emergency SPS > 1 (dummy) 0.017 0.128 0 1 101,430 Authors' own / SPS-IMS 
Regular SPS > 1 (dummy) 0.065 0.247 0 1 101,430 Authors' own / SPS-IMS 
AHS Tariff (wgt. av.) % 8.671 22.816 0 2,645 64,486 WITS / TRAINS 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) % 27.869 38.387 0 2,776 59,998 WITS / TRAINS 
MFN Tariff (wgt. av.) % 10.495 23.366 0 2,645 64,459 WITS / TRAINS 
BOMFN (wgt. av.) % 17.475 31.177 -1357 2,604 59,751 Authors' own / WITS 
ln(exports) ln(yr 2000 US$) 16.124 4.769 0 26.71 84,042 UN COMTRADE 
ln(imports) ln(yr 2000 US$) 17.608 3.160 0 27.15 84,111 UN COMTRADE 
ln(GDP per capita) ln(yr 2000 US$ / person) 8.304 1.452 4.96 10.64 99,981 World Bank WDI 
Current Account (+) (dummy) 0.409 0.492 0 1 101,430 World Bank WDI 
Exchange Rate Index ExRate / ExRate(‘96) 1.757 1.971 0.63 19.04 91,356 World Bank WDI 
ln(population) ln(1,000s people) 9.178 1.786 4.25 14.11 101,430 UN DESA Pop. Div. 
% population over 65 % 0.084 0.050 0.0043 0.23 100,395 UN DESA Pop. Div. 
Democracy Score See Source 5.455 6.133 -10 10 94,185 Polity IV Project 2010 
Environ. Stringency See Source 4.270 1.087 2 6.50 75,555 WEF Exec. Opin. Survey 
Regulatory Quality See Source 0.418 0.79 -1.61 2.23 101,430 World Bank WGI 
Pesticide Regulation See Source 15.582 7.877 0 22 101,430 Yale EPI 2010 
Biodiversity See Source 58.538 26.093 0 100 101,430 Yale EPI 2010 
Enviro. Health See Source 70.919 18.818 21.57 95.09 98,325 Yale EPI 2010 
Enviro. Governance See Source 0.287 0.617 -0.75 1.65 87,975 Yale ESI 2005 
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A.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR TBT NOTIFICATIONS 
 
Table 64: Summary statistics of all variables used in regressions for TBT measures in Chapter 2 
VARIABLE UNITS MEAN SD MIN MAX N DATA SOURCE 
Regular TBT Notifications 0.048 0.448 0 36 121,125 SPS - IMS 
Regular TBT > 1 (dummy) 0.027 0.162 0 1 121,125 Authors' own / SPS-IMS 
AHS Tariff (wgt. av.) % 8.310 14.716 0 1358 80,069 WITS / TRAINS 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) % 25.840 29.294 0 729 74,872 WITS / TRAINS 
MFN Tariff (wgt. av.) % 10.048 15.344 0 1358 79,993 WITS / TRAINS 
BOMFN (wgt. av.) % 15.881 26.456 -1357 729 74,407 Authors' own / WITS 
ln(exports) ln(yr 2000 US$) 16.280 4.853 0 26.90 101,650 UN COMTRADE 
ln(imports) ln(yr 2000 US$) 17.740 3.176 0 27.15 101,745 UN COMTRADE 
ln(GDP per capita) ln(yr 2000 US$ / person) 8.426 1.376 5.46 10.64 119,415 World Bank WDI 
Current Account (+) (dummy) 0.409 0.492 0 1 121,125 World Bank WDI 
Exchange Rate Index ExRate / ExRate(‘96) 1.014 0.194 0.64 2.49 74,100 World Bank WDI 
ln(population) ln(1,000s people) 9.289 1.852 4.22 14.11 121,125 UN DESA Pop. Div. 
% population over 65 % 0.087 0.050 0.0043 0.23 119,700 UN DESA Pop. Div. 
Democracy Score See Source 5.555 6.122 -10 10 112,575 Polity IV Project 2010 
Environ. Stringency See Source 4.331 1.132 2 6.50 99,750 WEF Exec. Opin. Survey 
Regulatory Quality See Source 0.474 0.801 -1.61 2.23 120,935 World Bank WGI 
Pesticide Regulation See Source 15.612 7.993 0 22 121,125 Yale EPI 2010 
Biodiversity See Source 58.590 24.449 0.47 100 121,125 Yale EPI 2010 
Enviro. Health See Source 73.604 15.981 25.91 92.77 116,850 Yale EPI 2010 
Enviro. Governance See Source 0.314 0.632 -0.75 1.62 106,875 Yale ESI 2005 
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A.3. TOTAL SPS/TBT NOTIFICATIONS BY HS-2 CODE FROM 1996-2010 
 
Table 65: SPS and TBT notification totals by country during sample period (1996 – 2010) 
HS 
Code Description 
Ag. 
Prod 
SPS  
Reg. Emer. Both TBT 
1 Live animals Yes 678 686 1364 6 
2 Meat and edible meat offal Yes 712 699 1411 46 
3 Fish & crustacean, mollusc & other  aquatic invert  272 24 296 45 
4 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey;  edible pr Yes 520 369 889 113 
5 Products of animal origin, nes or  included. Yes 255 290 545 11 
6 Live tree & other plant; bulb, root; cut  flowers Yes 271 26 297 11 
7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and  tubers. Yes 328 37 365 65 
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus  fruit or me Yes 501 41 542 56 
9 Coffee, tea, matï and spices. Yes 145 10 155 39 
10 Cereals Yes 247 15 262 30 
11 Prod.mill.indust; malt; starches;  inulin; wheat g Yes 45 1 46 34 
12 Oil seed, oleagi fruits; miscell grain,  seed, fru Yes 299 9 308 39 
13 Lac; gums, resins & other vegetable saps Yes 16 0 16 9 
14 Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable  products Yes 15 0 15 9 
15 Animal/veg fats & oils & their cleavage  products; Yes 116 19 135 47 
16 Prep of meat, fish or crustaceans,  molluscs etc Yes 107 36 143 56 
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. Yes 28 1 29 35 
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations. Yes 34 1 35 20 
19 Prep.of cereal, flour, starch/milk;  pastrycooks' Yes 123 11 134 60 
20 Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts or other  parts of Yes 71 5 76 60 
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations. Yes 74 8 82 82 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. Yes 135 1 136 122 
23 Residues & waste from the food indust;  prepr ani Yes 240 205 445 17 
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes Yes 15 0 15 47 
25 Salt; sulphur; earth & stone; plastering  mat; lime  18 1 19 36 
26 Ores, slag and ash.     9 
27 Mineral fuels, oils & product of their  distillati  4 0 4 134 
28 Inorgn chem; compds of prec mtl,  radioactive  15 1 16 52 
29 Organic chemicals. Partial 36 3 39 68 
30 Pharmaceutical products.  219 13 232 107 
31 Fertilisers.  32 4 36 46 
32 Tanning/dyeing extract; tannins &  derivs; pigm et  9 0 9 35 
33 Essential oils & resinoids; perf,  cosmetic/toilet Partial 13 6 19 40 
34 Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing  2 0 2 45 
35 Albuminoidal subs; modified starches;  glues Partial 31 5 36 18 
36 Explosives; pyrotechnic prod; matches;  pyrop allo     30 
37 Photographic or cinematographic goods.     1 
38 Miscellaneous chemical products. Partial 7 1 8 85 
39 Plastics and articles thereof.  45 1 46 119 
40 Rubber and articles thereof.  3 0 3 97 
41 Raw hides and skins (other than  furskins)  Partial 19 5 24 1 
42 Articles of leather; saddlery/harness;  travel goo  5 0 5 20 
43 Furskins and artificial fur;  manufactures thereof Partial 5 0 5 7 
44 Wood and articles of wood; wood  charcoal.  119 17 136 42 
45 Cork and articles of cork.  4 0 4 4 
46 Manufactures of straw, esparto/other  plaiting mat  5 0 5 0 
47 Pulp of wood/of other fibrous cellulosic  mat; was  2 0 2 5 
48 Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp  5 1 6 30 
49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures &  other      5 
50 Silk. Partial 2 0 2 8 
51 Wool, fine/coarse animal hair, horsehair  yarn & f Partial 9 1 10 9 
52 Cotton. Partial 23 0 23 16 
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HS 
Code Description 
Ag. 
Prod 
SPS  
Reg. Emer. Both TBT 
53 Other vegetable textile fibres; paper  yarn & wove Partial 7 0 7 10 
54 Man-made filaments.     8 
55 Man-made staple fibres.     20 
56 Wadding, felt & nonwoven; yarns; twine,  cordage,     22 
57 Carpets and other textile floor  coverings.     8 
58 Special woven fab; tufted tex fab; lace;  tapestri     7 
59 Impregnated, coated, cover/laminated  textile fabr     10 
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics.     6 
61 Art of apparel & clothing access,  knitted or croc     18 
62 Art of apparel & clothing access, not  knitted/cro     20 
63 Other made up textile articles; sets;  worn clothi  0 1 1 36 
64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of  such art     24 
65 Headgear and parts thereof.     22 
66 Umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks,  whips, et     2 
67 Prepr feathers & down; arti flower;  articles huma  5 2 7 1 
68 Art of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos,  mica/sim     55 
69 Ceramic products.  3 0 3 40 
70 Glass and glassware.  1 0 1 39 
71 Natural/cultured pearls, prec stones &  metals, co  1 0 1 20 
72 Iron and steel.     64 
73 Articles of iron or steel.  2 0 2 167 
74 Copper and articles thereof.  1 0 1 19 
75 Nickel and articles thereof.     7 
76 Aluminium and articles thereof.  1 0 1 64 
78 Lead and articles thereof.     9 
79 Zinc and articles thereof.  1 0 1 9 
80 Tin and articles thereof.  1 0 1 7 
81 Other base metals; cermets; articles  thereof.     4 
82 Tool, implement, cutlery, spoon & fork,  of base m  1 0 1 7 
83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal.     44 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery  4 2 6 446 
85 Electrical mchy equip parts thereof;  sound record     595 
86 Railw/tramw locom, rolling-stock & parts  thereof;  1 0 1 18 
87 Vehicles, parts  & accessories  2 1 3 375 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof.  3 0 3 14 
89 Ships, boats and floating structures.  3 0 3 12 
90 Optical, photo, cine, meas, checking,  precision,  5 0 5 151 
91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof.     2 
92 Musical instruments; parts and access of  such art     1 
93 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories     12 
94 Furniture; bedding, mattress, matt  support, cushi  4 0 4 101 
95 Toys, games & sports requisites; parts &  access t  1 0 1 91 
96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles.     30 
97 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques.  2 0 2  
 
 
  
350 
 
A.4. TOTAL SPS/TBT NOTIFICATIONS BY COUNTRY FROM 1996-2010 
 
Table 66: SPS and TBT notification totals by country during sample period (1996 – 2010) 
 
SPS 
Country Reg. Emer. Both TBT 
Albania 13 380 393 1 
Antigua and Barbuda 16 0 16  
Argentina 120 27 147 2 
Armenia 38 12 50 96 
Australia 174 27 201 22 
Bahrain 71 5 76 40 
Barbados 0 1 1 1 
Belize 1 0 1 3 
Benin 4 4 8  
Bolivia 12 22 34 13 
Botswana 3 0 3  
Brazil 396 12 408 281 
Brunei Darussalam 0 4 4  
Cambodia    1 
Canada 155 29 184 10 
Chile 261 35 296 2 
China 286 36 322 505 
Colombia 152 93 245 96 
Costa Rica 105 14 119 105 
Croatia 2 0 2  
Cuba 18 2 20 2 
Dominica    3 
Dominican Republic 27 0 27 23 
Ecuador 69 13 82 70 
Egypt 27 21 48  
El Salvador 99 13 112 120 
European Union 771 311 1082 129 
Fiji 4 0 4 1 
Gambia 1 0 1  
Georgia 29 4 33  
Guatemala 177 44 221 16 
Honduras 27 12 39 10 
Hong Kong 12 16 28 45 
Iceland 1 29 30  
India 34 18 52 3 
Indonesia 23 13 36 41 
Israel 9 7 16 587 
Jamaica 2 17 19 1 
Japan 530 23 553 376 
Jordan 9 42 51 9 
Kenya 2 103 105 176 
Korea, Republic of 178 31 209 43 
Kuwait 0 7 7 52 
Kyrgyz Republic   23 
Macao SAR, China 2 25 27  
Macedonia 1 8 9 7 
Madagascar 7 1 8  
Malawi 2 0 2  
Malaysia 16 28 44 13 
Mauritius 9 12 21  
Mexico 179 34 213 2 
Mongolia 0 2 2 35 
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SPS 
Country Reg. Emer. Both TBT 
Morocco 31 11 42 1 
Nepal 18 3 21  
New Zealand 274 86 360 58 
Nicaragua 44 0 44 28 
Norway 10 10 20 2 
Oman 24 43 67 7 
Pakistan 0 3 3 1 
Panama 48 6 54 2 
Paraguay 19 6 25 3 
Peru 329 149 478 92 
Philippines 114 362 476 1 
Qatar 15 0 15 4 
Republic of Moldova 3 0 3 45 
Saudi Arabia 3 3 6 45 
Senegal 3 0 3  
Singapore 16 24 40 21 
South Africa 15 6 21 205 
Sri Lanka 21 3 24 14 
St. Lucia    12 
St. Vincent and the G.  1 
Swaziland 0 2 2  
Switzerland 75 25 100 23 
Taiwan 105 2 107 77 
Tanzania    35 
Thailand 140 62 202 389 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 21 21 6 
Turkey 3 6 9 2 
Ukraine 31 46 77 39 
United Arab Emirates 3 42 45 1 
United States 446 92 538 650 
Uruguay 21 9 30  
Venezuela 22 0 22 15 
Viet Nam 15 0 15 1 
Zambia 6 0 6  
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A.5. SPS STC BY RAISING MEMBER AND HS-2 CODE 
 
Table 67: Totals of SPS STC by raising WTO member country and HS-2 code 
 HS-2 Code  
RAISING MEMBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 30 33 44 88 TOTAL 
Argentina 2 4 8  1  1 2 5  2        1   1 1 28 
Australia 2 2                   1   5 
Brazil 2 1 10   1 1 1 4        1       21 
Canada 3 2 7     1   1           1  15 
Certain Members 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 1       1     1  23 
Chile  1 1    1  1               4 
China 2   2   1  2 1   2    4  2   2  18 
Hong Kong                      1  1 
Colombia 1  1       1              3 
Costa Rica   1  1  1                 3 
Cote d'Ivoire        1                1 
Cuba     1                   1 
Ecuador         3      1         4 
Egypt        1                1 
European Union 7 6 17 1 7 1 4 4 1        1 1 1  1 2  54 
Fiji          1              1 
Hungary  1 1      1          1     4 
India 2 1       1               4 
Indonesia    1          1          2 
Israel                1        1 
Mexico  2 2      2         1      7 
Morocco 1                       1 
353 
 
 HS-2 Code  
RAISING MEMBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 30 33 44 88 TOTAL 
New Zealand        1 2               3 
Nicaragua  1       1               2 
Pakistan           1             1 
Philippines       1  1    1    1       4 
Republic of Moldova   1                     1 
Saint Vincent & the G.         1               1 
Senegal         1               1 
Slovenia   1                     1 
South Africa   1                     1 
Sri Lanka          1              1 
Switzerland 1  2                     3 
Taiwan       1                 1 
Thailand   3      1  1  1    1       7 
United States 9 3 15 2 3 5  2 6  6 1 1 1     3 1  1  59 
Uruguay   2      1               3 
Venezuela         1               1 
TOTAL 36 25 77 8 14 9 12 17 36 5 11 1 5 2 1 1 9 2 8 1 2 9 1 292 
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A.6. SPS STC BY MAINTAINING MEMBER AND HS-2 CODE 
 
Table 68: Totals of SPS STC by maintaining WTO member country and HS-2 code 
 
HS-2 Code 
 
MAINTAIN MEMBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 30 33 44 88 TOTAL 
Argentina  1 3   1                  5 
Australia 2  2 2    1 5        1       13 
Barbados         1               1 
Bolivia 1 1 1                     3 
Brazil 4 3 1    1 1    1      1      12 
Canada   2  1  1  1          1     6 
Certain Members 6 1 7  1  1               2  18 
Chile   1        1        1    1 4 
China 1 1 5 2 1    2    1     1   1 1  16 
Colombia   2   1                  3 
Costa Rica         1               1 
Croatia  1 1                     2 
Cuba   1      1               2 
Czech Republic   1     1           1     3 
Dominican Republic        1                1 
Egypt   1          1           2 
El Salvador   3                     3 
European Union 8 6 3 2 2 6 1 2 8 5 2  1 1 1 1 3  2  1 2  57 
France         1               1 
Guatemala   1      1               2 
Honduras   1        1             2 
Hungary   2                     2 
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 HS-2 Code  
MAINTAIN MEMBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 30 33 44 88 TOTAL 
Iceland   1                     1 
India  2   2   1            1    6 
Indonesia  2 2  1   1 2               8 
Israel  1 2    1                 4 
Japan 4  3 1    3 5  1   1   4  1     23 
Korea 1  5      1  1             8 
Malaysia 1      1                 2 
Mexico  1 5     1   2             9 
New Zealand       1                 1 
Norway                 1       1 
Panama 2 1 1  2      1             7 
Philippines   1                     1 
Poland     2      1             3 
Romania   2                     2 
Senegal   1                     1 
Slovakia        1 1               2 
South Africa   2                     2 
Switzerland   1        1             2 
Taiwan 1  2   1  1           1     6 
Thailand 1 1                      2 
Trinidad and Tobago   1                     1 
Turkey 1        1          1     3 
Ukraine  1                      1 
United States 3 2 6 1 2  5 1 5    2         4  31 
Venezuela   4     2                6 
Total 36 25 77 8 14 9 12 17 36 5 11 1 5 2 1 1 9 2 8 1 2 9 1 292 
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A.7. STC RE-RAISE SAMPLING METHOD 
 
A component of the analysis was the number of time a concern has been re-raised after the 
original date. Since a claim raised more recently has had less time to possibly be re-raised, it is 
important to account for this dynamic. First, the number of years it takes to re-raise a claim is 
investigated.  
 
 
Figure 88: Years between original and second raising of the same specific trade concern for the 356 TBT 
and SPS concerns that are re-raised at least once 
 
From the data sample of STCs from the TBT (282 concerns) and SPS (292 concerns) systems, 
356 out of 574 trade concerns (62%) raised originally from 1996 to 2010 are re-raised at least 
once before 2012. As shown in Figure 88, 57% are re-raised at a subsequent meeting within 
the same year as the original raising. A further 34% are re-raised in the following year and 3% 
are re-raised for the first time two years after the original date. Only ~5% of all concerns that 
are ever re-raised are done so for the first time after two years. As a result, analysis of the 
sample from 1996 to 2010 with additional data through end of 2012 for concerns that were re-
raised would likely account for the majority of the dynamics of the regulatory system. 
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A.8. TOTAL SPS STC BY RAISING COUNTRY 
 
Table 69: STCs summary statistics by raising member country with resolution status 
Raising 
Member 
Num. 
STC 
Raise 
Num. 
STC 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Years 
until 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Num. 
Times 
Raised 
% of 
STC 
with 
Support 
(max) 
Num. of 
Supporters 
(Total) 
SPS 
Notification 
of Raising 
Member 
(mean)  
SPS Notif.’s 
of 
Maintaining 
Members 
United States 59 15 3.8 2.5 51% 11 538 455 
European Union 54 27 5.6 2.3 31% 4 1,082 290 
Argentina 28 14 3.3 2.5 39% 4 147 337 
Certain Members 23 5 4.4 5.4 74% 13  670 
Brazil 21 4 1.8 2.8 29% 7 408 309 
China 18 2 3.0 6.0 33% 3 322 618 
Canada 15 8 3.9 1.9 60% 5 184 490 
Thailand 7 3 2.3 8.0 43% 4 202 326 
Mexico 7 0   43% 5 213 256 
Australia 5 0   60% 3 201 802 
Chile 4 2 1.5 3.5 50% 2 296 258 
Ecuador 4 1 3.0 3.0 50% 2 82 589 
India 4 0   75% 3 52 818 
Philippines 4 1 3.0 5.0 75% 7 476 473 
Hungary 4 2 3.5 3.5 50% 2  6 
New Zealand 3 2 1.5 2.0 33% 3 360 115 
Uruguay 3 2 2.0 2.5 67% 3 30 403 
Costa Rica 3 1 2.0 3.0 67% 5 119 210 
Colombia 3 0   33% 10 245 504 
Switzerland 3 2 1.5 6.0 0% 0 100 538 
Nicaragua 2 0   0% 0 44 166 
Indonesia 2 0   0% 0 36 818 
Taiwan 1 1 3.0 2.0 0% 0 107 184 
Fiji 1 0   0% 0 4 1,082 
Israel 1 0   0% 0 16 1,082 
South Africa 1 0   0% 0 21 1,082 
St. Vincent & G. 1 0   100% 12  1,082 
Sri Lanka 1 1 1.0 2.0 100% 1 24 1,082 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 0   0% 0  1,082 
Venezuela 1 0   0% 0 22 1 
Senegal 1 0   0% 0 3 1,082 
Morocco 1 0   100% 1 42 408 
Slovenia 1 0   0% 0  2 
Hong Kong 1 0   100% 1 28 538 
Egypt 1 0   0% 0 48 1,082 
Moldova 1 0   100% 1 3  
Cuba 1 0   0% 0 20 1,082 
Pakistan 1 1 2.0 4.0 0% 0 3 213 
ALL COUNTRIES 292 94 3.8 3.0 44% 13  444 
Note: EU members will show blank for Total SPS Notifications since all are assigned to 
the EU as the country reporter. However, the other blanks like for Cote d’Ivoire indicate 
that the member has reported no SPS notifications, but has registered SPS trade 
concerns against other members.  
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A.9. TOTAL SPS STC BY MAINTAINING MEMBER 
  
Table 70: STC summary statistics by member maintaining the SPS measure under dispute, with 
resolution status and tariff BO information. 
Maintain 
Member 
Num. 
STC 
Against 
Num. 
STC 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Years 
until 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Num. 
Times 
Raised 
% of 
STC 
with 
Support 
(max) Num. 
of 
Supporters 
(total) 
SPS 
Notif’s of 
Maintain 
Member 
(median) 
Binding 
Overhang 
w/ STC 
(median) 
Binding 
Overhang 
w/ SPS 
European Union 57 9 5.5 3.6 60% 13  1,082  1.7 1.0 
United States 31 6 3.3 3.3 32% 5  538  1.7 0.5 
Japan 23 4 3.5 4.0 57% 7  553  2.2 0.4 
certain members 18 5 4.4 4.0 39% 6    
China 16 6 2.3 2.5 31% 3  322  -0.1 0.2 
Australia 13 7 4.6 3.0 85% 7  201  1.2 3.4 
Brazil 12 4 3.8 2.3 33% 5  408  21.0 21.3 
Mexico 9 3 3.3 7.3 22% 2  213  19.5 26.1 
Indonesia 8 2 1.5 4.0 38% 3  36  42.3 34.4 
Korea 8 2 1.0 3.0 38% 5  209  6.8 3.9 
Panama 7 6 5.5 2.0 43% 5  54  -1.2 12.4 
Canada 6 3 5.7 1.3 33% 2  184  1.4 2.3 
Venezuela 6 1 2.0 2.0 33% 2  22  29.5 22.8 
Taiwan 6 2 2.0 1.0 50% 5  107  0.0 0.0 
India 6 0   50% 3  52  51.1 26.7 
Argentina 5 4 6.3 3.0 60% 3  147  23.6 24.0 
Chile 4 4 4.0 2.3 50% 2  296  19.3 19.0 
Israel 4 2 4.0 3.5 50% 2  16  131.4 11.0 
Colombia 3 1 1.0 6.0 0% 0  245  88.0 29.1 
Turkey 3 2 3.5 3.0 33% 3  9   16.6 
El Salvador 3 1 1.0 2.0 0% 0  112  77.0 31.5 
Bolivia 3 2 1.5 2.0 0% 0  34  30.4 30.4 
Czech Rep. 3 3 3.3 2.7 33% 1    
Poland 3 2 5.0 2.5 33% 2    
South Africa 2 0   0% 0  21  46.9 10.1 
Croatia 2 0   50% 1  2   4.3 
Hungary 2 2 3.0 1.0 0% 0    
Switzerland 2 2 6.5 3.0 50% 8  100  10.1 2.3 
Thailand 2 0   50% 2  202  9.5 15.8 
Guatemala 2 0   50% 1  221  128.8 36.1 
Romania 2 0   50% 1    
Cuba 2 1 2.0 2.0 0% 0  20  30.1 3.2 
Malaysia 2 0   100% 4  44   6.5 
Egypt 2 0   0% 0  48  10.2 11.6 
Honduras 2 1 4.0 2.0 50% 3  39  13.8 23.3 
Slovakia 2 2 4.5 4.0 100% 3    
France 1 0   0% 0    
Philippines 1 1 1.0 2.0 100% 5  476  21.2 18.6 
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Maintain 
Member 
Num. 
STC 
Against 
Num. 
STC 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Years 
until 
Resolve 
(mean) 
Num. 
Times 
Raised 
% of 
STC 
with 
Support 
(max) Num. 
of 
Supporters 
(total) 
SPS 
Notif’s of 
Maintain 
Member 
(median) 
Binding 
Overhang 
w/ STC 
(median) 
Binding 
Overhang 
w/ SPS 
Dominican Rep. 1 0   0% 0  27  49.3 25.8 
Costa Rica 1 0   0% 0  119  22.3 37.6 
New Zealand 1 1 1.0 2.0 100% 1  360   5.8 
Barbados 1 0   0% 0  1   64.8 
Trinidad & Tob. 1 0   0% 0  21  78.5 47.2 
Iceland 1 1 4.0 1.0 0% 0  30   9.9 
Senegal 1 0   0% 0  3  10.0 17.7 
Norway 1 1 2.0 3.0 0% 0  20  125.3 1.8 
Ukraine 1 1 1.0 2.0 100% 4  77  6.4 0.3 
ALL COUNTRIES 292 94 3.8 3.0 44% 13  3.0 1.0 
 
Note: The last two columns report the median binding overhang tariff information. The 
first is for all the HS-2 codes of the relevant member country with a Specific Trade 
Concern raised against it. The last column is the median binding overhang tariff for all 
SPS measures notified by the maintaining member from 1996 to 2010 (from the data 
used in Chapter 2).  
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A.10. TOTAL TBT STC BY MAINTAINING MEMBER 
 
Table 71: STCs by member country maintaining the TBT measure under dispute 
Rank Maintaining Member 
Num. 
STC 
Against 
(mean) Num. 
Times Raise 
w/o Resolve 
(total) TBT 
Notifications of 
Maintain 
Member 
1 European Union 62 4.5 129 
2 China 34 2.9 505 
3 United States 33 2.4 650 
4 Korea, Republic of 19 2.7 43 
5 India 15 4.9 3 
6 Brazil 14 3.5 281 
7 Japan 11 2.1 376 
8 Canada 9 3.3 10 
9 Indonesia 9 2.7 41 
10 Argentina 7 2.7 2 
11 Mexico 7 1.7 2 
12 Colombia 6 3.8 96 
13 Thailand 6 4.2 389 
14 Taiwan 5 1.4 77 
15 Egypt 4 2.3  
16 Turkey 4 3.8 2 
17 Israel 3 3.7 587 
18 Peru 3 2.0 92 
19 South Africa 3 1.3 205 
20 Chile 2 2.5 2 
21 Hong Kong 2 1.0 45 
22 Ecuador 2 2.0 70 
23 Malaysia 2 2.0 13 
24 New Zealand 2 5.0 58 
25 Norway 2 8.0 2 
26 Republic of Moldova 2 1.5 45 
27 Bahrain 1 1.0 40 
28 certain members 1 1.0  
29 Croatia 1 1.0  
30 Jordan 1 1.0 9 
31 Kuwait 1 1.0 52 
32 Philippines 1 3.0 1 
33 Qatar 1 1.0 4 
34 Saudi Arabia 1 7.0 45 
35 Switzerland 1 7.0 23 
36 Tunisia 1 1.0  
37 United Arab Emirates 1 2.0 1 
38 Uruguay 1 3.0  
39 Venezuela 1 2.0 15 
40 Viet Nam 1 2.0 1 
 ALL COUNTRIES 282 3.3  
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A.11. NET AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS/IMPORTS BY COUNTRY IN 2011 
 
Table 72: Net agricultural trade from top net exporter to top net importer in 2011 
Rank Countries 
Export Value 
(1000 US$) 
Import Value 
(1000 US$) 
Net Export (+) or 
Net Import (-) 
in 1000 US$ 
1 Brazil      79,630,341     10,908,333      68,722,008  
2 Argentina      43,206,677       2,005,262      41,201,415  
3 United States of America    139,891,089   107,109,145      32,781,944  
4 Netherlands      89,329,878     57,833,353      31,496,525  
5 Thailand      36,779,807       9,794,454      26,985,353  
6 Indonesia      41,867,553     18,338,684      23,528,869  
7 Australia      32,655,860     11,687,339      20,968,521  
8 France      73,960,489     55,611,260      18,349,229  
9 Malaysia      35,709,575     18,579,490      17,130,085  
10 India      30,288,815     17,246,819      13,041,996  
11 New Zealand      15,215,480       2,802,298      12,413,182  
12 Canada      41,041,943     31,000,458      10,041,485  
13 Spain      40,915,988     32,930,037        7,985,951  
14 Denmark      19,203,452     11,982,161        7,221,291  
15 Ukraine      12,679,998       5,770,402        6,909,596  
16 Cote d’Ivoire        6,613,446       1,438,855        5,174,591  
17 EU(12)ex.int    163,011,187   157,965,153        5,046,034  
18 Chile      10,374,887       5,330,276        5,044,611  
19 Belgium      42,909,630     39,102,640        3,806,990  
20 Hungary        9,165,422       5,440,327        3,725,095  
21 Ireland      12,057,308       8,420,322        3,636,986  
22 Poland      19,422,095     16,251,101        3,170,994  
23 Ecuador        4,880,824       1,944,919        2,935,905  
24 Uruguay        4,046,142       1,331,341        2,714,801  
25 Paraguay        3,622,870          920,259        2,702,611  
26 Guatemala        4,503,414       2,251,697        2,251,717  
27 Costa Rica        3,648,262       1,608,627        2,039,635  
28 Colombia        6,844,410       5,050,491        1,793,919  
29 Bulgaria        4,418,491       3,038,688        1,379,803  
30 Serbia        2,700,808       1,362,030        1,338,778  
31 Viet Nam      13,527,573     12,276,349        1,251,224  
32 Ghana        3,008,021       1,759,978        1,248,043  
33 Honduras        2,528,071       1,460,168        1,067,903  
34 Malawi        1,144,870          338,143           806,727  
35 Nicaragua        1,587,229          870,971           716,258  
36 Lithuania        4,145,933       3,504,615           641,318  
37 Bolivia         1,260,425          637,315           623,110  
38 Ethiopia        2,154,207       1,565,452           588,755  
39 Belarus        3,723,709       3,156,732           566,977  
40 Kenya        2,618,683       2,091,507           527,176  
41 Papua New Guinea        1,055,425          541,948           513,477  
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Rank Countries 
Export Value 
(1000 US$) 
Import Value 
(1000 US$) 
Net Export (+) or 
Net Import (-) 
in 1000 US$ 
42 Peru        4,541,972       4,039,381           502,591  
43 Turkey      14,228,577     13,748,485           480,092  
44 Uganda        1,180,328          767,509           412,819  
45 Zambia           759,452          356,737           402,715  
46 South Africa        6,913,921       6,533,679           380,242  
47 Republic of Moldova           924,922          642,286           282,636  
48 Sri Lanka        2,748,223       2,494,721           253,502  
49 Togo           351,208          172,998           178,210  
50 Guyana           379,851          243,603           136,248  
51 Cameroon        1,105,986          981,450           124,536  
52 Guinea-Bissau           209,103          104,737           104,366  
53 Uzbekistan        1,378,395       1,293,162             85,233  
54 Burkina Faso           477,874          397,220             80,654  
55 Belize           162,413          106,176             56,237  
56 Liberia           312,690          259,420             53,270  
57 Swaziland           277,486          234,345             43,141  
58 Burundi             83,093            78,096               4,997  
59 British Virgin Islands                    -                     -                      -   
60 Falkland Islands                    -                     -                      -   
61 Norfolk Island                    -                     -                      -   
62 Niue                  168              1,372              (1,204) 
63 Nauru              1,818              (1,818) 
64 Tuvalu                    -               2,918              (2,918) 
65 Guam                    -               3,212              (3,212) 
66 Solomon Islands             89,171            96,218              (7,047) 
67 American Samoa                      3            12,623            (12,620) 
68 St Pierre and Miquelon                      5            15,767            (15,762) 
69 Cook Islands                  626            25,773            (25,147) 
70 Dominica               9,199            38,148            (28,949) 
71 Vanuatu             40,673            69,721            (29,048) 
72 Sao Tome and Principe               6,592            39,282            (32,690) 
73 Kiribati               6,126            40,521            (34,395) 
74 Tonga               7,671            42,696            (35,025) 
75 Saint Kitts and Nevis               4,098            40,373            (36,275) 
76 Cambodia           370,089          412,319            (42,230) 
77 Central African Republic             21,977            65,914            (43,937) 
78 Saint Vincent and the G.             19,048            64,562            (45,514) 
79 Comoros             22,053            68,117            (46,064) 
80 Bhutan             31,400            81,499            (50,099) 
81 Grenada               8,710            61,650            (52,940) 
82 Cayman Islands            60,384            (60,384) 
83 Fiji           268,015          328,933            (60,918) 
84 Samoa               5,672            78,213            (72,541) 
85 Rwanda           155,881          230,016            (74,135) 
86 Chad             80,891          162,043            (81,152) 
87 Seychelles               4,134            92,175            (88,041) 
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Rank Countries 
Export Value 
(1000 US$) 
Import Value 
(1000 US$) 
Net Export (+) or 
Net Import (-) 
in 1000 US$ 
88 Saint Lucia             14,936          104,624            (89,688) 
89 Timor-Leste             12,324          113,343          (101,019) 
90 Faroe Islands             19,151          124,491          (105,340) 
91 Antigua and Barbuda               1,782          107,295          (105,513) 
92 Gambia             24,506          135,110          (110,604) 
93 Suriname             97,734          232,872          (135,138) 
94 Bermuda               3,100          138,926          (135,826) 
95 Zimbabwe        1,150,401       1,286,232          (135,831) 
96 Tanzania           982,513       1,120,943          (138,430) 
97 Namibia           224,107          375,585          (151,478) 
98 Eritrea                  660          156,354          (155,694) 
99 Madagascar           345,617          503,024          (157,407) 
100 Mali           323,358          483,567          (160,209) 
101 Lesotho               2,374          162,662          (160,288) 
102 Benin           710,513          878,451          (167,938) 
103 Turkmenistan           165,578          340,297          (174,719) 
104 Niger           123,120          304,154          (181,034) 
105 Equatorial Guinea               1,970          185,584          (183,614) 
106 Macedonia           640,178          829,921          (189,743) 
107 Barbados             90,700          309,664          (218,964) 
108 Aruba           117,877          341,628          (223,751) 
109 Sierra Leone             35,236          263,329          (228,093) 
110 Cabo Verde               1,010          238,169          (237,159) 
111 Latvia        1,788,224       2,033,066          (244,842) 
112 Laos           116,028          365,551          (249,523) 
113 Maldives                    -           281,534          (281,534) 
114 Iceland             99,409          414,844          (315,435) 
115 Guinea           180,244          502,064          (321,820) 
116 Mauritania             26,825          355,495          (328,670) 
117 Estonia        1,148,762       1,487,653          (338,891) 
118 Mongolia           104,263          461,716          (357,453) 
119 Tajikistan           170,642          531,186          (360,544) 
120 Mozambique           575,867          941,093          (365,226) 
121 French Polynesia             22,567          393,605          (371,038) 
122 New Caledonia               4,206          375,711          (371,505) 
123 Brunei Darussalam               3,119          384,555          (381,436) 
124 Bahamas             10,503          392,613          (382,110) 
125 Somalia           266,176          650,068          (383,892) 
126 Mauritius           403,675          813,474          (409,799) 
127 Dem. Rep. of Korea             32,101          465,686          (433,585) 
128 Kyrgyzstan           261,696          701,078          (439,382) 
129 Occupied Palestine             53,206          496,451          (443,245) 
130 Gabon             84,436          597,576          (513,140) 
131 Montenegro             79,192          595,383          (516,191) 
132 El Salvador        1,235,781       1,761,879          (526,098) 
133 Malta           109,085          638,781          (529,696) 
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Rank Countries 
Export Value 
(1000 US$) 
Import Value 
(1000 US$) 
Net Export (+) or 
Net Import (-) 
in 1000 US$ 
134 Dominican Republic        1,455,767       2,010,967          (555,200) 
135 Romania        5,463,428       6,018,732          (555,304) 
136 Armenia           207,333          771,348          (564,015) 
137 Congo             25,177          597,270          (572,093) 
138 Myanmar           782,477       1,355,505          (573,028) 
139 Jamaica           295,655          912,763          (617,108) 
140 Botswana           140,250          758,997          (618,747) 
141 Azerbaijan           727,070       1,372,260          (645,190) 
142 Trinidad and Tobago           184,859          833,757          (648,898) 
143 Nepal           195,610          891,110          (695,500) 
144 Georgia           427,718       1,143,555          (715,837) 
145 Djibouti             63,601          787,294          (723,693) 
146 Haiti             28,282          802,410          (774,128) 
147 Albania             84,355          876,491          (792,136) 
148 Panama           307,138       1,249,214          (942,076) 
149 Cyprus           310,286       1,271,666          (961,380) 
150 Dem. Rep. of the Congo             68,380       1,108,127       (1,039,747) 
151 Bahrain           417,624       1,479,519       (1,061,895) 
152 Croatia        1,406,270       2,475,401       (1,069,131) 
153 Senegal           503,901       1,601,387       (1,097,486) 
154 Tunisia        1,620,193       2,771,952       (1,151,759) 
155 China, Macao SAR             21,160       1,176,609       (1,155,449) 
156 Pakistan        5,181,303       6,355,761       (1,174,458) 
157 Luxembourg        1,700,834       2,913,222       (1,212,388) 
158 Austria      12,827,146     14,087,373       (1,260,227) 
159 Qatar             28,480       1,303,759       (1,275,279) 
160 Slovenia        1,862,456       3,204,427       (1,341,971) 
161 Afghanistan           242,962       1,669,632       (1,426,670) 
162 Cuba           720,637       2,169,504       (1,448,867) 
163 Slovakia        3,867,330       5,367,003       (1,499,673) 
164 Bosnia and Herzegovina           458,380       1,999,971       (1,541,591) 
165 Jordan        1,256,688       2,898,119       (1,641,431) 
166 Oman           921,107       2,566,247       (1,645,140) 
167 Sudan (former)           521,698       2,282,508       (1,760,810) 
168 Philippines        4,588,536       6,452,843       (1,864,307) 
169 Kazakhstan        1,840,852       3,920,497       (2,079,645) 
170 Czech Republic        6,746,358       9,116,906       (2,370,548) 
171 Lebanon           580,930       3,042,981       (2,462,051) 
172 Libya               5,262       2,534,057       (2,528,795) 
173 Israel        2,371,461       5,044,538       (2,673,077) 
174 Greece        5,418,062       8,092,616       (2,674,554) 
175 Kuwait           153,223       2,868,125       (2,714,902) 
176 Finland        2,854,251       5,720,958       (2,866,707) 
177 Syrian Arab Republic           948,111       3,814,962       (2,866,851) 
178 Yemen           296,751       3,169,380       (2,872,629) 
179 Morocco        2,182,062       5,286,521       (3,104,459) 
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Rank Countries 
Export Value 
(1000 US$) 
Import Value 
(1000 US$) 
Net Export (+) or 
Net Import (-) 
in 1000 US$ 
180 Switzerland        8,866,329     12,087,792       (3,221,463) 
181 Angola             11,009       3,313,118       (3,302,109) 
182 Singapore        8,181,043     11,517,859       (3,336,816) 
183 Portugal        5,622,476     10,369,773       (4,747,297) 
184 EU(15)ex.int    151,501,718   156,419,242       (4,917,524) 
185 Mexico      20,997,304     26,035,799       (5,038,495) 
186 EU(25)ex.int    136,379,636   141,703,647       (5,324,011) 
187 Iran (Islamic Republic of)        4,847,022     10,171,414       (5,324,392) 
188 Nigeria        1,551,308       6,899,254       (5,347,946) 
189 Venezuela             41,907       5,393,141       (5,351,234) 
190 Norway           832,550       6,592,783       (5,760,233) 
191 EU(27)ex.int    132,996,344   138,834,143       (5,837,799) 
192 Sweden        5,610,674     12,117,045       (6,506,371) 
193 Bangladesh           474,461       7,373,491       (6,899,030) 
194 Iraq             57,974       7,061,240       (7,003,266) 
195 Italy      40,992,469     49,937,030       (8,944,561) 
196 Egypt        5,194,233     14,686,163       (9,491,930) 
197 Taiwan        2,102,817     11,976,355       (9,873,538) 
198 Algeria           352,654     10,789,342     (10,436,688) 
199 United Arab Emirates        2,862,721     13,780,101     (10,917,380) 
200 Hong Kong        7,917,170     20,045,763     (12,128,593) 
201 Germany      80,321,346     94,997,392     (14,676,046) 
202 Saudi Arabia        3,482,995     19,492,724     (16,009,729) 
203 Republic of Korea        4,302,135     23,129,073     (18,826,938) 
204 Russian Federation        9,215,159     37,233,201     (28,018,042) 
205 United Kingdom      28,822,398     59,786,884     (30,964,486) 
206 China, mainland      42,304,534     95,066,246     (52,761,712) 
207 Japan        3,272,542     68,470,353     (65,197,811) 
208 China      52,345,681   128,264,973     (75,919,292) 
209 China ex.int      41,094,890   122,563,082     (81,468,192) 
Note: Data from FAOSTAT (2014) for Agricultural Product (Total +) in 2011 by value 
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A.12. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPS TOTALS AND STCS BY HS CODE 
 
Table 73: Percentage of total SPS measures with STCs raised against them by HS code from 1996 to 2010 
HS 
Code 
Total SPS 
Notifications 
Total 
STCs 
% SPS 
Raised as 
STC 
88 3 1 33.3% 
21 82 9 11.0% 
33 19 2 10.5% 
17 29 2 6.9% 
8 542 34 6.3% 
44 136 7 5.1% 
2 1411 65 4.6% 
7 365 15 4.1% 
10 262 10 3.8% 
6 297 11 3.7% 
16 143 5 3.5% 
9 155 5 3.2% 
18 35 1 2.9% 
3 296 8 2.7% 
11 46 1 2.2% 
1 1364 24 1.8% 
5 545 9 1.7% 
23 445 7 1.6% 
22 136 2 1.5% 
20 76 1 1.3% 
4 889 11 1.2% 
30 232 1 0.4% 
12 308 0 0.0% 
13 16 0 0.0% 
14 15 0 0.0% 
15 135 0 0.0% 
19 134 0 0.0% 
24 15 0 0.0% 
25 19 0 0.0% 
27 4 0 0.0% 
28 16 0 0.0% 
29 39 0 0.0% 
31 36 0 0.0% 
32 9 0 0.0% 
34 2 0 0.0% 
35 36 0 0.0% 
38 8 0 0.0% 
39 46 0 0.0% 
40 3 0 0.0% 
41 24 0 0.0% 
42 5 0 0.0% 
43 5 0 0.0% 
45 4 0 0.0% 
46 5 0 0.0% 
47 2 0 0.0% 
48 6 0 0.0% 
50 2 0 0.0% 
51 10 0 0.0% 
52 23 0 0.0% 
53 7 0 0.0% 
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HS 
Code 
Total SPS 
Notifications 
Total 
STCs 
% SPS 
Raised as 
STC 
63 1 0 0.0% 
67 7 0 0.0% 
69 3 0 0.0% 
70 1 0 0.0% 
71 1 0 0.0% 
73 2 0 0.0% 
74 1 0 0.0% 
76 1 0 0.0% 
79 1 0 0.0% 
80 1 0 0.0% 
82 1 0 0.0% 
84 6 0 0.0% 
86 1 0 0.0% 
87 3 0 0.0% 
89 3 0 0.0% 
90 5 0 0.0% 
94 4 0 0.0% 
95 1 0 0.0% 
97 2 0 0.0% 
 
Note: STCs included are those with named maintaining members excluding the category 
“certain members” and individual EU members. See description in section 3.6.1 
(beginning on page 98). Total SPS notifications for Regular and Emergency measures in 
the EU aggregate dataset (see page 39 for explanation on the treatment of the EU).  
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A.13. ARE STCS MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR ON LESS USED HS CODES? 
 
No. 
 
Table 74: Cross-sectional correlates of total SPS notifications by maintaining country and HS code using 
negative binomial estimator without HS-2 code dummies 
 STC  
(Present Year SPS) 
STC  
(Last Notified SPS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) 0.00751* 0.00705* 0.00621 0.00568 
 (0.00300) (0.00297) (0.00331) (0.00330) 
Log Imports -0.00399 0.0249 -0.0263 -0.00330 
 (0.0691) (0.0693) (0.0772) (0.0781) 
Log Exports -0.0971* -0.110* -0.0702 -0.0824 
 (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0545) (0.0542) 
Log GDP 0.467** 0.475** 0.478** 0.478** 
 (0.0808) (0.0821) (0.0900) (0.0919) 
Total SPS 0.0266** 0.0260** 0.0302** 0.0297** 
 (0.00546) (0.00530) (0.00608) (0.00597) 
Enviro. governance  -0.286  -0.167 
  (0.198)  (0.227) 
ln(α)216 0.913** 0.862** 1.023** 0.996** 
Observations 868 834 868 834 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients reported. 
 
 
 
  
                                               
216
 The value of α confirmed significant over-dispersion in the data (i.e. α ≠ 0), hence the choice of the NB 
estimator over Poisson. 
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A.14. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR STC REGRESSION MODELS 
Table 75: Summary statistics for variables used in cross-section models of section 3.6.2 
VARIABLE UNITS MEAN SD MIN MAX N DATA SOURCE 
STC (present SPS) Num. Concerns 0.21 0.76 0 8.00  1,080  Author's own / SPS - IMS 
STC (last SPS) Num. Concerns 0.17 0.70 0 8.00  1,080  Author's own / SPS - IMS 
BND Tariff (wgt. av.) % 31.06 34.07 0 316.97  915  WITS / TRAINS 
ln(imports) ln(yr 2000 US$) 18.24 2.69 0 26.83  1,009  UN COMTRADE 
ln(exports) ln(yr 2000 US$) 17.28 3.95 0 26.44  1,013  UN COMTRADE 
ln(GDP) ln(yr 2000 US$) 25.26 2.30 20.23  30.09  1,076  World Bank WDI 
Total Both SPS Num. Notifications 7.86 16.61 0 205.00  1,080  Author's own / SPS - IMS 
Enviro. Governance See source 0.24 0.56 -0.75 1.65  1,000  Yale ESI 2005 
 
Table 76: Summary statistics for variables used in time-series models of section 3.6.3 
VARIABLE UNITS MEAN SD MIN MAX N DATA SOURCE 
STC (present year SPS) Num. Concerns 0.069 0.283 0 4.00 3345 Author's own / SPS - IMS 
STC (last notified SPS) Num. Concerns 0.081 0.311 0 4.00 2265 Author's own / SPS - IMS 
L.D. BND Tariff (wgt. av.) % -0.237 8.118 -114.15 188.36 2078 WITS / TRAINS 
L2.D. Log Imports ln(yr 2000 US$) 0.141 0.986 -17.32 18.88 2543 UN COMTRADE 
L2.D. Log Exports ln(yr 2000 US$) 0.104 1.134 -18.46 12.14 2540 UN COMTRADE 
D. Log Exchange Rate ExRate / ExRate(‘96) 0.002 0.068 -0.24 0.28 1763 World Bank WDI 
D. Current Account (+) (dummy) -0.007 0.314 -1.00 1.00 3235 World Bank WDI 
D. ln(GDP per capita) ln(yr 2000 US$ / person) 0.025 0.038 -0.15 0.22 3196 World Bank WDI 
D. ln(population) ln(1,000s people) 0.013 0.015 -0.01 0.17 3235 UN DESA Pop. Div 
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Table 77: Summary statistics for variables used in resolution logistic models of section 4.4.2 
VARIABLE UNITS MEAN SD MIN MAX N DATA SOURCE 
Resolved? (dummy) 0.33 0.47 0 1 253 SPS - IMS 
# Supporting Num. WTO Members 1.04 1.87 0 12 253 Author's own / SPS - IMS 
Raise Count Num. Times STC raised 2.36 1.74 1 15 253 Author's own / SPS - IMS 
Raise ln(GDP) ln(yr 2000 US$) 27.76 2.19 19.82 30.09 253 World Bank WDI 
Maintain Developing? (dummy) 0.45 0.50 0 1 253 World Bank WDI 
Raise Developing? (dummy) 0.47 0.50 0 1 253 World Bank WDI 
Diff. ln(GDP) ln(Constant 2000 US$) 0.32 3.00 -10.04 7.17 253 Author's own / WB WDI 
Maintain ln(GDP) ln(yr 2000 US$) 27.44 2.22 21.63 30.09 253 World Bank WDI 
Raise ln(GDP per capita) ln(yr 2000 US$ / person) 9.13 1.21 6.01 10.56 253 World Bank WDI 
Maintain ln(GDP per capita) ln(yr 2000 US$ / person) 9.10 1.22 6.09 10.60 253 World Bank WDI 
Joint Democracy Score See source 15.55 5.87 1 20 249 Author's own / Polity IV 
Diff. Democracy Score See source 0.068 6.86 -17 17 249 Author's own / Polity IV 
Maintain Democracy Score See source 7.76 4.50 -7 10 251 Polity IV 
Raise Democracy Score See source 7.80 4.50 -7 10 251 Polity IV 
Diff. Regulatory Quality See source 0.01 1.16 -2.83 2.49 253 Author's own / WB WGI 
Maintain Regulatory Quality See source 0.72 0.74 -1.54 1.74 253 World Bank WGI 
Raise Regulatory Quality See source 0.73 0.86 -1.31 1.93 253 World Bank WGI 
Diff. Enviro. Governance See source 0.06 0.83 -1.67 1.99 249 Yale ESI 
Maintain Enviro. Governance See source 0.47 0.55 -0.58 1.65 252 Yale ESI 
Raise Enviro. Governance See source 0.40 0.56 -0.58 1.39 250 Yale ESI 
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A.15. PLANT HEALTH SPS STCS SUMMARY TABLES 
 
Table 78: Use of plant health related STCs by maintaining country and UN region 
Maintaining  
UN Region 
Maintaining 
Member 
Num. 
STCs 
% 
Regional 
Total  
% 
World 
Total 
East Asia  21 100.0% 19.4% 
 Japan 13 61.9% 12.0% 
 China 4 19.0% 3.7% 
 Taiwan 2 9.5% 1.9% 
  Korea 2 9.5% 1.9% 
North America  18 100.0% 16.7% 
 United States 17 94.4% 15.7% 
  Canada 1 5.6% 0.9% 
Latin America   17 100.0% 15.7% 
 Brazil 5 29.4% 4.6% 
 Mexico 4 23.5% 3.7% 
 Venezuela 2 11.8% 1.9% 
 Chile 2 11.8% 1.9% 
 Panama 1 5.9% 0.9% 
 Guatemala 1 5.9% 0.9% 
 Honduras 1 5.9% 0.9% 
  Costa Rica 1 5.9% 0.9% 
Europe   16 100.0% 14.8% 
 European Union 9 56.3% 8.3% 
 Switzerland 2 12.5% 1.9% 
 Poland 2 12.5% 1.9% 
 Slovakia 2 12.5% 1.9% 
  France 1 6.3% 0.9% 
Australasia   11 100.0% 10.2% 
 Australia 9 81.8% 8.3% 
  New Zealand 2 18.2% 1.9% 
SE Asia   10 100.0% 9.3% 
 Indonesia 8 80.0% 7.4% 
 Malaysia 1 10.0% 0.9% 
  Philippines 1 10.0% 0.9% 
Certain Members   4 100.0% 3.7% 
South Asia   4 100.0% 3.7% 
  India 4 100.0% 3.7% 
West Asia   4 100.0% 3.7% 
 Israel 3 75.0% 2.8% 
  Turkey 1 25.0% 0.9% 
Caribbean   3 100.0% 2.8% 
 Cuba 1 33.3% 0.9% 
 
Dominican 
Republic 1 33.3% 0.9% 
  Barbados 1 33.3% 0.9% 
TOTAL  108  100% 
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Table 79: Use of plant health related STCs by maintaining country and RPPO 
Maintaining 
RPPO 
Maintaining 
Member 
Num. 
STCs 
% 
Regional 
Total 
% 
World 
Total 
APPPC  31 100.0% 28.7% 
 Australia 9 29.0% 8.3% 
 Indonesia 8 25.8% 7.4% 
 India 4 12.9% 3.7% 
 China 4 12.9% 3.7% 
 New Zealand 2 6.5% 1.9% 
 Korea 2 6.5% 1.9% 
 Philippines 1 3.2% 0.9% 
  Malaysia 1 3.2% 0.9% 
EPPO  20 100.0% 18.5% 
 European Union 9 45.0% 8.3% 
 Israel 3 15.0% 2.8% 
 Switzerland 2 10.0% 1.9% 
 Slovakia 2 10.0% 1.9% 
 Poland 2 10.0% 1.9% 
 Turkey 1 5.0% 0.9% 
  France 1 5.0% 0.9% 
Independent  19 100.0% 17.6% 
 Japan 13 68.4% 12.0% 
 certain members 4 21.1% 3.7% 
  Taiwan 2 10.5% 1.9% 
NAPPO  18 100.0% 16.7% 
 United States 17 94.4% 15.7% 
  Canada 1 5.6% 0.9% 
OIRSA  9 100.0% 8.3% 
 Mexico 4 44.4% 3.7% 
 Honduras 1 11.1% 0.9% 
 Panama 1 11.1% 0.9% 
 Dominican Rep. 1 11.1% 0.9% 
 Guatemala 1 11.1% 0.9% 
  Costa Rica 1 11.1% 0.9% 
COSAVE  7 100.0% 6.5% 
 Brazil 5 71.4% 4.6% 
  Chile 2 28.6% 1.9% 
CPPC  4 100.0% 3.7% 
 Venezuela 2 50.0% 1.9% 
 Cuba 1 25.0% 0.9% 
  Barbados 1 25.0% 0.9% 
TOTAL   108   100.0% 
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Table 80: Use of plant health related STCs by raising country and UN region 
Raising UN 
Region 
Raising 
Member 
Num. 
STCs 
% 
Regional 
Total 
% 
World 
Total 
North America  36 100.0% 33.3% 
 United States 32 88.9% 29.6% 
  Canada 4 11.1% 3.7% 
Latin America  26 100.0% 24.1% 
 Argentina 11 42.3% 10.2% 
 Chile 3 11.5% 2.8% 
 Brazil 3 11.5% 2.8% 
 Ecuador 2 7.7% 1.9% 
 Uruguay 2 7.7% 1.9% 
 Costa Rica 2 7.7% 1.9% 
 Venezuela 1 3.8% 0.9% 
 Mexico 1 3.8% 0.9% 
  Nicaragua 1 3.8% 0.9% 
Europe  19 100.0% 17.6% 
 European Union 18 94.7% 16.7% 
  Hungary 1 5.3% 0.9% 
East Asia  9 100.0% 8.3% 
 China 7 77.8% 6.5% 
 Hong Kong 1 11.1% 0.9% 
  Taiwan 1 11.1% 0.9% 
Australasia  8 100.0% 7.4% 
 New Zealand 5 62.5% 4.6% 
  Australia 3 37.5% 2.8% 
SE Asia  6 100.0% 5.6% 
 Philippines 4 66.7% 3.7% 
  Thailand 2 33.3% 1.9% 
South Asia  2 100.0% 1.9% 
 India 1 50.0% 0.9% 
  Pakistan 1 50.0% 0.9% 
Northern Africa  1 100.0% 0.9% 
  Egypt 1 100.0% 0.9% 
West Asia  1 100.0% 0.9% 
  Israel 1 100.0% 0.9% 
TOTAL  108  100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
374 
 
 
Table 81: Use of plant health related STCs by raising country and RPPO 
Raising 
RPPO 
Raising 
Member 
Num. 
STCs 
% 
Regional 
Total 
% 
World 
Total 
NAPPO  36 100.0% 33.3% 
 United States 32 88.9% 29.6% 
  Canada 4 11.1% 3.7% 
APPPC  22 100.0% 20.4% 
 China 7 31.8% 6.5% 
 New Zealand 5 22.7% 4.6% 
 Philippines 4 18.2% 3.7% 
 Australia 3 13.6% 2.8% 
 Thailand 2 9.1% 1.9% 
  India 1 4.5% 0.9% 
EPPO  20 100.0% 18.5% 
 European Union 18 90.0% 16.7% 
 Hungary 1 5.0% 0.9% 
  Israel 1 5.0% 0.9% 
COSAVE  19 100.0% 17.6% 
 Argentina 11 57.9% 10.2% 
 Brazil 3 15.8% 2.8% 
 Chile 3 15.8% 2.8% 
  Uruguay 2 10.5% 1.9% 
OIRSA  4 100.0% 3.7% 
 Costa Rica 2 50.0% 1.9% 
 Nicaragua 1 25.0% 0.9% 
  Mexico 1 25.0% 0.9% 
CAN  2 100.0% 1.9% 
  Ecuador 2 100.0% 1.9% 
NEPPO  2 100.0% 1.9% 
 Egypt 1 50.0% 0.9% 
  Pakistan 1 50.0% 0.9% 
Independent  2 100.0% 1.9% 
 Taiwan 1 50.0% 0.9% 
  Hong Kong 1 50.0% 0.9% 
CPPC  1 100.0% 0.9% 
  Venezuela 1 100.0% 0.9% 
TOTAL  108  100.0% 
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A.16. AGENDA FOR FARMER/TRADER WORKSHOP 
 
 
 
RASD Farmer and Trader Meeting 
RASD Resource Centre 
1/11/2014 
10am – 6pm 
 
 
Part 1: Understanding Other Market Opportunities 
10am – Introduction – Ignitius Bwoogi 
10:10am – Prayer – Paul Kisseki 
10:30am – Welcome from Village Chief 
11am – Break-up into 5 focus groups to discuss questions 
12:30pm – Return to discuss in big group 
1pm – Lunch catered from Bonnie’s Restaurant 
 
Part 2: Pests and Diseases of Coffee and Responses 
2pm – Large group discussion of problems faced by coffee farmers 
2:30pm – Break-out into 5 focus groups to discuss questions 
3:30pm – Large group discussion about pathways forward 
4pm – Small break 
 
Part 3: Market Connections Trading Game 
4:30pm – Review the day and explain game 
5pm – Game starts: each breakout group needs to decide whether to sell to Neil, Lee, or Igntiius  
for each of the 10 simulated coffee years. They will each have a different price list to 
simulate the market. Paul will enter data on the laptop 
5:45pm – Game ends and winner announced  
6pm – Closing 
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A.17. CONSENT PAGE FOR SURVEYS 
 
Brief of survey:  
The point of this survey is to understand how coffee pests and diseases have affected your farm and 
your region. This study is undertaken by the Rural Agency for Sustainable Development (RASD) in 
Nkokonjeru as well as research collaborators at the University of California Davis in the USA and 
Imperial College London in England.  
 
Procedures: 
We will ask you questions about pests, your farm, and your family. All answers will be recorded. At the 
end of the survey you will be paid for your time—as there are no right or wrong answers. With your 
permission, your photo and photos of your coffee plot may be taken. 
 
Risks: 
This interview is not expected to cause you harm, but if you feel uncomfortable with some of the 
questions you can choose not to answer them and continue the interview or stop the interview as you 
wish. You will still be given the opportunity to receive the benefits of the survey, even if you decide to 
end the interview. 
 
Benefits: 
You will be compensated for your time via a brief risk-aversion game at the end of the interview. You 
will be awarded an amount between 2,000-7,000 USh depending on the outcome of the game.  
 
Confidentiality: 
You name will be taken at the time of interview, but will be changed to an ID number and nothing will 
be associated with your real name once the data is saved digitally.  
 
Whom to contact: 
If you want to find more information about the study, or make a complaint, please contact Dr. Neil 
McRoberts (nmcroberts@ucdavis.edu) (+1 530-752-3248) at University of California at Davis, or Lee 
Pearson (L.Pearson10@imperial.ac.uk) (+44 7532 003 029) at Imperial College London.  
 
 
____________________________ 
Subject’s signature or fingerprint 
 
____________________________    ________________ 
Signature of interviewer      Date 
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A.18. INSTRUCTION PAGE FOR RISK-AVERSION GAME 
 
Instructions: 
1. Before showing the sheet, explain: 
o You will play a game with 2 bags A and B.  
o In each bag there are 4 marbles, you will draw 1.  
o Each marble is worth some amount money. 
 
2. In bag A, there are 4 red marbles each worth 4,000 USh. (Demonstrate with 
marbles in bag).  
 
3. In bag B, there are 3 red marbles and 1 white marble, but the value of each 
will vary on each row. 
 
4. (show sheet and explain briefly the pay-out possibilities again with the 
numbers in front of them. Do a practice with the bag) 
 
5. Demonstrating on sheet, explain there are 8 rounds/rows and for each they 
choose whether they prefer to draw one marble from bag A or B.  
 
6. Explain that after they have filled out all 8 rows, one row will be chosen and 
played for real. 
 
7. Questions? 
 
 (Interviewer should answer questions and then report the outcome below: 
which of the 8 rows was selected, the amount paid, and signature of volunteer 
indicating they were paid. Save sheet in safe place and bring back to RASD.) 
 
 
END OF INTERVIEW 
 
Row Randomly Chosen: ___________  
 
 
Paid:___________________________ Signature: __________________________ 
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A.19. SURVEY FORM FOR FARMERS 
 
Coffee Production Questions: 
 
1. What do you produce in 
addition to coffee? (e.g. 
matoke, chicken…) 
 
2. Total size of farm land (acres) 
3. Size of coffee plot  (acres) 
4. Number of coffee trees (#) (trees) 
5. How many years have you 
been growing coffee? (years) 
6. Have you planted seedlings 
in the past 5 years 
a. When? 
b. How many? 
(yes / no) 
(years) 
(trees) 
7. Amount of coffee produced 
a. This year? 
b. Last year? 
c. Typical year in past? 
(kg) 
(kg) 
(kg) 
8. What do you sell? (Mwanyi mbisi / Mwanyi  Nkalu / Kase) 
9. Do you dry your coffee on the 
ground or on a tarpaulin? (ground   /    tarpaulin    /   other) 
10. Do you think you could 
produce more with your plot?  
a. What limits your 
production? (e.g. 
pests, old trees, etc.) 
(yes / no) 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Has quality been a problem? (yes   /   sometimes   /   no) 
12.  Has the price been adequate 
a. 2013 price? 
b. 2012 price? 
c. “fair” price? 
 
(yes / no)                                      (USh/kg) 
                                                     (USh/kg) 
                                                     (USh/kg) 
13. What are your total estimated 
costs for producing coffee 
each year?  
a. What are the 3 biggest 
expenses? (e.g. 
pesticides, seedlings, 
harvesting etc.) 
(USh/year) 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
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Network Questions: 
 
14. Who do you go to help make 
decisions on your coffee plot 
(from planting through to sale)? 
a. Spouse? 
b. Extension agent? 
c. Input salesperson? 
d. Neighbour? 
e. Coffee trader? 
f. Friend?  
g. Community leader?  
 
 
 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no)      
(yes / no)       
15. Do you apply fertilizer or growth 
treatments to your coffee trees? 
What? Who do you get it from? 
(yes / no) 
(what?) 
(who?) 
16. Do you apply pesticides, 
fungicides, or other treatments 
against diseases/pests? What? 
Who do you get it from? 
(yes / no) 
(what?) 
(who?) 
17. Who do you talk to when 
deciding how to treat a 
pest/disease? 
(who?) 
18. Who do you sell your coffee to? 
Where does it go next? 
(who?) 
(where?) 
19. What other options are there for 
selling coffee? 
- Who does neighbour sell to? 
 
20. Are you a member of a Co-op or 
other coffee farmer group? 
Which one? Why? 
(yes / no)                                  (which?) 
 
(why?) 
21. Why did you start growing 
coffee?  
- Who did you talk to about 
that decision? 
 
22. Have you attended a course:  
a. At RASD?  
b. Other agency? Which? 
 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no)                                  (which?) 
 
 
Pest Questions: 
23. What are the most significant pest problems you’ve faced this year? 
 
25. What were the most significant pest problems last year? 
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26.  If coffee pests/disease got very bad such that you couldn’t grow it: 
a. What other crops would you grow instead (e.g. matoke, beans)?  
 
 
b. Would you consider a non-planting activity to make money (e.g. 
waaragi brewing, chicken raising, craft making, etc.)? 
 
 
Pest/Disease Image Survey: 
 
27.  Tick the box after showing pictures of each 
  Name of it YES NO 
27.A. Have you seen A before?    
27.B. Have you seen B before?    
27.C. Have you seen C before?    
27.D. Have you seen D before?    
27.E. Have you seen E before?    
 
28.  How severe do you think the impact would be from A,B,C,D,E on your plot? 
 
 DESCRIPTION A B C D E 
NONE It does nothing to the coffee when it comes      
LOW Very minor change to yield or quality      
MED. I earn less money due to impact on yield or quality 
     
HIGH I lose about half of my crop earning from loses to 
yield or quality 
     
VERY 
HIGH 
Losses are substantial (more than half) and it may 
impact my ability to grow coffee following years 
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29.  How frequently do you observe A,B,C,D,E on your plot? 
 
 DESCRIPTION A B C D E 
NEVER I’ve never seen this on my plot in the past 5 years 
     
SELDOM I’ve seen this in 1 year of the past 5 years 
     
OFTEN I’ve seen this in 2 to 4 years of the past 5 years      
ANNUAL I see this every year at some point on my plot 
     
ALWAYS This is essentially always present on my plot. 
Throughout the year, I’ll see it many times. 
     
 
 
 
30. What do you do to prevent and treat A, B, C, D, E on your farm? 
Describe measures 
Rate the effectiveness of each from 1-5 
(1-not very, 5-super effective) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31. What are the barriers you face to dealing with coffee pests/diseases? 
 
 
 
 
 
32. What do others (e.g. neighbours) do to prevent A, B, C, D, E on their plots? 
Describe measures Why don’t you use these measures? 
 
 
 
 
 
33. Are there other pests/disease problems with coffee that we have not talked 
about so far? How frequently do they occur? How severe is their impact? 
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Household Questions: 
 
34. Sex ( male   /   female ) 
35. Age  
36. Highest education of head of house (none / primary / secondary / higher) 
37. Number of children  
38. Married (yes / no) 
39. Total household size including 
relatives or friends living with you  
40. Estimate yearly or monthly income? (USh/month)  
or (USH/year) 
41. How many times a day do you eat? (  <1    /    1   /    2   /   3  /   3+  ) 
42. Do you own a cellphone? (yes / no) 
43. Do you own a motorcycle/vehicle? (yes / no) 
44. Do you have electricity? (no / solar / grid / generator / battery) 
45. Do you own the land you grow on? (yes / no) 
46. Do you own a watch or clock? (yes / no) 
47. In addition to coffee, how else does 
your family make money?  
48. How important is coffee to your 
income? 
      not important 
      less than half of income 
      more than half of income 
      sole income source  
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A.20. SURVEY FORM FOR TRADERS 
 
Coffee Trading Questions: 
 
1. What do you trade in addition 
to coffee?  
2. How many coffee growers did 
you buy from in 2013? 
a. How many in 2012? 
b. Typically how many? 
(growers) 
 
(growers) 
(growers) 
3. Travel how far to buy coffee? (miles or km) 
4. How many people do you 
employ to buy on your behalf? (traders) 
5. Typical purchase size from 
one coffee grower  (kgs) 
6. Coffee bought: 
a. Variety of coffee 
b. Cherry? 
c. Kase? 
d. Mwanyi Nkalu how? 
e. Certifications? 
 
( Robusta  / Arabica  /  Koronal  /  other) 
(Mwanyi Nkalu  /  Mwanyi mbisi) 
(yes  /  no) 
(ground   /   tarp   /   both   /   other) 
 (none  /  fair-trade  /  Nucafe  / other) 
7. Percentage coffee bought from 
other traders?  
______% from traders 
 
_______% from growers 
8. What do you mainly sell? 
a. 2013 price? 
b. 2012 price? 
c. Fair price? 
(Kase  /  Mwanyi Nkalu  /  Mwanyi mbisi) 
(USh/kg) 
(USh/kg) 
(USh/kg) 
9. How many years have you 
been trading coffee? (years) 
10. Amount of coffee bought 
a. In 2013? 
b. In 2012? 
c. Typical year? 
Mwanyi Nkalu 
 
(tonnes) 
(tonnes) 
(tonnes) 
Mwanyi mbisi 
 
(tonnes) 
(tonnes) 
(tonnes) 
11. Do you think you could trade 
more coffee?  
a. What limits you? (e.g. 
pests, credit, etc.) 
(yes / no) 
 
 
12. Has quality been a problem? (yes   /   sometimes   /   no) 
13.  What price do you pay 
farmers: 
a. In 2013?  
b. In 2012?  
c. What is a fair price? 
Mwanyi Nkalu 
 
(USh/kg) 
(USh/kg) 
(USh/kg) 
Mwanyi mbisi 
 
(USh/kg) 
(USh/kg) 
(USh/kg) 
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14. What are your total costs for 
trading coffee each year?  
a. What are the 3 biggest 
costs? (e.g. transport, 
processing, etc.) 
(USh/year) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
15. Cost at mill to process Mwanyi 
Nkalu to Kase (remove husk)? (USh/kg) 
16. Drying 10kg Mwanyi mbisi 
makes what kg Mwanyi Nkalu? (kgs) 
17. Milling 10kg of Mwanyi Nkalu 
makes how many kgs Kase? (kgs) 
 
Network Questions: 
18. Who do you go to help make 
decisions about your business: 
h. Spouse? 
i. Exporter of coffee? 
j. Coffee mill? 
k. Neighbour? 
l. Mill owner? 
m. Coffee grower? 
n. Friend? trades coffee? 
o. Community leader? 
trades coffee? 
 
 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no)      (yes / no) 
(yes / no)      (yes / no) 
19. Do you give advice to coffee 
growers? 
a. New varieties of coffee? 
b. Where to get seedlings? 
c. Pesticides? 
d. Fertilizers? 
e. Drying/process methods? 
f. How to improve quality? 
g. Other? 
(yes / no) 
 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no) 
______________________________ 
20. Who do you sell your coffee to? 
Where does it go next?  
(Top 3 buyers and places) 
    (who?)                              (where?) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
 
21. What other options are there for 
selling coffee, or who do other 
traders sell to? 
(what?) 
(who?) 
22. Do you buy as a part of a coffee 
trading group?  
 
(yes / no)                                  (which?) 
  
(why?) 
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23. Why did you start trading 
coffee? Who did you talk to 
about that decision? 
(why?) 
 
(who?) 
24. Do you grow coffee as well? 
How much in 2013? 
a. If you did in past, but not 
now, why did you stop? 
(yes  /  no) 
 _______kgs Mwanyi mbisi in 2013 
 
(why?) 
25. Have you attended a course:  
a. At RASD?  
b. Other agency? Which? 
 
(yes / no) 
(yes / no)                                  (which?) 
 
 
Pest Questions: 
26. What are the most significant pest problems coffee growers had in 2013? 
 
27. What were the most significant pest problems in 2012? 
 
28.  If coffee pests/disease got very bad, such that you couldn’t trade coffee: 
a. What would you do instead to make money? (e.g. raise chickens, trade 
other crops, grow matooke, etc.) 
 
 
 
b. How likely do you think this is to happen in the next 5 years? 
  1 – Very unlikely      2 – Unlikely       3 – Possible       4 – Likely     5 – Very likely 
 
 
Pest/Disease Image Survey: 
 
29.  Tick the box after showing pictures of each 
  Name of it YES NO 
27.A. Have you seen A before?    
27.B. Have you seen B before?    
27.C. Have you seen C before?    
27.D. Have you seen D before?    
27.E. Have you seen E before?    
 
30.  Rank the severity of each pest/disease for coffee growers starting with worst: 
 
1_____ 2_____3_____ 4_____5_____ 
 
31. What makes #1 so bad? 
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32. What do growers do to prevent and treat A, B, C, D, E on their plots? 
Describe measures taken How effective is it? 
 
 
 
 
 
33. What are the barriers coffee growers face to deal with coffee pests/diseases? 
 
 
34. Are there other pests/disease problems with coffee that we have not talked 
about so far? How frequently do they occur? How severe is their impact? 
 
 
 
Household Questions: 
 
35. Sex ( male   /   female ) 
36. Age  
37. Highest education of head of house (none / primary / secondary / higher) 
38. Number of children (kids) 
39. Married (yes / no) 
40. Total household size including 
relatives or friends living with you (people) 
41. What is your operation capital? (USh) 
42. Estimate yearly or monthly income? (USh/month)  
or (USH/year) 
43. How many times a day do you eat? (  <1    /    1   /    2   /   3  /   3+  ) 
44. Do you own a cellphone? (yes / no) 
45. Do you own a motorcycle/vehicle? (yes / no) 
46. Do you have electricity? (no / solar / grid / generator / battery) 
47. Do you own land? (yes / no) 
48. Do you own a watch or clock? (yes / no) 
49. In addition to trading coffee, how 
else does your family make money?  
50. How important is coffee to your 
income? 
(check one) 
      not important 
      less than half of income 
      more than half of income 
      sole income source 
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A.21. MPL DESIGN FOR IMPERIAL FESTIVAL IN LONDON 
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A.22. ROBUSTA COFFEE PESTS AND DISEASES OF UGANDA 
 
A.22.1. Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD) 
Tracheomycosis—Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD)—is caused by the anamorph Fusarium fungal 
pathogen F. xylarioides (Gibberella xylarioides in the sexual, teleomorph stage) (Hakiza, DT, 
Musoli, et al., 2009; Flood, 2009). The fungus blocks water and nutrient transport in the tree 
causing wilting and eventual death. While it was detected in coffee in the early 1900s, the 
biological understanding of the disease is still improving. Recent work has found isolates of 
other associated Fusarium species (F. lateritium) on CWD infected coffee plants in Uganda, 
but it is thought these could be secondary invaders of plants injured by an initial F. xylarioides 
infection (Geiser, Ivey, Hakiza, et al., 2005). Coffee wilt can affect a coffee plant at any stage 
in its life cycle from seedling to mature plant. The fungus has also been found to host in 
tomatoes in Nigeria and recently, in bananas in Uganda—an important find for management as 
often coffee is intercropped with bananas in Uganda farming systems (Waller, Bigger & 
Hillocks, 2007a). Once affected by CWD, mortality rate for plants is considered to be nearly 
100% (Geiser, Ivey, Hakiza, et al., 2005). The high mortality rate for this fungal pathogen 
makes it a serious threat to coffee production once it has established a strong presence in a 
given field or region.  
 
CWD was first detected in 1939 on C. excelsa coffee (synonymously C. liberica) samples 
collected from plantations at a town called Aba in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
near the border of South Sudan (Kalonji-Mbuyi, Tshilenge Djim & Saiba, 2009). The detection 
was just subsequent to the scaling up of coffee production in the DRC; commercial-level 
growing began between 1924 and 1930 (Kalonji-Mbuyi, Tshilenge Djim & Saiba, 2009). 
However, others credit the first detection of CWD to a source in the Central Africa Republic. 
There is a reference to a wilt disease affecting coffee first observed in 1927 near Bangui in the 
Central African Republic (Waller, Bigger & Hillocks, 2007a). The disease spread quickly 
among the large plantations of C. excelsa coffee in Central African Republic such that be the 
end of the 1930s, CWD was found throughout the country. By 1945 was found to affect other 
coffee varieties (specifically Robusta, C. canephora) (Waller, Bigger & Hillocks, 2007a).  
 
CWD is now present in coffee growing areas throughout Africa, but it is especially severe in 
Uganda as shown in Figure 89.  
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Figure 89: Coffee Wilt Disease (G. xylarioides) is widespread in Africa, with a concentrated presence in 
East Africa (see inset of Uganda) (Leach & Hobbs, 2013). 217 
 
Due to the diseases’ impact on production, Uganda has had various projects from domestic and 
international institutions to control the disease (Rutherford, 2006). Management practices on 
the farm have encouraged farmers to be more careful about cross-field contamination from 
spreading soil and there have been measures put in place to raise awareness about burning 
infected trees. However, one of the more successful efforts have been the development and 
distribution of CWD-resistant seedlings. Rutherford (2006) reviews the current state of the 
knowledgebase on CWD in East Africa including resistant seedling development. The 
NaCCRI/COREC218 Senior Scientist interviewed (interviewee #15) as a part of this research 
confirmed they have developed seven different resistant varieties of Robusta coffee, which 
have been widely distributed in the past decade or more to control the severity of CWD on 
farmers’ production. Despite the advancements to get CWD under control, it is still a major 
constraint on farmers’ production as evidence from the pest survey (see section 6.4.1).  
 
                                               
217
 Data available through CABI Plantwise Pest Distribution Map database:  
http://www.plantwise.org/KnowledgeBank/ Map/ GLOBAL/ Gibberella_xylarioides/ 
218
 NaCCRI is the National Crops Research Institute and a part of this research group is the Coffee Research 
Centre or COREC, both are under the National Agricultural Research Organization or NARO in Uganda.  
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A.22.2. Black Twig Borer (BTB) 
BTB (Xyleborus ferrugineus) is an ambrosia beetle with a wide range of distribution across the 
world as well as a wide variety of host plants. The distribution of the beetle across Africa is 
shown in Figure 90. In Uganda, it is often called the Coffee Twig Borer as well (CTB). Like 
most ambrosia beetles, the BTB lives in symbiosis with a fungus that the beetle infects the twig 
with when it burrows a tunnel. The fungus digests the xylem tissue of the plant and then the 
beetle consumes the fungus. Unlike the majority of ambrosia beetles though, the BTB attacks 
healthy trees and not dead wood or damaged trees—although anecdotally in Uganda, it is 
thought that coffee trees already under stress (e.g. from lack of nutrients, water, or CWD) may 
be more susceptible to attack from BTB (personal conversation, interviewee #15).   
 
 
Figure 90: Black Twig Borer (Xyleborus ferrugineus) is present (green dot) in most countries in sub-
Saharan Africa including Mali and Sudan to the north (Leach & Hobbs, 2013). 
 
A NaCCRI/COREC Senior Scientist confirmed that BTB is the pest they are currently most 
concerned about for coffee production (personal conversation, interviewee #15). It came as 
early as 1993 they believe. Like CWD, it came from the Democratic Republic of Congo, but it 
only became a real problem for coffee production in several districts of Uganda in the past five 
years. The NaCCRI/COREC scientist do not know the true extent of severity of the pest, but 
last year reports showed that 25 out of 26 coffee districts surveyed were affected to some extent, 
with the southern and central districts thought to be the worst impacted (personal conversation, 
interviewee #15). The interviewee also noted that BTB spread to Kenya across the Nile in 2011. 
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The institute’s consensus belief is that Uganda is still on an upward trend with the worst years 
yet to come for BTB. Interviewee #15 had many estimates they were using in their work in 
studying the BTB’s biology and ecology.219 The data would be helpful in developing a spread 
model for BTB to help with control planning, but this application was saved for future research.  
 
NaCCRI/COREC is planning national surveys to get a better idea of the extent of the 
problem—though currently interviewee #15 estimated that nationwide perhaps 8% of branches 
are affected. In Uganda, they have confirmed that the insect can host on over 40 crops 
commonly grown. As such, this makes it a very difficult pest to tackle since it can live on host 
shade trees surrounding coffee plots or on neighbouring cocoa or avocado trees that a farmer 
may have in his or her garden. They believe the shade also helps the borer with lower 
temperatures. Interestingly though, the damage anecdotally seems to be more severe in the dry 
season (personal conversation, interviewee #15). The reason for this discrepancy was thought 
to be that the tree is stressed more in the dry season and is thus more susceptible to damage 
from the fungus that the borer spreads. Some of the clonal varieties developed to resist CWD 
are also more vulnerable to BTB than others; however, interviewee #15 believed that all 
cultivars are ultimately susceptible to some extent.  
 
 
                                               
219
 Interviewee #15 from NaCCRI/COREC reported that the BTB female can fly up to 200m in a day, can infest 
approximately 10 twigs in her lifetime, and produce around 20 eggs per twig she infests. It takes around 1 month 
from boring the twig to hatching. Interviewee was unsure about mortality rates, gender dynamics, and predation 
as much more research is needed into the ecology of the BTB in Uganda.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Note: (a) entry hole for BTB; (b) mature BTB (red circle) in thicker twig and fungus clearly 
visible in split open gallery; (c) BTB in mature, brown twig; (d) BTB in young, green twig. 
All photos taken by author. 
 
Figure 91: Examples of BTB present in twigs in coffee trees found during household surveys 
 
The senior scientist also reiterated the importance of checking for signs of BTB (e.g. small 
holes in the twigs of the coffee tree) and then pruning and burning any infected branches. While 
most farmers know this based on the grower/trader workshop in Nkokonjeru that the research 
team conducted, the HH survey confirmed that few were actually following this practice (see 
section 7.2.1 beginning on page 276). Interview #15 also observed that if farmers were more 
diligent about pruning to keep the coffee tree from getting too “bushy” and fertilized regularly, 
the tree health would be improved and the vigour might help it to survive localized infestations 
by BTB. Many farmers visited during household surveying were able to identify an infestation 
of BTB on their trees once shown a picture during the pest survey, even when they did not have 
a name for it (see examples in Figure 91 above). 
 
Other treatment methods include alcohol-based traps (personal conversation, interviewee #15 
and #14). The manager of a coffee supply chain training organization (interviewee #14) thought 
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that alcohol-based traps worked well, except that farmers may drink the alcohol. However, the 
senior scientist at NaCCRI/COREC (interviewee #15) found that even in their controlled 
experiments at their field test site in Mukono, they were only capturing a maximum of five 
beetles per week. This rate of capture was thought far too low to affect seriously the spread of 
the insect on a farmer’s plot (personal conversation, interviewee #15). As well, the Regional 
Sustainability Manager (interviewee #8) who worked with farmers on behalf of Exporter B, 
also reported that their trials of alcohol-based traps were not successful; interviewee #8 
reported capturing more wasps than BTB.  
 
Despite the only government research agency for coffee as well as a major exporter not 
recommending traps, several other stakeholders were still actively promoting them. RASD as 
well as NGO B had active programs to teach coffee growers how to construct and use alcohol-
based traps. The local NAADS officers also talked about the need for funding to construct more 
alcohol-based trap interventions as an extension service (personal conversation, interviewee 
#16). While this discrepancy was not fully explored, it appeared that there was a lot of latency 
in communication between stakeholders further removed from the farmers with those that are 
meant to interface with them directly. The NGOs were still working on promoting alcohol-
based traps, while the research agency and exporters had already done controlled scientific 
experiments to show they do not work effectively and had moved on to new ideas. Given that 
no one from the research team saw one trap in use during all of the household surveys, it was 
likely that farmers as well had realized the traps were ineffective.  
 
Moving beyond chemical attractants, NaCCRI/COREC had also done some limited testing on 
chemical control agents (personal conversation, interviewee #15). They had found that “E-
max” a pesticide220 when applied along with tebuconazole (a triazole fungicide) worked to 
some extent to control BTB populations in their field, but they had yet to do extensive 
controlled experiments to confirm best practice on using pesticide/fungicide combinations. 
These tests were seen as low priority as the vast majority of Uganda’s coffee growers would 
be unable to afford pesticide/fungicide treatment regimens due to the high costs (personal 
conversation, interviewee #15).  
 
                                               
220
 Interviewee #15 was unsure what chemical was in it, and the author could not find it on the market when he 
interviewed the inputs store employee, interviewee #13 
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In the course of the surveys, the team found that ants sporadically inhabited the inside of twigs 
that looked like they had been infested by the BTB based on the entry hole of the twig and 
symptoms of the tree. A few images from one case found at the beginning of the household 
surveys is shown in Figure 92.  
 
 
 
Note: the red circle (right) shows what looks like ant larva in the gallery of the twig 
Figure 92: Examples of black ants (unknown spp) inhabiting a likely former Black Twig Borer gallery 
 
The contact at NaCCRI/COREC had not heard of ants interfering with BTB and was interested 
by the anecdotal evidence we had from the surveys. The Senior Scientist (interviewee #15) 
however thought that finding a natural predator of the BTB would be the best control strategy 
for BTB given the lack of cash farmers have for pesticides and ineffectiveness of alcohol-based 
traps. In conversation with the Regional Sustainability Manager for Exporter B (interviewee 
#8), the author found that interviewee #8 as well had seen ants in a BTB gallery. Interviewee 
#8 was excited that someone else had found this as well. Interviewee #8 had thought the ants 
might be predatory and eating the eggs of the BTB, but could not find any research on the topic 
(personal conversation, interviewee #8). Although, unconfirmed by this present survey, the 
investigation into the species of ant present in the coffee twigs as well as confirming if it 
interacts with BTB would be a fruitful area of future research. Identification of other possible 
natural enemies based on surveys in the DRC where BTB likely originated before entering 
Uganda could also possibly point to some biological control strategies that may help reduce 
the impact from BTB in Uganda.  
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A.22.3. Coffee Berry Borer (CBB) 
Coffee Berry Borer (Hypothenemus hampei) is one of the most important pests found at coffee 
plantations worldwide accounting for severe yield losses in some areas, but with presence in 
almost every coffee producing country in the world (Damon, 2000). Considering its extensive 
range, it is believed that Coffee Berry Borer (CBB) was one of the first pests associated with 
coffee in its infancy of international trade during the 16th and 17th century as coffee production 
spread beyond Ethiopia (Damon, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 93: Coffee Berry Borer (Hypothenemus hampei) is present (green dot) on mainland sub-Sarahan 
Africa, as far south as Mozambique (Leach & Hobbs, 2013). 
 
Within Africa, CBB is found in many countries as shown in Figure 93 above. Unfortunately, 
the expected impact of CBB in East Africa is expected to become much worse under various 
climate change scenarios (Jaramillo, Muchugu, Vega, et al., 2011). CBB damages the output 
of coffee in different ways compared to CWD or BTB. CBB enters into the coffee cherry either 
on the tree or after harvest and feeds on the bean inside as well as laying eggs. It is one of the 
most devastating pests in Colombia and as a result many IPM (Integrated Pest Management) 
strategies have been developed as, like Uganda, it is a critical part of the economy of Colombia. 
Given the effectiveness of some of the measures, the adoption rate reported by Chaves & Riley 
(2001) are much higher than the adoption of best practices for coffee plot maintenance found 
in Uganda (see section 7.2.1). The importance of learning from the experience of CBB in 
Colombia is that one might be able to predict the uptake of IPM strategies if similar methods 
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could be found to control BTB. Additionally, many of the strategies discussed in Chaves & 
Riley (2001) were not being used in Uganda. Considering the severity of the pest reported by 
farmers (see section 6.4.1), it could be a useful area of extension work to apply lessons to a 
new, African context.  
 
A.22.4. Red Blister Disease (RBD) 
Red Blister Disease (RBD) is the fungal pathogen Cercospora coffeicola (Mycosphaerella 
coffeicola in the sexual, teleomorph stage) and is synonymously referred to as Brown Eye Spot 
Disease221 (Rutherford & Phiri, 2006). The fungus is present in many countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as warmer climates in Sudan and Yemen (see Figure 94 below).  
 
Only recently has the mechanism of infection of the coffee trees been clearly examined (Souza, 
Rodrigues, Maffia, et al., 2011). The disease is observed on the top (adaxial) surface of the 
leaves as red/brown circular spots surrounded by a yellow halo. Interestingly though, it has 
been shown that the conida of the fungus can only penetrate and cause disease development 
via open stomata or cracks in the epicuticular wax in the lower (abaxial) surface of the leaves 
(Souza, Rodrigues, Maffia, et al., 2011). Several growers interviewed during the HH survey 
showed us the signs of RBD on their plots (see Figure 95).  
 
                                               
221
 The fungal pathogen also goes by berry blotch, berry spot disease, coffee leaf spot, and Cercospora spot, but 
these names are less common than the two that will be used in this text.  
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Figure 94: Red Blister Disease or Brown Eye Spot (Cercospora coffeicola) is present (green dot) 
throughout sub-Sarahan Africa including Sudan (Leach & Hobbs, 2013). 
 
  
  
Figure 95: Examples of Red Blister Disease from household surveys on berries and leaves of coffee trees 
 
It is thought that RBD does not have much of an impact on the yields of coffee plants 
(particularly of Arabica coffee trees however, Robusta are more susceptible to damage from 
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the fungus). The main impact is on tree rigour often causing defoliation. It can be especially 
harmful to seedlings and young trees (Rutherford & Phiri, 2006). Despite the understanding 
among experts that the damage from Red Blister/Brown Eye Spot Disease is limited if the tree 
is mature, the farmers reported rather high severity and frequency of the fungal pathogen on 
their coffee plots (see results in section 6.4.1). Anecdotally, the farmers and traders during the 
workshop reported that RBD reduced the weight and the quality of the bean and as such, both 
the weight and price offered for the coffee would decrease. The discrepancy between the 
consensus opinion of farmers surveyed in Uganda and that of field manuals based on expert 
experience is worthy of further exploration, but will not be discussed in the present work.  
 
A.22.5. Root Mealybug (RMB) 
Root Mealybug (Planococcus fungicola) is a small pest that is found in groups on the roots of 
the coffee tree and is associated with a fungus (Polyporus coffeae222 synonymously in an 
updated nomenclature Diacanthodes novoguineensis223.) which forms a protective brown layer 
with white mycelium over the clumps of Mealybugs (Watson & Cox, 1990). As stated by 
Waller, Bigger & Hillocks (2007b), the Root Mealybugs (RMBs) of East Africa are often 
confused with Planococcus citri and the associated fungus Polyporus spp., and even recent 
literature including the most recent 2007 survey of Ugandan soil organisms and pests continues 
with this incorrect identification (Sekamatte & Okwakol, 2007). CABI Plantwise as a result 
does not have detailed presence information for P. fungicola and as such, P. citri is used to 
construct the distribution map displayed in Figure 96.  
 
                                               
222
 Mycobank number: 185071 (Crous, Gams, Stalpers, et al., 2004) 
223
 Mycobank number: 329835 (Crous, Gams, Stalpers, et al., 2004) 
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Figure 96: Root Mealybug (Planococcus citri) is present (green dot) almost ubiquitously across sub-
Saharan Africa. Kenya (Coffee) Mealybug (Planococcus kenyae) is present (orange dot) along with Root 
Mealybug (Leach & Hobbs, 2013).  
 
Other Mealybugs like the Kenya or Coffee Mealybug (Planococcus kenyae) are also found in 
Uganda, but attack the aerial parts of the plant including the berries and leaves. An example of 
a Mealybug found during the household survey is shown in Figure 97.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Note: (a) red circle around Mealybug; (b) example of the fungus covering the Mealybugs; 
(c) Mealybugs on surface of twig of the coffee tree 
 
Figure 97: Example of Mealybugs on the aerial portion of the coffee tree identified during household 
surveys 
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RMB is usually considered a minor pest of Robusta coffee in Uganda (Rutherford & Phiri, 
2006). The damage can be extensive if the infestation rate is high and not effectively controlled. 
In January of 2014, The Uganda Radio Network carried a story of an Australian firm that had 
a large plantation of coffee in the Rakai district224 of Uganda which Mealybugs had destroyed 
30 of the some 130 acres of coffee (Bindhe, 2014). While many farmers surveyed had aerial 
Mealybugs (likely Kenya/Coffee Mealybugs, but unconfirmed), there were relatively few that 
reported having RMB. Those that did report having them, they came infrequently, but were 
reported to be quite damaging when they were present. Further discussion on the reported 
severity and frequency of these pests is analysed against the other pests in the survey in section 
6.4.1 starting on page 238.  
 
A.22.6. Other coffee pests and diseases 
 
Figure 98: Coffee Berry Disease and Coffee Leaf Rust are present (in orange) throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa. In addition, White Stem Borer is present as well (in purple) on the mainland excluding most of 
West Africa (Leach & Hobbs, 2013).  
 
Coffee Leaf Rust (CLR) is one of the most widely found coffee diseases in the world and 
caused by the fungal pathogen H. vastatrix (Hindorf & Omondi, 2011). It has caused extensive 
damage in the 2012 coffee season in Central America. The damage to farmers’ plots was 
                                               
224
 The Rakai District is in the south-west part of Uganda partially touching Lake Victoria and the border of 
Tanzania. 
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perhaps in excess of $1B USD and will be felt in the industry for decades (Malkin, 2014). 
Fortunately for Uganda, this fungus is not a major issue.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Note: (a) only one instance of coffee leaf rust was encountered on the household 
surveys; (b) one household also had evidence of coffee leaf miner; (c) green scale with 
associated black sooty mould was found at several households, but never reported by 
the farmers; (d) another sucking insect pest on a coffee berry cluster. All photos by 
author.  
 
Figure 99: Examples of other coffee pests that were found but not reported as issues by the farmers 
surveyed 
 
Another major disease worth mentioning in the context of coffee diseases is Coffee Berry 
Disease (CBD). CBD is caused by the fungal pathogen Colletotrichum kahawae, which is 
currently confined to the African continent and effects Arabica coffee plants strongly (Hindorf 
& Omondi, 2011). It was first detected and characterized in Kenya in 1922 (Rutherford & Phiri, 
2006). However, in Uganda, since the Arabica production is a small part of the industry and 
isolated on the western and eastern mountainous areas, it is relatively protected from major 
crises. According to Rutherford & Phiri (2006), Coffee Berry Disease has not been observed 
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on Robusta (C. canephora) or C. liberica coffee outside of controlled lab conditions. However, 
NGO stakeholders involved with the fieldwork were not aware of this and several of our survey 
team members often thought they might be seeing CBD. During the HH survey, several 
samples looked like they could be CBD, but when other parts of the tree were observed it was 
clear that it had been an earlier outbreak of RBD that, in the latter stages, had formed dark 
lesions on the berries. Some examples of RBD infection were not as vividly bright and spotty 
as others (see an example in side (b) of Figure 100 as compared to Figure 94). The difference 
between these two funguses is most apparent by the lack of sporulation on the surface of the 
lesions of berries infected with RBD. The lesion site also appears to be a darker black in the 
typical CBD infection; however, in a mixed Robusta and Arabica context it would be difficult 
for a non-expert to identify the correct infection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: images included for examiners’ 
copies, but removed for the online, 
publically available version on Imperial 
College Spiral due to copyright regulations. 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Note: (a) example images of CBD from Rutherford & Phiri (2006) with lesions marked; (b) 
likely RBD without as many bright spots as typical infections (photo by author). 
Figure 100: CBD photos compared to RBD on immature, green coffee berries 
 
The last pest worth mentioning is the White Stem Borer (Monochamus leuconotus), a beetle, 
that has periodically been an issue for coffee production in East Africa. In southern Africa it 
has lowered yields by some 25% affecting over half of farms in some areas (Rutherford & 
Phiri, 2006). However, it was not mentioned in the open-ended part of the current pest survey 
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and was not reported as a major issue in Uganda by a workshop held by the Coffee Research 
Network (CORNET) in 2004 (Rutherford & Phiri, 2006).  
 
  
Figure 101: Young coffee tree attacked by unknown pest causing necrosis on the outside of the main stem. 
On the interior of the main stem, there was evidence of fungal infection and insect burrowing (photos by 
author). 
 
After the workshop in Kamuli District, the research team visited a farmer’s home who pointed 
out a dying coffee sapling that the NGO’s extension agent thought could potentially be a White 
Stem Borer issue. The farmer had a young tree that had been attacked by an unknown insect 
that seemed to have built a gallery within the main stem of the tree (see images in Figure 101 
above). Although the stem borer does prefer young trees, the tree lacked the characteristic signs 
of multiple tunnels from larvae or necrotic rings on the stem (Rutherford & Phiri, 2006). The 
research team was unable to identify the pest, but it could have potentially been a BTB that 
attacked a larger than usual stem, based on the gallery and fungus inside the young tree. 
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A.23. ORIGINAL POSTERS FROM SUPPLY CHAIN QUESTION AT WORKSHOP 
 
Current Supply Chain Ideal Supply Chain 
 
 (a.1) 
 
 
(b.1) 
 
(a.2) 
 
 
 (b.2) 
 
(a.3) 
 
 (b.3) 
 
 
 (a.4) 
 
 (b.4) 
 
 (a.5)  (b.5) 
Note: All photos by author. 
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A.24. ANECDOTE OF GROWER WHO ABANDONED COFFEE PRODUCTION 
 
She had just a few coffee trees left near her house which she used for home consumption of 
coffee (not a common practice, but she was producing too little to sell). Her typical year in the 
past produced 180 kg of coffee and even in 2012 before the worst of the BTB hit, she produced 
50 kg of wet cherry on her half acre. She was already losing trees due to CWD and then to 
make matters even worse, the BTB quickly infested and destroyed every tree in the half acre; 
all that was left were five trees near her house. As recently as 2011, she had planted 80 seedlings 
to increase her production of coffee and replace some old trees. She had said that there was not 
anyone in the village to talk to about pests/diseases and so she and her husband figured it out 
themselves, but never invested much in pruning or trying to treat their trees. She had never 
attended a course at RASD or any other agency in the area. Cattle and maize is what the 
household had decided to focus on after losing the ability to produce coffee. They decided not 
to acquire more seedlings and start in coffee again; the devastation from that year was too great.  
 
She had never seen any RMB or CBB, but in addition to the CWD and BTB that destroyed 
their plot, they had seen RBD annually on their plot, but could not be sure what damage it 
really did. The neighbours do nothing to control pests and diseases she said, but she felt helpless 
in controlling the rapid scourge of “tree drying”.225 Luckily, they were not among the areas 
poorest, she had been to secondary school, and they had diversified into other income-
generating activities. In addition to the maize and cattle they invested in to replace coffee, her 
family of six also grew cassava, beans, and matooke. They also managed a few goats. They 
maintained a greater than 75th percentile income of all the other farmers surveyed, earning an 
estimated 3.6M USh per year. Despite these occurrences, her answers to the risk-aversion game 
put her well within the risk-seeking category. She switched to B in the 2nd row in the risk game, 
which was the first rational place to switch.  
 
 
  
                                               
225
 Tree drying is the common phrase given to a coffee tree when it dies from wilt or twig borer infestation as 
the branches and leaves seem to wilt, turn black, and die in a way that looks like it has dried up in the sun 
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A.25. GREEN COFFEE EXPORT MARKET 
 
Coffee is grown around the world in a band of favourable climate conditions just north or south 
of the equator—roughly from the Tropic of Cancer to the Tropic of Capricorn. Though 103 
species are identified in the family, there are three major varieties of coffee grown 
commercially: Coffea arabica (Arabica coffee), Coffea canephora (Robusta Coffee), and 
Coffea liberica (Liberian or excelsa coffee) (Davis, Govaerts, Bridson, et al., 2006). Robusta 
coffee does well in lowland environments and is a heartier species of coffee, while Arabica is 
typically grown in altitude ranges of 1,400 to 1,800 meters, often shade grown. Robusta as well 
is easier to grow: higher yields, minimal maintenance, and on the whole, a target for fewer 
pests than Arabica coffee trees (Kalonji-Mbuyi, Tshilenge Djim & Saiba, 2009). The main 
difference in the final marketable product comes to the “cup test” and perceived high-quality 
taste to the palette. Arabica coffees are typically less bitter, lower acidity, more mellow, and 
have a “higher quality” flavour profile as a drinkable coffee than Robusta coffees, which have 
more caffeine and are more “harsh” (personal conversation, interviewee #14). Robusta does 
however have redeeming features that make it a good blend coffee for espressos. Robusta beans 
produce a good crema—the frothy, creamy foam on top of a freshly brewed espresso that is 
created from high-pressure steam flowing through the packed coffee grounds. As well, the 
strength and full-bodied flavour of Robusta provide it the opportunity to be mixed well with 
“Italian” blends of filter coffee (personal conversation, interviewee #14).  
 
Some of these characteristics like acidity or caffeine content can be scientifically measured, 
and indeed are tracked in each batch shipped from exporters in Kampala (personal 
conversation, interviewee #3). Many of the usual descriptors of Robusta coffees (e.g. “full-
bodied”, “harsh”, “lower quality taste”) come from taste tests done in coffee cuppings from 
quality professionals as well as word of mouth at international coffee exhibitions (personal 
conversation, interviewee #14). While certainly there is training and skill involved in being a 
coffee cupper, it is difficult to assess the characteristics one perceives on their palate 
quantitatively. These quality perceptions from the cup tests form strong market perceptions 
that some of those interviewed in the Ugandan coffee industry believe form a significant barrier 
to creating a wider market for their Robusta (personal conversation, interviewee #3).  
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Despite the generalized perception of Robusta as an inferior coffee on the market, one can 
process a quality Robusta to use as a substitute for a medium-grade Arabica. As the price 
differential between the London commodity exchange for Robusta and the New York 
commodity exchange for Arabica becomes quite large, roasters substitute in “washed” 
Robustas for their blends replacing the commodity Arabica coffees (see section 5.5.6). In the 
overall global market for coffee, Robusta coffee accounts for about 40% of coffee consumption 
though there is year-to-year variation (40% in 2010; 41% in 2011; 42% in 2012) (Almeida, 
2012).  
 
A.25.1. Global coffee exports 
Coffee has a long history: it is a beverage that has been consumed for over 1,000 years, and it 
is one of the earliest traded commodities (Mussatto, Machado, Martins, et al., 2011). As a result 
of this history, it is not too surprising that today coffee is one of the most consumed beverages 
in the world and as a result is the 2nd largest traded commodity after oil (Mussatto, Machado, 
Martins, et al., 2011). Given the large market in the developed world and the climate conditions 
conducive to tropical environments near the equator, coffee is well suited for generating foreign 
exchange in the developing world. The production and trading of coffee is a crucial economic 
activity for dozens of emerging economies, and a core economic activity for millions of people 
from South America, to Africa, to Asia.  
 
Commodity green coffee is an actively traded product on the LIFFE (London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange).226 There are two financial instruments that are used 
to trade Robusta coffee on the exchange: future contracts for delivery in a specified month 
(exchange contract no. 409) and options on futures contracts which allow an investor to hedge 
against price fluctuations (exchange contract no. 501). These exchanges are used by every large 
exporter in Uganda to hedge against price risk and ensure their business viability if output from 
Uganda is low (personal conversation, interviewee #10). The quality requirements of these 
contracts traded on the exchange in Europe flow down throughout the Robusta production 
system such that farmers and traders in Uganda are aware of how their product will be assessed 
by the exporters. The exchange trades coffee based on a grade of “Class 1” and then classes 
                                               
226
 LIFFE was taken over by Euronext in 2002, which was bought out by NYSE in 2007, and as of 2013 became 
part of the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) group of exchanges. As such data on commodity futures available 
on the LIFFE are easily found at NYSE Euronext Global Derivatives website: https://globalderivatives.nyx.com/  
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below are taken at a discount from Class 1 and any higher quality lots are given a premium 
over the Class 1 price. These discounts or premiums are often referred to as “allowances” on 
commodity coffee227. The range of quality classes available on the international market is 
shown in Table 82. The screen categories refer to the size of the holes where coffee beans 
cannot pass through, where a larger screen has larger beans and thus is higher quality. Given 
the price for Robusta has typically varied between $1,000 and $2,000 per tonne, the allowances 
for higher quality classes are small percentage of the total price per tonne (see last column of 
Table 82). This lack of strong incentive for producing the highest quality Robusta (if it requires 
refined maintenance, harvesting, and sorting costs) carries through to the behaviour of the 
farmers and traders. 
 
Table 82: Quality classes traded on the LIFFE for Robusta futures contracts 
Class Defects  
 
Foreign 
Matter 
Screen 
15 
Screen 
14 
Screen 
13 
Screen 
12 
Allowance 
Premium <0.5% <0.2% >90%  >96%  + $30/tonne 
1 <3.0% <0.5%  >90%  >96% $0/tonne 
2 <5.0% <1.0%   >90% >96% - $30/tonne 
3 <7.5% <1.0%   >90% >96% - $60/tonne 
4 <8.0% <1.0%    >90% - $90/tonne 
          Note: All standards by weight in 300g sample 
          Data: (NYSE-Euronext, 2014) 
 
Although there is a long history of growing, trading, and drinking coffee, there has been a 
significant shift in the export market over the course of the last half century that has affected 
in many ways the market for Ugandan coffee. As shown in Figure 102, the rise of Asia as a 
major region for coffee exports has been steady since the mid-1970s. This rocketing rise in 
production and export has almost solely been driven by Vietnam, the 3rd largest coffee 
exporting country in Figure 104. Vietnam is a major producer of Robusta coffee, which has a 
significant effect on the market for Ugandan coffee exports. As Asia has become a larger player 
in the export market, Africa has been crowded out and represents a much smaller portion of 
the market than it did in the mid-20th century (from a high of 32% in the 1970s to an average 
of around just 10% in the 2000s). The Americas (mainly Central and South America) have 
                                               
227
 For specialty, sustainability certified, or Arabica coffee the grading/quality sorting system is different and 
specific lots may have a “premium”, “micolot” or other term attached to the price to signify the extra money 
paid over the standard commodity price. 
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remained strong, exporting over half of the world’s green coffee exports throughout the last 50 
years; however, they have declined slightly with the growth of Asia and Europe from 68% in 
1961 to 52% in 2011. An interesting feature of the figure is the growth of the European regional 
segment for green coffee “exports” since Europe does not have a suitable climate for producing 
coffee.  
 
 
Figure 102: Percentage of green coffee export (by volume) from world regions from 1961 to 2011 
(FAOSTAT, 2014) 
 
Europe did not reach even 1% of total world exports until 1973, but by 2011, 9% of all coffee 
exported internationally was at one point exported from Europe (see Figure 102). Obviously, 
coffee does not grow in Europe, but the European market has become a hub of international 
trade to other destinations. As an example, there is a significant market internationally for 
German processed coffee (Thiemann, 2012). The large commodity-trading group Neumann 
Kaffee Gruppe, based in Hamburg, imports and then re-exports coffee beans used in one out 
of every ten cups of coffee consumed globally (Terazono, 2013). A large share of this is coffee 
sourced from Vietnam or Brazil for instance and then further sorted in Germany as well as 
being chemically processed to remove caffeine (producing decaffeinated green coffee) which 
is then exported to the USA for roasting and local consumption. The addition value from 
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decaffeination, branding, or further sorting for quality in developed economies like Europe 
appears in the unit value (roughly understood as a “price”) as well.228 
  
 
Figure 103: Regional unit value differences from global mean unit value from 1961 to 2011 (FAOSTAT, 
2014) 
 
As shown in Figure 103, the unit value for green coffee exports from Europe in the period 
1961-2011 was on average around $1,000 above the global unit value each year. 229 At the other 
end of the spectrum, the median unit value for green coffee exports from Asia were around 
$750 less per tonne than the global value. There are many outlier years (with values below 1.5 
times the inter-quartile range, IQR, of the bottom quartile or above 1.5 times the IQR for the 
upper quartile). For Oceania, these outlier years could be a data quality issue as Oceania is such 
a small regional exporter of coffee that some years may be missing either value or quantity 
information from some of the small island countries that make up the region resulting in a 
                                               
228
 Unit value is reported by FAO and is the reported value of exports ($1,000 US) divided by the quantity 
(tonnes) by year. It is converted to constant 2005 USD as explained in more detail in footnote 231 on page 415. 
It represents an average price for the year, though the spot price at which the green coffee lot was sold will vary 
widely over the course of the year. 
229
 The global unit value or regional unit value are a weighted mean of the unit values from each constituent 
country in the group. The equivalent is the total value ($1,000 US) for all exports from the countries of the 
region divided by the total quantity (tonnes) from the region in the given year.  
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skewed unit value for the region as a whole. While the regional view gives a high level picture 
of the green coffee market, further analysis of the unit values for coffee are explored in section 
A.25.4 where Uganda is compared to its East African neighbours. 
 
A.25.2. Top coffee exporting nations 
While dozens of countries produce coffee, there are some major players in the market that 
account for a large portion of the total coffee exported around the world. Brazil is the largest 
exporter of coffee with some 53 million tonnes sold in the period 1961-2010. By itself, Brazil 
accounts for an astonishing 24% of the total volume of green coffee exported by every country 
in the past 5 decades (1961-2010); as a comparison, the collective exports from the entire 
continent of Africa only account for around 20% of total world volume exported. The top ten 
countries by exported volume in the 1961-2010 period are shown below in Figure 104. In 
addition to Brazil, Colombia is the 2nd largest exporter by volume which accounted for just 
over 12% of global exports—more than all countries combined of East Africa which exported 
just under 11% of the global total. That does not however mean that East Africa is irrelevant 
as a source of green coffee exports. In addition to Uganda at number seven, many East African 
countries are in the upper half of global exporters: Ethiopia (12th), Kenya (17th), Tanzania 
(22nd), Burundi (28th), and Rwanda (30th).  
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Figure 104: Top 10 world exporters by total volume exported 1961 to 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2014) 
 
The top five exporters by volume from the last five decades have evolved over time (see Figure 
105). Vietnam has emerged as a major player in green coffee exports only since the 1980s with 
rapid growth continuing throughout the 2000s. The top five represent roughly half of the total 
global exports of green coffee throughout the period (ranging from a low of 42% in 1977 to a 
high of 62% in 2007). Interestingly the 1960s and the 2000s are similar in the contribution of 
the top five to the total global exports, but the decline of Brazil has been compensated for by 
growth from Vietnam. This is not to suggest that production from Brazil has declined, the 
growth from Brazil’s exports has just not kept pace with the global growth in the export market 
for green coffee.  
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Figure 105: Percentage contribution to global exports from top five exporters by volume (lines) and the 
total contribution of the top five to global exports (area) (FAOSTAT, 2014) 
 
As suggested by Figure 105 above, the late 1990s through the 2000s became a period of 
concentration in the global green coffee export market of major coffee exporters as they started 
accounting for a larger percentage of total coffee exports than any other year (surpassing the 
previously highest years in 1961 and 1963). Despite the growth in the market share of the top 
five countries, it is unclear up until this point what the other roughly 40% of the export market 
looks like. Have small exporting countries grown as well along with global growth trends? 
Have the middle tier exporters grown or shrunk because of the top five taking a larger share of 
the market?  
 
One way to consider these questions about the distribution between small and large exporters 
of green coffee is to consider the Lorenz curve and related Gini coefficient of the export values 
by year. Although the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient are traditionally used as index 
measures of income inequality, the mathematics can also be used in this case to reveal the 
export value share inequality by year. There are several different ways to calculate measures 
of income inequality, but the present method follows the methodology used by Jenkins (2008).  
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The Lorenz curve is a graphical way to show what percentage of a population accounts for 
what percentage of a given value (e.g. income or export value). First the countries are ordered 
in terms of ascending order of export value for each year. Formally, each country (x) and 
associated export value (y) are ordered as in equation 1 and 2 for all (n) countries.  
   
 0T = (0B, 0D, 0E … 0j),  = 0,1, …  "  > 0 (6) 
 
kT = (kB, kD, kE … kj) , kT < kTcB " l kT > 0
j
TmB
 (7) 
 
Following generally the derivation of the discrete case from Kleiber (2008) the Lorenz curve 
plots for each point the share of total export value  nojp taken by the  
o
j ∗ 100% smallest 
exporters for all values of 3 from 0  . The discrete Lorenz curve of a set of data with n 
points arranged in ascending order such that k satisfies equation (7) is then given by equation 
(8) below: 
 
  q3r =
S kToTmB
S kTjTmB  , 3 = 0,1, … ,  
(8) 
 
In the present example, the curve is a plot of the cumulative share of the smallest 100*p% of 
total export value against the cumulative share of the total number of countries exporting green 
coffee for a given year. As such the Lorenz Curve ranges from 0 to 1 on both the y and x axis. 
If every exporter were exporting the same value of coffee each year, then the Lorenz curve 
would be a straight 45 degree line (e.g. 10% of exporters would account for 10% of export 
value, 40% would account for 40% of export value etc.).  
 
The Lorenz curve plots confirm the suggestive results from looking at the top five exporters in 
Figure 105. The distribution of coffee exports from 1961 through the mid-1990s was one of 
more equal contributions from each coffee exporting country (see (b) of Figure 105). There 
were certainly large players—as noticed by the major difference from the line of equality—
but, small and medium size countries experienced more growth during that period as overall 
global coffee volumes grew. Since 2000, however, each year in the sample shows that the larger 
exporters are taking a larger piece of the global growth than small and medium sized exporting 
countries (see (a) of Figure 105). Shown another way, dividing exporters into three different 
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group sizes by the amount of coffee exported per year, the resulting number of countries fitting 
that category as well as their mean and median export are displayed in Figure 106. Confirming 
the results of the Lorenz curves, it is clear from Figure 106 that the reason for the increasing 
inequality of export values is due to both more small countries entering the export market with 
small volumes as well as the set of large exporting countries growing even larger in terms of 
their export volumes. The fact that the mean is so much higher than the median for the large 
country exporters also suggests that a few dominate coffee exporting nations dominate the 
global export market. While the trend is clear, the cause of this concentration is not. One 
possibility is that larger exporters have focused on volume growth with lower cost coffee. 
 
 
Figure 106: Since 1990 there are more small exporters entering coffee export and the larger exporters are 
exporting even more leading to a more unequal distribution of global coffee export 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 107: Lorenz curves by year for all green coffee exporting nations (a) for past decade since 2000 
and (b) for 1961 to 1995 
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By unit value, similar to the regional results in Figure 103, Asian countries in the top 10 
exporters have the lowest unit values for coffee from 1961-2011. Vietnam and Indonesia for 
more than 75% of years on record are consistently below the global weighted mean price for 
green Robusta coffee exports (Figure 108). Similarly for Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and 
Uganda, both African countries have export earnings per tonne of green coffee which are over 
$500/tonne below the global price for at least half of the years from 1961 to 2011. Brazil’s unit 
values for the period are grouped rather tightly near the global mean unit value, likely reflecting 
its position as the largest exporter of green coffee and thus determining largely the global mean 
unit value for green coffee. The other countries in the Americas (Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia) all receive earnings per tonne on average well above the 
global unit price most years—though Mexico in particular has had several outlier good years 
and bad years in the period.    
 
 
Figure 108: Difference from global mean unit value for top ten exporters from 1961-2011 (FAOSTAT, 
2014) 
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A.25.3. East African coffee exports 
Prior to the most recent decades, there was limited growth in coffee production in East Africa 
from the late 1970′s to the mid 1990′s, but the same period for Uganda was marked by moderate 
decline and volatility of year-on-year exports (see Figure 109). This is especially unfortunate 
for the region, given the context that global coffee production experienced a doubling in total 
exports (from around 4 million tonnes to 8 million, see line in Figure 109) over the past four 
decades (1970-2010). During that period, exports from Eastern Africa did not make significant 
gains—the peak in exports in 1996 was higher than any other year through 2010.  
 
 
Figure 109: East African and world production of green coffee from 1961 to 2011 (FAOSTAT, 2014) 
 
Uganda has historically made up a large portion of the total value from East African230 exports 
of coffee: from a low of 15% of total East African export value in 1981, to a high of 41% in 
1969 (see Figure 109). In recent years, Ethiopia has come to take the largest export share (by 
                                               
230
 This chapter will follow the definition of East Africa from FAOSTAT (2014) database which includes the 
following countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. By definition Eritrea 
and South Sudan are also included, but do not have any data available for green coffee exports so will not be 
mentioned.  
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export value) of green coffee from East Africa—in 2010 Ethiopia made up nearly half of the 
total value of green coffee exports from East Africa (see Figure 110). Another strong trend 
through the decades has been that other East African nations are becoming even smaller players 
as Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia make up the majority of green coffee exports from this part of 
the continent (see Figure 110). The underlying economic or geopolitical cause of this trend are 
not clear, but visibly, there has been a drop in exports from Burundi and Madagascar during 
the 2000s which are the key drivers of the trend (see Figure 111).  
 
 
Figure 110: Export share of East African exports by decade from 1961 to 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2014) 
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Figure 111: Exports of green coffee from other East African countries decline in 2000s (FAOSTAT, 2014) 
 
Given the production system for coffee depending on the cherries coming from the millions of 
smallholder farmers, one likely cause for drops are conflict within the rural areas of the given 
country. The precipitous drop in exports in Rwanda in 1994 (a 94% drop compared to 1993) 
coincides with the massive genocide the same year in that country, when up to an estimated 1 
million Tutsi were killed in a 4-month period (Reyntjens, 1996). Similarly the coffee export 
drop for Burundi in 1993 (44% less than 1992) coincides with a recognized genocide in that 
nation (Bhavnani & Backer, 2000). However, the continuing decline of coffee exports in the 
2000s during a period of more relative stability cannot be explained away by conflict. 
Additionally, the 1992 to 2010 period in Madagascar is known as the Third Republic of 
Madagascar corresponding to the end of a socialist regime (Barrett, 1994). This transition 
process coincided with a huge decline in coffee exports (see Figure 111), but while economic 
reforms were ushered in, it is not readily apparent why there was such a drastic decline in coffee 
exports. Was there a shift away from coffee to other crops? Did economic reforms away from 
a socialist system discourage the production of coffee? The causes of these declines and the 
possible relationship to political stability or economic reforms are left to further research.  
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A.25.4. Uganda coffee exports vs. neighbours 
Uganda has historically been East Africa’s dominant producer of coffee by volume, exporting 
on average over 150,000 tonnes of green coffee annually as shown in Figure 112. However, 
looking just at this figure highlights another feature of this high median export: there is great 
year-on-year variation in export output.  
 
As shown in Figure 112, 1996 was one of the best years for Ugandan coffee export at nearly 
twice the median and well outside 1.5 times the inter-quartile range (IQR) of the upper quartile 
(the top “whisker” of the box plot for Uganda). However, in the country’s worst year (2003), 
it exported less than the distant second place competitor (Ethiopia) has ever experienced. 
Uganda’s variance is higher than any other country in East Africa in terms of the export output. 
While exporters may try to smooth out year-to-year variations through storage of export-grade 
coffee, it is clear that the production is so variable that is difficult for the export at a national 
level to be smoothed to any significant degree.  
 
While Uganda has been the largest exporter of coffee in East Africa, as shown in Figure 113 it 
has been losing this position over time, especially since the precipitous drop from the peak of 
1996. This was no doubt in a large part due to the struggle with CWD that heavily affected the 
majority of growers throughout the country from the mid-1990s throughout the early 2000s 
(see section A.22.1). However, the other regional players (namely Kenya) faced declines as 
well which could not be attributed to CWD. Fafchamps & Hill (2008) show that price 
transmission from the world market down to the first level of processing is quite robust, 
especially when prices fall at the international level. As such, the volume declines co-current 
in Kenya and Uganda around the year 2000 could reflect the farmers attributing less effort to 
production or exporters making similar decisions about storage and exporting. Since the present 
purpose is to present just a snapshot of the national exports against the regional players, 
robustly analysing the determinants behind the movements are left to future research. 
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Figure 112: Box plots of annual (1961-2010) export volumes of green coffee for top seven (by volume) 
East African countries. Outliers labelled with the year of export.  
 
 
Figure 113: Top three (by volume) East African countries’ green coffee exports from 1961-2010 
 
423 
 
Ugandan coffee commands a lower price in the international market compared to its East 
African neighbours, largely due to its bulk production of lower value Robusta as opposed to 
higher value Arabica coffees. The unit value is in constant231 2005 $1,000 US per tonne as 
shown in Figure 114. Ethiopia and Kenya, both the closest by volume to Uganda’s exports, 
both command a significantly higher unit value for each tonne of green coffee exported 
compared to Uganda. As is clear from looking at the top-end outliers in the figure, the final 
years of the 1970s were particularly good for the coffee exporters of East Africa. The price 
spike is even clearer in the time series plot (Figure 115) for the top 3 East African coffee 
exporting countries by volume (Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia).  
 
                                               
231
 FAO unit value data is given in nominal $1000 US dollars from 1961 to 2010, however, given inflation the 
unit values need to be converted to constant US dollars for appropriate time-series comparison. There are a 
variety of ways to deflate currencies using different price indexes. For this work, since FAO already gives the 
export values in US dollars, the US dollar deflator used by the World Bank to convert US GDP from nominal to 
constant 2005 US dollars was used. The data to do so is available upon request or can be found through the data 
source of the World Bank located at: http://data.worldbank.org 
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Figure 114: Box plot of export green coffee unit value (constant 2005 $1,000 US / tonne) for East African 
countries (1961-2010) (FAOSTAT, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 115: Unit value over time (1961-2010) for top 3 East African coffee exporters by volume 
(FAOSTAT, 2014) 
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A.25.5. Competition among Ugandan exporters 
Data from the UCDA’s monthly reports was extracted manually from the data tables in their 
monthly reports given as pdf documents available to the public via their website.232 This 
monthly export data was used in order to analyse the export at the firm level from Ugandan 
UCDA registered exporting firms.  
 
The total number of firms has increased drastically in the past 6 years and the mean export by 
firm has decreased as well as shown in Figure 116. Similarly, for importers, the number of 
firms has increased and the mean monthly import decreased (see Figure 117). However, many 
of the exporters are quite small players in the market. The top five Ugandan exporters of coffee 
based on monthly export data acquired from the UCDA is given in Figure 118. The top five 
importers of Ugandan coffee based on the monthly data from the UCDA is presented in Figure 
121. The exporters interviewed as part of the fieldwork come from this list of the top five 
exporters of Ugandan coffee (see 5.3.2). Despite several interviewees (#10 and #14) discussing 
the concentration of power in the top exporters that has happened since liberalisation, the 
emerging story seems to be one of many smaller players entering the export market based on 
Figure 116.  
 
As shown in Figure 120 (page 428), the top five exporters within the sample extracted account 
for a decreasing percentage of the total annual export from Uganda each year. While they 
accounted for 70% of the total export in 2006, they make up only 40% for the first two months 
of 2013. The decrease in buyer concentration has not been as drastic, but still the top five 
importing firms buy a decreasing percentage of the total import (see Figure 121, page 428). 
While the impact on the supply chain from this movement in exporter concentration is an 
interesting research question, it will not be explored further in this chapter. However, the views 
from interviewees from two firms in this top five cohort will inform much of the work in the 
following sections. Similar movement with more firms importing Ugandan coffee can be seen 
in Figure 117. The cyclical trend in the mean import data would suggest that some of the bigger 
importers only by Ugandan coffee in certain months or place larger orders in those months. 
Questions arising from these figures are left for future research.  
                                               
232
 http://www.ugandacoffee.org/ 
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Figure 116: Trend of exporting firms and mean monthly mean export from 2006 to 2013 
 
 
Note: Others category is assigned by UCDA so this total number of importers still reflects 
growth, but hides the nature of the smaller importers grouped in “others”. 
Figure 117: Trend of importing firms and mean monthly mean import from 2006 to 2013 
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Note: Total from monthly export data from October 2006 to February 2013 with some 
month gaps where data was not available for any firm. 
Figure 118: Top five firms exporting Ugandan coffee based on total export from 2006 to 2013 
 
Note: Total from monthly export data from October 2006 to February 2013 with some 
month gaps where data was not available for any firm. Others is a category for all the 
miscellaneous smaller importing firms.  
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Figure 119: Others and top five firms importing Ugandan coffee based on total import from 2006 to 2013 
 
Note: Top five exporters based on total export from 2006 to 2013 in the dataset 
Figure 120: Top five exporters historically account for decreasing percentage of total export in later years 
 
 
Note: top five importers based on total import from 2006 to 2013 in the dataset 
Figure 121: Top five importers historically account for decreasing percentage of total import in later years 
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A.25.6. Implications for Ugandan production 
Uganda has struggled to increase its market share with robust growth in world demand for 
coffee. Despite its position as a leading supplier in the 1960s, it has only lost competitiveness 
to other East African players like Ethiopia. Not only did Uganda lose its portion of East African 
exports of coffee, unfortunately, East African’s share of world production has been going down 
as well.  
 
Given the growing world demand for coffee, the question remains whether Uganda has lost out 
due to a lack of demand for their source of coffee or whether it has been supply constraints 
within the country. The primary answer is likely supply constraints. Robusta is largely traded 
as a commodity coffee and if Uganda were to produce more coffee that met the standards, there 
would be a buyer for the coffee. Uganda has lost a huge amount of productive trees to CWD 
and the disorder caused by the Idi Amin regime did not help the country nor the coffee 
producing sector. However, the answer is not supply issues completely. As mentioned by many 
stakeholders that were interviewed, Ugandan coffee faces a real problem with marketing and 
quality consistency in the final export product (personal conversations, interviewees #14, #10, 
#1). There is a perception among world buyers that quality cannot be dependable year-to-year 
for Ugandan coffee (personal conversation, interviewee #10). As such, roasters may prefer 
other origins for a more consistent product.  
 
In addition to a shrinking portion of world exports of coffee and questions about consistent 
standards in the commodity coffee coming from Uganda, the supply of coffee is more variable 
year-to-year than other East African countries. While the drivers of this will not be determined 
at the national level, this sets the background for the following research on the supply chain 
actors on the ground from production to export. The research questions will address some of 
the pest and disease issues that could be leading towards the erratic output at the national level 
for Ugandan coffee. Additionally, the survey will help to analyse the determinants of growers 
decision-making on their plots. Furthering understanding of this specific commodity chain 
could help illuminate policies that improve quality and volume of Ugandan coffee, as well as, 
highlight the myriad issues that arise from the establishment and spread of plant pests/diseases 
more generally.  
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A.26. PERSPECTIVES ON LIBERALISATION OF THE COFFEE INDUSTRY IN 
UGANDA IN THE 1990S 
 
Coffee has been a large part of agricultural production and foreign exchange earnings in 
Uganda for over 50 years. It is an income source for at least half a million families (Cheyns, 
Mrema & Sallée, 2006). The sector has seen many challenges and changes through the decades. 
The supply chain observed and discussed throughout this chapter largely reflects the changes 
that occurred during a period of liberalisation that happened in the early 1990s. The 
stakeholders interviewed had differing views on the benefits of this major shift to the supply 
chain for coffee in Uganda.  
 
The Research Fellows at EPRC (interviewees #11 and #12) explained that one of the most 
significant and lasting shifts due to liberalisation has been the concentration of exporters. This 
shift towards larger export firms has been driven by the need to link to roasters and processors 
without a coffee marketing board aiding the industry (personal conversations, interviewees #11 
and #12). On the demand side, some exporters have been more successful at locking down the 
import market (the roasters) than others. Also on the supply side, the larger merchant traders 
who link processors to exporters develop favourable relationships with certain firms. While the 
recent trend in the export markets seems to suggest an emergence of smaller exporters again 
(see section A.25.5), neither interviewees were aware of this shift in the data from the UCDA.  
 
Another shift after liberalisation was the liberalisation of seedling production. The private 
sector became a major player in the supply of seedlings via the nursery sector between 1999 
and 2005 (personal conversation, interviewee #11). Also from 1999-2005 there was a large 
intervention by the government to encourage the planting of seedlings, with a follow-on 
intervention from 2008-2011. These seedling campaigns boosted production some according 
to the interviewee, but there is still a lot of old standing stock (40+ year-old trees) causing 
supply constraints (personal conversation, interviewee #11). With many farmers surveyed not 
planting seedlings within the last five years, these supply constraints will not be ameliorated 
(see section 7.2.1).  
 
The NGO view on the recent history of Ugandan coffee supply chain changes from 
liberalisation were more mixed. The Director of NGO B (interviewee #6) was most concerned 
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about how liberalisation effectively eliminated many cooperatives that were encouraged by the 
Coffee Marketing Board. The NGO director credited the government’s implementation of 
liberalisation alone with “squashing” the coops that existed before. Only recently through 
action from exporters and NGOs are cooperatives returning with strength and helping to 
improve the quality of Ugandan coffee (see section 5.5.2). NGO B’s Director also felt that the 
price support mechanism that the government via the Coffee Marketing Board put into place 
was hugely beneficial to farmers. The price floor ensured a steady income which allowed coffee 
growers to feel secure with investments in inputs and farming effort. The director felt that it 
was the low and inconsistent prices that discouraged farmers leading them to not invest in 
coffee production. This opinion was largely confirmed by the survey results on the impact of 
the divergence between a farmers’ view of a fair price compared to the current price (see 
sections 5.5.7 and 7.2.1). There was limited evidence from the coffee game at the workshop in 
Nkokonjeru to suggest farmers do indeed prefer a consistent, but possibly lower income (see 
section 6.4.1). The other NGO director (interviewee #1) thought the biggest issue after 
liberalisation was that farmers were no longer inspected and forced to maintain quality and 
plant other food crops. Although the survey found that many farmers were growing alternative 
crops and many food crops (see section 7.2.1), the interviewee thought it was better before.  
 
Exporter B’s Quality Manager (interviewee #3) felt that quality went way down after 
liberalisation for the dried coffee beans that they receive from traders with lots of defects 
entering the system. They also had more failures of the ochratoxin test, which was monitored 
in order to meet SPS requirements before export for the presence of mycotoxins. The increase 
in the failures indicated poorer handling of coffee during the drying process such that mould 
was likely growing on the drying cherries and leaving behind mycotoxins on the bean, even if 
the physical presence of the mould was removed when the bean was hulled. A typical example 
of this poor handling was observed in the survey of traders (see next section, Figure 87).  
 
Some of the benefits of liberalisation have been massive investments in processing technology 
by exporter firms. The Managing Director of Exporter B (interviewee #10) thought 
liberalisation was great for the coffee industry. It generated much-needed investment in 
primary and secondary processing to get Uganda back from behind the curve on processing 
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infrastructure post-Amin.233 Exporter B had recently put $9M USD into a processing plant in 
Mbale and that level of investment never happened pre-liberalisation (personal conversation, 
interviewee #10).  
 
Explored more in the next section, the Head of Programs from NGO B (interviewee #5) argued 
that it was the traders (or middlemen) that are killing the quality of coffee by mixing good and 
bad beans. This became easier to do after liberalisation as (1) exporters were more competitive 
and needed to compete for buying coffee volumes, and (2) the government was less strict in 
the regulation of growers. Interviewee #5 felt the government needed to intervene again and 
was nostalgic for the Coffee Marketing Board that would prohibit traders from mixing coffees. 
While cooperatives have worked to eliminate this issue, traders were still responsible for much 
of the quality issues in the supply chain. 
 
A.26.1. The difficulty of quality coffee 
Roasters have become more discerning about the choice between quality and price. The Quality 
Manager at Exporter A (interviewee #3) confirmed that buyers specify the quality, some asking 
for super clean and quality coffee, others happy for the exporter to send them whatever quality 
at a lower price. As a result, the key for an exporter to maximize profits is to be able to precisely 
sort coffee. Overall, though, interviewee #3 felt that quality requirements in markets were 
beginning to rise faster than they were accustomed to dealing with and they needed to focus 
more on marketing strategy and competiveness to keep their markets (personal conversation). 
The trend was that buyers would ask for lower prices rather than higher quality as the set point 
for quality was becoming quite high. There was a lot of good quality coffee on the market, 
which has pushed up buyers standards (personal conversation, interviewee #14). The margins 
for better coffee were also small. Screen 15 is paid at par to the London exchange price. FAQ 
is usually at around 80% of London price. Screen 18 is about +100-120 USh/kg above the 
Screen 15, par price (personal conversation, interviewee #14).  
 
When asked about the possibility of a single origin Robusta market for Ugandan exporters, the 
industry expert felt it was next to impossible (personal conversation, interviewee #14). The 
                                               
233
 Idi Amin was the infamous dictator of Uganda in the 1970s whose regime devastated the economy of the 
country and killed hundreds of thousands of citizens 
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markets are poor with little interest in Ugandan Robusta on its own since it is usually sold into 
a mass market. Additionally, the image of Robusta as a “bad” coffee constrains the ability to 
sell a single origin, quality coffee to consumers. Another constraint is the setup of the Ugandan 
coffee supply. It is difficult to bulk smallholder coffee and get a consistent specialty coffee; 
one needs big estates like those that they have in Kenya with a central processing place on-site 
(personal conversation, interviewee #14). Given the nature of the Ugandan supply chain, the 
best way to improve coffee quality is to work on aggregation and help with bulking the supply. 
The industry expert (interviewee #14) believes the best way to do so is to cut out the 
intermediaries with viable farmer groups that can bulk the coffee instead and incentivize them 
to keep coffee separated into different qualities. The farmers in the workshops had either heard 
this message or largely agreed on their own accord (see section 5.5.7).  
 
Other stakeholders still keep a part of their operation geared towards quality Robusta 
production. The Managing Director of Exporter B said that although they were doing washed 
Robusta, it was prone to quality issues. The operation was sensitive to loading of the cherries: 
if too few come in, then both water and time are wasted; and if too many come in, some may 
over-ripen and contaminate the whole lot of cherries. As soon as a batch begins to ferment too 
much, the coffee is ruined and has to be discarded. As such, it is very difficult to make the 
operation financially viable.  
 
A local entrepreneur (interviewee #19) faced similar challenges when trying to start a 
cooperative in the Nkokonjeru area to make washed Robusta. The logistics of getting all the 
cherries from farms to a central processing facility in time were just too great, and so they could 
not maintain quality consistency to keep up the business. As well, farmers felt that they were 
being cheated when the company refused to pay for green, unripe cherries, or black, dried 
cherries. There was a tremendous amount of social inertia. Growers wanted to carry on the 
practices they were accustomed to; they demanded an inflated price to justify changing to a 
new system where quality was demanded, and where poor quality was refused. 
 
While UCDA has a mandate to help farmers and improve quality, they are too understaffed 
(personal conversation, interviewee #2). For instance, there have one employee who is 
supposed to cover three districts. They also have not been identifying good export markets as 
they are mandated to do; the largest exporters (like Exporter A in the interviewee’s opinion) 
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have been doing that. The presence of multinationals having a stronger operation in Uganda 
has also made the market more competitive (see section A.25.5). Given the thin margins for 
quality coffee and the lack of government subsidy, it is also difficult for the UCDA to 
effectively incentive farmers to follow GAPs and conform to best practices.  
 
The Managing Director of Exporter B (interviewee #10) focuses on incentives when talking 
about getting growers to improve quality and yields because the MD knows it works. A 
favourite anecdote the MD shared with the author highlighted the extent to which most small 
holders respond to cash incentives that are presented to them, even when it compromises the 
quality of the crop. In the early 1980s, Côte d'Ivoire had a government guaranteed price for 
every level of production from the farm gate through the product ready for export. However, 
the price to deliver on 1st November and 1st December were the same. As a result, at the 
beginning of November, farmers harvested everything and got the guaranteed price, but once 
the beans had been processed, it was clear that they had just produced a massive amount of 
black beans at a national-scale from a perverse policy incentive. Cash-strapped farmers 
harvested everything when it was green and unripe in order to book profits as soon as they 
could. Traders passed the poor quality beans along since the price was guaranteed regardless. 
The government’s export board was stuck with the issue when no foreign importer would buy 
any of the entire national production.  
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A.27. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR COFFEE EXIT MODELS 
 
Table 83: Summary statistics for models in section 7.2.5 of Chapter 7 
VARIABLE UNITS MEAN SD MIN MAX N 
fair price factor (scalar) 1.78 0.59 0.75 5 114 
% plot in coffee (proportion) 0.37 0.22 0.033 1 119 
Num. other incomes (count) 3.33 1.49 1 8 119 
social (count) 2.78 2.20 0 7 119 
log(income) log(Ush/year) 14.06 1.07 11.47 16.30 110 
i.importance (category) 2.16 0.71 1 4 119 
volume decrease factor (scalar) 0.77 0.69 0.10 5.60 112 
coffee plot size ha 1.34 1.69 0.10 14 119 
total plot size ha 4.52 6.26 0.13 50 119 
NRC (count) 4.90 2.11 0 8 119 
 
  
436 
 
A.28. RASFF AND RAPEX BORDER REJECTIONS REVEAL RISK AT EU BORDER 
 
There are two research questions that could be addressed using EU border rejections of food 
and non-food products due to safety issues. RASFF notifications represent new cases of a 
reported health risk detected in a shipment of food or feed and rejected at any border post within 
the EU; border rejections are those consignments of products that were refused entry into the 
EU for violating regulations meant to protect human, animal, or environmental health. The 
RAPEX is a parallel system for non-food products (a closer parallel to the TBT agreement).  
 
The first research subject is that issuing SPS/TBT measures on imports is meant to mitigate 
risks associated with the import pathway back down to an appropriate level of risk for the given 
country. Previous econometric studies have looked extensively at whether SPS and TBT 
measures are trade facilitating or trade reducing (see literature in section 2.4 of Chapter 2), but 
the question of evaluating ex-post whether risks have decreased to an acceptable level has not 
been extensively analysed.  
 
Another possible research question is what factors make shipments more likely to fail 
inspections and be rejected? An interesting methodology to test the possibility of new invasive 
species coming into the UK was used by Mwebaze, Monaghan, Spence, et al. (2010) using 
interception data for fresh produce. The overarching logic behind the model is that products 
coming from new origins are more likely to contain pests previously unestablished in the 
importing country (assuming the origin country is a unique source of said pest). They test this 
for new non-indigenous insect pests in the imports of fresh produce to the UK, confirming the 
hypothesis with the interception data. Extending the scope from Mwebaze, Monaghan, Spence, 
et al. (2010), analysis could look at any food product covered in the RASFF database (as 
opposed to just fresh produce) and look at the entire EU (as opposed to just the UK). Unlike 
the data source used by Mwebaze, Monaghan, Spence, et al. (2010), RASFF only records 
interceptions and not the number of inspections. As a result, one could not consider the cost 
effectiveness of inspections.  
 
The data needs signficiant processing to be useful for analysis. As an example, the reason for 
rejecting the product is recorded in a text box without clear indicators of the issue. The author 
began to use regular expressions in STATA to develop a way to code the results. Examples of 
437 
 
the code are given below to pick specific terms out of the variable “Danger” which was the free 
text box describing the reason for rejection:  
 
/// DECIPHERING PROBLEM IN THE PRODUCT 
//aflatoxin dummy 
gen aflatox = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*aflatox*") 
replace aflatox = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*ochratox*") & aflatox==. 
 
//gmo dummy 
gen gmo = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*genetically modified.*") 
 
//residue dummy (prohibited substance) 
gen residue = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*prohibited substance*") 
 
//salmonella E coli and Bacillus cereus 
gen bact = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*E.* coli .*") 
replace bact = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*Salmonella.*") & bact==. 
replace bact = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*Bacillus cereus.*") & bact==. 
replace bact = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*plate count.*") & bact==. 
 
//insects or arachnids (mites) 
gen insects = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*insects.*") 
replace insects = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*mites.*") & insects==. 
 
//mould or spoilage, temperature control, organoleptic 
gen spoiled = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*spoil.*") 
replace spoiled = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*organoleptic.*") & spoiled==. 
replace spoiled = 1 if regexm(Danger, ".*temperature control.*") & spoiled==. 
 
Once the issues are coded more effectively, seasonal trends can be plotted as demonstrated in 
Figure 122 or by year to see how hazards at the border have changed in Figure 123. It appears 
that aflatoxins are being better controlled, but there is a rise in the amount of food arriving 
spoiled at the border.  
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Figure 122: Seasonal trends on reasons for border rejections from RASFF 
 
 
Figure 123: Hazards at the EU border by year 
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A.29. COPY OF RASFF AND RAPEX PERMISSION DOCUMENTS 
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A.30. DIFFICULTY OF MERGING RASFF PRODUCTS WITH SPS 
NOTIFICATIONS AND TRADE DATA 
 
The author first contacted the DG Sanco support office Feb 19th, 2013. A brief discussion 
revealed there was some work on developing a concordance system to merge RASFF 
notifications with trade data and SPS notifications, but it was still underdeveloped. The author 
saved the work of developing the concordance for future work.  
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